ASEAN is a crucial balancing force in Asia for the United States


April 1, 2018

Foreign Policy: ASEAN is a crucial balancing force in Asia for the United States

by Gary Clyde Hufbauer,Peterson Institute for International Economics

http://www.eastasiaforum.org

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At the APEC Summit in November 2017, US President Donald Trump declared, ‘We are not going to let the United States be taken advantage of anymore … I am always going to put America first’.

 

Considering Trump’s ‘America First’ philosophy and his disdain for past trade agreements — sentiments proclaimed at the Da Nang APEC summit and on numerous other occasions — it’s reasonable to conclude that ASEAN plays no role in Trump’s world view. But Trump is President for a defined term. His views on US relations with the rest of the world neither represent mainstream opinion nor define the importance of ASEAN to the United States.

ASEAN, in fact, is vitally important to the United States for several reasons.Perhaps most importantly, ASEAN has successfully pursued good politics alongside good economics. At its inception in 1967, ASEAN was intended to put an end to guerrilla conflicts between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Owing in large measure to ASEAN, those conflicts have long since been relegated to the history books.

Today ASEAN serves both as an economic partner with China and as a bulwark against incremental Chinese expansion. None of the ASEAN countries individually carries much heft in geopolitical contests but collectively they represent a considerable force. The United States badly needs regional powers that can counterbalance China’s growing geopolitical footprint. The three most important powers in this respect are India, Japan and ASEAN.

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India’s Prime Minister Modi with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Malaysian PM Najib Razak in Manila. (ANI)

ASEAN has also fostered the explosive growth of supply chains, both among its members and with outside powers, notably China, the United States, Japan and Europe. No one in 1967 thought much about supply chains. Trade was dominated by natural resources on the one hand (such as oil, copper and other commodities) and finished products made by vertically integrated firms on the other (including clothing, furniture, steel and turbines).

The supply chain revolution has enabled the magic of comparative advantage to operate on a far grander scale since each component — of a good or a service — can now be produced or assembled in the best location. The revolution has greatly benefited the United States with less expensive footwear, TVs, computers, smart phones and many other products.

ASEAN’s success has served as a paradigm for troubled regions elsewhere. The United States has grown weary of its erstwhile role as ‘policeman of the world’, but fortunately the need for this service is greatly diminished when neighbouring countries get along. An immensely successful regional grouping, patterned after ASEAN, is the Pacific Alliance that joins Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico.

Groupings in Africa are less successful. The Arab Maghreb Union is perhaps the least successful, joining only on paper the North African states from Morocco to Libya. ASEAN can pride itself on providing a model for successful regional groups elsewhere and being an aspiration for the less successful groups.

ASEAN Summit meetings, at which leaders dialogue with external powers such as China, Europe, Japan, India, Australia and the United States, make it much easier for US political leaders to hold productive meetings with their regional counterparts. The time of senior ministers is their scarcest resource. The ability of US Secretaries of Commerce, State, Treasury and other departments to meet with all the leaders of Southeast Asia in a single week is highly valued.

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US President Donald Trump with Cambodia’s Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen in Manila (2017)

Future ASEAN integration could provide a strong lure for future US Presidents to reconsider membership in the renewed Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Three ASEAN members — Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam — are already members of the CPTPP. Conceivably, over the next five years, the CTTPP will expand to include Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and perhaps one or two other ASEAN members.

Future US Presidents will have to reconsider the political and economic losses resulting from self-inflicted exclusion from such a powerful bloc. The case for US membership will be strengthened if the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is concluded between China, India, all of ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

By enlarging trade between its members, ASEAN has significantly raised standards of living across Southeast Asia. The United States prospers when the rest of the world prospers. The global expansion of trade and investment over the past 70 years has made an enormous contribution to levels of well being worldwide, especially in Asia.

Indeed, according to the pioneering analysis by Angus Maddison of economic growth over the very long term, the post-World War II period has been the best in human history. As part of this advance, ASEAN has dramatically improved the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of its people.

ASEAN leaders and observers should look beyond the shadow of neglect emanating from the current administration in Washington. Over the longer term, there can be no doubt as to the importance of ASEAN not only for US geopolitical goals in Asia but also for US prosperity through economic interdependence.

Gary Clyde Hufbauer is a Reginald Jones Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC.

This article appeared in the most recent version of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Why ASEAN Matters’.

Foreign Policy: Tenets of Thailand’s ASEAN Engagement


March 30, 2018

Foreign Policy: Tenets of Thailand’s ASEAN Engagement

by John Blaxland and Greg Raymond, ANU

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(L-R) Malaysia Prime Minister Najib Razak, Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, Thailand Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Brunei Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen, Indonesia President Joko Widodo and Laos Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith join hands during a family photo before the 31st Asean Summit in Manila on Monday, November 13, 2017. AFP PHOTO

ASEAN member states have different perspectives on the significance of the grouping. As one of the founder member states, the second largest economy and a leading state within ASEAN, Thailand’s view is important. A survey of 1800 former and current Thai officials conducted from 2014–17 on Thailand’s relationship with great powers demonstrates that despite Bangkok’s reputation for hard realism in its foreign policy, ASEAN surprisingly seems to matter a great deal to Thailand in terms of regional security and prosperity.

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Thailand’s Prime Minster Prayuth Chan-ocha

Respondents considered ASEAN to be very important in terms of regional prosperity, with 72.3 per cent rating it eight or higher (very important) out of ten on the Likert scale. In terms of ASEAN’s importance to security and stability, the rating was not as high but still significant, with 67.36 per cent rating it eight or higher.

