See Van Jackson, “Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, no. 3 (2014): 331–56.
Recent descriptions of hedging include: the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, which noted, “our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.” “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC, The White House, 2006), 32; Evan S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005–2006): 145–67; Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,” International Affairs 82, no. 1 (January 2006): 77–94; Wojtek M. Wolfe, “China’s Strategic Hedging,” Orbis 57, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 300–13; Brock F. Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu,” Security Studies 21, no. 2 (April 2012): 192–231.
David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57–85; Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 113–57; Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
Yuen Foong Khong, “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy,” in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, ed. Jae-Jung Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 172–208; Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 305–22; Evelyn Goh, “Understanding ‘Hedging’ in Asia-Pacific Security,” PacNet 43, 31 August 2006; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China,”Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 30, no. 2 (August 2008): 159–85.
Alastair Iain Johnston addresses whether Chinese assertiveness, in addition to military capabilities, has increased over time. Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 7–48.
At times China has sought to de-emphasize conflicts of interest, employing charm offensives with certain countries. See Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
Balancing is typically described as large and sustained increases in defense spending and/or the pursuit of countervailing alliances in order to bridge the security deficit. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Bandwagoning is typically defined as aligning with the source of the danger through offering asymmetric concessions and accepting the illegitimate actions of the dominant ally. See Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” International Organization 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 275–316.
Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: the Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999), 1–32.
David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” 113–57; Robert Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility,” Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations, 21 September 2005.
Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” 305–22; Khong, “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty,” 172–208; Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” 113–57. For an alternative approach to hedging as a risk management strategy, see: Tessman, “System Structure and State Strategy,” 192–231.
Øystein Tunsjø makes a similar observation in the context of Chinese energy security. Tunsjø describes hedging as “a strategy aiming to reconcile conciliation and confrontation in order to remain reasonably well positioned regardless of future developments.” Øystein Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging Against Risk (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 2–3.
Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Engagement and Hedging: Japan’s Strategy toward China,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 32, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2012): 109.
For simplicity, we use the term engagement to apply to fostering positive relations, and the term risk management to cover various forms of balancing behavior. These labels appear in the studies cited above as well as studies of individual countries such as Björn Jerdén and Linus Hagström, “Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of China, 1978–2011,” Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no. 2 (May–August 2012): 215–50; Bjorn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, “Japan’s Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise,” Asian Security 10, no. 1 (2014): 1–21; Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging,” 159–85; Andrew Tan, “The U.S. and China in the Malay Archipelago,” Asia-Pacific Review 17, no. 2 (2010): 26–55; See Seng Tan, “Faced with the Dragon: Perils and Prospects in Singapore’s Ambivalent Relationship with China,”Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 245–65; James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil, “China’s Rise and Middle Power Democracies: Canada and Australia Compared,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12, no. 2 (May 2012): 199–228; James Reilly, “Counting On China?: Australia’s Strategic Response to Economic Interdependence,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 369–94; Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July 2006): 355–95; David C. Kang, “Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea’s response to China,” Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (January–April 2009): 1–28; Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy against an Emergent China: Its Domestic and External Dimensions,” Pacific Affairs 87, no. 1 (March 2014): 5–27; Ann Marie Murphy, “Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand’s Response to China’s Rise,” Asian Security 6, no. 1 (2010): 1–27.
To be clear, not every scholar describes every state as hedging, but almost all recognize the dualism in East Asian states’ policy responses embodied by the welcoming of the benefits from positive relations with China, combined with a need to address future risks.
Adam P. Liff, “Whither the Balancers?” Security Studies (forthcoming).
The balancing-bandwagoning concept was fashioned for larger states and is most useful for analyzing alignment decisions during wartime. It is accordingly less helpful when conflict is not immediately apprehended. Glenn H. Snyder writes that the “balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy is… unfortunate… [and] obscures the full range of choices within the alliance realm and inhibits more discriminating analysis.” Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” International Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 121–42. Ann Marie Murphy argues that we need to move beyond the dichotomy in “Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning,” 1–27.
Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging,” 159–85; Chan, Looking for Balance.
Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong,” 57–85; Kang, China Rising; Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” 113–57.
Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China,” 355–95.
Chan, Looking for Balance, 51.
Ibid. See also Daniel H. Nexon, “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Politics 61, no. 2 (April 2009): 330–59.
Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation,” 275–316.
