The Guardian view on Trump at the UN: Bluster and Belligerence


September 21, 2017

The Guardian view on Trump at the UN:  Bluster and Belligerence

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The US President is wrong to think that nations acting in their own self-interest would on their own create a more stable world. Countries need to work together under rules to which they agree to adhere.

Whatever its difficulties, the United Nations must surely be cherished. Founded in 1945 under US leadership after the defeat of Nazism and imperial Japan, the UN remains the central pillar of the global order.

At its core has stood the ambition that peace, international security and human rights would be better protected than they were by the 1930s League of Nations (whose founding treaty the US Senate refused to ratify). The UN is the only existing forum where the representatives of all nation states can be brought together to try to address crises and common challenges.

Donald Trump’s first address to the organisation’s annual general assembly was anticipated with dread by many – and rightly so. This US president is after all the first in history to have made heaping scorn on the UN something of a pastime. His views on the subject have ranged from crude hostility to abject ignorance. The speech he delivered was scripted – not the ramblings of a maverick whose taste for rash tweets and cheap provocations have become an almost daily routine. It was deeply worrying all the same. Unlike his eloquent predecessor, President Trump trades in crass belligerence. His speech will be remembered for its ominous language.

Threats and grandstanding are just bluster, not policy. Crises require a deftness the Trump Administration has failed to demonstrate. He wants allies to back him, but seems oblivious that his lack of personal credibility is an obstacle to international cooperation. An “America First” approach runs counter to the UN’s multilateralism.-The Guardian

On North Korea he mocked its young leader Kim Jong-un, saying that “rocket man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime”. He threatened that “if [the US] is forced to defend itself and its allies, it will have no other choice but to destroy North Korea”.

Iran, he said, was “a corrupt dictatorship” whose “chief export is violence, bloodshed and chaos”. Trump called the 2015 nuclear deal “the worse transaction ever” – a sign perhaps he may be getting ready to pull out of it, or ensuring Iran is provoked enough to do so itself. What the White House could have done is appeal to the Iranian people directly, offering a “new beginning” in the relationship between the two nations. But the US President has not displayed the slightest interest in fundamental democratic values. His speech carried enough of a whiff of “regime change” to make Tehran think hard over nuclear compliance.

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As last week’s UN Security Council vote on sanctioning North Korea has shown, there is an international consensus on the dangers presented by Pyongyang’s behaviour. But on Iran, President Trump risks finding himself in stark isolation, with European allies already making clear they want to preserve the 2015 agreement, not tear it up. The US President no doubt speaks to his base as much as he does to an international audience. But the nationalist ideology he espouses was yet again made clear, not least with the emphasis he put on “strong, sovereign, independent nations”, rather than on the body of universal values that the UN is meant to uphold.

President Trump wants the UN to put pressure on North Korea and Iran, but he’s brought little clarity as to the wider strategy he contemplates. Threats and grandstanding are just bluster, not policy. Crises require a deftness the Trump Administration has failed to demonstrate. He wants allies to back him, but seems oblivious that his lack of personal credibility is an obstacle to international cooperation. An “America First” approach runs counter to the UN’s multilateralism.

His credo could be summed up by his claim that nations acting in their own self-interest create a more stable world. The question is what rules would states operate under? Not the UN’s, Trump’s response appeared to suggest. The president may want to speak of “principled realism”, but he is a reckless and dangerous leader, sitting, alas, in a most powerful position.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/19/the-guardian-view-on-trump-at-the-un-bluster-and-belligerence

Donald Trump’s War Doctrine Débuts, at the U.N.


September 21, 2017

Donald Trump’s War Doctrine Débuts, at the U.N.

In a bellicose address at the United Nations, Donald Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea, called Kim Jong Un “Rocket Man,” and baffled veteran American diplomats. Photograph by Spencer Platt / Getty

On Tuesday, Donald Trump made his début on the world stage—on the same elegant green-marble dais, donated by Italy after the Second World War, that he had mocked in a 2012 tweet as ugly. “The 12 inch sq. marble tiles behind speaker at UN always bothered me,” Trump wrote. “I will replace with beautiful large marble slabs if they ask me.” Trump’s thoughts about the United Nations were bigger—and badder—this time around.

“Major portions of the world are in conflict, and some, in fact, are going to hell,” Trump declared. He vowed to “totally destroy” North Korea if it didn’t abandon its nuclear weapons and the intercontinental ballistic missiles that deliver them. He came close to calling for regime change in “reckless” Iran, for policies that “speak openly of mass murder, vowing death to America, destruction to Israel, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this room.” Trump called the nuclear deal—brokered by all the veto-wielding nations of the world body—“an embarrassment” to the United States, implicitly insulting the European allies that initiated the effort and the Security Council, which unanimously endorsed it. He implied a willingness to use military action in Venezuela “to help them regain their freedom, recover their country, and restore their democracy.” He blasted Cuba and took sharp digs at China and Russia.

The President also delivered a few campaign-style zingers—like his pledge to “crush loser terrorists.” About North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Trump pronounced, “Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”

Trump reportedly insisted, over aides’ objections, that he keep the reference to the Elton John song in his speech. The line is sure to become part of U.N. lore—along with the Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega’s quip, in 1987, “Remember, President Reagan, Rambo only exists in the movies,” and the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s insult, the day after George W. Bush’s 2006 U.N. speech, “The devil came here yesterday, and it smells of sulfur still.”

For a body more accustomed to nuanced diplomatic speak, and now yearning for leadership in an unsettled world, Trump’s bellicose speech was his America First doctrine on steroids. Indeed, he opened his remarks to leaders from almost two hundred countries with a litany of his achievements since Election Day. “Our military will soon be the strongest it has ever been,” he boasted.

One of Trump’s most curious and convoluted themes—in an increasingly interconnected and globalizing world—was the need for greater sovereignty. “The nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition,” he said. The subtext was that walls, along every nation’s borders, were the keys to prosperity and international security.

The line baffled veteran American diplomats. “The President kept talking about sovereignty as if it were imperilled,” Richard Haass, the current president of the Council on Foreign Relations and the head of the State Department’s policy-planning staff under the George H. W. Bush Administration, told me. “The last I checked, we still have a veto at the U.N. We set our own limits in the Paris climate pact. No one is forcing us to adhere to trade agreements. It seemed to me it was something of a red herring. U.S. sovereignty is not imperilled. It’s an odd emphasis at the U.N., where our goal is to generate collective effort against common problems. It seemed to me inherently contradictory.”

The tenor throughout Trump’s forty-minute speech was contrary to many of the trends of the twenty-first century. He advocated ideas that other nations either find suspect or shun outright. Trump ignored the fact that he needs the world right now more than the world needs (or wants) him. Saying that the United States is gaining military muscle no longer means that Washington gains more leverage. Power has been redefined and defused, as have the threats of the era.

“The defining challenges of the twenty-first century are global in nature,” Haass said. “That is what was missing—whether proliferation or terror or climate change or hacking or democratic disruption. A pinched approach to sovereignty is inadequate.”

Ian Bremmer, the president of the Eurasia Group, a risk-consulting firm, told me that the long-term fallout from Trump’s speech may be to accelerate the identity politics and anti-globalization sentiments that fuel so many of today’s conflicts. The world, he said, has been headed toward a “geopolitical recession,” a period of instability featuring setbacks to globalization and international coöperation. Weakened global institutions that can’t respond quickly or effectively to challenges increase the prospects for more wars. Trump’s unilateralist rhetoric is “facilitating a faster unwind, and that’s a dangerous thing,” Bremmer said.

Trump’s patronizing language at the U.N. was a stark departure from the policies of America’s two other twenty-first-century Presidents. George W. Bush’s strategy emphasized the promotion of democracy and nation-building, while Barack Obama was big on human rights, global outreach, and resolving old tensions.

“Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty to promote security, prosperity, and peace for themselves and for the world,” Trump said. “We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government.”

The question is whether Trump, in his speech, went too far—and scared too many—to generate the kind of collaboration that he needs to achieve the very foreign-policy goals he outlined.

The President’s threat “won’t make Kim Jong Un quiver in his boots and give up his nukes,” Mark Fitzpatrick, the executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in Washington, told me. “To the contrary, it will reinforce his determination to have nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles that can deter the U.S.” America’s allies also now have to worry, he added, that Trump’s belligerent words will make Pyongyang even more dangerous.

