The United Nations Association of Malaysia(UNAM) fully endorses and supports the statement issued on February 25th by the Chairman of SUHAKAM, Tan Sri Razali Ismail on the uncalled for, intemperate and controversial statement by YB Dato Sri Nazri AbdulB Dato Sri Nazri Abdul Aziz, Secretary General of Barisan Nasional.


February 27, 2019

The United Nations Association of Malaysia(UNAM) fully endorses and supports the statement issued on February 25th by the Chairman of SUHAKAM, Tan Sri Razali Ismail on the uncalled for, intemperate and controversial statement by YB Dato Sri Nazri AbdulB Dato Sri Nazri Abdul Aziz, Secretary General of Barisan Nasional.

 

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The United Nations Association of Malaysia(UNAM) fully endorses and supports the statement issued on February 25th by the Chairman of SUHAKAM, Tan Sri Razali Ismail on the uncalled for, intemperate and controversial statement by YB Dato’ Sri Nazri had insinuated that the current incumbents in the positions of the Honourable Chief Justice, the Attorney General and the Minister of Finance in Malaysia were inappropriate persons to hold these offices on account of their ethnic or religious affinity. It has also been reported that there was some adverse reference by Dato Sri Nazri to vernacular schools which have been operating in the country for more than a century.

It is UNAM’s position that it is downright dishonest and disappointing to suggest that particular individuals are unsuited to hold certain positions of authority on account of their ethnic or religious affinity. This goes against the grain of the carefully crafted policy of the Malaysian Government since the early 1970s to work towards the elimination of the identification of race with certain occupations.

UNAM appreciates the efforts by successive Prime Ministers of Malaysia to manage the administration of inter-ethnic and inter religious relations in a rather complex situation in a carefully planned and sensitive way. This issue is largely the legacy of a protracted Divide-and-Rule policy and practice of a colonial power and is partly conditioned by the need for national unity and harmony.

Malaysia’s rich diversity and dynamism is remarkable. It is a source of strength for our country and has safeguarded the peace, harmony and growth aspirations of the people.

The President of UNAM YM Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen wishes to draw attention to Goal 16 of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals in particular which clearly stipulates, inter alia, that Malaysia as a staunch supporter of the UN system is obliged to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”

It is the responsibility of all Malaysians to safeguard the peace and harmony in our nation.

To Lose or Not to Lose: Cambodia’s Dilemma over its EBA Status


February 27, 2019

To Lose or Not to Lose: Cambodia’s Dilemma over its EBA Status

By Kimkong Heng

 

http://www.ippreview.com

https://dinmerican.wordpress.com/2019/02/27/to-lose-or-not-to-lose-cambodias-dilemma-over-its-eba-status/

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William Shakespeare’s famous quote, “to be or not to be, that is the question”, can now be applied to what is happening in Cambodia, but with a twist. As the country is now negotiating with the European Union (EU) regarding the latter’s wish to strip off its Everything But Arms (EBA) trade preferences from the former, we can see the relevance of Shakespeare’s well known line and we can say “to lose or not to lose, that is a Cambodian dilemma”.

After the EU threatened to remove its preferential trade deal in response to Phnom Penh’s perceived lack of commitment to improve its democracy and human rights situation, the country now faces a dilemma. On one side, Cambodia has to satisfy the demands of the EU, which may eventually result in the reinstatement of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), dissolved by the Cambodian Supreme Court in 2017. This is a dilemma on the part of the incumbent Cambodian government because, as the results of the 2013 national election and 2017 local elections showed, the CNRP could be a threat to the domination of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) of Prime Minister Hun Sen. Dissolving the opposition before the election is clearly a win-win strategy that the CPP employed to secure victory. Reinstating it is certainly not part of the government’s agenda.