Compare this to balancing and bandwagoning, which are legitimate alternatives. Hedging is not an alternative to balancing and bandwagoning, since it is optimal for a state to avoid balancing and bandwagoning and instead hedge wherever possible. Note that we do not argue that fostering positive political and economic relations can never further security interests. The strategies of engagement and binding described by Schweller are designed to reduce the risk that a dissatisfied power will resort to war. Our argument is that including these strategies as part of the hedging concept offers little analytical traction because they do not involve costly trade-offs, admitting no variation in state behaviour and offering little insight into a state’s alignment choice: Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers,” 1–31.
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Kuik makes a deft attempt to distinguish variation within hedging strategies, but even his identification of different behaviors admits to only minor variation and relies on policy differences between Malaysian and Thailand on one hand, and Singapore and Indonesia on the other, which in our view are marginal at best. Kuik, “Essence of Hedging,” 166.
Nexon, “Balance of Power in the Balance,” 330–59.
Goh explicitly defines hedging as the avoidance of trade-offs: Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005), 22–23.
On the need for signals to be costly to be credible, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68–90.
In this construction, the potential for competition does not nullify bases for cooperation, but the potential for cooperation does not remove the risk of competition.
James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 270–97; James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?”Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (June 2000): 63–83.
This definition of alignment is simply a weak form of alliance, which Alastair Smith defines as a voluntary agreement between two states representing a nonbinding commitment to help each other in the event of a conflict. Alastair Smith, “Alliance Formation and War,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (December 1995): 405–25. See also Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” 270–97. Alignments include alliances, but unlike alliances do not require an explicit commitment. However, because anything that an alliance accomplishes during wartime can also be accomplished without a prewar alliance, alliances are still just a signal and thus can be thought of as a subset of the broader alignment phenomenon. See Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” 63–83.
Our setup derives from the discussion of alliances by James D. Morrow. States have preferred ideal points over international issues, and their security is defined as their ability to maintain the status quo on issues currently in a favorable equilibrium. See James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904–33.
The spectrum is informed by: John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); Zachary Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing With?: The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony,” Security Studies 22, no. 2 (April 2013): 330–64.
Table 1 Spectrum of Security Alignment Behaviors.
Formal alliances are normally accompanied by the building of alliance bureaucracies that provide a specific instrument to coordinate behavior thereby strengthening the signal of shared interests.
Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun discuss the cost-benefit trade-off in the context of alliances. Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why do States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (November 2007): 1118–32.
Prewar planning or coordination improves the expected outcome from fighting. Alignment may also bring positive (nonsecurity) externalities, economically if it fosters trade or investment relationships, diplomatically if alignment increases the state’s influence in international affairs, and domestically if the alignment generates prestige for government leaders. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” 270–97.
Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” 63–83.
Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 261–91.
In the alliance literature this is referred to as an “asymmetric alliance.” Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” 904–33.
On the trade-off between the fear of entrapment and the fear of abandonment inherent in all alliances, see Glenn H. Snyder, “Theory: Alliance Management” in Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
The theoretical and empirical debate surrounding whether reputation inferences are drawn in international relations is vigorous. Do an opponent’s past actions affect policymakers’ expectations of how it will behave in the present? Some empirical studies question whether reputation matters: Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965–1990 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). However, more recent efforts offer both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence re-establishing reputation’s importance: Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 371–93; Keren Yarhi-Milo and Alex Weisiger, “Revisiting Reputation: How do Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International Organization (forthcoming). We do not seek to decide this debate here, but observe that it matters what the great power’s reputation is for—the circumstances in which resolve is at stake. See Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” 380; Douglas M. Gibler, “The Cost of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (June 2008): 425–54; Marc J. C. Crescenzi, Jacob D. Kathman, Katja B. Kleinburg, and Reed M. Wood, “Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance Formation,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 2 (June 2012): 259–74; Gregory D. Miller, The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances before the First World War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).
Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?,” 63–83.
Secondary states can still engage in policy disputes with great power alignment partners that have no bearing on alignment posture. The question is whether signals are being sent which undermine the scale of and commitment to security cooperation.
Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Measuring Economic Interdependence: A Geopolitical Perspective,” Geopolitics and International Boundaries 1, no. 3 (1996): 225–46.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
We thank an anonymous reviewer for cogently arguing this point.
Two founding members included the Philippines and Vietnam who, at the time, were engaged in serious and ongoing territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.
Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” 270–97.
South Korea does have an overlapping claim with China over Socotra Rock (known as Ieodo in South Korea and Suyan Rock in China). We classify this claim is minor, however, due to statements by both sides downplaying the dispute and because the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea classifies the rock as a submerged reef that cannot be claimed as territory. Thailand’s recent history of political upheaval and its increasing skepticism of the United States raise questions at the time of writing (early 2015) about whether Thailand will alter its alignment in the future. Nevertheless, this domestic political instability makes it difficult for us to examine its alignment decisions in this treatment.
Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone does overlap with China’s nine-dash line, but Indonesia has thus far maintained that it is not a claimant to disputes in the South China Sea. See Prashanth Parameswaran, “Indonesia Avoids Open Territorial Dispute, Despite Concerns,” China Brief
14, no. 13, 3 July 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42584&no_cache=1#.U_IChWMd3Sg
. Brunei has claimed the southern Spratly Islands as part of its continental shelf, but Brunei does not occupy any land features in the region and has not attempted to enforce its claims. See Tessa Jamandre, “Brunei Snubs Phl, Others on United Stand vs. China,” Philippine Star
, 3 March 2014, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/03/03/1296636/brunei-snubs-phl-others-united-stand-vs.-china
On its face, South Korea would seem an even better case study of a reserved ally than Australia, given that its economic interdependence with China is arguably even deeper than Australia’s and its proximity to the mainland increases its exposure to destabilizing activity in the region. However, we do not consider South Korea to be an appropriate case because its dominant security challenge arises not from managing great power relationships, but from a third party: Seoul remains focused on the danger of North Korean provocation, its nuclear and missile programs, and the potential for a political and humanitarian crisis if the regime in Pyongyang collapses. South Korea’s arguable strengthening of security ties with the United States in recent years may accordingly have less to do with how it evaluated the trade-offs of closer alignment with the United States or China, and more with the possibility of an increased threat from Pyongyang. The North Korea situation thus represents a potentially confounding variable that may bias any inference. The impact of third party security threats on hedging behavior thus lies outside the scope of our model. This is regrettable given the central policy importance of Seoul’s efforts to balance its relationships with Washington and Beijing, and we hope future research can extend our framework to incorporate this security dynamic.
Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “Far Eastern Promises: Why Washington Should Focus on Asia,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (May 2014): 106–16.
Ely Ratner, “Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China,” Washington Quarterly 36, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 21–38.
David Fouse, “Japan’s New Defense Policy for 2010: Hardening the Hedge,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 23, no. 3 (2011): 489–501; Axel Berkofsky, “Japan’s December 2010 ‘National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)’: The ‘Big Bang’ of Japanese Security and Defense Policies?” Korean Review of International Studies 14, no. 1 (2011): 33–52.
For prior calls for a more robust U.S.-Japan alliance, see Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, ed., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
Echoing the importance of Japan’s ability to defend U.S. forces, U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey noted that, “The Japanese Self Defense Forces’ ability and willingness to not only protect themselves, but their closest partners… is an important step for the region,” quoted in Jim Garamone, “Chairman Stresses Value of Military Partnerships,” DoD News
, 2 July 2014, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122597
“Joint Statement of Security Consultative Committee,” 3 October 2013.
For Prime Minister Abe, the Secrets Law was important because its perceived value in advancing Japan’s commitment to information security, as outlined in the October 2013 2+2 Agreement between the United States and Japan. The Secrets Law also indicates in Article 3 that such activities as “mutual defense support between Japan and the United States” would be designated as “special secrets.” Also see “Tokutei Himitsu no Hogo ni kansuru Hōritsu
(Act on Protection of Specified Secrets),” Japanese Diet
, 6 December 2013, http://search.e-gov.go.jp/servlet/PcmFileDownload?seqNo=0000103648
Nick Bisley, “‘An Ally for All the Years to Come’: Why Australia is not a Conflicted US Ally,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 4 (August 2013): 403–18.
Ross Babbage describes a possible defense policy option which would reduce dependence on the United States through heavy investments in military capabilities, but which would be highly costly, possibly requiring a 25–50 percent increase in defense spending over ten years. Ross Babbage, “Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030,” Kokoda Paper, no. 15, February 2011.