Positioned centrally among the mainland Southeast Asian states and with relatively advanced infrastructure, Thailand benefits from closer integration with its Southeast Asian neighbours. That benefit is shared across the region as the reach of transport and infrastructure projects increases.

Not surprisingly, Thai respondents saw the advent of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015 as a positive development. Intra-ASEAN trade is now bigger than trade with any single external partner. In Thailand’s case, exports to ASEAN are bigger than exports to China, the United States, Japan or the European Union. As ASEAN’s share of world gross domestic product continues to increase, this market of more than 640 million will offer opportunity to reduce reliance on external powers.

Security is a more complicated question. While the creation of ASEAN was never ostensibly about any form of mutual security pact, its formation always had a security dimension that was internal to ASEAN rather than external. After the US withdrawal from Vietnam (in 1975) and the consolidation of communist regimes in mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand decided to prioritise relations with its neighbours. For Thai policymakers, ASEAN has remained integral to Thailand’s security and is perceived as almost an article of faith.

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Yet this faith is not blind and Thai respondents frequently pointed out ASEAN’s shortcomings. There is no expectation that ASEAN will present a unified front to the world in political or foreign policy terms. A senior Thai prime ministerial adviser argued that ‘if ASEAN was a nation it would be very mixed. Brunei is a monarchy, others are communist. Some are democracies, some are not. Some are Buddhist, while others are largely Muslim or Christian’. Similarly, a serving Thai military officer declared that making progress on security, humanitarian assistance or even joint task forces would take time because of the differences in politics, economies and levels of prosperity.

Balancing the great powers is a key issue for Thailand. ASEAN now organises a wide range of meetings to help member states’ relations with external powers. One officer declared: ‘In ASEAN I speak with many people. They don’t want the superpowers to come in and dominate. That is the concept. There are various mechanisms to balance the powers’.

This task is complicated further by China’s growing influence across the region, notably in Cambodia and Laos. Like these two countries, Thailand is on a path of integration with the Southeast Asian mainland, including with southern China. The greater inter-connectedness with China impinges on member states’ perceived freedom of political and economic action.

History plays a role too. As noted by one senior intelligence official, the unity of ASEAN is ‘a little bit weak and shaken’ because of the past: ‘Thailand, for instance, used to invade Laos and Cambodia, and Myanmar invaded Thailand. That makes achieving consensus within ASEAN all the more difficult’. As suggested by the same intelligence official, ASEAN members will need to learn how to forgive and overcome past grievances if the organisation is to become ‘stronger and more united’.

Despite the enduring reasons for distrust and enmity, countries involved in various ASEAN-related forums remain eager to participate — in part to keep a check on each other’s intentions and initiatives. In the case of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) forum, the significant work undertaken by expert working groups feeds into the ADMM Plus summits and provides much of the detail for the practical application and development of ideas to enhance collaboration. Collaboration in the ADMM Plus realm covers the domains of cyber security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peace-keeping operations, and military medicine and humanitarian mine action.

Progress has been slow and steady but over time these groups have generated significant outcomes, including seminars, workshops, exercises and conferences. Combined, they provide an extraordinary range of opportunities for enhanced cooperation, increased mutual understanding and familiarity with other member states.

In essence, the Thai establishment sees ASEAN as a proto-great power. Thanks to the perpetuation of the notion of ASEAN centrality and despite its remarkable diversity, ASEAN gives comfort to its members that their otherwise relatively insignificant international roles amount to more than the sum of their parts. That sense of centrality, fragile though it is, has been perpetuated through the various forums that have ASEAN at their core. Thais argue that it remains in the interests of the member states for this centrality to continue. But in an era of growing great power contestation that may be increasingly difficult.

John Blaxland is Professor of International Security and Intelligence Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and Director of the Southeast Asia Institute, The Australian National University.

Greg Raymond is a Research Fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University, and co-editor of the journal Security Challenges.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, Why ASEAN matters’. John Blaxland and Greg Raymond’s research was funded by the Minerva Research Institute.

The Trump Factor in the New World Order


January 1, 2018

The Trump Factor in the New World Order

by Editorial Board, East Asia Forum

 

Image result for America First Donald TrumpThe Inward Looking President of The United States of America  has not changed the game in Asia or around the world: it has been changing for a long time and will continue to change regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. Trump should stop imagining that he can make a difference except to cede Asia to China.
 

 

How much difference has US President Donald Trump made to America’s standing in the world? Despite the almost daily awe and horror that has accompanied media coverage of the first year of his presidency there is a view that Trump has barely made a dent on the structural trends that are paring back America’s influence in Asia and around the world. That influence was well on the wane before Trump took the keys to the White House, says Evan Feigenbaum. Hugh White sees President Trump as merely accelerating America’s inevitable retreat from Asia in the face of China’s rise.

Trump has created uncertainty in the global system in spades — with his loose play in the North Korean crisis, his assault on the international trading system and his retreat from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — but he is responsible neither for China’s rise nor for the recent shifts we have seen in Asian alignments. After the global financial crisis, traditional export-led Asian economic strategies could no longer count on robust growth from American demand. Domestic demand was called in as a new driver of growth and as an intra-regional hedge against uncertainty. The structural changes now working in China’s favour — some at America’s expense — all pre-date Mr Trump. He has not changed the game in Asia or around the world: it has been changing for a long time and will continue to change regardless of who sits in the Oval Office.

