Malaysian Politics in 2018: Getting the Harapan House in order

January 7, 2018

Malaysian Politics 2018– Getting the Harapan House in order

by Nathaniel Tan

The year 2017 closed out with debates about Pakatan Harapan’s candidate for Prime Minister.

This discussion touches at the very heart of the state of the opposition today, and what its prospects for GE14 are. The question is, of course, not a small one. Over the years, a great deal of power has come to be invested in the office of the Prime Minister. Ironically, a lot of this was achieved during the tenure of Dr Mahathir Mohamed, in the decades that he governed as Prime Minister.

Since as things stand, the Prime Minister has the power to make most of the important decisions in the country – almost all by himself – it seems reasonable to expect a clear answer with regards to who a coalition would like to put forward as Prime Minister, should they win the elections.

In this, we must sadly admit a great advantage lies with BN.From day one, there has been absolutely no doubt whatsoever that BN’s candidate for Prime Minister is the incumbent, Najib Abdul Razak (photo).

Especially since the removal of his former deputy Muhyiddin Yassin, every echelon of the UMNO and BN hierarchy has been of one voice on this matter.

Love him, or hate him, there is no question in anyone’s mind that Najib Razak will become Prime Minister should BN win the elections.

While they got off to a decent enough start, the Perak government was soon wrested in 2009, and the Kajang Move (thanks to Rafizi Ramli) threw the Selangor government into disarray – breaking the back of Pakatan Rakyat, and causing a split whose reverberations continue to be felt today.

Former Menteri Besar of Selangor Tan Sri Khalid Ibrahim

These conflicts speak to the very heart of governance and stability. A certain amount of growing pains can be tolerated, but when this degenerates into full-on squabbling over the highest position of power – as evidenced in the Selangor crisis – then any illusion of stability is shattered.

In politics, there aren’t many opportunities to create a first impression. Had the Selangor crisis been about clear-cut corruption, or some other type of scandal backed up by irrefutable evidence, the story could have been different.

As it is, bad excuses were made to cover up what one couldn’t help but assume was a simple power grab and a mud-fight over resources. Extrapolating from this to federal power can conjure up scary images of chaos and destructive instability.

Where UMNO -BN is strong

Even as we seek to topple UMNO and BN, it would be foolhardy not to acknowledge their strengths. Failure to do so will condemn any attempt to defeat them.

It must be noted that while not every UMNO Deputy President has become president – a fact Muhyiddin, Anwar Ibrahim and others are all too familiar with – there has not been a single individual who has become UMNO President, and thus Prime Minister, without being the Party Deputy president first.

UMNO, for all its racism, bigotry, and corruption, can point to this as a history of relative stability – not forgetting, of course, the many deputies that didn’t make it, and the harm created when they rebelled.

The opposition should perhaps look to establish a similar history of internal stability, instead of grasping clumsily at every general election.

The best front the opposition was able to put up was probably in 2013, when the opposition had what seemed to be a viable coalition representing a wide and representative cross-section of Malaysian society, with a clear and (publicly) undisputed candidate for PM.

We didn’t win, but we did do better than ever before. Instead of staying the course though, short-sightedness brought everything crashing down prematurely.

Falling between chairs

As a result, Harapan finds itself in quite an awkward position, falling perhaps, between multiple chairs. They do not have a clear, obvious choice for candidate for PM. If they did, we wouldn’t be having the controversy we have now.

Going into GE14, they’ll have to make the best of what they have, and the Mahathir-Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail combination is as good as any I suppose (although it is unclear why they would thereafter want to move Wan Azizah out of Permatang Pauh).

Observers have been right to point out that an “interim PM” arrangement is both far from ideal and fraught with potential risk. That said, the best Harapan can do, all things considered, is simply to decide on a plan, and stick to it.

In this case and at this stage, better an early commitment to an imperfect plan, than ongoing waffling over trying to find a perfect plan – one which, if not obvious by now, likely doesn’t exist. Said waffling is itself probably doing more damage to Harapan’s prospects than anything BN can do at this point.

Getting fit for future

At the end of the day, and at the beginning of a new year, we find ourselves with the cards we’ve been dealt, and we’ll have to play them the best we can for GE14, regardless.

As we look beyond the next election though, and onwards to the next generation – as aspiring statespersons should – we should perhaps be more conscious of whether we are putting the cart before the horse.