The same is true of his condemnation of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, the clunkily named Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the most significant nonproliferation agreement in more than a quarter century. “Nobody in the room, save Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, will have been pleased by Trump’s denunciation of the J.C.P.O.A.,” Fitzpatrick said. The consequences of abandoning the Iran deal, he noted, could also backfire in relation to North Korea. “Denouncing a deal that all other parties are upholding will certainly not make North Korea any more disposed toward striking a deal with the United States over its nuclear program.”

Trump’s speech infuriated the Iranians. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted, “Trump’s ignorant hate speech belongs in medieval times-not the 21st Century UN -unworthy of a reply. Fake empathy for Iranians fools no one.”

Key players didn’t even show up for Trump’s début. President Xi Jinping, of China, didn’t come to New York to build on the relationship started over dinner at Mar-a-Lago, in April. Trump is dependent on China to deal with North Korea—and Xi is unlikely to make the grand gestures required to force the “Rocket Man” to surrender his deadliest weapons. For all that is at stake between Washington and Moscow, President Vladimir Putin didn’t bother to attend, either. Trump needs Russian help to tighten the squeeze on Pyongyang through U.N. sanctions.

Angela Merkel, now the de-facto champion of the West, also stayed home, occupied by the run-up to a crucial election. The Germans are outspoken about their commitment to the Iran nuclear deal—and have said so, bluntly, to the Trump Administration. Despite closer ties with Saudi Arabia forged during Trump’s first foreign trip, neither the King nor the Crown Prince came to New York. As at Trump’s Inauguration, the crowd at this opening of the United Nations may not have been as large as the President had hoped.

Iran President Hassan Rouhani Latest Speech At UNGA United Nations | 20 Sept 2017–A Rebuttal to Donald Trump

 

The United States Should Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)


September 21, 2017

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Number 397 | September 20, 2017

ANALYSIS

The United States Should Join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

By Niruban Balachandran

The United States has not yet joined Beijing’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a member state, partially because of the perceived risk of legitimizing or normalizing this new multilateral development bank (MDB) at the expense of the Bretton Woods component of the postwar liberal international order: the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. A related US hesitation is the potential for Beijing to mainstream weaker, watered-down infrastructure quality standards across the East Asia and Pacific region. US policy toward the AIIB also ostensibly seeks to prevent Beijing from increasing its checkbook diplomacy in developing countries. This is understandable, given that Beijing has previously provided conditional aid with eyebrow-raising terms to developing countries, such as aid to Costa Rica and Panama under the condition that they cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. However, the AIIB is most likely here to stay, and as a result of Washington’s absence, the United States will have no voice or voting presence in the bank. Such a position hinders Washington’s ability to influence and shape Beijing’s development effectiveness in the region.

 

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The United States has not yet joined Beijing’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a member state, partially because of the perceived risk of legitimizing or normalizing this new multilateral development bank (MDB) at the expense of the Bretton Woods component of the postwar liberal international order: the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. –Niruban Balachandran

Some Trump administration staff have expressed interest in US membership in the new bank. For example, Trump Advisor James Woolsey wrote last November that the US should have joined AIIB, adding that he hoped its reception to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative would be “much warmer”. Even Japan, Washington’s key ally in Asia, has recently hinted at joining AIIB. An absent US does not serve American or regional interests.

AIIB’s mandate is to provide loans, grants, and technical assistance to build infrastructure such as roads, ports, housing, and bridges for developing countries. To date, AIIB comprises 57 founding member states, a number that will most likely rise to about 70 in the near future. The AIIB’s initial capitalization is $100 billion, with Beijing contributing half of this total. In contrast, the World Bank is governed by 189 member states, and its capitalization is over $252 billion, with the United States contributing about 17% and Japan contributing about 8% of the total; it provides loans and grants in health, education, energy, climate change, and other sectors beyond infrastructure to client countries.

Unfortunately, the voice of the United States in the AIIB is absent. According to an exhaustive February 2017 Congressional Research Service report, “China’s voting share at the AIIB (28%) is over 350% that of the second largest AIIB member nation, India (8%). This is the largest gap between the first and second largest shareholders at any of the MDBs…” In the same vein, while the United States is criticized by other governments for having “too much power” in the World Bank with a capital shareholding of roughly 17 percent, China’s AIIB capital shareholding runs at an enormous 50 percent. Additionally, unlike most other MDBs, the AIIB does not have a resident board of executive directors that have a daily voice in bank processes and decisions.

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The New Boy on the Block

If the Trump administration joins the AIIB, it can help negotiate a higher voting share for the United States, a higher capital shareholding proportion for the United States, and resident board membership for all member states within the new bank. Such outcomes would help alter Beijing’s disproportionate power in AIIB. Although negotiating for more favorable conditions on behalf of Washington and other member states may be more difficult, it will by no means be impossible. While some in Beijing might view US membership in the AIIB as a strategic risk to China’s long-term aspirations for a Sinocentric regional order, it’s worth remembering that including Washington’s voice in key infrastructure projects can advance quality of life for the poor and unblock the free flow of water, goods, and people while drawing upon America’s most innovative infrastructure experts, unmatched global and subnational convening power, and enormous US diplomatic apparatus around the world.

It is understandable that aid and development projects managed by less-experienced donors like the AIIB might run greater risks of displacing indigenous peoples, threatening physical cultural-heritage assets, and constructing dangerous, disaster-prone, and less-than-green infrastructure. In addition, a report by a prominent watchdog group ranked the AIIB the lowest among the MDBs in level of public information transparency, most notably in terms of its lack of access to information procedures and public registry for information requests, as well as its failure to adopt time-bound disclosures of board minutes, draft strategies, and policies. The United States can drive capacity-building in these domains.

If Washington’s objective is to support Beijing’s efforts in development effectiveness and infrastructure quality, then it is imperative for the Trump administration to reverse course, seek to join the AIIB as a member state, and encourage resident board membership for all member states in line with MDB governance best practices. As in the World Bank and other multilateral institutions, it is on this platform that Washington can then negotiate on weighted AIIB voting practices, express its voice in day-to-day decision-making, convene like-minded stakeholders around policy and programmatic issues, build coalitions, and vote on projects that reduce poverty.

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The Go It Alone Man in a Globalised World–America First

The AIIB is only one component of Beijing’s proposed “China-led” regional architecture, which includes the New Development (BRICS) Bank, BRI, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) free trade agreement, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the China-ASEAN Interbank Association, the China-Eurasia Economic Cooperation Fund, and other multilateral initiatives. The Trump administration should therefore acknowledge that these new Chinese institutions will probably not be going away anytime soon, and that in many cases, it is best to try to advance American interests from within, or in close partnership with these institutions. For example, in May 2017, the World Bank and AIIB signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that establishes mechanisms for staff sharing, knowledge exchanges, country-level coordination, and other forms of close cooperation.

It is also worth noting that Tokyo’s $200 billion, whole-of-government answer to Beijing’s AIIB and OBOR – the Japan Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PIQ) – combines the multidisciplinary capacities of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), and the Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN). As The Straits Times recently reported, “While Japan cannot compete with China in dollars, it has touted its superiority in its capability to build high-quality infrastructure and commitment to train local workers.”

In the same vein, Washington should also seek to further improve the AIIB’s quality-control, governance, accounting, and safeguards by first negotiating to join the new bank’s executive board, then ensuring not only that meticulous M&E practices are utilized, but also that strict environmental and social safeguards are enforced in the field to protect communities, indigenous peoples, and families across every full project cycle.

Lastly, at the bilateral infrastructure aid level, an impartial self-governing body similar to that of the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) should execute an omnibus, cross-sectoral American infrastructure aid review to refine the subnational service delivery, donor coordination functions, and development effectiveness of USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Asia Foundation, and other crucial bilateral instruments of American infrastructure aid to the East Asia and Pacific region. Comparatively efficacious project execution and whole-of-government initiatives such as US-ASEAN Connect will continue to provide powerful insurance against the long-term marginalization of Washington’s bilateral infrastructure-aid instruments.

