ASEAN Decision Making can be frustrating and self -defeating –Who is holding back Timor Leste’s Membership?


March 11, 2017

ASEAN Decision Making can be frustrating and self-defeating:Who is holding back Timor Leste’s Membership?

by Dr. Khoo Ying Hooi@www.newmandala.org

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Delay in admitting Timor-Leste as 11 the member  will only reflect negatively on ASEAN’s decision-making process, writes Khoo Ying Hooi.

2017 is a pivotal year for the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) as it celebrates its 50 years since its founding. Among the puzzles that need to be solved is whether Timor Leste will be formally accepted as the regional bloc’s 11th member.

As the newest country in Southeast Asia, Timor Leste and its place in the region is often overlooked.

Timor-Leste is vulnerable not only as a small and relatively young state. The fact that it has suffered an Indonesian occupation that destroyed its economy and infrastructure prior to the restoration of independence in May 2002, means it faces various post-conflict challenges, including having its voice heard in regional and international forums.

Timor-Leste expressed its desire to be part of ASEAN right after the restoration of independence in 2002. In July 2005, it became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and it signed the ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Cooperation in 2007. As outlined in its Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, Timor-Leste’s aspiration to join ASEAN is based on geographical location, the wishes of the country’s leaders and people, and its cultural affinity with its neighbours.

Timor-Leste officially applied for ASEAN membership in March 2011 during Indonesia’s chairmanship after a number of years of ASEAN observer status. An ASEAN Coordinating Council Working Group (ACCWG) was then set up and tasked to assess Timor-Leste’s readiness to be part of the regional grouping, and the implications for ASEAN if it did join. It has been almost six years now since its official application in 2011.

With its domestic challenges, some questioned Timor-Leste’s aspiration for ASEAN membership, as well as the benefits and costs of joining.  For Timor-Leste’s part, ASEAN membership is hoped to provide access to an established forum where important issues such as security, economic development and integration, and socio-cultural matters can be pursued.

Timor-Leste has indeed come a long way. The nation’s independence came at a high price. Now, the country is gradually moving from fragility to a country that is consolidating and strengthening the necessary foundations of a state. But that is not without obstacles.

In ASEAN’s 50th year, many are hoping that the Philippines will use its chairmanship to accelerate  Timor-Leste’s formal membership to  the regional bloc. Under the theme of “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World” as announced by President Rodrigo Duterte last September 2016 in Laos, it is hope that ASEAN could live up to its inspiration as a model of greater regional integration when it comes to Timor-Leste.

Timor-Leste has done everything it can to be part of ASEAN. Now, the question is not what Timor-Leste will have to accomplish to be accepted formally as ASEAN’s 11th Member State. The test now lies with ASEAN leaders, and whether they can live up to the ASEAN aspiration as lauded in the ASEAN Community.

The longer Timor-Leste’s membership is delayed will only reflect negatively on ASEAN’s decision-making process that has often being criticised. It is time to demonstrate ASEAN’s commitment to a region made prosperous through the spirit of cooperation and integration and most importantly, a people-centred organisation.

Khoo Ying Hooi (PhD) is Senior Lecturer at the Department of International and Strategic Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Malaysia.

 

The EU and ASEAN Post Brexit


January 18,2017

The EU and ASEAN Post Brexit

by Laura Allison-Reumann, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

and Philomena Murray, University of Melbourne, Australia
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The result of the UK referendum in June 2016 in favour of leaving the European Union stunned Europe and the world. In the context of the current uncertainty surrounding the negotiations between the UK government and the EU regarding Brexit, expectations and understandings of regionalism and integration will need to be reassessed.

In Asia, Britain’s exit will have far-ranging effects on how European integration is perceived and trigger reassessment of ASEAN’s own endeavours. How will ASEAN cultivate its relationship with the EU? If, in the words of the UK’s Prime Minister Theresa May, ‘Brexit means Brexit’, what does it mean for ASEAN?