My uncles used to say that you don’t play squash to get fit, you get fit to play squash.

Perhaps the key to defeating BN some day is not to keep flinging things randomly until we find something that sticks, but to establish an alternative institution on strong principles, and to focus on strengthening that institution and its principles before obsessing about winning elections.

NATHANIEL TAN would like to wish everybody love, positivity, courage, and all the very best for 2018.

The Worldview from Cambodia

October 3, 2015

The worldview from Cambodia

by Chheang Vannarith

The Cambodian government, under the leadership of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), is striving to adjust its foreign policy and adapt itself to the fast-changing global geopolitics and geo-economics.

Addressing the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn underlined two key terms: multipolar world and complex interdependence.

“Today, our multipolar world has gained its prominence in global affairs, causing chaos and turbulence as competition between the major powers is becoming more confrontational,” Mr Sokhonn said.

“We are more interdependent, but more unequal; we are more prosperous, and yet millions are inflicted with poverty,” he added.

Image result for prak sokhon cambodia

In terms of the global economic system, there are more than two growth poles. A growth pole refers to an economy that significantly drives global growth, mainly through international trade and investment, capital flows and the spillover effects of innovation, technology and knowledge.

Emerging economies, especially BRICS economies including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, are transforming the global economy. The Asia Pacific region has become the centre of gravity of the world economy.

The China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the new engine of an emerging new global economic order. The BRI will also significantly affect the global geopolitical landscape. The question is time. How long will it take China to realise this grand strategy to project its global power?

Global power shifts or transitions, as historical facts have shown, usually lead to conflicts or wars. According to the “Thucydides Trap” theory, it is forecast that China, the rising power, and the US, the status-quo power, will inevitably clash.

How can the “Thucydides Trap” be avoided? China has proposed “a new type of major power relations”, but it failed to convince the US. Trust deficit is the main stumbling block in China-US bilateral ties.

The West is relatively declining. The two black swan events, the Brexit vote in the UK in June 2016 and the election of Donald Trump to the White House in the US in November 2016, have damaged the global role and image of the West.

The Western values of liberal democracy are adversely affected as well. President Trump has attacked the freedom of the press by calling them “fake news” and alleged some journalists as “truly dishonest people”.

Rising protectionism and inward-looking political leadership puts the future of the West in an uncertain and dangerous path. Widening socio-economic inequality is partially due to the implementation of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, in which corporate governance is focusing on shareholders, not stakeholders.

Amidst global power shifts, Cambodia is softly going with China, while slightly hedging through a strategic and economic diversification strategy. The good Cambodia-Japan partnership is a case in point explaining Cambodia’s hedging strategy.

There are three reasons explaining Cambodia’s view of China. First, China gives a core “back up” to Cambodia’s ruling elites to counterbalance the pressures from the US and its allies relating to democracy and human rights.

The ruling CPP gives priority to output legitimacy, which is defined in terms of peace, political stability and economic growth than input legitimacy, which is defined in terms of free and fair elections and people’s participation.

Hence the ideals of liberal democracy as understood and practiced by the West are deemed not yet appropriate for Cambodia. Power politics, the survival of the fittest, remain the characteristics of Cambodian politics

Second, Cambodia stands to benefit from China’s economic powerhouse, especially in infrastructure development, foreign direct investment, tourism and trade. China is now the top donor and investor in the kingdom.

Third, China offers an effective balancing force against two big neighbours – Thailand and Vietnam – which are perceived as “historic predators”.

Cambodia “views its immediate neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand, as historic predators of Khmer territories, and China as playing a pivotal role in ensuring its own survival”, wrote Edgar Pang, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

Similarly, Terrence Chong, from the same institute, argues that “Cambodia’s fear that Vietnam and Thailand’s growing economic superiority will threaten its sovereignty has been a key reason for its embrace of China”.

Cambodia believes that complex interdependence, especially economic interdependence, will prevent major powers from going to war. Economic interest is the most decisive factor in foreign policy formation.

Prime Minister Hun Sen said in 2015: “Relations between the US and China are extremely important for the Asia-Pacific. Washington and Beijing are conscious of their complex interdependence and have been building mechanisms across their bilateral relationship to help manage their relations.”

Cambodia also stresses the critical role of ASEAN in maintaining regional peace and order by strengthening regional multilateral institutions and cooperation. Maintaining and strengthening the central role of ASEAN in shaping the evolving regional architecture serves regional common interests.