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If Trump has a strategy, it is to accept America’s diminished global reach and to protect against the rapacity of China and the rest. That is the game he was dealt, not the game he has delivered (so this argument runs).

Trump may be more a symptom than a cause of America’s problems. Bernie Sanders was symptomatic of a similar retreat from global leadership on the Democratic side of US politics. A stagnant median income, growing inequality and the lack of a social safety net or adequate social protections has led to most Americans missing out on the benefits of an open and innovative economy. Those structural problems will get worse before they get better with the tax bill to which Trump and the US Congress recently gave the green light.

Leadership in Asia demands an economy that can be translated into strategic power. Japan, Australia, all of East Asia and India are now deeply integrated economically with China. There may be ambivalence about the rise of China, and economic integration is yet to translate into comprehensive political security between China and its partners. But the United States is going about deploying its diminished economic heft in a counterproductive way and the TPP was never going to rebuild America’s geo-economic dominance in the face of China’s growth and continued openness.

Nor does China’s newfound economic heft automatically translate into strategic weight — much less into regional or global leadership.

Leadership in Asia needs an overarching strategic framework that leverages economic, military and diplomatic power together towards a grand strategic goal. Trump’s answer to America’s new predicament is to abandon the grand US strategic goal that has engaged the world’s multilateral assets over three-quarters of a century and instead to opt for the reasserting the use of bilateral power at a time when America has lost its economic muscle and is limited in critical theatres to an Armageddon military option. This is a curious response to America’s new diminished circumstance.

In this week’s lead, David Camroux says that the United States could once have plausibly been described as the world’s ‘indispensable power’. ‘Perhaps thirty years from now we will look back on US President Donald Trump’s first official visit to East Asia as the moment when the United States abandoned a superpower role in Asia and grudgingly accepted that hegemonic power in the region would be shared with China’.

For Camroux, this is not an accidental outcome delivered by a leader swept haplessly along in the vast currents of our times. ‘The breakdown of [America’s] Asia foreign policy status quo involves a combination of wilful negligence and discreet sabotage’.

‘Abandoning the TPP fell into the first category, while the hollowing out of the US State Department is a combination of both. Ten months after Trump’s inauguration, many senior positions in the State Department still have not been filled. Some one hundred senior diplomats have left and the threat of a one-third budget cut remains. The Trump administration’s gratuitous assault on multilateral institutions and agreements such as the WTO, UNESCO and the Paris Climate Change Agreement is being conducted in the same vein’, says Camroux.

Camroux sees Trump’s November 2017 trip to East Asia as a demonstration that his administration had largely abandoned two of the three pillars of America’s bipartisan foreign policy edifice. In relation to North Korea there was a bellicose reaffirmation of the US commitment to playing sheriff, while the multilateral economic and soft power dimensions were substantially abandoned.

US proposals for bilateral trade deals were greeted with polite silence. Given the Trump administration’s drive to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement and the US–Korea Free Trade Agreement as part of its ‘America first’ agenda, US credibility as a trustworthy trading partner has been severely compromised.

While ‘the United States has been seeking to weaken the international institutions it helped establish, China has been creating new international institutions to further its aims’. The most visible in Asia is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It is by no means clear that the objective of Chinese leadership is to supplant existing institutions with its new initiatives like the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative. ‘Still, in terms of articulating a long-term vision, China’s Belt and Road dwarfs anything that Trump seems capable of offering’, says Camroux.

The fear that a new world order might evolve into a Chinese creature of influence has gone mildly viral in countries which thus far have put all bets on the alliance relationship with the United States. This is not to be unexpected: security communities struggle to justify alliance relationships that have been injected with such uncertainty by Mr Trump.

As Camroux concludes, the world we see today is far less open to hegemonic influence — China has a powerful interest in appealing to multilateralism (as in its 19th Party Congress pledges) in order to manage its many problems in the world. How the world is ordered in the future will much depend on whether other powers (in Asia and elsewhere including the European Union) can compensate for the US vacuum and help to preserve and promote an open multipolar international environment.

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The ‘United States Factor’ in Southeast Asia: The Philippine and Singaporean (Re)assesments


December 31, 2017

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Number 408 | December 27, 2017

ANALYSIS

The ‘United States Factor’ in Southeast Asia: The Philippine and Singaporean (Re)assesments

By Ithrana Lawrence

Despite reports on the unpredictability of Washington’s Asia policy, the Trump Administration, through telephone diplomacy, high-level bilateral visits, attendance at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asian Summit (EAS) and bilateral meetings in Vietnam and the Philippines, has displayed a “post-pivot” US commitment to the region and its multilateral initiatives. This aside, its engagement framed by collective action on North Korea, and a lack of specific concrete regional cooperatives, plays into Southeast Asia’s long-term anxiety.

This anxiety is addressed by Southeast Asian  leaders recalibrating their external engagements, including relations with the United States, in their strategic pursuit of policy maneuverability, autonomy, and prosperity. The cases of the Philippines and Singapore highlight how regional countries are coping with “The United States Factor”.

The Philippines’ Realignment under President Rodrigo Duterte

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Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines’ perception of the US role in the region has changed. Although recognized as a major non-NATO US ally since 2003, the Philippines increasingly views China as an important and economically attractive source of support, and Manila has shown an increasing willingness to accommodate Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS). Despite a 66 year-old alliance, the Philippines is diverging from the United States on issues of security and governance.