About the Author

Niruban Balachandran is a recent graduate of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Master’s of Public Administration, focusing on international order and strategy, as well as US-Southeast Asian relations.He can be contacted at Niruban_Balachandran@hks17.harvard.edu.

 

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Additional Read:

“Who’s Afraid of the AIIB: Why the United States Should Support China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”

Phillip Y. Lipscy (Stanford University)
Foreign Affairs, May 7 2015

When China first proposed creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013, it generated considerable anxiety in Washington and many other capitals. Many pundits and policymakers view the AIIB as a bid to undermine or replace the international architecture designed by the United States and its allies since the end of World War II. Although several U.S. allies, including Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have declared their intention to join the AIIB, others, including Japan, have expressed ambivalence. For its part, the United States has made it clear that it will seek to influence the institution from the outside. But it would be a mistake to shun or undermine the AIIB. Rather, it should be welcomed. Both the United States and Japan have far more to gain by joining the AIIB and shaping its future than remaining on the sidelines.

The details remain vague, but the AIIB is meant to be a multilateral development institution that will focus on infrastructure needs in Asia. There is no question that this is a deserving cause. Asia’s large population, rapid growth, and integration with the global economy all generate demand for better infrastructure. A report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates the region needs about $750 billion annually in infrastructure-related financing. [i] Citing historical underinvestment, McKinsey & Company, a global management consulting firm based in New York City, proclaims a “$1 trillion infrastructure opportunity” [ii] in Asia. Although precise estimates vary from one report to another, the broad point is uncontroversial: Asia needs more infrastructure, and international financing can help.

Why, then, is the AIIB itself controversial? There are essentially two reasons. First, Western governments fear that the AIIB will, in one way or another, undermine existing international aid institutions. U.S. policymakers have publicly expressed concern that the AIIB will undercut social and environmental standards adopted by existing institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). An underlying fear is that the AIIB could eventually overshadow and undermine these institutions, which are based in Washington and seen as closely reflecting U.S. interests. Japanese policymakers have expressed similar reservations.

Second, there is concern about China’s intentions within the broader context of its economic and geopolitical rise. The AIIB signals that China intends to play a larger international role. Will China act like a responsible stakeholder by further integrating itself into the existing world order, or will it focus more on challenging U.S. hegemony by seeking to undermine and replace the post–World War II international architecture? The AIIB seems to indicate that China is interested in the second scenario. After all, why else would China choose to design its own development institution from scratch rather than working through existing institutions?

Yet both sets of concerns are largely misplaced. The AIIB is highly unlikely to undermine existing aid organizations, and the creation of the AIIB conveys very little information about China’s broader international intentions. On balance, the United States and Japan have more to gain from joining the AIIB and shaping its future than seeking to exert influence as bystanders.

INSTITUTION IN-CROWD

China has a unique relationship with post–World War II international organizations. After the Chinese civil war, Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwan remained the de jure representative of all of China in major international organizations. This was a serious fault line of the early Cold War, triggering the Soviet boycott of the UN Security Council in 1950. However, the United States used the boycott to its advantage, securing UN Security Council authorization for operations against North Korea during the Korean War. The Soviet Union grudgingly returned to the council to aggressively exercise its veto, but the question of Chinese representation remained unresolved.

China exacerbated its international isolation by withdrawing from several international organizations, such as the Universal Postal Union and the World Meteorological Organization, in protest of Taiwan’s membership. As a result, by the 1960s, China had essentially no representation in the postwar institutional architecture. There were a few occasions on which China endorsed proposals that would pose competition with existing institutions. For example, the premier of China, Zhou Enlai, encouraged Indonesia under President Sukarno to challenge the architecture: “In these circumstances,” he said, “another UN, a revolutionary one, may well be set up so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with that body which calls itself the UN but which is under the manipulation of United States imperialism and therefore can only make mischief and do nothing good.” [iii]

China sent the largest delegation and won the most medals at Sukarno’s “Games of the New Emerging Forces,” an athletic competition created to pose direct competition against the Olympics, from which China was excluded. Indonesia also became the only country in the UN’s history to formally withdraw from the organization in 1965, and Sukarno proposed the creation of an alternative institution, the New Emerging Forces Organization (NEFO). The proposal raised concerns among U.S. policymakers, who worried that the initiative might entice developing countries away from the UN. NEFO ultimately went nowhere, though, as Sukarno’s grip over his own country slipped. Indonesia returned to the UN only a year later.

If China’s isolation from the international architecture had continued in subsequent decades, such challenges may have become more serious. However, in a pivotal UN General Assembly vote in 1971, China displaced Taiwan as the sole representative of its country in the UN. Although membership in other organizations came with varying lags, within about a decade, China had completely turned the tables on Taiwan.

China’s history of contestation over representation sets the scene for contemporary debates about the international architecture. For decades after the end of World War II, a major Chinese foreign policy objective was to secure recognition and status in postwar international organizations. Once that status was secured, China’s unique method of entry gave it significant advantages that were denied to many other rising powers. The postwar architecture systematically advantaged the major Allied powers of World War II over countries on the wrong side of the war (Japan and Germany) or countries that were weak or colonized (Brazil and India). In many respects, China avoided these disadvantages: it automatically assumed the formal privileges that had been granted to the Republic of China, most notably permanent membership and veto power in the UN Security Council.

These factors mean that when it comes to major international institutions, China is more of a status quo power than one might expect. Much of the contemporary Chinese foreign policy narrative emphasizes China’s contributions to the Allied victory in World War II against fascism and militarism. [iv] Undermining the architecture is not in China’s interest: it provides material benefits, enhances Chinese legitimacy, and is not obviously biased against China. For sure, Chinese underrepresentation is an important problem in several areas, such as in the voting rights of the IMF and the representation of Chinese nationals among the personnel of major organizations. However, for the most part, China has more to gain from incremental adjustments of the architecture than from a wholesale redesign.

 

HOW AID WORKS

The AIIB does not alter this basic picture. It is useful to consider some features of contemporary development aid. Development aid is a highly competitive and fragmented policy area. There are at least 28 multilateral international organizations that already specialize in international development akin to the AIIB. [v] In addition, most major economies also engage in bilateral aid through their own aid agencies. These include 29 members of the Development Cooperation Directorate of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and a host of developing countries, including China. To top it off, numerous private foundations and firms participate in development directly or indirectly. On a yearly basis, the ADB and Inter-American Development Bank each disburse the equivalent of about 40 percent of the World Bank’s disbursements. Yearly U.S. bilateral aid is typically on a par with World Bank disbursements.

Aid organizations often work collaboratively, pooling expertise and resources to implement projects. However, competition is also an important feature of contemporary development aid. Donors have numerous channels through which they can give out aid; likewise, potential recipients can receive aid from a wide range of sources. This is particularly true for the rapidly developing countries of Asia, which the AIIB will target.

The competition imposes accountability and places important limits on international aid organizations. A good example is the United Nations Development Program. The UNDP is considered one of the premier international development organizations. It was established in 1966 as a major agency of the United Nations, and it has near-universal membership. However, the agency was created with a decision-making structure that limits the influence of important donor states: following the broader UN principle that each member state should have equal representation, the organization follows a one-country-one-vote rule. Hence, the United States, one of the largest donors to the organization, has the same voting power as Nepal, a major aid recipient.

This means that large donor states feel their interests are not sufficiently reflected in UNDP decision-making. As a consequence, they have effectively shifted their attention elsewhere, depriving the UNDP of resources and forcing the organization to pursue “noncore” arrangements over which it has limited control. The UNDP has faced a chronic shortage of funding: adjusted for inflation, core disbursements by the UNDP peaked in 1981 and have steadily declined to about half those levels.

This type of competition has two implications for the AIIB. First, to remain relevant, aid organizations must be accountable to their stakeholders. If the AIIB is seen as being overly dominated by China, other members will turn their attention elsewhere, depriving the organization of resources, attention, and skilled staff. There is no plausible scenario under which the AIIB could supplant existing organizations such as the World Bank and ADB unless the organization suitably reflects the concerns and interests of the broader international community.

