Political financing reforms should top PH Government’ s political agenda – Jomo

Koh Jun Lin  |  Published: September 27, 2018@ http://www.malaysiakini.com

Reforming how political activities are financed in Malaysia should be on top of the government’s political agenda, said the former Council of Eminent Persons member Jomo Kwame Sundaram.

He said Malaysia has a “very decadent” political system that had been abused, giving examples such as the 1MDB scandal and the inflated costs of the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project and two gas pipeline projects that have since been cancelled.

“It is important to recognise that we have a system of political financing which has been so abused that we cannot get ourselves out of this, unless we develop a legitimate, accountable, system of political financing. “So, I would put the whole system of political financing at the top of the list of political priorities that needs to be addressed by the current government,” he said.

He was speaking as a panellist at a talk titled “The Way Forward for Malaysia” last night together with Rembau MP Khairy Jamaluddin Abu Bakar in Kuala Lumpur last night. The event was organised by the Oxford and Cambridge Society of Malaysia and was attended by approximately 170 people.

Former Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak has been accused of siphoning money from 1MDB and SRC International and using part of the money to fund political activities through his personal bank account. Najib had maintained that the money had come from foreign donors.

Malaysiakini set up a microsite in July detailing some of the outflows from one of his bank accounts to political entities.

After Najib was implicated in the 1MDB scandal in 2015, he set up the National Consultative Council on Political Financing (JKNMPP) that went on to produce 32 recommendations to reform political financing in Malaysia.

However, the reforms were not in place in time for the 14th General Election.

ECRL ‘a hoax’

As for the ECRL project, Jomo described it as a hoax that is not part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects, and would not be able to pay for itself even if its development expenses are written off.

The government has claimed the cost of the project is RM81 billion – compared to the previous administration’s estimate for RM55 billion – adding it is worth no more than RM30 billion.

China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCC) Vice-President Sun Ziyu has defended the cost of the project.

Meanwhile, Jomo said there needs to be consensus involving all political parties in Malaysia on what needs to be done to tacklecorruption, where political financing is only a part of the problem.

Otherwise, he said there won’t be much progress in the area.

“I have a great deal of concern with addressing other sources of corruption, and this of course is very, very important and necessary to address. But we have a very decadent and corrupt economic system as well as a political system. In other words, we have been thoroughly compromised,” he said.

Read More: How political financing is done in other countries https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/444827

Foreign Policy: President Xi Jinping’s Vision for Global Governance

August 12, 2018

by Kevin Rudd

Xi is determined to defy the trend-line of Western history, to see off Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” culminating in the general triumph of liberal democratic capitalism, and preserve a Leninist state for the long term.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/xi-jinping-has-a-coherent-global-vision-by-kevin-rudd-2018-07

Last June, the Communist Party of China concluded its Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, the second since Xi Jinping became China’s undisputed ruler in 2012. These meetings express how the leadership sees China’s place in the world, but  also  they tell the world much about China as well.

 

NEW YORK – The contrast between the disarray in the West, on open display at the NATO summit and at last month’s G7 meeting in Canada, and China’s mounting international self-confidence is growing clearer by the day. Last month, the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded its Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, the second since Xi Jinping became China’s undisputed ruler in 2012. These meetings are not everyday affairs. They are the clearest expression of how the leadership sees China’s place in the world, but they tell the world much about China as well.

The last such conference, in 2014, marked the funeral of Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead,” and heralded a new era of international activism. In part, this change reflected Xi’s centralization of control, Chinese leaders’ conclusion that American power is in relative decline, and their view that China had become an indispensable global economic player.

Since 2014, China has expanded and consolidated its military position in the South China Sea. It took the idea of the New Silk Road and turned it into a multi-trillion-dollar trade, investment, infrastructure, and wider geopolitical-geo-economic initiative, engaging 73 different countries across much of Eurasia, Africa and beyond.

And China signed up most of the developed world to the first large-scale non-Bretton Woods multilateral development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

China has also launched diplomatic initiatives beyond its immediate sphere of strategic interest in East Asia, as well as actively participating in initiatives such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. It has developed naval bases in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti, and participates in naval exercises with Russia as far away as the Mediterranean and the Baltic. In March, China established its own international development agency.