On the other side of the dilemma, Cambodia is facing a potential loss of its EBA status after the EU began a procedure to withdraw its trade preferences from the Kingdom in October 2018. Under the EBA scheme, Cambodia being one of the world’s least developed countries is granted with duty-free access to the European market. In 2017 Cambodia’s exports to the EU were valued at 5 billion euros (US$5.8 billion), making Europe the largest export market of Cambodia. The garment and footwear industries, which account for 40 percent of Cambodia’s GDP and employ about 800,000 Cambodian workers, rely to a great extent on tariff-free exports to Europe. Losing the EBA preferences would adversely impact the whole industry which is vital to Cambodia’s economy and has been considered as a sector too big to fail.

Thus, Cambodia is apparently in a dilemma over how to tackle the EBA issue. To continue benefiting from the EU trade preferences, the CPP-led government has to consider bringing back the dissolved opposition, a move Hun Sen and his ruling elites have tried to avoid. However, if Hun Sen’s government refuses to give in to the EU’s human rights demands, it will risk losing the EBA status, the consequences of which may be severe for Cambodia’s economic growth. As it stands, it is no longer a win-win scenario for the Cambodian government. It is a dilemma between sustaining robust economic growth and maintaining political dominance, both of which are critical to the incumbent government’s legitimacy.

Cambodia’s responses to the EU’s potential economic sanctions have been contradictory, perhaps reflecting this dilemma. As David Hutt aptly noted, the Cambodian government’s response to the EBA issue “has oscillated between victimhood and vainglory, between saying Cambodia’s economy won’t be too badly affected by the EBA’s withdrawal and saying that if the EU goes ahead with its threat, it will destroy of livelihoods of millions of Cambodians, mostly the poor”.

The inconsistency in the government’s response may explain the dilemma confronting Hun Sen and the CPP elites. Clearly the Cambodian government understands the potential negative effects that the loss of the EBA scheme may have on the lucrative garment sector that has contributed to Cambodia’s economic growth and directly benefited almost a million garment workers, not to mention the cumulative impact on their extended family. The promulgation by the government that losing the EBA preferences won’t affect Cambodia is far from convincing. How can losing tariff-free export ability not affect the economy that benefits from tariff-free exports? It is not so difficult to comprehend.

After the EU announcement regarding the EBA withdrawal, there have been strong reactions by the Cambodian government and a series of analyses in the media about the EU’s double standards in its treatment of Cambodia. The Cambodian government has called the EU’s EBA threat an extreme injustice and a prejudicial decision. Hun Sen has warned of the death of the opposition and has been reported saying that the EU’s withdrawal of its trade preferences may become the West’s third mistake in dealing with Cambodia.

While Cambodia is facing a dilemma and may easily look to China for support, the EU should probably understand the potential repercussions of its decision.

However, lingering uncertainty regarding the eventual outcome of the EBA withdrawal, coupled with the EU’s recent announcement to implement protectionist tariffs on Cambodia’s rice exports, has worried investors and business leaders in Cambodia. In late January 2019, 40 signatory leaders of industry associations who represent the Cambodian economic community released a joint statement to the EU Trade Commissioner to express their deep concerns with respect to the potential imposition of tariffs and withdrawal of the EBA scheme. The statement appealed to the European Commission and the European member states to continue to support Cambodia by “refraining from taking any action that will harm the interests and livelihoods of the country’s [Cambodia] people”. The EU has not officially responded to the appeal but seems to proceed with its formal procedure to withdraw the EBA benefits from Cambodia; nevertheless, according to the EU, the channels of dialogue to resolve the difference are still kept open.

Although it remains to be seen how this EBA issue will unfold, Cambodia’s recent response to the EU’s calls does not seem to be effective and satisfy the EU’s demands. The Cambodian government has viewed the EU’s dealing with Cambodia as an injustice and a threat to Cambodia’s sovereignty and independence. Complying with the EU requirements, in the Cambodian ruling elites’ view, is like allowing foreign countries or entities to interfere with Cambodian politics or domestic affairs. Cambodia cannot trade its sovereignty, independence, and peace for economic assistance.