Second, maintaining governance and accountability standards in development aid is already extremely difficult, particularly when dealing with relatively successful developing countries that can pick and choose from a wide range of multilateral, bilateral, and private financing sources. For this reason, the entry of the AIIB as an additional funding source in Asia is unlikely to make a significant difference in social and environmental standards. If China truly seeks to undercut the quality and conditions of existing aid agencies, it can already do so more expediently through bilateral aid and overseas activities of its state-owned enterprises.

INSTITUTIONAL POWER

Many pundits and policymakers see the AIIB in zero-sum terms: if China is successful, the United States and its allies lose. A recent article in the conservative Japanese Sankei newspaper is illustrative, arguing that the AIIB represents China’s attempt to follow Sun-tzu’s teachings to subdue the United States and Japan without engaging in direct combat. [vi] But there is a fundamental problem with this worldview: international institutions are not like military equipment or strategic territory, which makes a country more powerful and potentially threatening.

Multilateral international institutions are fundamentally cooperative arrangements, premised on mutual benefits. On net, the activities of the AIIB are much more likely to bring benefits rather than costs to the United States as well as the broader international community. The most obvious of these is the positive spillover of economic development. China itself is testament to the importance of infrastructure investment for growth. Better infrastructure in Asia will mean more economic activity and business opportunities not only for Chinese firms but also for American, European, and Japanese firms. For sure, some infrastructure can be designed to bring disproportionate benefits to specific countries: for example, roads and pipelines that direct traffic toward China. However, in an age of interconnected markets and global supply chains, it is practically impossible to limit positive spillover effects to a single country.

Multilateralism will also make it more difficult for China to overtly manipulate projects funded by the AIIB. An important reason the United States established multilateral institutions after the end of World War II was to reassure its allies that their voices would be heard and that the United States would not seek unilateral domination. Multilateralism not only enhances but also constrains the ability of powerful states to get what they want. For all the shortcomings of U.S. foreign policymaking since the end of World War II, its emphasis on multilateralism has been a resounding success.

Take trade. Before the 1930s, U.S. trade policy oscillated between openness and closure depending on which political party controlled Congress. The contemporary trade architecture, initially based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and more recently the World Trade Organization and a host of regional arrangements, prevents such dramatic swings. It also surely benefits U.S. economic interests by maintaining the free flow of international commerce.

The same logic applies to the AIIB. The AIIB will likely give China some important advantages akin to what the United States and Japan enjoy, respectively, in the World Bank and ADB. However, China will also be constrained by other members of the institution. The structural advantages that China enjoys in the AIIB will be beneficial only insofar as other members take the institution seriously and provide funding, skilled staff, and coordination. If the institution is perceived as being unfair or nontransparent, it will become nothing more than a shell organization through which China disburses bilateral foreign aid.

To put it differently, China has a basic choice. It can create an AIIB that is mutually beneficial, reflects the broader concerns of its members, and perhaps modestly overrepresents Chinese interests. If, instead, China seeks to dominate the AIIB, the institution will shrivel into irrelevance. In the former case, U.S. membership in the AIIB will provide an opportunity to influence and shape the trajectory of an institution that will make a meaningful contribution to economic development in Asia. In the latter case, there is no meaningful threat to U.S. interests anyway.

COOPERATIVE CONFLICT

Realist international relations scholars have predicted that China and the United States face inevitable conflict based on the idea that power transitions create turbulence as rising powers seek to assert their newfound authority and status quo powers resist. An optimistic alternative, based on the liberal tradition, predicts a more benign outcome, in which the pacifying effects of economic interdependence, international institutions and norms, and, perhaps one day, democracy will push Beijing and Washington toward cooperation rather than conflict.

Between these two extremes is a third possibility that ought to be taken more seriously: the renegotiation of the world order. To some degree, contestation over international institutions replicates the functions performed by military clashes in prior eras. It shapes geopolitical and economic outcomes, provides markers for relative status among states, and integrates states into groupings that share common values and purposes.

Japan’s emergence in the late twentieth century is illustrative. Scholarly work in the early 1990s predicted confrontation between Japan and the United States as the former emerged as a major economic power. The political scientist Kenneth Waltz, for example, forecasted that Japan would increase its military capabilities and perhaps acquire nuclear weapons as it reemerged as a great power and reasserted its authority. [vii] Others worried that tensions between the United States and Japan could intensify as the latter sought to reestablish its predominant position in the East Asian region. [viii]

For the most part, Japan instead maintained close ties with the United States and focused its diplomatic attention on international institutions as venues for promoting its newfound status and policy prescriptions for the international order. A crucial battleground for competing Japanese and American visions has been international economic institutions. In the World Bank and IMF, Japan sought to achieve greater voting rights and recognition for its economic approach, which has emphasized greater state intervention and a focus on basic infrastructure. Japan also sought to create regional institutions through which it could exercise influence, such as the ADB and the failed Asian Monetary Fund.

Of course, China differs from Japan in many respects, but its proposal for the AIIB is best seen in this light. The AIIB would give China somewhat greater material and ideological influence over multilateral development lending than it currently enjoys. Perhaps equally important, the AIIB can be interpreted as a marker of status and prestige. One could argue that a multilateral development bank is one of the bells and whistles that comes with contemporary great power status: the United States has the World Bank, Japan has the ADB, and the EU has the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. China will have the AIIB.

The upshot is that the influence and prestige of contemporary international institutions give countries a new avenue through which to gently contest the contours of the world order. There is less of a need to resort to coercion or military conflict. The heart of the matter is this: Does the United States prefer a world in which China seeks to establish its influence and international prestige by building multilateral development banks or one in which it seeks to do so by building aircraft carriers? Pushing back against the former sends the troubling message that the United States is concerned about not just the means but the ends of China’s rise. The AIIB provides an opportunity to acknowledge and applaud China’s emergence as a builder of multilateral institutions and a contributor to global public goods. The institution may very well give China more influence over development in Asia, but it will be a more transparent and accountable way of exerting influence than through bilateral economic or military pressure. The AIIB may or may not ultimately succeed, but it poses very little risk to U.S. and Japanese interests, since it enters a crowded, competitive field of multilateral development agencies. The United States thus has every incentive to encourage, not discourage, Chinese foreign policy initiatives such as the AIIB.

This article was originally published by Foreign Affairs, and has been reproduced here with permission. The article is also accessible on the Foreign Affairs website.

[i] Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute, 2009, “Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia,” Manila and Tokyo: Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Bank Institute.

[ii] Naveen Tahilyani, Toshan Tamhane, and Jessica Tan, 2011, “Asia’s $1 trillion infrastructure opportunity,” McKinsey & Company Insights and Publications.

[iii] Kent, Ann. 2007. Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 45.

[iv] E.g. see http://www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/fyrth/t1072338.htm

[v] See Phillip Y. Lipscy, 2015, “Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas, Outside Options, and the Bretton Woods Institutions,” American Journal of Political Science, 59 (2): 341-356, DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12130

[vi] http://www.sankei.com/world/news/150331/wor1503310067-n1.html

[vii] Kenneth Waltz, 1993, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18(2), 56, 65.

[viii] Miles Kahler and Jeffrey Frankel, 1992, “Introduction,” in Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia, edited by Miles Kahler and Jeffrey Frankel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 8.

North Korea: Dealing with the “Rocket Man” via Negotiation, not Threats


September 20, 2017

North Korea: Dealing with the “Rocket Man”via Negotiation, not Threats

by Editorial Board, East Asia Forum

http://www.eastasiaforum.org

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War? “Look at the Map”, says French President Emmanuel Macron in an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour at United Nations, New York

The North Korean nuclear threat has ratcheted up in recent months, following new rounds of missile and nuclear weapons tests by Pyongyang. In July, North Korea undertook two tests of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM). Then on 3 September, it undertook its sixth nuclear test of a new thermonuclear bomb designed to be used with its ICBMs. US President Donald Trump responded to the ICBM tests by promising to deliver ‘fire and fury’ if North Korea again threatened the United States, to which North Korea responded in turn by threatening to deploy missiles into the seas near US military bases in Guam. And in the midst of all this, Pyongyang continued to unnerve the Japanese government and population by launching two ballistic missiles into the seas beyond the island of Hokkaido.

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The “Rocket Man” says to President Donald Trump: “Show me some respect. I am the leader of North Korea,an independent and sovereign nation. My duty is to protect my people from warmongers like you and to act in the best interest of my country. Aren’t you doing the same for your people when you say to the world, “America First”?