The emergence of a coherent grand strategy (regardless of whether the West chooses to recognize it as such) is not all that has changed since 2014. For starters, the emphasis on the CPC’s role is much stronger than before. Xi, concerned that the party had become marginal to the country’s major policy debates, has reasserted party control over state institutions and given precedence to political ideology over technocratic policy making.

Xi is determined to defy the trend-line of Western history, to see off Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” culminating in the general triumph of liberal democratic capitalism, and preserve a Leninist state for the long term.

This approach – known as “Xi Jinping Thought” – now suffuses China’s foreign policy framework. In particular, Xi’s view that that there are identifiable immutable “laws” of historical development, both prescriptive and predictive, was particularly prominent at last month’s foreign policy conference. If this sounds like old-fashioned dialectical materialism, that’s because it is. Xi embraces the Marxist-Leninist tradition as his preferred intellectual framework.

Given its emphasis on iron laws of political and economic development, a dialectical-materialist worldview means that there is nothing random about world events. So, Xi argues, if Marx’s analytical framework is applied to the current period, it is clear that the global order is at a turning point, with the West’s relative decline coinciding with the fortuitous national and international circumstances enabling China’s rise.

In Xi’s words, “China has been in the best period of development since modern times, while the world is undergoing the most profound and unprecedented changes in a century.” Of course, formidable obstacles lie ahead for China. But Xi has concluded that the obstacles facing the US and the West are greater.

How such thinking will now drive China’s concrete foreign policy is anyone’s guess. But how one-party states, particularly Marxist states, choose to “ideate” reality matters a great deal: it is how the system speaks to itself. And Xi’s message to China’s foreign policy elite is one of great confidence.

Specifically, the Central Conference called for the country’s international policy institutions and personnel to embrace Xi’s agenda. Here Xi seems to have the foreign ministry in his sights. There is a strong ideological flavor to Xi’s apparent frustration with the ministry’s glacial approach to policy innovation.

China’s diplomats were urged to bear in mind that they are first and foremost “party cadres,” suggesting that Xi is likely to push the foreign policy apparatus toward greater activism, to give full effect to his emerging global vision.

The biggest change to emerge from the June 2018 conference concerns global governance. In 2014, Xi referred to an impending struggle for the future structure of the international order. While he did not elaborate, much work has since been devoted to three inter-related concepts: guoji zhixu (the international order); guoji xitong (the international system), and quanqiu zhili (global governance).

Of course, these terms have different and overlapping meanings in English, too. But, broadly speaking, in Chinese, the term “international order” refers to a combination of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the G-20, and other multilateral institutions (which China accepts), as well as the US system of global alliances (which China does not). The term “international system” tends to refer to the first half of this international order: the complex web of multilateral institutions that operate under international treaty law and seek to govern the global commons on the basis of the principle of shared sovereignty. And “global governance” denotes the actual performance of the “international system” so defined.

What is startlingly new about Xi’s remarks at the Central Conference was his call for China now to “lead the reform of the global governance system with the concepts of fairness and justice.” This is by far the most direct statement of China’s intentions on this important question offered so far. The world should buckle up and get ready for a new wave of Chinese international policy activism.

Like much of the rest of the international community, China is acutely conscious of the dysfunctionality of much of the current multilateral system. So Xi’s wish to lead “reform of the global governance system” is no accident. It reflects growing diplomatic activism in multilateral institutions, in order to reorient them in a direction more compatible with what China regards as its “core national interests.”

Xi has reminded China’s international policy elite that the totality of China’s future foreign policy direction, including the reform of global governance, must be driven by these core national interests. In this context, China also wants a more “multipolar” international system. This is code for a world in which the role of the United States and the West is substantially reduced.

The challenge for the rest of the international community is to define what type of global order we now want. What do existing institutions like the European Union, the Association  of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the African Union want for the international rules-based system for the future? What exactly does the US want, with or without Trump (pic above)? And how will we collectively preserve the global values embodied in the UN Charter, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

The future of the global order is in a state of flux. China has a clear script for the future. It’s time for the rest of the international community to develop one of its own.