Such a line of thinking is applaudable and is well-received by Cambodians, but as has been spelled out in a recent article, “EBA is not a trade pact open to negotiations – it is a trade preference gifted to financially impoverished countries and designed to encourage democratic and social reforms more attuned with European standards”. Therefore, it seems appropriate when the EU demands improvements to the human rights situation in Cambodia. If Cambodia wishes to remain part of this preferential scheme, it has to meet the conditions laid out by the EU with regard to the trade preferences. Cambodia does not have “inherent right to be part of the EBA scheme”.

Despite the dilemma, Cambodia seems to have a choice which, analyzed based on recent political developments, requires it to choose between losing the EBA status or improving the human and political rights situation in the country, perceived to be deteriorating. If no concrete measures are taken to salvage the current situation, losing the EBA benefits would be a high possibility. Cambodia apparently cannot continue to enjoy the duty-free access to the EU market while ignoring the EU’s demands for better human rights and democracy. The aim of EBA preferences is to contribute to the economic development of the world’s poorest countries; however, the preferential scheme does come with conditions that have to be fulfilled by beneficiary countries.

Based on the current development, the EU’s intention to withdraw its special trade preferences granted to Cambodia does have implications for the relationship between the two sides. In the Cambodian government’s words, the EU decision to suspend the EBA preferences would “nullify the enormous positive impact of the European policy from which Cambodia has benefited so far”. The EU measures would also very likely propel Cambodia into a closer embrace of China, its largest aid donor and foreign investor.

Thus, while Cambodia is facing a dilemma and may easily look to China for support, the EU should probably understand the potential repercussions of its decision. Both sides need to bring the issue to the discussion table and continue to keep the path of dialogue open. The way forward, as the EU has suggested, is through dialogue and negotiation. The EU, however, should try harder to understand Cambodia’s difficulty and situation, while Cambodia has to keep an open mind and try to understand the underlying intention of the EU actions with trust and willingness. Going to the discussion table with suspicion, distrust, and accusation is not a viable option, but it only helps to exacerbate the precarious situation.

 

Malay uber alles, above everybody else


December 27, 2019

Malay uber alles, above everybody else

Opinion
by  S. Thayaparan

 

COMMENT | After Harapan won the last election, I assumed we had some breathing space.

“So I urge young Malays to plan their lives properly. Don’t make the same mistake I did. Malaysia is a sick Muslim country that teaches you the wrong things.”

– Zaid Ibrahim

The recent comments by BN secretary-general Nazri Abdul Aziz on the Semenyih campaign trail about the racist inclination of the UMNO grassroots on their fear of non-Malays leading certain ministerial portfolios is neither shocking nor unexpected.

All this is part of the Malay über alles strategy of the far right and the foundation of mainstream Malay politics. Non-Malay political operatives in Pakatan Harapan, now that the coalition has achieved federal power, have to be careful about how they define their power because everyone has been told not to spook the Malays.

Furthermore, because Bersatu was not the powerhouse Malay bloc that Harapan had hoped for, the old maverick has had to resort to all sorts of stratagems to entice UMNOmno political operatives to step into his tent.

All this, of course, plays into the hands of UMNO and PAS who can now freely explore their racial and supremacist ideologies without fear of losing their non-Malay base because the MCA and MIC are out of play.

Two years ago, former minister Zaid Ibrahim, encouraged young Malays to leave this country because of the policies of BN. This, of course, caused a stir. As always, whenever Zaid says something, he does so without political consideration. He spits it out because he knows that outlier Malay voices think this way.

There were the usual calls to stay and fight by those in the intelligentsia who supported the then opposition Harapan. I was sceptical. In a piece exploring what Zaid actually said – there is always confusion because some pundits do not bother to refer to what he said, instead relying on what others claim he said – I wrote:

“If you want people to stay and fight for their rights, you must be able to demonstrate that staying and fighting is something that is worthwhile. We are not yet at the stage where you can point to incremental changes (elsewhere) and say that this is progress. We are a developed country with narratives that are evidence that religious and racial plurality is something we had, but lost like many Islamic state narratives in countries all over the Middle East.”