North Korea’s most recent tests and launches are significant. Like it or not, they demonstrate that the regime has crossed the technical threshold of being able to target the continental United States — as well as US allies in Asia — potentially with a nuclear warhead.

Throughout the growing crisis, the Trump administration — along with most of the international community — has viewed China as the key player in bringing North Korea to heel. This perception of China’s special leverage stems from China’s decades-old treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the North Korean regime and, even more importantly, the fact that around 90 per cent of North Korean trade now takes place with or through China. Given North Korea’s near total dependence on China for its international economic ties, the United States and others have consistently called for China to tighten economic sanctions.

China had resisted tightening sanctions on North Korea for fear that economic pressure could prompt massive inflows of refugees into China’s Northeast, or even the collapse of the North Korean regime. Although North Korea remains China’s most troublesome and unpredictable neighbour, it also serves as a strategic ‘buffer’ between China and US forces stationed in Japan and South Korea.

Yet a combination of growing international pressure, and Beijing’s own frustration with Pyongyang over its unwelcome nuclear program, has made China more willing to apply sanctions and other economic measures. In February, in the wake of North Korea’s test of a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan, and the assassination in Malaysia of Kim Jong-un’s half-brother, China announced it was suspending coal imports from North Korea for the remainder of 2017. More significantly, on 11 September China (and Russia) agreed to a new round of UN Security Council sanctions which will ban North Korean textile exports, freeze its imports of crude oil at current levels and introduce a cap on its imports of refined petroleum. These are the most far-reaching sanctions that have so far been applied to North Korea. In addition, Chinese state-run banks have begun to ban North Koreans from opening new accounts and to suspend transactions on accounts already held by North Koreans.

Yet the key problem in all of this is that there is little evidence that sanctions applied in the past have worked in checking North Korea’s nuclear program. Most regional analysts are fairly pessimistic that even this latest round of sanctions will have much effect on the regime’s nuclear development plans.

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In our two lead pieces this week, Chen Dongxiao of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, and Jia Qingguo of Peking University, underscore the urgent need for new thinking in managing the North Korean nuclear issue. Both highlight diplomatic engagement, with Pyongyang and among other key states in the region, as the only way forward.

Chen suggests that it is futile to hope that increased Chinese pressure will somehow encourage North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons. He underlines Pyongyang’s lack of regard for China’s interests to date, suggesting that, ‘Pyongyang will never shy away from pressing for more concessions by leveraging its nuclear weapons program, even at the expense of China’s national security interests and overall regional stability’.

Instead, the region must find new diplomatic and economic incentives to encourage Pyongyang to come back to the negotiating table. As a first step, both authors nominate China’s ‘two suspensions’ proposal as a way to reduce the dangerous tensions between Pyongyang and Washington. This proposal would see ‘North Korea…suspend nuclear and missile tests in exchange for suspension of joint US-South Korea military exercises’, explains Jia.

As a second step, Jia calls on Beijing to begin active ‘contingency planning’ talks with Washington and Seoul. In the past, Beijing has been hesitant to take part in such talks, out of concern for the signals that this would send to Pyongyang. Jia and Chen carry clear messages for Pyongyang and Washington. Given the gravity of the situation and the risk that North Korea may continue to ignore Beijing’s diplomatic efforts, it is now time for China to put aside its hesitation and engage in serious talks with Washington and Seoul, Jia argues.

Contingency planning talks should cover a range of critical issues including: who would control North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal in the event of a collapse of the regime; how to deal with the North Korean refugee problem; who would be responsible for restoring domestic order in North Korea in the event of a crisis; post-crisis political arrangements on the Korean Peninsula; and removal of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system when and if North Korea’s nuclear program has ended.

Each of these issues is a source of considerable anxiety in Beijing, and so far they’ve stymied closer regional cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue. Indeed, these issues have, in Chen Dongxiao’s words, showcased the ‘deeply entrenched strategic suspicion’ between the US and China. Dialogue and negotiation on these questions may therefore help to alter the current impasse between China and the United States, and lessen Pyongyang’s ability to exploit the lack of unity among its neighbours.

As is now widely understood, both in Pyongyang and around the region, there are no good military options for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. That will crucially require countries to get much better at talking to their adversaries and negotiating on fundamental, long-term political and security questions.

The EAF Editorial Board is comprised of Peter Drysdale, Shiro Armstrong, Ben Ascione, Amy King, Liam Gammon, Jillian Mowbray-Tsutsumi and Ben Hillman, and is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.

Remarks by President Donald Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly


September 20, 2017

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Remarks by President  Donald Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly

United Nations
New York, New York

10:04 A.M. EDT, September 19, 2017

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/19/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly

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President Donald Trump delivers a tough message to North Korea’s Rocket Man, Iran, Cuba and Venezuela  at The United Nations General Assembly

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, world leaders, and distinguished delegates: Welcome to New York. It is a profound honor to stand here in my home city, as a representative of the American people, to address the people of the world.

As millions of our citizens continue to suffer the effects of the devastating hurricanes that have struck our country, I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to every leader in this room who has offered assistance and aid. The American people are strong and resilient, and they will emerge from these hardships more determined than ever before.

“…we meet at a time of both of immense promise and great peril. It is entirely up to us whether we lift the world to new heights, or let it fall into a valley of disrepair.

Fortunately, the United States has done very well since Election Day last November 8th. The stock market is at an all-time high — a record. Unemployment is at its lowest level in 16 years, and because of our regulatory and other reforms, we have more people working in the United States today than ever before. Companies are moving back, creating job growth the likes of which our country has not seen in a very long time. And it has just been announced that we will be spending almost $700 billion on our military and defense.

Our military will soon be the strongest it has ever been. For more than 70 years, in times of war and peace, the leaders of nations, movements, and religions have stood before this assembly. Like them, I intend to address some of the very serious threats before us today but also the enormous potential waiting to be unleashed.

We live in a time of extraordinary opportunity. Breakthroughs in science, technology, and medicine are curing illnesses and solving problems that prior generations thought impossible to solve.

But each day also brings news of growing dangers that threaten everything we cherish and value. Terrorists and extremists have gathered strength and spread to every region of the planet. Rogue regimes represented in this body not only support terrorists but threaten other nations and their own people with the most destructive weapons known to humanity.

Authority and authoritarian powers seek to collapse the values, the systems, and alliances that prevented conflict and tilted the world toward freedom since World War II.

International criminal networks traffic drugs, weapons, people; force dislocation and mass migration; threaten our borders; and new forms of aggression exploit technology to menace our citizens.

To put it simply, we meet at a time of both of immense promise and great peril. It is entirely up to us whether we lift the world to new heights, or let it fall into a valley of disrepair.

We have it in our power, should we so choose, to lift millions from poverty, to help our citizens realize their dreams, and to ensure that new generations of children are raised free from violence, hatred, and fear.

This institution was founded in the aftermath of two world wars to help shape this better future. It was based on the vision that diverse nations could cooperate to protect their sovereignty, preserve their security, and promote their prosperity.

It was in the same period, exactly 70 years ago, that the United States developed the Marshall Plan to help restore Europe. Those three beautiful pillars — they’re pillars of peace, sovereignty, security, and prosperity.

The Marshall Plan was built on the noble idea that the whole world is safer when nations are strong, independent, and free. As President Truman said in his message to Congress at that time, “Our support of European recovery is in full accord with our support of the United Nations. The success of the United Nations depends upon the independent strength of its members.”

To overcome the perils of the present and to achieve the promise of the future, we must begin with the wisdom of the past. Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty to promote security, prosperity, and peace for themselves and for the world.

We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government. But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign duties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other sovereign nation. This is the beautiful vision of this institution, and this is foundation for cooperation and success.

Strong, sovereign nations let diverse countries with different values, different cultures, and different dreams not just coexist, but work side by side on the basis of mutual respect.

Strong, sovereign nations let their people take ownership of the future and control their own destiny. And strong, sovereign nations allow individuals to flourish in the fullness of the life intended by God.

In America, we do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to watch. This week gives our country a special reason to take pride in that example. We are celebrating the 230th anniversary of our beloved Constitution — the oldest constitution still in use in the world today.