This is an edited version of an address delivered to the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

 

Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, is President of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York and Chair of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism.

Trade, Technology, and Xi Jinping’s Question

July 7, 2018

by Kaushik Basu

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/digital-technology-trade-war-protectionism-by-kaushik-basu-2018-07y Kausik Basu

Despite unprecedented technology-enabled development, the world is beset with challenges, from violent conflict to rising inequality. The underlying reason for these problems may be that we have reached a turning point in the march of technological progress – and we are navigating it very badly.

The Protectionist (Donald Trump) is the Loser. The Globalist (Xi Jinping) will emerge the winner eventually.

 

NEW YORK – “It was the best of times; it was the worst of times,” said President Xi Jinping, quoting Charles Dickens’ famous line to open his speech at the 2017 World Economic Forum. “Today,” Xi continued, “we also live in a world of contradictions.” On one hand, “growing material wealth and advances in science and technology” have enabled unprecedented rates of development. On the other hand, “frequent regional conflicts, global challenges like terrorism and refugees, as well as poverty, unemployment, and a widening income gap” are generating deep uncertainty.

Xi then posed a potent question: “What has gone wrong with the world?”

Perhaps the answer lies with the very technology that Xi regards as the key to China’s rise to high-income status. Specifically, it may be that we have reached a turning point in the march of technological progress – one that we are navigating very badly.

Technology has been shaping and reshaping our lives ever since early human beings discovered how to make tools from stone. It is only natural for such a long process to include moments when technological change generates unprecedented challenges.

One such turning point was the Industrial Revolution. In mid-eighteenth-century Britain, the revolution’s birthplace, progress entailed considerable adversity. Some workers toiled 12-14 hours per day, yet inequality surged. And the incidence of child labor rose beyond the levels seen in some of the poorest Sub-Saharan African economies today.

But Europe rose to the occasion. Groundbreaking research in economics was carried out by the likes of Adam Smith and Antoine Cournot, leading to novel interventions like progressive income tax, as well as new labor laws and regulations. As a result, the Industrial Revolution accelerated economic development and human welfare.

Human development has seen other “industrial revolutions,” including the one that is currently unfolding. This so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution is centered on advances in digital technology, including “labor-linking technologies” (which enable workers across continents to work together in real time) and, more recently, artificial intelligence and robotics.

These advances have enabled economic globalization, which, like the Industrial Revolution, has brought unprecedented progress, as Xi acknowledged, while generating new challenges, including rising inequality and worker vulnerability. But instead of managing those challenges, as Europe did in the nineteenth century, much of the world is succumbing to political polarization, rising nationalism, and a toxic blame game. Most notably, the United States under President Donald Trump has initiated what is rapidly escalating into a tit-for-tat trade war – one that will be devastating for the entire world, but especially for the US itself.

What such behavior fails to take into account is that globalization is, fundamentally, a natural phenomenon. It is the result of billions of individuals going about their daily activities, making decisions based on the possibilities available to them. Arguing against globalization is as constructive as blaming gravity for a building’s collapse. As Xi pointed out in his WEF speech, it “is a natural outcome of scientific and technological progress, not something created by any individuals or any countries.”

In the case of Trump’s trade war, US policy also reflects a misunderstanding – one that economists have repeatedly pointed out – about bilateral trade deficits. According to Trump, a trade deficit is essentially a loss, and the countries with surpluses vis-à-vis the US, such as Mexico or China, are behaving in unfair and exploitative ways. Thus, they should be made to pay.

To understand the fallacy, consider your interaction with the neighborhood grocery store. At the end of each year, you run up a large “trade deficit” vis-à-vis the store, because the store sells goods to you, whereas you do not sell anything to the store. To claim that China “owes” the US for its trade bilateral trade surplus would be like saying that your local grocery store owes you for the money you spent there during the last year. In fact, you were not cheated, just as your employer was not cheated by the bilateral deficit it runs with you. Rather, you made mutually beneficial transactions based on your needs.

The modern economy depends on bilateral trade deficits; it would collapse without them. In an age of advanced technologies and accelerating specialization, attempting to manufacture everything domestically or bilaterally would be prohibitively costly.