“Cambodia will continue to join hands with all ASEAN member states in the common endeavour to strengthen the community that is highly integrated, resilient, inclusive, people-oriented and people-centered for the sake of peace and prosperity of our region and the world at large,” wrote Mr Sokhonn in August this year.

Cambodia’s worldview can be understood as the following: First, a multipolar world is in the making. Second, the West is declining and the global power balance is shifting in favour of emerging economies, especially China.

Third, complex interdependence is the foundation of peace given it restrains major powers from going to war against each other. Fourth, multilateral institutions, especially Asean, play a crucial role in maintaining peace and promoting prosperity.

Chheang Vannarith is a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

Donald Trump’s War Doctrine Débuts, at the U.N.

September 21, 2017

Donald Trump’s War Doctrine Débuts, at the U.N.

In a bellicose address at the United Nations, Donald Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea, called Kim Jong Un “Rocket Man,” and baffled veteran American diplomats. Photograph by Spencer Platt / Getty

On Tuesday, Donald Trump made his début on the world stage—on the same elegant green-marble dais, donated by Italy after the Second World War, that he had mocked in a 2012 tweet as ugly. “The 12 inch sq. marble tiles behind speaker at UN always bothered me,” Trump wrote. “I will replace with beautiful large marble slabs if they ask me.” Trump’s thoughts about the United Nations were bigger—and badder—this time around.

“Major portions of the world are in conflict, and some, in fact, are going to hell,” Trump declared. He vowed to “totally destroy” North Korea if it didn’t abandon its nuclear weapons and the intercontinental ballistic missiles that deliver them. He came close to calling for regime change in “reckless” Iran, for policies that “speak openly of mass murder, vowing death to America, destruction to Israel, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this room.” Trump called the nuclear deal—brokered by all the veto-wielding nations of the world body—“an embarrassment” to the United States, implicitly insulting the European allies that initiated the effort and the Security Council, which unanimously endorsed it. He implied a willingness to use military action in Venezuela “to help them regain their freedom, recover their country, and restore their democracy.” He blasted Cuba and took sharp digs at China and Russia.

The President also delivered a few campaign-style zingers—like his pledge to “crush loser terrorists.” About North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Trump pronounced, “Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”

Trump reportedly insisted, over aides’ objections, that he keep the reference to the Elton John song in his speech. The line is sure to become part of U.N. lore—along with the Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega’s quip, in 1987, “Remember, President Reagan, Rambo only exists in the movies,” and the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s insult, the day after George W. Bush’s 2006 U.N. speech, “The devil came here yesterday, and it smells of sulfur still.”

For a body more accustomed to nuanced diplomatic speak, and now yearning for leadership in an unsettled world, Trump’s bellicose speech was his America First doctrine on steroids. Indeed, he opened his remarks to leaders from almost two hundred countries with a litany of his achievements since Election Day. “Our military will soon be the strongest it has ever been,” he boasted.

One of Trump’s most curious and convoluted themes—in an increasingly interconnected and globalizing world—was the need for greater sovereignty. “The nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition,” he said. The subtext was that walls, along every nation’s borders, were the keys to prosperity and international security.

The line baffled veteran American diplomats. “The President kept talking about sovereignty as if it were imperilled,” Richard Haass, the current president of the Council on Foreign Relations and the head of the State Department’s policy-planning staff under the George H. W. Bush Administration, told me. “The last I checked, we still have a veto at the U.N. We set our own limits in the Paris climate pact. No one is forcing us to adhere to trade agreements. It seemed to me it was something of a red herring. U.S. sovereignty is not imperilled. It’s an odd emphasis at the U.N., where our goal is to generate collective effort against common problems. It seemed to me inherently contradictory.”

The tenor throughout Trump’s forty-minute speech was contrary to many of the trends of the twenty-first century. He advocated ideas that other nations either find suspect or shun outright. Trump ignored the fact that he needs the world right now more than the world needs (or wants) him. Saying that the United States is gaining military muscle no longer means that Washington gains more leverage. Power has been redefined and defused, as have the threats of the era.

“The defining challenges of the twenty-first century are global in nature,” Haass said. “That is what was missing—whether proliferation or terror or climate change or hacking or democratic disruption. A pinched approach to sovereignty is inadequate.”