After Harapan won the last election, I assumed we had some breathing space. To my thinking and I suppose some people who voted for Harapan, we believed that if we begin the process – however incrementally – of dismantling the Malay uber alles ideology, we could at least set the foundation for a brighter tomorrow for future generations. This kind of thinking is not based on any idealist impulses. This is pure self-preservation. People sometimes confuse capitulation with pragmatism.

But as the days drag on, I see very little hope or evidence that things are going to change. While I received the usual hate mail for my last piece from the usual suspects, I received many emails from Malays overseas, who claimed that what Zaid two years ago was the right thing to do.

Many young Malays ask me how they can overcome a system which is against them, but which people think provides privileges for them? Zaid said it best: “They will continue to make you intellectually poor by stifling you, giving you no freedom to grow and develop your minds.”

As one young Malay activist told me, there is this bubble we exist in. There is some freedom in the political/activist circles, but it slowly evaporates depending on where you go. Non-Malays, although they face discrimination, do not have to look over their shoulder all the time in case they are targeted by the religious bureaucracy or they are sanctioned for making racially provocative statements which are in reality egalitarian statements.

Assimilation

Umno political operatives make an argument about how “immigrants” assimilate in the West “Western” culture and norms, so why can’t the non-Malays do it here too? This is a silly argument because assimilation of Western culture generally means assimilating democratic and egalitarian norms and not sublimating culture to Islam and racial hegemony which is what is expected of the non-Malays here.

Please note, I am not saying that the “West” is perfect, only that assimilation in the West means submitting to a whole different set of values which are more aligned to democratic first principles, rather than being pak turuts (yes-men) which is how someone like PAS leader Abdul Hadi Awang and the rest of the Malay political elite sees the non-Malays. Are there extremists in the West pushing a right-wing Judeo/Christian agenda? Yes, but we should note the blow-back this agenda receives.

Say what you like about Nazri, but he is saying exactly what the Malay grassroots believe, and keep in mind this is the base that Bersatu and other Malay power structures in Harapan want.

How can you change this sort of thinking? How long will it take? A generation? Two generations? The non-Malays are losing the numbers game and in a couple of decades, will there be any young Malays who would even think of migrating because of a totalitarian government?

People often ask what can they do. I have no idea. I cannot point to alternatives in mainstream political parties. Young people who have left the country and who correspond with me, tell me the same thing. There are no mainstream alternatives in the Malaysian political landscape. One Malay power structure is the same as the next.

Lawyer Latheefa Koya correctly points out that Nazri’s comments are an insult to Malays, but so is claiming Malays need a party to defend them, that Islam needs to be protected, the Malays are under siege and the DAP is working to destroy Malay rule in Malaysia.

If Nazri is being investigated for sedition, then perhaps, the mainstream political system in Malaysia is seditious.


S THAYAPARAN is Commander (Rtd) of the Royal Malaysian Navy. A retired barrister-at-law, he is one of the founding members of the National Patriots Association.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.

Weaker political parties in Semenyih by-election


February 26, 2019

Weaker political parties in Semenyih by-election

Opinion  | by Dr. Bridget Welsh

 

COMMENT | The French statesman Charles de Gaulle once said: ‘Politics is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians.’

This could also be said of the Semenyih by-election – where 54,000 largely urban voters face the serious decision of whether to endorse Pakatan Harapan, return BN to the seat it has never lost before GE14 or choose another path, including not to vote at all.

Despite growing cynicism about politicians in Malaysia (and sadly there is a good reason for some of this cynicism), the choice of the Semenyih voters will matter.

This by-election will not affect the balance of power in Selangor state. However, the campaign and outcome will serve to further consolidate new Malaysia’s political battle lines and potentially constrain the prospects for reform.