This timeless document has been the foundation of peace, prosperity, and freedom for the Americans and for countless millions around the globe whose own countries have found inspiration in its respect for human nature, human dignity, and the rule of law.

The greatest in the United States Constitution is its first three beautiful words. They are: “We the people.”

Generations of Americans have sacrificed to maintain the promise of those words, the promise of our country, and of our great history. In America, the people govern, the people rule, and the people are sovereign. I was elected not to take power, but to give power to the American people, where it belongs.

In foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of sovereignty. Our government’s first duty is to its people, to our citizens — to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights, and to defend their values.

As President of the United States, I will always put America first, just like you, as the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries first. (Applause.)

All responsible leaders have an obligation to serve their own citizens, and the nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition.

But making a better life for our people also requires us to work together in close harmony and unity to create a more safe and peaceful future for all people.

The United States will forever be a great friend to the world, and especially to its allies. But we can no longer be taken advantage of, or enter into a one-sided deal where the United States gets nothing in return. As long as I hold this office, I will defend America’s interests above all else.

But in fulfilling our obligations to our own nations, we also realize that it’s in everyone’s interest to seek a future where all nations can be sovereign, prosperous, and secure.

America does more than speak for the values expressed in the United Nations Charter. Our citizens have paid the ultimate price to defend our freedom and the freedom of many nations represented in this great hall. America’s devotion is measured on the battlefields where our young men and women have fought and sacrificed alongside of our allies, from the beaches of Europe to the deserts of the Middle East to the jungles of Asia.

It is an eternal credit to the American character that even after we and our allies emerged victorious from the bloodiest war in history, we did not seek territorial expansion, or attempt to oppose and impose our way of life on others. Instead, we helped build institutions such as this one to defend the sovereignty, security, and prosperity for all.

For the diverse nations of the world, this is our hope. We want harmony and friendship, not conflict and strife. We are guided by outcomes, not ideology. We have a policy of principled realism, rooted in shared goals, interests, and values.

That realism forces us to confront a question facing every leader and nation in this room. It is a question we cannot escape or avoid. We will slide down the path of complacency, numb to the challenges, threats, and even wars that we face. Or do we have enough strength and pride to confront those dangers today, so that our citizens can enjoy peace and prosperity tomorrow?

If we desire to lift up our citizens, if we aspire to the approval of history, then we must fulfill our sovereign duties to the people we faithfully represent. We must protect our nations, their interests, and their futures. We must reject threats to sovereignty, from the Ukraine to the South China Sea. We must uphold respect for law, respect for borders, and respect for culture, and the peaceful engagement these allow. And just as the founders of this body intended, we must work together and confront together those who threaten us with chaos, turmoil, and terror.

The scourge of our planet today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate every principle on which the United Nations is based. They respect neither their own citizens nor the sovereign rights of their countries.

If the righteous many do not confront the wicked few, then evil will triumph. When decent people and nations become bystanders to history, the forces of destruction only gather power and strength.

No one has shown more contempt for other nations and for the well being of their own people than the depraved regime in North Korea. It is responsible for the starvation deaths of millions of North Koreans, and for the imprisonment, torture, killing, and oppression of countless more.

We were all witness to the regime’s deadly abuse when an innocent American college student, Otto Warmbier, was returned to America only to die a few days later. We saw it in the assassination of the dictator’s brother using banned nerve agents in an international airport. We know it kidnapped a sweet 13-year-old Japanese girl from a beach in her own country to enslave her as a language tutor for North Korea’s spies.

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If this is not twisted enough, now North Korea’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threatens the entire world with unthinkable loss of human life.

It is an outrage that some nations would not only trade with such a regime, but would arm, supply, and financially support a country that imperils the world with nuclear conflict. No nation on earth has an interest in seeing this band of criminals arm itself with nuclear weapons and missiles.

The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea. Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. The United States is ready, willing and able, but hopefully this will not be necessary. That’s what the United Nations is all about; that’s what the United Nations is for. Let’s see how they do.

It is time for North Korea to realize that the denuclearization is its only acceptable future. The United Nations Security Council recently held two unanimous 15-0 votes adopting hard-hitting resolutions against North Korea, and I want to thank China and Russia for joining the vote to impose sanctions, along with all of the other members of the Security Council. Thank you to all involved.

The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea. Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. The United States is ready, willing and able, but hopefully this will not be necessary.

But we must do much more. It is time for all nations to work together to isolate the Kim regime until it ceases its hostile behavior.

We face this decision not only in North Korea. It is far past time for the nations of the world to confront another reckless regime — one that speaks openly of mass murder, vowing death to America, destruction to Israel, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this room.

The Iranian government masks a corrupt dictatorship behind the false guise of a democracy. It has turned a wealthy country with a rich history and culture into an economically depleted rogue state whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed, and chaos. The longest-suffering victims of Iran’s leaders are, in fact, its own people.

Rather than use its resources to improve Iranian lives, its oil profits go to fund Hezbollah and other terrorists that kill innocent Muslims and attack their peaceful Arab and Israeli neighbors. This wealth, which rightly belongs to Iran’s people, also goes to shore up Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship, fuel Yemen’s civil war, and undermine peace throughout the entire Middle East.

We cannot let a murderous regime continue these destabilizing activities while building dangerous missiles, and we cannot abide by an agreement if it provides cover for the eventual construction of a nuclear program. (Applause.) The Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. Frankly, that deal is an embarrassment to the United States, and I don’t think you’ve heard the last of it — believe me.

It is time for the entire world to join us in demanding that Iran’s government end its pursuit of death and destruction. It is time for the regime to free all Americans and citizens of other nations that they have unjustly detained. And above all, Iran’s government must stop supporting terrorists, begin serving its own people, and respect the sovereign rights of its neighbors.

We cannot let a murderous regime continue these destabilizing activities while building dangerous missiles, and we cannot abide by an agreement if it provides cover for the eventual construction of a nuclear program. (Applause.) The Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. Frankly, that deal is an embarrassment to the United States, and I don’t think you’ve heard the last of it — believe me.

The entire world understands that the good people of Iran want change, and, other than the vast military power of the United States, that Iran’s people are what their leaders fear the most. This is what causes the regime to restrict Internet access, tear down satellite dishes, shoot unarmed student protestors, and imprison political reformers.

Oppressive regimes cannot endure forever, and the day will come when the Iranian people will face a choice. Will they continue down the path of poverty, bloodshed, and terror? Or will the Iranian people return to the nation’s proud roots as a center of civilization, culture, and wealth where their people can be happy and prosperous once again?

The Iranian regime’s support for terror is in stark contrast to the recent commitments of many of its neighbors to fight terrorism and halt its financing.

In Saudi Arabia early last year, I was greatly honored to address the leaders of more than 50 Arab and Muslim nations. We agreed that all responsible nations must work together to confront terrorists and the Islamist extremism that inspires them.

We will stop radical Islamic terrorism because we cannot allow it to tear up our nation, and indeed to tear up the entire world.

We must deny the terrorists safe haven, transit, funding, and any form of support for their vile and sinister ideology. We must drive them out of our nations. It is time to expose and hold responsible those countries who support and finance terror groups like al Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Taliban and others that slaughter innocent people.

The United States and our allies are working together throughout the Middle East to crush the loser terrorists and stop the reemergence of safe havens they use to launch attacks on all of our people.

Last month, I announced a new strategy for victory in the fight against this evil in Afghanistan. From now on, our security interests will dictate the length and scope of military operations, not arbitrary benchmarks and timetables set up by politicians.

I have also totally changed the rules of engagement in our fight against the Taliban and other terrorist groups. In Syria and Iraq, we have made big gains toward lasting defeat of ISIS. In fact, our country has achieved more against ISIS in the last eight months than it has in many, many years combined.

We seek the de-escalation of the Syrian conflict, and a political solution that honors the will of the Syrian people. The actions of the criminal regime of Bashar al-Assad, including the use of chemical weapons against his own citizens — even innocent children — shock the conscience of every decent person. No society can be safe if banned chemical weapons are allowed to spread. That is why the United States carried out a missile strike on the airbase that launched the attack.

We appreciate the efforts of United Nations agencies that are providing vital humanitarian assistance in areas liberated from ISIS, and we especially thank Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon for their role in hosting refugees from the Syrian conflict.