Duterte’s announced “separation” from the United States and refusal to visit Washington despite Trump’s invitation are efforts to chart an independent foreign policy. Distance from the U.S. is a price President Duterte seems eager to pay. Although the Obama-Aquino administrations’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) allowing US military forces and weapons to be stationed in the Philippines was ruled constitutional and has not been abrogated, Manila is wary of implementation. For example, the Philippine Defense Secretary remarked it was “unlikely” that the United States would be allowed to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) from the Philippines “to avoid any provocative actions that can escalate tensions” as the “US can fly over there coming from other bases.” Similarly, Duterte downplayed US assistance in Marawi despite the US Embassy in Manila reporting a donation of planes, weapons, technical assistance, and humanitarian aid worth $56 million in 2017 – recognizing instead the contributions of China and Russia on the same day Secretary of Defense Mattis arrived in Manila.

Doubts about US commitment of the United States to defend the Philippines in the event of a conflict with China in the South China Sea have driven President Duterte to chart an engagement strategy avoiding over-reliance on Washington. China’s symbolic $14.4 million arms package was delivered as the US Congress disapproved a sale of assault rifles for the Philippine National Police (PNP) due to concerns of state sanctioned human rights violations in the ‘war on drugs’. The Philippines has leveraged competition in the region, securing Beijing’s pledge of $24 billion in infrastructure (including free infrastructure) projects in Davao and Manila, and $22.7 million in Marawi; alongside Tokyo’s $8.8 billion “maximum support” to rebuild Marawi.

Duterte’s Philippines has shown selective accommodation to China’s assertiveness as it recognizes the opportunities of engaging a rising China. Recent examples include the removal of a hut on a sandbar upon Beijing’s protest, not openly protesting territorial incursions, and allowing Chinese ships to survey within Philippine territory. That being said, the Philippines remains committed to its territorial sovereignty, with the Philippine Navy deployed to guard current claims.

The Trump administration’s generally absent rhetoric on human rights, and praise for the war on drugs has improved bilateral leadership camaraderie. All anti-US outbursts over the year aside, President Duterte’s ‘karaoke diplomacy’ at the ASEAN Summit gala dinner signals an affinity for the commander in chief of the United States.

Singapore’s Longstanding Alignment

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Despite China’s growing economic significance, political assertiveness, and security provocations in the SCS, Singapore’s alignment responses have been different than those of the Philippines. Singapore is partnering closer with Washington than with Beijing on most issues, and the United States is still viewed as an indispensable partner, significant to the development and security of the island state. While Singapore boasts a high degree of military technology, interoperability, and physical infrastructure to host the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s logistics command, its refusal to be recognized as a major non-NATO US ally reflects the island-state’s maintenance of a public non-aligned strategic engagement.

Although China is the island-state’s top trading partner, the United States remains its largest foreign investor with stock totaling $228 billion and an annual bilateral trade surplus. Singapore’s open support of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 2016 ruling and non-claimant concern over freedom of navigation in its regional waters faced high-cost pressure from Beijing: seizure of military equipment in Hong Kong en-route from exercises in Taiwan, cancellation of the 2016 high level Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) and apparent non-invitation of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. Although showing resolve to face China’s growing pressure, a subsequent delegation of high-level officials to Beijing followed by Prime Minister Lee’s own visit is symbolic of Beijing’s growing significance as a partner not to be openly defied. Singapore looks to harness China’s economic engagement with the region specifically as a global financial services hub for the Belt and Road Initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

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Singapore remains a strong advocate for US engagement in the region, with a pledge to facilitate initiatives for regional counter-terrorism efforts upon assuming ASEAN Chairmanship in 2018. Bilaterally, Prime Minister Lee’s pledge to extend to 2018 his country’s support for the anti-IS coalition in the Middle East (the only Asian country to contribute personnel) and deployment of helicopters to hurricane relief efforts in Texas are symbolic of Singapore’s activism and the leadership’s institutionalized affinity for the United States. The progressive deepening of defense cooperatives also witnessed the first bilateral naval exercise taking place off the coast of Guam, following the deployment of the Singapore Air Force (RSAF) there for joint training in April.

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The lack of transparency on Malaysia’s deals with China is worrying

 

The Philippine and Singaporean alignments demonstrate models that can be expanded to other Southeast Asian countries. There are signs countries like Indonesia and Malaysia are reassessing the traditional role of the United States and to a certain extent adjusting their external engagements as the systemic conditions that placed the United States as the key security protector, economic patron, and diplomatic partner at the end of the Cold War are changing. Future research on asymmetrical alignment under uncertainty should examine these states.

About the Author

Ithrana Lawrence, is a former Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington. She can be contacted at Ithrana.L@gmail.com

The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue.

Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options.

The Asia Pacific Bulletin (APB) series is produced by the East-West Center in Washington.

APB Series Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye, Director, East-West Center in Washington
APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente, East-West Center in Washington

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with which the author is affiliated.

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Foreign Policy: South Korean Perspective on Trump’s Visit to Asia


November 23, 2017

South Korean Perspective on Trump’s Visit to Asia

by Joonhyung Kim@www.asiasentinel.com

 

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“America First” is fundamentally different from pursuing national interests. In essence, it is tough diplomacy that has no regard for means and methods in pursuit of interests, changing anything that is disadvantageous to the US, regardless whether the opponent is an ally or a foe.Joonhyung Kim

 

It is now time to cool down and check the balance sheet of US President Trump’s Asia trip calmly. The whole world was awaiting the tour, a year after he was elected.