The One and Only Harley defies Trump’s America First Trade Policy

For now, the US seems committed to its demands that its partners pay up. The more likely scenario, however, is that economies like Canada, Europe, and Mexico will seek to offset the impact of Trump’s tariffs by deepening their ties with China – an obvious win for America’s main global competitor. Meanwhile, US corporations will probably move production elsewhere to avoid retaliatory tariffs, as some – such as Harley-Davidson – have already threatened to do.

There is no denying that the technological turning point at which we find ourselves has caused strain for all countries. But instead of blaming one another for the challenges generated by technological progress – an approach that will only bring about the worst of times – we should work together to address them. Any country that refuses to do so will create strain for all – and end up condemning itself to being left behind.

 

Kaushik Basu, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, is Professor of Economics at Cornell University and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Data Driven Preventive Diplomacy For ASEAN Member States

July 6, 2018

by Hana Hanifah and Askabea Fadhilla, The Habibie Center

http://www.eastasiaforum.org

ASEAN countries are no strangers to conflict and violence. As a region comprising diverse nation-states, Southeast Asia has experienced a number of inter- and intra-state conflicts. Political stability in the region has improved over the last decade, especially due to a decline in inter-state disputes. But intra-state disputes in the form of ethnic conflicts, violence against minorities and violent extremism — including terrorism — are gaining ground.

 

There are ongoing reports about Rohingya trying to escape from Myanmar and seeking refuge in Malaysia. Amid the Myanmar army’s denial of its alleged atrocities against the Rohingya, about 700,000 Rohingya have reportedly fled the country since August 2017.

Meanwhile, according to the Global Peace Index, the Philippines is one of the least peaceful countries in the region due to its bloody war against drugs and crime that has resulted in increasing rates of homicide, incarceration and extrajudicial killings. Based on the same report, Indonesia had the greatest performance drop in the Asia Pacific in terms of peacefulness due to an increase in politically-motivated terrorism and growing tensions between hard-line fundamentalists and minority groups. Indonesia is also more and more vulnerable to the threat of an alliance between the so-called Islamic State, Darul Islam and some local violent extremist groups, as shown in the recent Surabaya bombing.

Even decades before the United Nations’ An Agenda for Peace report in 1992, ASEAN had committed to maintaining peace in the region without using the label of ‘preventive diplomacy’. From its inception, ASEAN was intended to be a regional conflict-prevention mechanism that internalised the practices of peaceful dialogue, consultation and consensus building among its members, amid the geopolitical uncertainty and diplomatic breakdowns that characterised the Cold War period.

The ASEAN Regional Forum defined preventive diplomacy for ASEAN in 2001 as member states’ diplomatic or political action to prevent disputes or conflicts that could pose a threat to regional stability, with the purpose of preventing such disputes from escalating to armed confrontation and minimising the impact of those conflicts and disputes on the region.

But in practice, preventive diplomacy in ASEAN is limited to the execution of forums and meetings that do not necessarily producing binding mechanisms to resolve potentially destabilising intra-state conflicts. ASEAN seems to be stuck in confidence-building measures and has not completely implemented preventive diplomacy as envisioned by the United Nations.

Critics point to the development gap and significant political differences between ASEAN member states. The ‘ASEAN way’ that rests on the principles of consensus building and non-intervention is often cited as one of the factors that undermine a deeper commitment to implementing preventive diplomacy. ASEAN’s limited definition of preventive diplomacy is also criticised for constraining the practice of preventive diplomacy in the region to only include conflicts between and among states. This excludes non-state and intra-state conflicts or violence, which are seemingly growing in the post-Cold War era.

But the biggest challenge to preventive violence in ASEAN yet to be taken seriously is the lack of knowledge about conflicts and violence. To this day, it remains a challenge to pinpoint the general trend and exact number of violent events and conflicts within ASEAN. Some instances were allegedly perpetrated by the state, while others were committed by non-state entities and individuals. Although some reports intuitively indicate that violence in ASEAN is increasing, it is hard to identify the exact number of incidents because the data is scarce and rarely updated.