The United States is a compassionate nation and has spent billions and billions of dollars in helping to support this effort. We seek an approach to refugee resettlement that is designed to help these horribly treated people, and which enables their eventual return to their home countries, to be part of the rebuilding process.

For the cost of resettling one refugee in the United States, we can assist more than 10 in their home region. Out of the goodness of our hearts, we offer financial assistance to hosting countries in the region, and we support recent agreements of the G20 nations that will seek to host refugees as close to their home countries as possible. This is the safe, responsible, and humanitarian approach.

For decades, the United States has dealt with migration challenges here in the Western Hemisphere. We have learned that, over the long term, uncontrolled migration is deeply unfair to both the sending and the receiving countries.

For the sending countries, it reduces domestic pressure to pursue needed political and economic reform, and drains them of the human capital necessary to motivate and implement those reforms.

For the receiving countries, the substantial costs of uncontrolled migration are borne overwhelmingly by low-income citizens whose concerns are often ignored by both media and government.

I want to salute the work of the United Nations in seeking to address the problems that cause people to flee from their homes. The United Nations and African Union led peacekeeping missions to have invaluable contributions in stabilizing conflicts in Africa. The United States continues to lead the world in humanitarian assistance, including famine prevention and relief in South Sudan, Somalia, and northern Nigeria and Yemen.

We have invested in better health and opportunity all over the world through programs like PEPFAR, which funds AIDS relief; the President’s Malaria Initiative; the Global Health Security Agenda; the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery; and the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative, part of our commitment to empowering women all across the globe.

We also thank — (applause) — we also thank the Secretary General for recognizing that the United Nations must reform if it is to be an effective partner in confronting threats to sovereignty, security, and prosperity. Too often the focus of this organization has not been on results, but on bureaucracy and process.

In some cases, states that seek to subvert this institution’s noble aims have hijacked the very systems that are supposed to advance them. For example, it is a massive source of embarrassment to the United Nations that some governments with egregious human rights records sit on the U.N. Human Rights Council.

The United States is one out of 193 countries in the United Nations, and yet we pay 22 percent of the entire budget and more. In fact, we pay far more than anybody realizes. The United States bears an unfair cost burden, but, to be fair, if it could actually accomplish all of its stated goals, especially the goal of peace, this investment would easily be well worth it.

Major portions of the world are in conflict and some, in fact, are going to hell. But the powerful people in this room, under the guidance and auspices of the United Nations, can solve many of these vicious and complex problems.

The American people hope that one day soon the United Nations can be a much more accountable and effective advocate for human dignity and freedom around the world. In the meantime, we believe that no nation should have to bear a disproportionate share of the burden, militarily or financially. Nations of the world must take a greater role in promoting secure and prosperous societies in their own regions.

The socialist dictatorship of Nicolas Maduro has inflicted terrible pain and suffering on the good people of that country. This corrupt regime destroyed a prosperous nation by imposing a failed ideology that has produced poverty and misery everywhere it has been tried. To make matters worse, Maduro has defied his own people, stealing power from their elected representatives to preserve his disastrous rule.

That is why in the Western Hemisphere, the United States has stood against the corrupt and destabilizing regime in Cuba and embraced the enduring dream of the Cuban people to live in freedom. My administration recently announced that we will not lift sanctions on the Cuban government until it makes fundamental reforms.

We have also imposed tough, calibrated sanctions on the socialist Maduro regime in Venezuela, which has brought a once thriving nation to the brink of total collapse.

The socialist dictatorship of Nicolas Maduro has inflicted terrible pain and suffering on the good people of that country. This corrupt regime destroyed a prosperous nation by imposing a failed ideology that has produced poverty and misery everywhere it has been tried. To make matters worse, Maduro has defied his own people, stealing power from their elected representatives to preserve his disastrous rule.

The Venezuelan people are starving and their country is collapsing. Their democratic institutions are being destroyed. This situation is completely unacceptable and we cannot stand by and watch.

As a responsible neighbor and friend, we and all others have a goal. That goal is to help them regain their freedom, recover their country, and restore their democracy. I would like to thank leaders in this room for condemning the regime and providing vital support to the Venezuelan people.

The United States has taken important steps to hold the regime accountable. We are prepared to take further action if the government of Venezuela persists on its path to impose authoritarian rule on the Venezuelan people.

We are fortunate to have incredibly strong and healthy trade relationships with many of the Latin American countries gathered here today. Our economic bond forms a critical foundation for advancing peace and prosperity for all of our people and all of our neighbors.

I ask every country represented here today to be prepared to do more to address this very real crisis. We call for the full restoration of democracy and political freedoms in Venezuela. (Applause.)

The problem in Venezuela is not that socialism has been poorly implemented, but that socialism has been faithfully implemented. (Applause.) From the Soviet Union to Cuba to Venezuela, wherever true socialism or communism has been adopted, it has delivered anguish and devastation and failure. Those who preach the tenets of these discredited ideologies only contribute to the continued suffering of the people who live under these cruel systems.

America stands with every person living under a brutal regime. Our respect for sovereignty is also a call for action. All people deserve a government that cares for their safety, their interests, and their wellbeing, including their prosperity.

In America, we seek stronger ties of business and trade with all nations of good will, but this trade must be fair and it must be reciprocal.

For too long, the American people were told that mammoth multinational trade deals, unaccountable international tribunals, and powerful global bureaucracies were the best way to promote their success. But as those promises flowed, millions of jobs vanished and thousands of factories disappeared. Others gamed the system and broke the rules. And our great middle class, once the bedrock of American prosperity, was forgotten and left behind, but they are forgotten no more and they will never be forgotten again.

While America will pursue cooperation and commerce with other nations, we are renewing our commitment to the first duty of every government: the duty of our citizens. This bond is the source of America’s strength and that of every responsible nation represented here today.

If this organization is to have any hope of successfully confronting the challenges before us, it will depend, as President Truman said some 70 years ago, on the “independent strength of its members.” If we are to embrace the opportunities of the future and overcome the present dangers together, there can be no substitute for strong, sovereign, and independent nations — nations that are rooted in their histories and invested in their destinies; nations that seek allies to befriend, not enemies to conquer; and most important of all, nations that are home to patriots, to men and women who are willing to sacrifice for their countries, their fellow citizens, and for all that is best in the human spirit.

In remembering the great victory that led to this body’s founding, we must never forget that those heroes who fought against evil also fought for the nations that they loved.

Patriotism led the Poles to die to save Poland, the French to fight for a free France, and the Brits to stand strong for Britain.

Today, if we do not invest ourselves, our hearts, and our minds in our nations, if we will not build strong families, safe communities, and healthy societies for ourselves, no one can do it for us.

We cannot wait for someone else, for faraway countries or far-off bureaucrats — we can’t do it. We must solve our problems, to build our prosperity, to secure our futures, or we will be vulnerable to decay, domination, and defeat.

The true question for the United Nations today, for people all over the world who hope for better lives for themselves and their children, is a basic one: Are we still patriots? Do we love our nations enough to protect their sovereignty and to take ownership of their futures? Do we revere them enough to defend their interests, preserve their cultures, and ensure a peaceful world for their citizens?

One of the greatest American patriots, John Adams, wrote that the American Revolution was “effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.”

That was the moment when America awoke, when we looked around and understood that we were a nation. We realized who we were, what we valued, and what we would give our lives to defend. From its very first moments, the American story is the story of what is possible when people take ownership of their future.

History is asking us whether we are up to the task. Our answer will be a renewal of will, a rediscovery of resolve, and a rebirth of devotion. We need to defeat the enemies of humanity and unlock the potential of life itself.

The United States of America has been among the greatest forces for good in the history of the world, and the greatest defenders of sovereignty, security, and prosperity for all.

Now we are calling for a great reawakening of nations, for the revival of their spirits, their pride, their people, and their patriotism.

History is asking us whether we are up to the task. Our answer will be a renewal of will, a rediscovery of resolve, and a rebirth of devotion. We need to defeat the enemies of humanity and unlock the potential of life itself.

Our hope is a word and — world of proud, independent nations that embrace their duties, seek friendship, respect others, and make common cause in the greatest shared interest of all: a future of dignity and peace for the people of this wonderful Earth.