In addition, there were considerable implications in the destinations he visited. The Korean Peninsula is on the brink of war due to the North Korean nuclear crisis. Japan is getting even closer to the US following its eight-year honeymoon with President Barack Obama and China is starting to show its teeth in a hegemonic confrontation with Washington.

There was the possibility of an unforeseeable eventuality during Trump’s visit, considering that Trump has used the crisis on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia with the mindset of a businessman under his “America First” policy.

Despite this, it seems that most observers consider the visits as being better than feared. During his trip to South Korea, he made little to no aggressive remarks that might have heightened the crisis, and differences between South Korea and the US did not stand out. Trump’s trademark provocative tweets were also generally absent.

Not much could be new 

In fact, as this summit was the fourth meeting between the Presidents of the US and South Korea, and the third bilateral meeting in just six months since the Moon administration was inaugurated, nothing much could be new. Public confirmation of the solidarity of the alliance and cooperation against North Korea has always accompanied these meetings.

Items of interest included whether trade issues such as a renegotiation of the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), increasing South Korean contribution to US forces stationed on their soil, or confirming early deployment of THAAD would be discussed, as well as how much Trump would seek to pressure Moon. The South Korean government seems to have focused on building friendship through hospitality and on controlling possible damage rather than persuading the US or expecting big things. The unexpected visit to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek and large armament deal were positive factors that South Korea wanted.

The sensitive issues mentioned above and Trump’s address to the South Korean National Assembly, which possibly could have been another UN General Assembly-type speech, inflamed by Trump’s National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, who mentioned that military options on the Korean Peninsula would be a priority, worried the South Korean government. This is especially so because South Korea and China jointly announced that additional THAAD deployments, South Korea’s participation in joint Missile Defense with the US, and a military alliance between South Korea, Japan, and the US would not be an option just a week before Trump visited South Korea.

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 Despite these concerns, many inside and outside South Korea believe that Trump’s visit was quite successful. The most important factor is that Trump didn’t resort to his typical blunt remarks or unpredictable actions. He didn’t say or do anything that would hurt the pride of South Koreans, didn’t heighten the threat of war by saying he would destroy North Korea as he did in his address to the UN, and maintained a cautious and toned-down appearance. One can agree that Trump showed a different side of himself.

However, it is difficult to agree with the assessment that Trump’s visit was one where South Korea paid what it had to pay and earned what it could. It was, instead, one where the US got what it wanted from South Korea. It was unidirectional. Trump behaved as though it was a prerogative of the United States as Korea’s guardian when he visited the large-scale high-tech US military base, even with South Korea picking up 92 percent of the bill.

He didn’t, however, forget to criticize the KORUS FTA in the joint press conference with Moon after the summit. As he was celebrating the first anniversary of his presidential election, Trump was busy bragging about the fruits of his “America First” policy to his domestic audience. His emphasis was on the fact that he sold weapons and that this would help decrease the trade deficit and create new jobs.

Moon, on the contrary, was unable to secure any benefits or emphasize negotiation with North Korea or promote the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative.

Trump focuses on the alliance’s cost 

Although one can agree that the strength of the South Korea-US alliance was confirmed, it seems that we are blind to the cold reality that the cost of maintaining this alliance is increasing sharply. Trump repeatedly referred to South Korea as a great ally and a perpetual ally, more than a simple alliance partner. However, he was more into taking benefits in response to the nuclear crisis. The principle that reciprocity and national interests come first could not be found, even if we consider that the South Korea-US alliance is asymmetric.

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Trump maximized the reality of the alliance’s unilateral cost rise. He pursues only business interests and does not voice values ​​such as democracy, peace, or democratic leadership, as previous US presidents did. While not hypocritical, the bare face of the “America First” policy shows no solicitude or room for others.

“America First” is fundamentally different from pursuing national interests. In essence, it is tough diplomacy that has no regard for means and methods in pursuit of interests, changing anything that is disadvantageous to the US, regardless whether the opponent is an ally or a foe.

The Korean Peninsula, along with the Balkans, is often said to be cursed by its geography. It is, indeed, an asset to have the US as an ally present on this peninsula. Not only North Korean nuclear threats, but also China’s rise makes the US presence more important. However, the unilateral rise in alliance costs is not an issue that South Koreans can afford to overlook.

Despite these facts, why would many evaluate Trump’s visit as a success? First, it is the learning effect of the Trump style. Trump is a type of US president we have never seen before, and he has been carving out his own territory, constantly breaching taboos and crossing limits. He has so far not thought of becoming the president for all Americans. He has and will continue to rule as if running a campaign for hardcore supporters. He divides sides and picks fights regardless of whether the opponent is domestic or foreign. He attacks African-American football players for kneeling during the national anthem and encourages conflicts rather than addressing white supremacist rallies.

He also clashes with the Republican Party, his own party, and mocks his own Secretary of State whom he himself appointed. He publicly announced that he would destroy North Korea at the UN General Assembly, a hall of peace, and declared Iran to be a murderous regime. Allies are no exception. He criticized NATO members. He called President Moon’s position a policy of appeasement, an ahistorical rudeness. He has also said that the US will not be hurt in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, despite the fact that there would be thousands of casualties in South Korea were a conflict to occur. Some say this is a high-level “crazy man strategy,” but it is simply gangster leadership, bereft of any class.