Ian Bremmer, the president of the Eurasia Group, a risk-consulting firm, told me that the long-term fallout from Trump’s speech may be to accelerate the identity politics and anti-globalization sentiments that fuel so many of today’s conflicts. The world, he said, has been headed toward a “geopolitical recession,” a period of instability featuring setbacks to globalization and international coöperation. Weakened global institutions that can’t respond quickly or effectively to challenges increase the prospects for more wars. Trump’s unilateralist rhetoric is “facilitating a faster unwind, and that’s a dangerous thing,” Bremmer said.

Trump’s patronizing language at the U.N. was a stark departure from the policies of America’s two other twenty-first-century Presidents. George W. Bush’s strategy emphasized the promotion of democracy and nation-building, while Barack Obama was big on human rights, global outreach, and resolving old tensions.

“Our success depends on a coalition of strong and independent nations that embrace their sovereignty to promote security, prosperity, and peace for themselves and for the world,” Trump said. “We do not expect diverse countries to share the same cultures, traditions, or even systems of government.”

The question is whether Trump, in his speech, went too far—and scared too many—to generate the kind of collaboration that he needs to achieve the very foreign-policy goals he outlined.

The President’s threat “won’t make Kim Jong Un quiver in his boots and give up his nukes,” Mark Fitzpatrick, the executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in Washington, told me. “To the contrary, it will reinforce his determination to have nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles that can deter the U.S.” America’s allies also now have to worry, he added, that Trump’s belligerent words will make Pyongyang even more dangerous.

The same is true of his condemnation of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, the clunkily named Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the most significant nonproliferation agreement in more than a quarter century. “Nobody in the room, save Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, will have been pleased by Trump’s denunciation of the J.C.P.O.A.,” Fitzpatrick said. The consequences of abandoning the Iran deal, he noted, could also backfire in relation to North Korea. “Denouncing a deal that all other parties are upholding will certainly not make North Korea any more disposed toward striking a deal with the United States over its nuclear program.”

Trump’s speech infuriated the Iranians. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted, “Trump’s ignorant hate speech belongs in medieval times-not the 21st Century UN -unworthy of a reply. Fake empathy for Iranians fools no one.”

Key players didn’t even show up for Trump’s début. President Xi Jinping, of China, didn’t come to New York to build on the relationship started over dinner at Mar-a-Lago, in April. Trump is dependent on China to deal with North Korea—and Xi is unlikely to make the grand gestures required to force the “Rocket Man” to surrender his deadliest weapons. For all that is at stake between Washington and Moscow, President Vladimir Putin didn’t bother to attend, either. Trump needs Russian help to tighten the squeeze on Pyongyang through U.N. sanctions.

Angela Merkel, now the de-facto champion of the West, also stayed home, occupied by the run-up to a crucial election. The Germans are outspoken about their commitment to the Iran nuclear deal—and have said so, bluntly, to the Trump Administration. Despite closer ties with Saudi Arabia forged during Trump’s first foreign trip, neither the King nor the Crown Prince came to New York. As at Trump’s Inauguration, the crowd at this opening of the United Nations may not have been as large as the President had hoped.

Iran President Hassan Rouhani Latest Speech At UNGA United Nations | 20 Sept 2017–A Rebuttal to Donald Trump


Why China won’t push North Korea into a corner of isolation

September 20, 2017

Why China won’t push North Korea into a corner  of isolation–It’s a Question of Trust

by Evan Osnos

It is a question of trust–Chinese Leaders trust Trump less than the Rocket Man of North Korea.

At the center of the North Korean nuclear crisis is a pivotal question: How much is China really willing to pressure and punish its longtime ally in Pyongyang? Recent conversations in Beijing and Washington suggest that Chinese leaders have decided to increase pressure substantially but are not—and probably never will be—willing to help President Trump strangle North Korea into submission. China doesn’t trust Kim Jong Un—but it trusts Trump even less.

For decades, China backed North Korea in hostilities with the United States. The fellow Communist armies had fought alongside one another in the Korean War, and North Korea still relies on China for as much as ninety per cent of its overseas trade. In Chairman Mao’s analogy, the two nations were as close as “lips and teeth.” But that is no longer true; since taking power, in 2011, Kim Jong Un, who is suspicious of China’s efforts to control North Korea or spur it to follow its model of economic reform, has openly antagonized the government in Beijing, including launching rockets that would embarrass the Chinese leadership. (Earlier this month, Kim fired a rocket just as Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, was opening an annual summit of developing countries in the Chinese city of Xiamen.)