The EU has always been perceived as primarily an economic entity characterised by trade and aid in its engagement with ASEAN. There is a certain persistent scepticism in Asian official circles about Europe’s approach to integration, especially regarding its pooling of sovereignty and decision-making on what are regarded as core roles of the state.

The Brexit crisis has to an extent reinforced the view that the EU is not a body to be replicated elsewhere, and that ASEAN and the EU are distinct.  But this idea has been around for quite some time in Asia.

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I want us to be a truly Global Britain – the best friend and neighbour to our European partners, but a country that reaches beyond the borders of Europe too. A country that gets out into the world to build relationships with old friends and new allies alike.–Theresa May, January 17, 2016

While some argue that the Brexit referendum result has threatened the EU’s example of regional integration, the idea that the EU was ever an archetype of integration has long been dismissed by scholars, practitioners and the general public. Brexit will likely consolidate existing perceptions in Asia about the EU — that European style integration has little relevance for ASEAN, even though there are some areas of inspiration — as opposed to triggering novel insights with regard to the nature of regionalism.

But ASEAN must remain modest. ASEAN’s differences and idiosyncrasies have been emphasised to prove that similar exits by ASEAN states are unlikely in contemporary Asia.

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But ASEAN’s unique features are not necessarily strengths. ASEAN elites must avoid the temptation to condescendingly chide the EU for perceived failings. ASEAN needs to strike a fine balance between gaining self-confidence and remaining modest so as not offend its partners.

This is because many of the concerns surrounding European regionalism are also relevant to Asia.

The UK has been an ‘awkward’ partner of the EU since it joined in 1973. So what can we learn from Brexit about difficult or reluctant member states or partners of regionalism in ASEAN?

Might Indonesia, for example, prefer to pursue its own ‘awkward’ stance within ASEAN? Or Vietnam? How might ASEAN deal with the need for public awareness and education, public trust in ASEAN as a regional organisation, issues of social and economic inclusion and the rise of nationalism? After all, nationalism is at the heart of ASEAN and featured prominently in the Brexit referendum.

For regional organisations such as ASEAN and the EU, managing the domestic temptation to treat regional bodies as scapegoats for political failures is crucial. They need to develop clear strategies in order to maintain relevance and to provide clear benefits to their citizens. The Brexit campaign was remarkable for the absence of discussion regarding the domestic benefits of EU membership. ASEAN and the EU must reconsider how they maintain a balanced narrative of both modesty regarding their achievements and confidence that regionalism brings benefits to citizens.

As Paul Taylor has pointed out, the achievements of European integration — peace, open markets and open borders — have been overlooked or taken for granted and have been replaced with concern about ‘a loss of national identity, and remote, unaccountable rulers’.

The shock of Brexit has brought all of these themes to the fore. How Asian regional bodies respond to these concerns and expectations, and how the EU–ASEAN relationship is affected by these issues will be important questions for the future.

The resort to national interests is not only a UK approach. All ASEAN members seek to protect national interests. Yet their elites have all, to date, recognised the benefits of ASEAN membership. The UK case illustrates the dangers of emphasising the cost of membership to a regional body when its national leaders do not promote or even recognise the benefits of such a grouping.

The EU will continue to advance its case for closer strategic engagement with ASEAN. It will do so without the UK. The EU’s Foreign Policy chief, Federica Mogherini, has made clear to Asian partners that the EU seeks to be more embedded in the region.

As for the UK, post-Brexit it will seek to consolidate its relations with its Asian counterparts, but from a starkly different starting point — it has not negotiated trade deals since it joined the EU in 1973, as this is an EU policy competence. Beyond ASEAN, it will have its hands full re-establishing its place in the world outside of the EU and will need to renegotiate a plethora of deals, including within the WTO. It will be a steep learning curve for the UK — and ASEAN may well wish to take advantage of this.

Laura Allison-Reumann is Research Fellow at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Philomena Murray is Jean Monnet Chair ad personam at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia.