Tunnel vision

It seems that Trump’s South Korea visit was viewed as relatively fine because of the learning effect of these characteristics of the US President. However, this is the error of groupthink, which appears in policy decision theory of international relations. Groupthink refers to a tendency to strengthen conformity or consensus in decision-making groups. The actors participating in the group are pressured to follow the opinion of the group as a whole, while contrary opinions are hard to advocate or are easily ignored. It resembles the tunnel vision phenomenon in which the view is narrowed as one enters a tunnel, or a situation where balanced thought or objective judgment is blurred because one is excessively immersed in one thing.

This error is evident in the assessment that Trump has withdrawn from his hardline stance toward North Korea and has offered the possibility of opening a dialogue. This assessment seems to be based on the fact that Trump, who previously insisted on the uselessness of dialogue, made few intimidating comments about the military option and rather talked about negotiation.

However, this is groundless. The trouble-free expressions of hatred and contempt for North Korea, which accounted for more than two-thirds of his address to the National Assembly, were about how he would never be able to recognize North Korea as a dialogue partner. Such language as hell, cruel dictatorship, torture, rape, and murder were typical of his prejudice against the reality of North Korea.

This far surpasses the rhetoric of President George W. Bush, who called North Korea an outpost of tyranny, a pygmy, and a part of the “axis of evil,” and under whom North Korea-US relations were at their worst level up until now.

The error of groupthink also applies to the recent South Korea-China summit. The South Korean government and its media concluded that the South Korean and Chinese dispute over THAAD has been resolved with the three No’s that the two countries jointly announced. China did not revoke its position opposing THAAD. It just decided to take a two-track strategy.

China maintains its basic position opposing THAAD, while its practical relationship with South Korea will be separated from the issue and be allowed to recover. It is similar to the Moon administration’s position towards Japan: restore a practical relationship without giving up on the comfort women issue. This has very important implications. The more publicly South Korea acts as if China yielded, the more China will have to pull back its position on THAAD and, in severe cases, restart the sanctions. Also, for China, the joint announcement has become a benchmark, where it intends to see if South Korea actually complies.

In other words, the THAAD issue may reemerge depending on what South Korea does in the future.

Room for Korea to Maneuver 

Early November was filled with summit diplomacy: Trump’s visit to South Korea, the South Korea-China summit, and Moon’s visit to Southeast Asia. Although we should be cautious of groupthink, this does not deny the achievements on the diplomatic front. The South Korean government did very well to restore its room to maneuver between China and the US, which was obliterated thanks to the diplomatic failures of the previous administration of President Park Geun-hye, including the THAAD issue. However, the possibility of repeating failures while overestimating successes still exists.

South Korea has barely returned to a situation where it can make a choice. In other words, South Korea is back to the point where it can choose after a long period of lost diplomatic leverage when it muddled between the US and China, telling each side only what they wanted to hear without any real strategy. The issue has not been resolved nor has South Korea succeeded in achieving something. Depending on its future choices, South Korea may succeed or fail.

Now is the real contest in which diplomacy is crucial. The course is correct to stitch up the THAAD issue with China and to pursue a practical two-track strategy regarding Japan. It is also a desirable time to diversify diplomacy with the New Northward policy and the New Southward policy. The strategy serves as an economic vision for mid- to long-term prosperity and an alternative multilateral regime that can overcome the confrontational structure and security dilemma in Northeast Asia.

But the biggest threat is still a complete break of inter-Korean relations stemming from the North Korean nuclear crisis. And as much as this, the unilateral framework of the US-South Korea relationship, where South Korea cannot exert any real power at all, is also an issue to be addressed. The three No’s between South Korea and China are a desirable position, but it would be hard for the US to accept such a position, because it represents South Korea practically drawing the limits of US Asia strategy.

There will also be a harsh backlash to the Trump administration’s focal strategy against China, a trilateral alliance between the US, South Korea, and Japan, and thorough strategic preparation is necessary.

Negotiations need to begin behind curtains. It is natural that even diplomatic matters should be explained and communicated to the public. In that regard, the Moon administration has dissolved the past government’s mismanagement and secret diplomacy and declared a so-called “People-participatory Diplomacy.” However, closed diplomacy might sometimes be necessary in the national interest, and it seems to be necessary now. The recent series of diplomatic movements have become too open to the public and room to maneuver has been narrowed by politicization.

A closed-door strategy is becoming more necessary as the influence of domestic politics on diplomacy is growing in almost all countries compared to the past. It would have been better if the three No’s between China and South Korea had been left unpublicized for a while. North Korea policy, including seeking dialogue, should happen behind curtains.

South Korea holds the fewest options 

The reason why the North Korean nuclear crisis is a difficult problem today is that while South Korea is the biggest victim, it holds the fewest options. In this situation, the attitude most likely to emerge is defeatism or vague hopelessness and desperation. These two extremes are prone to fall into the error of groupthink. At the joint press conference by Trump and Moon, a reporter asked Trump about whether he was “passing” South Korea. It was surely a dumbfounding question, but on the other hand, it shows the current situation and the perceptions of South Koreans. Trump’s answer that there is “no skipping” on South Korea does not dictate South Korea’s standing.