By several measures, Chinese leaders have become more willing to get tough with Kim. Until recently, Chinese intellectuals rarely questioned China’s commitment to North Korea. But, in March, Shen Zhihua, one of China’s best-known experts on the Korean War, said, in a speech, “We must see clearly that China and North Korea are no longer brothers-in-arms, and in the short term there’s no possibility of an improvement in Chinese-North Korean relations.” The speech circulated widely, without much in the way of official censorship—a sign, to many Chinese analysts, that some of the country’s leaders agree.

When I met Shen last month, in Beijing, he told me, “I think more and more leaders share this view. At a minimum, they think that multiple views should exist.” Shen is a calm, silver-haired scholar who works in a research center at East China Normal University, in Shanghai. As a historian, he believes that long-standing tensions between Beijing and Pyongyang are becoming irreparable. “Officially, they tried to paper over the cracks, but the differences were inevitable,” he said.

Image result for The Rocket Man of North Korea is on a suicide mission

“Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”–President Donald Trump at The United Nations

Shen does not speak for the leadership or advise powerful officials. Rather, his views should be understood as a reflection of the change that is under way in the Chinese establishment. Of North Korea, he said, “I think China doesn’t care who is running the country. Xi and Kim have not met. It used to be a tradition if there is a new leader, to meet him. But not now.” Fundamentally, he said, some have come to believe what was once anathema—that North Korea could one day turn its aggression on China: “Many in China don’t want North Korea to have nuclear weapons because nuclear weapons are, first, threatening to China.”

I wondered if Shen was expressing a minority view. When I met Zhao Tong, who specializes in nuclear issues as a fellow at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, I asked him about Shen’s speech. “I think most people would broadly agree,” Zhao said. “It’s not a warm relationship of ‘brothers.’ ” Given that North Korea has continued to test nuclear weapons in the face of Chinese protests, he said, China would not feel automatically compelled to defend North Korea under their mutual-assistance treaty. “Most Chinese would laugh at the proposal that China should provide security guarantees,” he said.

Zhao ticked off examples of China’s new pressures on Pyongyang: “China has stopped coal imports. That’s a big step. It’s stopped supplying diesel and gas. That’s a big step. It has tightened regulations on companies and financial institutions, and the big ones have stopped doing business with North Korea. It’s the smaller ones that are motivated by narrow interests and are still doing business. China has enhanced inspections of goods at the border. They made efforts to help private-sector companies strengthen their export-control practices.”

But, importantly, Zhao added that it would be a mistake to misread those steps as China signing on, wholesale, to American efforts to force North Korea to the edge of collapse—a tactic, favored in Washington, known as “strategic strangulation.” “No, it’s just balancing Trump and Kim Jong Un,” Zhao said. “The reason China agreed to much tougher sanctions is to calm Trump down.” China has strategic tensions of its own with the U.S., so it is keeping both countries off balance. “It’s basically, ‘Who is the bigger evil?’ For China, the U.S. is always the top geostrategic concern, the top threat.”

Zhao notes that the U.N. sanctions against North Korea that were passed on August 5th, which China supported, stopped short of seeking to undermine trade and humanitarian activities. “They are trying to draw a line between North Korea’s military program and civilian trade. To put more pressure on North Korea, without undermining it. China has been taking the incremental approach,” he said. In Zhao’s view, even though China has agreed to limit oil exports to North Korea, it is unlikely to cut them off entirely, which the Trump Administration believes is a vital step to change Kim’s behavior. “If China remains the sole supplier, meaning Russia won’t step in, I think China would find it very hard to do that,” Zhao said.

There are hard limits to China’s willingness to advance American interests in Asia, because the two powers have deep disagreements—about trade, contested territory in the South China Sea, and Taiwan. As the North Korea crisis has escalated, China has urged the U.S. to consider offering North Korea a deal known as “freeze for freeze,” in which the North would halt further tests if the U.S. halts or reduces joint military exercises with South Korea and Japan—exercises that China resents as well. “I think some Chinese are secretly hoping the North Korean position can actually help drive the U.S. forces away from the Korean Peninsula,” Zhao said. “It is in China’s interest if, in the mid-to-long term, the North Koreans can have a deal with the United States where the U.S. reduces troops or reduces its exercises.”