A Harapan loss in Semenyih will have a derailing effect on the governing coalition, already weakened by its loss in Cameron Highlands, and embolden the BN coalition that is in desperate search of an afterlife.

Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM) and the independent candidate will have an uphill battle breaking the mould of the competition between the two larger coalitions, but they will serve to raise important social welfare issues and mobilise anger against Harapan, which goes into this contest in weakness rather than strength.

Drawing from polling station analysis of GE14, this article addresses some of the issues facing the political parties in this by-election and argues that there is a growing disconnect with the electorate.

Testing UMMNO Myths

Now, six by-elections since May 2018, the post-GE14 political terrain has increasingly featured practices of the past. Stoking Malay chauvinism has topped the list, with BN capitalising on insecurity and fear. Voters are being called to ‘protect your race and religion’.

This call rests on the myth that UMNO was indeed their ‘protector.’ Given the shambles that UMN0 left the country’s finances in, the damage to Malaysia’s reputation and the hardships and inequalities experienced by many Malays across the country, this message hopes to build on the adage that ‘Malays forget easily’ – the predatory behaviour of the Najib (Abdul Razak) government.

It also ignores that conditions within UMNO are dire; Strained by lack of access to funds, with its leaders facing multiple criminal charges and its legal future in the balance, Umno, as a party, is not in a position to deliver to its base. Its current focus is on saving its leaders. The use of “Bossku” as a campaign message is illustrative, as winning the by-election is about Najib’s search for protection, rather than the Malay community at large.

The other myth that is being projected is that Malays are united; they are one group. Semenyih in GE14 showcased what seems to be have been forgotten, that the Malay vote is sharply divided. My analysis of Semenyih’s polling station results found that the estimated support along Malay votes was split three ways, with Umno and Bersatu essentially capturing the same share, 41 percent and 37 percent respectively.

Bersatu’s share of the Malay voters in Semenyih was 15 percent more than the national average for Harapan, in keeping with patterns in urban areas, where more Malays from educated and middle-class backgrounds reside.

To push Malays into one group, to characterise their differences, is not only wrong, but it disregards the political diversity of the community as a whole – a lesson that UMNO ignored to its own peril.

PAS’ political polygamy

This racialised prioritisation of the Malay vote has contributed to the wheeling and dealing for the estimated 22 percent of Malay support that PAS won in Semenyih. Bersatu and Umno both want this support. Few recognise that much of this vote was never for PAS in the first place, as it represented ‘protest’ against Umno, rather than a vote for the Islamist party.

This hasn’t stopped the deal-making. Bersatu is especially focused on winning ‘Malay votes’ with the aim to address the ‘deficit’ of support for it from the Malay community. PAS, on its part, is claiming that is will work with all Malay political parties, apparently willing to engage in political polygamy irrespective of the party involved for the marriage of its interests. This accounts for the improved relations and ratcheting down of criticism between Bersatu/Mahathir and PAS.

PAS is trying to have its cake and eat it too – namely to work with Umno when expedient (as was the case in Cameron Highlands) and to work with Bersatu/Mahathir (to curry favour for national support as appears to be the case in Semenyih). PAS is playing a political game, working to make itself relevant in the national landscape.

PAS’ polygamous engagement is compromising the party, as it is becoming more like UMNO. Not only is PAS collaborating with Umno, but it is also increasingly adopting many of its practices as well – money politics, denial, racialised rhetoric, and of late, the active promotion of division within Harapan through deflective storytelling.

They justify these actions with the mantra that the ends (Syariah law) justify the means. Yet, this outcome is that PAS is being damaged along the way and a broader cynicism with political parties as a whole, is setting in. Political deals are eroding trust between the party leadership and the grassroots.

This is exacerbating other trends of weakening political parties. The machinery of the member-based parties of Umno and PAS are not functioning as well as the past – not least of which is the product of being out of power and lacking resources.