ASEAN turns 50 this year


January 11, 2017

ASEAN turns 50 this year

by Chheang Vannarith

http://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/34015/a-milestone-year-for-asean/

This year will be a milestone for ASEAN as it celebrates its 50th anniversary in August.

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While some remarkable achievements have been made over the last 50 years, some doubts have been cast on the future relevance and resilience of this regional organization, within the context of rising global and regional uncertainty and geopolitical pressure.

Based on its track record, ASEAN will likely remain a key driver in maintaining regional peace and stability, promoting an inclusive and open regionalism, and ideally, being a role model in building a truly people-centered regional community.

ASEAN, which was created in 1967, managed to survive the Cold War, navigated through the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, gradually enlarged its membership, cultivated trust and built dialogue partnerships will all the major powers and shaped international relations norms based on the ASEAN Way, which is consultation, consensus, peaceful coexistence, sovereign equality and non-interference in domestic affairs.

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However, 2017 will be a critical year for ASEAN to prove itself as a relevant institution as the global wave of populist nationalism, protectionism and extremism wobbles liberal international systems from Europe to America.

Brexit and Donald Trump’s America are threatening the very foundations of the liberal economic order created after the end of World War II.

ASEAN leaders must reassure their people and the world that inclusive and open regionalism is the way forward.

ASEAN needs to work harder to narrow the development gaps between and within the member states, strengthen a people-oriented and people-centered ASEAN and improve regional governance. “To further address the social ills confronting our society, inclusive economic growth must be ensured,” wrote Ambassador Enrique Manalo, the Undersecretary for Policy at the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, in ASEAN Focus in December.

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As the rotating chair of ASEAN this year, Ambassador Manalo added that the Philippines aims to achieve the betterment of the lives of the ASEAN citizens through “initiatives that significantly impact on their lives; and envisions ASEAN’s greater international engagement to advance common interests.”

ASEAN needs continuous reforms to adapt and stay ahead of the curve of rising global uncertainty and unpredictability and the fast-changing geopolitics, geoeconomics, social transformation and technological revolution.

The dilemma for ASEAN lies in its non-interference principle. On the one hand, a certain agenda by its members is needed to deepen regional integration, but on the other hand ASEAN member states firmly adhere to the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference.

It is necessary for ASEAN to find a middle ground to forge regional consensus and deepen regional integration. ASEAN should not aim to become a supra-national institution, but a functioning inter-governmental organization with greater flexibility in decision-making processes.

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One of the expected outputs this year is the completion of the framework of the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, which is critical to fostering ASEAN’s unity and centrality and deepening relations between ASEAN and China.

The realization of the COC will prove that ASEAN and China can work together in the spirit of friendship and partnership to manage and resolve their differences on a bilateral and multilateral basis. The ASEAN Charter adopted in 2007 is a benchmark of envisaging a rules-based ASEAN. But it needs to be reviewed to reflect the new realities of ASEAN and the region.

ASEAN needs to emphasize “putting ASEAN people first.” Some principles of the charter have not been effectively implemented or neglected by some ASEAN member states, particularly with regards to human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms, good governance and the rule of law.

So ASEAN needs to have a more effective enforcement or compliance mechanism. Some elements that need revision are the reduction of the annual ASEAN summit meetings from twice to once, the endorsement of an ASEAN human rights body with specific tasks and responsibilities, adding “people-centered” to “people-oriented” and consensus-based decision-making.

The failure of ASEAN to reach a consensus in dealing with the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict in 2008 and 2011 and the failure of the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh to issue a joint statement in 2012, due to differences over the South China Sea issue, present an urgency for ASEAN leaders to revise ASEAN’s decision-making mechanism.

The ASEAN Minus X formula needs to be adopted where consensus cannot be reached, particularly with regards to complex and sensitive issues.

Flexible decision-making mechanisms will provide room for ASEAN to react and respond more effectively and efficiently to emerging regional issues and challenges of common concern.