But South Koreans should ask themselves hard questions and try to take the initiative. Despite the geopolitical difficulties stemming from the nuclear crisis and the power struggle among the US, Japan, China, and Russia, South Korea does possess considerable power of its own and should make use of the fact that its strategic importance is as high as the problems it faces.

Joonhyung Kim received his undergraduate degree in political science from Yonsei University, and obtained his Master’s and Ph.D. in Political Science from The George Washington University. He is currently a professor of International and Area Studies at Handong Global University, and is serving in the Office of National Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Policy Planning and International Organizations Office, as well as a member of the innovation committee of the Ministry of Unification.  Reprinted with permission from the East Asia Foundation. Views expressed are those of the author.

 

Duterte as ASEAN Chair in 2017


November 20, 2017

Duterte as ASEAN Chair in 2017

by  Purple Romero

https://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/rodrigo-duterte-as-asean-leader/

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President Rodrigo Duterte, who took over the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations a year ago, is responsible for a decision to mute controversy over ownership of the South China Sea that has drastically changed ASEAN’s role in the resolution of the longstanding territorial dispute between its claimant-states and China.

Duterte’s year-long leadership of the 10-member pact was hardly a watershed. Overall, the Philippines did put ASEAN towards a more productive path on some points by steering clear of the more contentious issues of addressing human rights issues or giving claimant states much-needed regional support in their territorial conflict with China.

“Given ASEAN’s constraints and limitations, its modus operandi and increasing workload of consultations and discussions, it is difficult to see what else it [the Philippines] could have done within the one-year chairmanship that could make ASEAN more progressive and more productive,” said Jay Batongbacal, director of the UP Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea.

 “It was enough for [the Philippines] to have been able to competently chair and host the meetings without potential serious controversies (particularly regarding the South China Sea and the Rohingya) paralyzing its processes.”

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On the issue of the South China Sea and China’s claim to virtually all of it via its so-called Nine-Dash Line, the events of the last year draw a clear contrast to previous actions. Two decades ago, the Philippines had to ask for the help of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over China’s reported military installations in Mischief reef, an atoll claimed by both Manila and Beijing.

ASEAN came to the rescue with a joint communique calling for a code of conduct in 1996, designed to set restrictions on the construction of buildings and military activity in the sea, which was being claimed by ASEAN members Malaysia and Brunei. Vietnam, another claimant, joined ASEAN later.

Fast forward to 2017. ASEAN, under Duterte’s chairmanship, and China has endorsed a framework for the code of conduct. It was Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi – and not ASEAN – which announced the adoption of the framework at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August.

Wang said both parties would discuss “the principles, and plan for the next stage of consultation of the COC” and build a “consensus.”

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ASEAN and China now have announced their commitment to negotiate, saying it “is important that we cooperate to maintain peace.” After 21 years since ASEAN first raised the need for a code of conduct, the negotiations will start next year.

It won’t ultimately show ASEAN’s unity. Ironically, even as it signals an important milestone in the history of resolving the maritime rows between China and clamant-states, it also cements the return to settling the territorial discord over South China Sea through bilateral talks – just the way China wants it.

Duterte’s pivot: Good to a point

As the height of irony, the first sign of the thawing of Manila’s cold relations with Beijing started when the Philippines won its dispute against the latter when an international court in The Hague struck down China’s nine-dash claim in July 2016, scoring a significant win for the Philippines which, devoid of military might, had to cast its lot in the international court of arbitration.

It was a historic win in a David-vs-Goliath scenario. But Duterte was quick to change the tone of the triumph, calling “on all those concerned to exercise restraint and sobriety” instead of celebrating the stunning rebuke to China.

There are two major explanations behind Duterte’s lackluster reaction. US President Barack Obama chastised the Philippine leader for alleged human rights violations allegedly committed under Duterte’s violent and murderous war on drugs, sparking a furious response from Duterte, who responds to criticism of his actions with hair-raising rhetoric.

But in addition, Duterte has always maintained that the Philippines is no match for the military and economic superpower China and that as an Asian neighbor it is in the Philippines’ interest to make its own pivot.

That is a mantra that defined the Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship. And, while it marked a shocking turnaround for the Philippines – which used to be counted on as one of the most aggressive and vocal ASEAN-member states in its opposition to China’s expansionism in South China Sea – it did help keep China at the negotiating table until a framework on the COC was finalized.

“The Duterte administration’s ‘softly’ approach on its disputes with China in South China Sea permitted the framework agreement to be realized,” said Malcolm Cook, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Prior to Duterte’s reign, his predecessor Benigno Aquino III explored different ways to strengthen the position of the ASEAN claimant-states. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs proposed a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Cooperation in the South China Sea in 2011 to enclave the Spratly and Paracel islands and turn them into a Joint Cooperation Area.

The proposal, however, did not gain much support from other ASEAN members. The following year, China and the Philippines would engage in a standoff in the Scarborough Shoal, pushing the Philippines to consider taking the legal route – and eventually winning – against China.

ASEAN, however, was divided over the Philippines’ victory in 2016.  While Vietnam lauded it, Cambodia – which considers China a major economic ally – objected to it being referenced in the joint communique at the 2016 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Vientiane, Laos, resulting in the first time the organization failed to agree on a joint communique.

When the Philippines chaired ASEAN in 2017, it adopted Cambodia’s stance, negating the mention of Manila’s momentous victory in any forum involving ASEAN and China. The Philippines took that a step further by opposing the inclusion of any objection to China’s alleged militarization and land reclamation in South China Sea in the joint communique in August.