Hugh White, ”Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing,” Quarterly Essay 39 (2010): 1–74; Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Sydney: Black, 2012).
The ADIZ announcement was described as “unhelpful” by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop. John Kerin, “Bishop Queries China over Air Rights Claim,” Australian Financial Review, 27 November 2013, 6.
Ross Fitzgerald, “No Time to be Meekly Standing By, Placating Other Lands,” Australian, 4 January 2014, 12.
“PM’s High Wire Act,” Australian Financial Review, 3 July 2013, 52.
Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge,” 22–23.
John D. Ciorciari and Jessica Chen Weiss, “The Sino-Vietnamese Standoff in the South China Sea,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 13, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2012): 61–69; Tomotaka Shoji, “Vietnam, ASEAN, and the South China Sea: Unity or Diverseness?” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, 14, no. 1 (December 2011): 3–21.
Ciorciari and Weiss describe these moves as “the most significant defense opening in decades.” Ciorciari and Weiss, “The Sino-Vietnamese Standoff in the South China Sea,” 64.
Shoji, “Vietnam, ASEAN, and the South China Sea,” 14.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “South China Sea Two-Step,” Wall Street Journal, 25 November 2011, 12.
Some examples are increases in high-level diplomatic and military visits between the two nations and expanded security collaboration on issues like the use of Cam Ranh Bay. See Carl Thayer, “Vietnam Gradually Warms up to US Military,” Diplomat
, 6 November 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/vietnam-gradually-warms-up-to-us-military/
; Greg Torode, “Hanoi Plays Up Beijing Ties Ahead of Panetta Visit,” South China Morning Post
, 3 June 2012, 1.
The extent to which May 2014 was a turning point is evidenced by the fact that just a few months prior, Vietnamese media had been instructed to downplay grievances with China on the 35th anniversary of the Sino-Vietnamese border war in effort to sustain positive relations. Trung Nguyen, “Vietnam Muted Ahead of Border War Anniversary,” Voice of America
, 12 February 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/vietnam-muted-ahead-of-border-war-anniversary/1850215.html
Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 35, no. 3 (December 2013): 360.
See, for example, Greg Torode, “Keeping Ghosts at Bay,” South China Morning Post
, 10 June 2012, http://www.scmp.com/article/1003573/keeping-ghosts-bay
. Moreover, the oilrig incident sparked a populist backlash, with violent protests across Vietnam during which Chinese and other foreign-owned businesses were attacked, damaging Vietnam’s economic reputation. Chris Buckley and Edward Wong, “Unrest Poses a Risky Choice for Vietnam,” New York Times
, 17 May 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/world/asia/in-vietnam-indignation-toward-china-is-likely-to-linger.html
S. R. Nathan, “Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Beginnings and Future” (speech at the MFA Diplomatic Academy’s Inaugural S. Rajaratnam Lecture, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, 10 March 2008).
Singapore signed a Strategic Framework Agreement with the United States in 2005, and an Agreement on Defense Exchanges and Security Cooperation with China in 2008. “S’pore, US Deepen Security Partnership,” Straits Times
, 13 July 2005; “Sino-Singaporean Joint Exercise Boosts Military Ties: Defense Ministry,” Xinhua News Agency
, 24 June 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/china/military/2009-06/24/content_18008128.htm
. See also “Stealth Bomber Diplomacy,” Straits Times
, 3 July 2011.
“US Expected to Keep Up Asian Military Presence,” Straits Times, 7 April 2012; “US Closest Defense Partner of S’pore,” Straits Times, 7 April 2012.
“Sino-S’pore Bond is Special, Says Ng Eng Hen,” Straits Times, 22 June 2012.
“Leaders Hail Close Ties, High Points,” Straits Times, 5 September 2013.
Lee Hsien Loong, “China and the World: Prospering and Progressing Together” (speech at Central Party School, Beijing, 6 September 2012).
“Reply by Minister for Defence Dr. Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Question on the US Pivot Towards Asia,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 16 October 2012.
The decision was mentioned in passing by the Straits Times in a story about broader US force posture in the region. Jermyn Chow and Ben Nadarajan, “US Navy to Move 60% of Warships to Asia,” Straits Times, 3 June 2012. However, it had been discussed for some time. See “U.S. Plans to Deploy Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore,” Singapore Government News, 4 June 2011.
Seng Tan, “Faced with the Dragon,” 254.