Bilateral and Regional Implications of the U.S.-Philippine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement


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Number 365 | December 21, 2016

ANALYSIS

Bilateral and Regional Implications of the U.S.-Philippine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement

By Renato De Castro

On April 28, 2014, then Philippine Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Philip Goldberg signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) a few hours before President Barack Obama’s arrival in the Philippines. The signing of the EDCA sent a strong diplomatic signal to Beijing that it would have to take account of an American military presence in the Philippines if it chose to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea. More significantly, a rotational U.S. military presence was expected to strengthen the Philippines’ determination to uphold its territorial claims vis-à-vis China in the South China Sea dispute backed by American resolve and credibility to honor its defense commitment to the Philippines.

 The 21st Century Philippine-U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)

This is not a new security treaty; it is merely an updated version of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. This executive agreement serves as a framework by which the Philippines and the U.S. can develop their individual and collective defense capabilities. This goal is accomplished through the rotational deployment of American forces in Philippine bases. Although the EDCA allows American forces to utilize facilities owned and controlled by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine base commander has unrestricted access to these locations. Likewise, American-built or American-improved infrastructure inside these installations can be used by the AFP. Furthermore, any construction and other activities within the Philippine bases require the consent of the host country through the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) and Security Engagement Board (SEB). More importantly, the EDCA is designed to minimize domestic opposition to U.S. military presence in the country by explicitly affirming Philippine sovereignty and providing a legal framework for increased American rotational presence rather than the re-establishment of permanent bases, which remains a sensitive issue among Filipinos.

The EDCA also proved advantageous to the AFP. With its small and obsolete naval force and an almost non-existent air force, the Philippine military benefits from the regular and short-term visits of U.S. forces that conduct military training as well as humanitarian and disaster response operations. Logistically, the U.S. construction of vital military facilities, infrastructure upgrades (such as hangers, air defense surveillance radar systems, ground based air defense systems, and naval operating bases), and the storage and prepositioning of defense equipment in agreed locations can lower the cost of the force and training modernization programs since the buildings and equipment can be shared and utilized jointly by American and Philippine Armed Forces.

The implementation of EDCA augurs well for the Philippine military. Philippines Air Force (PAF) fighter pilots can train with their American counter-parts at the five airbases that are part of the agreement. The PAF can also use facilities that American forces will improve or build inside its facilities. In addition, the Obama Administration has requested US$50 million from the U.S. Congress to fund the Maritime Security Initiative in Southeast Asia. The lion’s share of the funds in the first year will go to the AFP’s capability building program. It is expected that there will be allocations for the purchase of equipment to monitor activities and movements in the South China Sea.

Regional Security Implications

During the Sixth Annual Bilateral Security Dialogue (BSD) between the U.S. and the Philippines in Washington D.C. on March 18, 2016, it was announced that American forces will be allowed access to the following AFP bases: Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan; Basa Air Base and Fort Magsaysay in Luzon; Lumbia Air Base in northern Mindanao; and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu.

With EDCA’s implementation, the United States enhances the rotational presence of its forward-deployed forces, improves existing facilities, and pre-positions supplies and equipment in five agreed-upon locations. In the long-term, the effects of EDCA will go beyond the modernization of the Philippines’ military and increased inter-operability between the armed forces of the two allies. The EDCA will have two far-reaching strategic/diplomatic implications. First, a rotational U.S. military presence will strengthen the Philippines’ resolve to uphold its territorial claims in the South China Sea and test American credibility in honoring its defense commitment to the country. Second, the use of air and naval infrastructure in the Philippines will facilitate a rapid and massive deployment of American forces in case armed clashes erupt in potential flash points such as the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and in the Taiwan Strait.

Since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the USAF has sought arrangements for the rotational deployments of its aircraft and personnel in the Philippines. This arrangement entails infrastructural improvements to keep facilities “warm,” enabling the rapid start of operations in the event of a crisis. American access to the aforementioned five operationally flexible Philippine bases addresses this need. It also thwarts China’s plan of preventing U.S. forces from operating in the disputed South China Sea.