In the ASEAN Regional Forum in August 2017, Philippine foreign affairs Sec. Alan Peter Cayetano admitted that the Philippines wanted references to land reclamation and militarization in South China Sea dropped in the joint communique, forcing Vietnam into a corner. “They’re not reclaiming land anymore, so why will you put it again this year?” he said.

In the end though, consensus prevailed and the chairman had to give in. The Philippines withdrew its opposition and the joint communique contained language showing concerns over China’s reported militarization and land reclamation activities.

But up until the 31st ASEAN Summit in November, even as the Philippines was caught in another standoff –   albeit briefly – with China in Thitu (Pag-asa) island, the Philippines was still generally cordial in its approach.

The most that Duterte did is to bring up with China the concerns of ASEAN about freedom of navigation in the strategic trade route, which China said it wouldn’t impede.

 “The warmer ties between Philippines and China, combined with the chairmanship of the Philippines, were instrumental in drawing down the prominence of the (South China Sea) SCS disputes on the ASEAN agenda, from being a divisive issue in 2013 into a practically peripheral matter in 2017,” Jay Bongalo, director of the UP Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea said.

“This will allow ASEAN to essentially remove the controversial aspects of the SCS issues from its agenda, move on from playing any really significant role in the resolution of the territorial and jurisdictional rows, and allow the ASEAN claimant countries to deal with their respective issues bilaterally with China.”

Even if the Philippines was able to get the negotiations on the COC going, ASEAN as whole and at its best, will now largely focus on crisis management or prevention. When it comes to resolving territorial tiff, each country will now be left on its own – a crucial victory for Beijing.

 ASEAN’s expected “lowest point:” human rights

In the 31st ASEAN Summit, allegations by a long list of human rights organizations over violations and extrajudicial killings in the Philippines were brought up by the US (though this was denied by the Philippines), Canada and New Zealand, countries that are external partners of ASEAN, but not by ASEAN members themselves.

The Philippines, which decried any criticism over the issue from other countries, was also silent on another human rights concern, the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar. The Rohingya ethnic group had to flee the Rakhine state in Myanmar due to cases of persecution and discrimination.

This was a curious reaction as Duterte appeared sympathetic to the state of refugees from the Middle East, even saying that they are welcome to the Philippines. In the case of the Rohingya however, the Philippines drew the line when it did not mention the “Rohingya” in its statement at the UN General Assembly in New York in September. This was challenged by Malaysia, which slammed the statement as a “misrepresentation of reality.””

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Malaysia has yet to find an ally from ASEAN. At the ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting, Philippine Defense Sec. Delfina Lorenzana said that ASEAN agreed the Rohingya problem is an “internal matter” in Myanmar.

ASEAN’s hands-off attitude over the human rights problems in the Philippines and Myanmar were to be expected, however according to political analysts given the body’s principle of non-interference.

“ASEAN’s handling of the most prominent human rights issues such as the Rohingya crisis and the drug-related killings in the Philippines are definitely the lowest points in its performance,” Batongbacal said. “However, this is to be expected given ASEAN’s non-interference principle and reluctance to discuss human rights issues, as both directly involve the domestic policies of member-states.”

Malcolm agreed, saying ASEAN’s hands are further tied by its principle to act based on consensus. While saying that ASEAN’s response to the reported human rights violations in the Philippines and Myanmar were far from sufficient, one should not expect much from it.

“As ASEAN is an inter-governmental, consensus-based body, one should not expect much from ASEAN in relation to human rights abuses undertaken by member-states,” Malcolm said. “Quiet diplomacy and moral suasion is the best ASEAN will do in this front.”

There’s one bright spot, however when it comes to ASEAN’s action on rights – and that is the signing of the ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. The agreement, which gives allows migrant workers to form unions apart from enjoying other rights, came 10 years after ASEAN member-states adopted the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers in Cebu, Philippines.

United against extremism

ASEAN, while divided on a number of issues, was united when it comes to tackling terrorism, a problem faced by the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. The Philippines in particular just ended a five-month siege in Marawi city, Mindanao which was caused by the ISIS-inspired Maute group.

ASEAN said it will take on additional preventive measures to stop the growth of terrorism in the region. These include education and enlisting the help of the women and youth sector to counter extremist leanings.

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When it comes to another threat to security, however – the nuclear ambition of North Korea – ASEAN, while one with the rest of the international community in condemning its launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles, did not go as far as asking its member-countries to cut ties with North Korea.

“Cambodia and Laos in particular have close relations with North Korea and this has not changed despite the focus on international pressure in North Korea,” Malcolm said.

In trademark ASEAN diplomacy, the regional bloc also kept its doors open to North Korea in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF has previously been touted by ASEAN as a venue for the six-party talks between North Korea, South Korea, the US, Russia, China and Japan.

 Not paralyzed by controversy

Under the Philippine chairmanship, Malcom said ASEAN gained some headway when it comes to trade, signing the ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free Trade Agreement (AHKFTA) and the ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement which could spur business opportunities in the region. The regional bloc has yet to gain significant progress though in the negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Agreement, which aims to lower tariffs and strengthen regional economic integration and cooperation.

Batongbacal said that ASEAN also deserved some plus points for putting the spotlight on the role of micro, small and medium economic enterprises in economic growth.