This is the true vision of the United Nations, the ancient wish of every people, and the deepest yearning that lives inside every sacred soul.

So let this be our mission, and let this be our message to the world: We will fight together, sacrifice together, and stand together for peace, for freedom, for justice, for family, for humanity, and for the almighty God who made us all.

Thank you. God bless you. God bless the nations of the world. And God bless the United States of America. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

 

Why China won’t push North Korea into a corner of isolation


September 20, 2017

Why China won’t push North Korea into a corner  of isolation–It’s a Question of Trust

by Evan Osnos

http://www.newyorker.com

It is a question of trust–Chinese Leaders trust Trump less than the Rocket Man of North Korea.

At the center of the North Korean nuclear crisis is a pivotal question: How much is China really willing to pressure and punish its longtime ally in Pyongyang? Recent conversations in Beijing and Washington suggest that Chinese leaders have decided to increase pressure substantially but are not—and probably never will be—willing to help President Trump strangle North Korea into submission. China doesn’t trust Kim Jong Un—but it trusts Trump even less.

For decades, China backed North Korea in hostilities with the United States. The fellow Communist armies had fought alongside one another in the Korean War, and North Korea still relies on China for as much as ninety per cent of its overseas trade. In Chairman Mao’s analogy, the two nations were as close as “lips and teeth.” But that is no longer true; since taking power, in 2011, Kim Jong Un, who is suspicious of China’s efforts to control North Korea or spur it to follow its model of economic reform, has openly antagonized the government in Beijing, including launching rockets that would embarrass the Chinese leadership. (Earlier this month, Kim fired a rocket just as Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, was opening an annual summit of developing countries in the Chinese city of Xiamen.)

By several measures, Chinese leaders have become more willing to get tough with Kim. Until recently, Chinese intellectuals rarely questioned China’s commitment to North Korea. But, in March, Shen Zhihua, one of China’s best-known experts on the Korean War, said, in a speech, “We must see clearly that China and North Korea are no longer brothers-in-arms, and in the short term there’s no possibility of an improvement in Chinese-North Korean relations.” The speech circulated widely, without much in the way of official censorship—a sign, to many Chinese analysts, that some of the country’s leaders agree.

When I met Shen last month, in Beijing, he told me, “I think more and more leaders share this view. At a minimum, they think that multiple views should exist.” Shen is a calm, silver-haired scholar who works in a research center at East China Normal University, in Shanghai. As a historian, he believes that long-standing tensions between Beijing and Pyongyang are becoming irreparable. “Officially, they tried to paper over the cracks, but the differences were inevitable,” he said.

Image result for The Rocket Man of North Korea is on a suicide mission

“Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”–President Donald Trump at The United Nations

Shen does not speak for the leadership or advise powerful officials. Rather, his views should be understood as a reflection of the change that is under way in the Chinese establishment. Of North Korea, he said, “I think China doesn’t care who is running the country. Xi and Kim have not met. It used to be a tradition if there is a new leader, to meet him. But not now.” Fundamentally, he said, some have come to believe what was once anathema—that North Korea could one day turn its aggression on China: “Many in China don’t want North Korea to have nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons are, first, threatening to China.”

I wondered if Shen was expressing a minority view. When I met Zhao Tong, who specializes in nuclear issues as a fellow at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, I asked him about Shen’s speech. “I think most people would broadly agree,” Zhao said. “It’s not a warm relationship of ‘brothers.’ ” Given that North Korea has continued to test nuclear weapons in the face of Chinese protests, he said, China would not feel automatically compelled to defend North Korea under their mutual-assistance treaty. “Most Chinese would laugh at the proposal that China should provide security guarantees,” he said.

Zhao ticked off examples of China’s new pressures on Pyongyang: “China has stopped coal imports. That’s a big step. It’s stopped supplying diesel and gas. That’s a big step. It has tightened regulations on companies and financial institutions, and the big ones have stopped doing business with North Korea. It’s the smaller ones that are motivated by narrow interests and are still doing business. China has enhanced inspections of goods at the border. They made efforts to help private-sector companies strengthen their export-control practices.”

But, importantly, Zhao added that it would be a mistake to misread those steps as China signing on, wholesale, to American efforts to force North Korea to the edge of collapse—a tactic, favored in Washington, known as “strategic strangulation.” “No, it’s just balancing Trump and Kim Jong Un,” Zhao said. “The reason China agreed to much tougher sanctions is to calm Trump down.” China has strategic tensions of its own with the U.S., so it is keeping both countries off balance. “It’s basically, ‘Who is the bigger evil?’ For China, the U.S. is always the top geostrategic concern, the top threat.”

Zhao notes that the U.N. sanctions against North Korea that were passed on August 5th, which China supported, stopped short of seeking to undermine trade and humanitarian activities. “They are trying to draw a line between North Korea’s military program and civilian trade. To put more pressure on North Korea, without undermining it. China has been taking the incremental approach,” he said. In Zhao’s view, even though China has agreed to limit oil exports to North Korea, it is unlikely to cut them off entirely, which the Trump Administration believes is a vital step to change Kim’s behavior. “If China remains the sole supplier, meaning Russia won’t step in, I think China would find it very hard to do that,” Zhao said.

There are hard limits to China’s willingness to advance American interests in Asia, because the two powers have deep disagreements—about trade, contested territory in the South China Sea, and Taiwan. As the North Korea crisis has escalated, China has urged the U.S. to consider offering North Korea a deal known as “freeze for freeze,” in which the North would halt further tests if the U.S. halts or reduces joint military exercises with South Korea and Japan—exercises that China resents as well. “I think some Chinese are secretly hoping the North Korean position can actually help drive the U.S. forces away from the Korean Peninsula,” Zhao said. “It is in China’s interest if, in the mid-to-long term, the North Koreans can have a deal with the United States where the U.S. reduces troops or reduces its exercises.”

In recent years, overly hopeful U.S. politicians and commentators have repeatedly misunderstood China’s views of North Korea and assumed that Beijing was, at last, turning against its irksome ally. In private meetings with President Obama, and later with President Trump, Xi has repeated a bottom-line principle about North Korea: “No war. No chaos. No nukes.” A former U.S. official, who was at several of those meetings, told me, “Every American senior official that I know hears, ‘Blah, blah, blah—no nuclear weapons.’ And thinks, ‘Oh, we agree! Excellent!’ So the Chinese ought to be willing to limbo under this bar for us. But, no, that’s third in the list of three strategic priorities. The first two are avoiding war on the Korean Peninsula, and avoiding chaos and collapse.” In that spirit, China has sought to limit the scope of U.S.-backed sanctions in the U.N. Security Council. In the latest round, earlier this month, China succeeded in forcing the U.S. to drop its pursuit of a full oil blockade, which China fears would drive North Korea to collapse.

Nothing worries Chinese officials more than the following scenario: the U.S. uses harsh sanctions and covert action—and possibly military strikes—to drive North Korea close to the point of regime collapse. In turn, Pyongyang lashes out with violence against America or its allies, sparking a full-blown war on China’s border, just as China is trying to maintain delicate economic growth and social stability. Xi, in separate sessions, has offered Obama and Trump the same Chinese adage in reference to North Korea: “When a man is barefoot, he doesn’t fear a man with shoes.” In other words, even if attacking America would be suicide for North Korea, if it sees nothing left to lose, it just might do the unthinkable. For that reason, China, above all, wants the U.S. to avoid backing Kim into a corner from which he has no exit.

Trump is fervently seeking China’s coöperation, but, ironically, his rhetoric and aggression may be putting that further out of reach. On Sunday, Trump mocked Kim as the “Rocket Man.” Members of his Administration have repeated their openness to “military options,” despite projections that air strikes, or other attempts at targeted attacks, could spark a wider war. Chinese intellectuals have taken to joking that “Telangpu”—which is one of the Chinese pronunciations of Trump’s name—sounds like “te meipu,” which means clueless or lacking a plan. In recent months, Trump has alternately praised China and threatened it with a trade war. “I don’t understand Trump,” Shen, the historian, told me. “One day he is saying something good about Xi Jinping and the next he is criticizing him. Trump is becoming more and more of a problem. China is becoming more and more stable.”