Conclusion

Currently, there is small unit of USAF aircraft and personnel deployed in the Philippines.  Only time will tell whether this small USAF formation will become an effective forward-deployed force that can deter China’s expansion in the South China Sea. This will depend largely on how President Rodrigo Duterte would tolerate China’s expansion into the Philippines’ maritime domain, and the importance of his country’s long-standing alliance with the U.S. Recently, however, President Duterte has expressed critical comments toward the alliance. He announced that he wants the withdrawal of 107 American troops from Mindanao, saying that he was only maintaining them against possible attacks by Muslim militants. He declared that the Philippines would stop patrolling the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea with the U.S. Navy to avoid provoking China. In early October, he also announced that the U.S.-Philippine Philbex joint amphibious exercise would be the last during his four-year term.

On November 7, 2016, despite his earlier rhetoric against the U.S. and the alliance, President Duterte suddenly gave his consent for the conduct of a joint U.S.-Philippine military exercise and for the implementation of the EDCA. His decision to continue joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises and to implement the EDCA will be conveyed to the MDB later this month. However, it is still too early to guess President Duterte’s future executive decisions toward the implementation of the EDCA in particular, and the alliance in general. The AFP’s recommendations to conduct joint exercises between U.S. and Philippine forces and the implementation of EDCA will not only affect Philippine national security interests but also the regional balance of power.

About the Author

Dr. Renato Cruz De Castro is a professor (on sabbatical leave) in the International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, and holds the Charles Lui Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies.  He is currently the U.S.-ASEAN Fulbright Initiative Researcher from the Philippines based in the East-West Center in Washington, D.C. He can be contacted at renato.dccastro@dlsu.edu.p

The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue.

Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options.

The Asia Pacific Bulletin (APB) series is produced by the East-West Center in Washington.

APB Series Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye, Director, East-West Center in Washington
APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente, Project Assistant, East-West Center in Washington

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with which the author is affiliated.

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Malaysia-China Relations: A New Turn? – Analysis


November 25, 2016

 

Malaysia-China Relations: A New Turn? – Analysis

Malaysia’s Najib Razak. Photo by Malaysian government, Wikipedia Commons.

Malaysia’s perceptible tilt towards China especially in economic relations reflects Malaysia’s foreign policy of hedging major power influence in the region and globally. While it seeks closer ties with China, it does not imply that Malaysia is shifting away from the US.

By Johan Saravanamuttu and David Han Guo Xiong*

Since Najib Razak assumed the premiership of Malaysia in 2009 China has featured significantly in his foreign policy. It was Najib’s father Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia’s second prime minister, who was the first leader in Southeast Asia to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic in 1974.

That said, Malaysia’s foreign policy has been one of hedging against major powers in the region and globally. While Malaysia has shown great awareness of China’s rise and importance in the Asia Pacific region, it remains highly cognisant of the political and economic role of the United States in the region.

Malaysia’s Perceptible Tilt Towards China

Thus, Malaysia is among the 12 countries that have signed the US-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement in Auckland, New Zealand, on 5 February 2016. The TPP is interpreted by some observers to be a crucial pillar of US rebalancing in the Asia Pacific to check China’s rising political and economic influence.

However, it is uncertain whether the US would commit to the TPP after the Obama administration. Thus, seemingly as a hedge to the signing of the TPP, the Malaysian parliament approved on 20 October participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) — thought to be China’s brainchild — just prior to the Malaysian premier’s seventh state visit to China this week.

Recent developments in Malaysia demonstrate a perceptible tilt towards China, particularly in economic relations. When President Xi Jinping unveiled China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road or “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) strategy some three years ago, Malaysia welcomed the initiative and has remained very enthusiastic about it.