Rather than address the underlying problems the parties face, race-based rhetoric and deals have become the easy options. These options do little to win long-term party loyalty from voters.

Pakatan’s own conflicted national engagement

Harapan political parties are also facing their own tensions. Bersatu’s obsession with the Malay vote reinforces the sense that Harapan is focused on race rather than Malaysia as a whole.

This can have political consequences in Semenyih. Given the multi-ethnic configuration of the state seat and political divisions within the Malay community, the by-election will be shaped as much about Malays as is it about other communities. A decisive third of the electorate is non-Malay.

Semenyih is perhaps the biggest test to date on whether Harapan can maintain non-Malay support in the urban areas, which was critical for putting the new government into office. It tests whether Harapan can project itself across the racial communities, rather than pandering to individual groups. An indication of this will be whether voters go to the polls at all. It will be difficult to maintain the high levels of turnout, which were pivotal for Harapan’s 2018 general election victory.

Semenyih also brings to the fore, assumptions about how parties should function in ‘new Malaysia’. Many in Harapan assume that voters will support the party in power for patronage advantage. This is especially true of Bersatu. This ‘contract’- supporting party is caught in a difficult bind. It does not have the patronage machinery on par with that of Umno.

 

Bersatu has not fully recognised that it (and its coalition partners) will never have the same scope of patronage infrastructure. Further, it does not fully appreciate that this tactic tied to distributing goodies and use of state power for political aims is what got UMNO into trouble in the first place. The tie between politics and greed runs deep. The reality is that patronage has long eroded in urbanised Selangor, especially among younger voters. Umno lost Semenyih in GE14 because it failed to appreciate the realities of non-patronage based urban politics.

Urban voters care predominantly about good governance. Corruption is of concern, but not as important as having a decent paid job, quality service provision and maintaining a good standard of living for families. Among urban voters, Najib lost power for rising inflation and contractions in opportunities in the face of the ostentatious spending tied to the 1MDB scandal.

Harapan has the challenge of convincing voters that it can offer a better government. Key in this regard will be its record in Selangor since 2008 and what the advantages of having national power are for improving governance at the state level. Harapan has been so focused on building a new federal patronage machine that it has forgotten it already has a record at the state level to strengthen.

A particularly important group in the Semenyih electorate concerned with governance is youth. The youth were Harapan’s support base in Semenyih. Bersatu captured the votes of 57 percent of those under 30, and the majority of voters under 50. Umno did not even win a third of the younger voters.

These voters want results, especially on the economy, as bread and butter issues are much more important to these voters than religion. The more impatient young voters want to see what Harapan will do for their future. Nearly half of the registered electorate, 43 percent, is under 40.

Since BN won the Cameron Highlands by-election, Harapan has been attempting to somewhat change its public engagement. There are differences in the coalition itself on what to emphasise – patronage or policies. Nevertheless, the Semenyih campaign has seen more substantive engagement with policy issues than those in earlier by-elections.

There has been a flurry of announcements of new programmes, health insurance, for example, and a new framework for highway tolls. It is not clear whether these measures are tied to the election or part of a broader set of programmes. The new Harapan measures are controversial, untested and have yet to be properly implemented.

However, Harapan’s initiatives are buried under the political noise of political infighting and its mixed performance record to date. It remains to be seen whether the steps toward improving governance will get a fair hearing.

The fact is that all of the political parties are facing an erosion of political trust. Much of this weakening is of their own making. Semenyih voters will ultimately have to decide which of these weaker political parties offer the strongest alternative, in spite of their weaknesses.


DR. BRIDGET WELSH is an associate professor of political science at John Cabot University in Rome. She also continues to be a senior associate research fellow at the National Taiwan University’s Center for East Asia Democratic Studies and The Habibie Center, as well as a university fellow of Charles Darwin University. Her latest book is the post-election edition of ‘The end of Umno? Essays on Malaysia’s former dominant party’. She can be reached at bridgetwelsh1@gmail.com.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.