In recent years, overly hopeful U.S. politicians and commentators have repeatedly misunderstood China’s views of North Korea and assumed that Beijing was, at last, turning against its irksome ally. In private meetings with President Obama, and later with President Trump, Xi has repeated a bottom-line principle about North Korea: “No war. No chaos. No nukes.” A former U.S. official, who was at several of those meetings, told me, “Every American senior official that I know hears, ‘Blah, blah, blah—no nuclear weapons.’ And thinks, ‘Oh, we agree! Excellent!’ So the Chinese ought to be willing to limbo under this bar for us. But, no, that’s third in the list of three strategic priorities. The first two are avoiding war on the Korean Peninsula, and avoiding chaos and collapse.” In that spirit, China has sought to limit the scope of U.S.-backed sanctions in the U.N. Security Council. In the latest round, earlier this month, China succeeded in forcing the U.S. to drop its pursuit of a full oil blockade, which China fears would drive North Korea to collapse.

Nothing worries Chinese officials more than the following scenario: the U.S. uses harsh sanctions and covert action—and possibly military strikes—to drive North Korea close to the point of regime collapse. In turn, Pyongyang lashes out with violence against America or its allies, sparking a full-blown war on China’s border, just as China is trying to maintain delicate economic growth and social stability. Xi, in separate sessions, has offered Obama and Trump the same Chinese adage in reference to North Korea: “When a man is barefoot, he doesn’t fear a man with shoes.” In other words, even if attacking America would be suicide for North Korea, if it sees nothing left to lose, it just might do the unthinkable. For that reason, China, above all, wants the U.S. to avoid backing Kim into a corner from which he has no exit.

Trump is fervently seeking China’s coöperation, but, ironically, his rhetoric and aggression may be putting that further out of reach. On Sunday, Trump mocked Kim as the “Rocket Man.” Members of his Administration have repeated their openness to “military options,” despite projections that air strikes, or other attempts at targeted attacks, could spark a wider war. Chinese intellectuals have taken to joking that “Telangpu”—which is one of the Chinese pronunciations of Trump’s name—sounds like “te meipu,” which means clueless or lacking a plan. In recent months, Trump has alternately praised China and threatened it with a trade war. “I don’t understand Trump,” Shen, the historian, told me. “One day he is saying something good about Xi Jinping and the next he is criticizing him. Trump is becoming more and more of a problem. China is becoming more and more stable.”

President Donald Trump addresses the United Nations General Assembly

September 19, 2017

President Donald Trump Addresses The United Nations General Assembly

Trump: “We are calling for a great reawakening of nations”

Trump concluded his UN speech by urging for a “great reawakening of nations” and a “revival of their spirits.”

“Now, we are calling for a great reawakening of nations. For the revival of their spirits, their pride, their people an their patriotism,” the President said. “History is asking us if we are up to the task. Our answer will be a renewal of will, a rediscovery of resolve and a rebirth of devotion.”

Listen to The President of The United States of America at The United Nations. He said leaders must serve their people and let me know what you think. –Din Merican

Zahid Hamidi speaks Malglish at United Nations and embarrasses Malaysia

September 28, 2016

Zahid Hamidi speaks Malglish at United Nations–This is Our Prime Minister in Waiting

Image result for zahid hamidi at the United Nations General Assembly 2016

He spoke Malglish at the UNGA and embarrasses Malaysia

Our Prime Minister in Waiting, Dr. Zahid Hamidi thinks he is God’s gift to our country. He is too arrogant to admit that he cannot speak Oxford English like Singapore’s erudite Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong.He is a bumbling village idiot. His boss, Najib Razak speaks well, but he is a crook. Language certainly matters, but integrity and character more.

Young Cambodians at The University of Cambodia’s English Language School can show Zahid how to speak English and speak before an audience. I suggest that he should come to our language school in Phnom Penh on a 3-month sabbatical to improve his English-speaking and writing skills. My colleague, Brenden Leks, can turn him from an ugly duck into a swan in a very short time.

This is the trouble with people who are too arrogant to learn. They end up making fools of themselves in public.

Zahid Hamidi who has a doctorate from one of the Malaysian universities–that speaks volume about the quality of Malaysian education system– should have opted to speak in Malay at the  United Nations which has qualified translators on its staff. In stead, he opted to embarrass Malaysia. If he is what Malaysia has to offer as Prime Minister, God Helps us. –Din Merican