On 3 September 2016, the Malaysian Minister of Transport, Liow Tiong Lai (concurrently President of the political party Malaysian Chinese Association, MCA) extolled the virtues of OBOR in a Malaysia-China Business Dialogue event in Kuala Lumpur. Liow suggested that Malaysia could be “China’s gateway to ASEAN” and a crucial link to the 65 OBOR countries across Asia, Europe and Africa.

Impact of New Posture

This new Malaysian posture has come together with concrete developments in Malaysia-China relations. Malaysia is currently China’s largest trading partner in ASEAN with total trade of some US$100 billion expecting to reach $160 billion by 2017. China has also recently become the largest direct foreign investor in Malaysia, overtaking Singapore, Japan, Netherlands and the US, through buying assets in Malaysia’s troubled 1MDB.

These multi-billion assets bought from the Malaysian national fund include Edra Global Energy sold to China General Nuclear Power Corp for $2.3billion and a 60 percent stake in Bandar Malaysia, 1MDB’s flagship 197-hectare property site in Kuala Lumpur, at a price tag of $1.7 billion to China Railway Construction Corp. The China railway corporation is also thought to be in pole position to undertake the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore high-speed railway worth some $16.6 billion.

More interestingly, in keeping with its OBOR policy, China has been deeply involved in the rebuilding and refurbishing of sea ports in Malaysia. According to Transport Minister Liow, Malaysia’s has signed a “port alliance” with China linking six of Malaysia’s ports to 11 of China’s. Currently, China is helping Malaysia to rebuild and expand port services at Klang, Malacca and Carey Island in the Straits of Malacca and Kuantan on the South China Sea. Some 70 to 80 percent of the ships passing through the Straits of Malacca are said to originate from China.

Kuantan on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula would be of great importance to Chinese maritime trade as well. Liow said his ministry is therefore encouraging China to participate in port construction across 120 kilometers of the Malacca Straits. According to Liow, the port alliance with China would help develop shipping, logistics and other related industries to augment the $1 trillion worth of OBOR trade.

Ramifications for Malaysia

There are three ramifications of Malaysia’s embrace of OBOR. Firstly, OBOR, which is partly funded by the AIIB, would help China to further expand its prominence in Southeast Asia. It is expected that through the OBOR, Malaysia would be a key node for China to access the ASEAN market. China’s increased economic prominence through OBOR and the AIIB could improve China’s image among ASEAN countries as a major player in boosting the economies of Southeast Asia.

The strengthening of economic ties between ASEAN and China would obviate potential conflict, and enhance the benefit for ASEAN and China to work closely together economically.

Secondly, Malaysia’s perceptible tilt towards China in the OBOR venture could be a nudge to the US to maintain its current commitment to Southeast Asia. If the US, under its new President, reneges on its commitment to TPP, this would be a setback for Malaysia as the TPP has the potential to enhance Malaysia-US economic ties.

Thus, Malaysia’s favourable tilt towards China and OBOR could help to cushion some of the negative fallout of such a scenario. It could also be a signal to the next US President that America risks losing the support of its friends to China if the US does not continue its economic rebalancing role in Asia.

Thirdly, domestically, strengthening economic growth would be advantageous to Najib’s administration. Due to domestic political challenges having a strong economic performance would enhance the legitimacy of Najib’s government. The economic benefits of OBOR would play a vital role in buttressing Najib’s regime.

Najib’s recent visit to China  will improve bilateral ties significantly with OBOR featuring prominently in this development. This does not however imply that Malaysia is coming under China’s sway while shifting away from the US.

Drawing closer towards China economically is a pragmatic move by the Malaysian government to expand its economic space and boost economic growth. Provided the US continues its commitments to Southeast Asia Malaysia will also seek to build up ties with the US for regional peace and development.

*Johan Saravanamuttu, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, was previously professor of political science at Science University of Malaysia (USM). David Han is a Research Analyst with the Malaysia Programme at RSIS.

Indonesia: Reassessing ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ (Poros Maritim Dunia)


September 7, 2016

Indonesia: Reassessing  ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ (Poros Maritim Dunia)