The limited reliable data that is available reveals that each country in Southeast Asia has its own patterns and characteristics of conflict and violence. In terms of intensity, there are also differences in the number of casualties and frequency of incidents. The types of violence also differ and include civil wars, insurgency, crimes, communal conflicts and violence against minority groups.

Relatively little data on violent incidents existed until recently, and the data is generally focused at the national level. Data on regional trends is patchy and scattered across various sources, which makes it difficult to generate a quick and accurate analysis to aid policy making processes. Not all countries have the capacity to record such data, which itself can be a controversial process in a number of ASEAN member states where conflicts are sometimes highly political.

Knowledge about the distinct features of violence in ASEAN is crucial to enable policymakers and stakeholders to identify shortcomings in the region’s approach to responding and preventing conflict. Such knowledge would also equip them to come up with effective policies and strategies to promote peace and stability in ASEAN.

A knowledge-based approach would enable stakeholders to resolve conflicts more effectively — not only by managing the impacts but also by preventing the escalation of future conflicts and violence. It would also encourage better practices of data collection and recording violence in and between ASEAN member states — which is essential to monitoring and evaluating preventive diplomacy and progress towards peace in the region.

Hana Hanifah and Askabea Fadhilla are Researchers at the ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center, Jakarta.

 

Regional leadership needed to save trade regime

July 5,2018

by Mari Pangestu, University of Indonesia, and Christopher Findlay, University of Adelaide

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/24/regional-leadership-needed-to-save-trade-regime/

The world in which Asia Pacific economies operate is changing. Two main forces are driving this change — one ‘top-down’, the other ‘bottom-up’.

The top-down force is the emergence of a world with a larger number of key economies. In recent decades, growth rates around the world have diverged. For much of Asia, this has meant dramatic improvements in incomes and a huge reduction in the number of people living in poverty. It has also meant a new order among countries — a multipolar world.

 

Prof. Christopher Findlay, University of Adelaide

The bottom-up force is the change in the way production is organised, driven by progress in communications and information technology. Technological improvements have shifted the location of production, with production processes becoming increasingly fragmented across countries. The nature of work and the composition of skills within economies have changed.

Given the new order of production and trade, the Trump administration’s mercantilist focus on reducing merchandise trade deficits will end up hurting the United States, as well as disrupting global production networks.

As trade flows change, pressure for domestic structural change can arise. In the United States, a decline in support for international trade and openness has been exacerbated by a lack of adjustment support for geographically concentrated bearers of the burden. Their reaction via domestic political processes has shocked the international system.

In the United States and elsewhere, good macroeconomic outcomes no longer win elections. Much economic policy is now driven by nationalistic and protectionist politics. This is particularly evident in US initiatives to protect its domestic production and seek adjustments from China.

These political conditions were preceded by waning support for openness at a multilateral level. As multilateral negotiations stalled, the response has been the emergence of ‘mega-regional’ platforms such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP 11) and the East Asian Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

These initiatives sit atop a ‘noodle bowl’ of messy bilateral agreements. Before the current US America First regime, these mega-regional and bilateral agreements still operated under the lid of the World Trade Organization. The rules-based trading system was still an anchor for economic integration, especially the dispute settlement mechanism.

Today, the principles of openness, non-discrimination, transparency and open regionalism — which have helped generate prosperity in the region, especially for developing economies in Asia — are being severely challenged. When the United States leaves the TPP, undertakes unilateral action and declares that the multilateral rules have not served US interests, the anchor of the trading system is challenged. At most international forums like the G20, policymakers’ time is being wasted on phrasing defensive communiques instead of cooperating on the substantive trade and investment issues of the day.

At the same time, new issues are emerging in relation to trade and investment, such as the taxation of international income flows, the treatment of data flows and the management of intellectual property. Responding to climate change and finding appropriate policies to deal with inequality are also among the challenges.

Progress will be difficult in the multipolar world without clear leadership from the major economies.

Waiting for a consensus to emerge among key economies about the importance of maintaining these anchor principles — while at the same time dealing with the new issues that have emerged — is not an option. There are no obvious forces now at work to resolve this lack of consensus within a reasonable timeframe. Lower-income people in rural ASEAN areas, for example, should not have to wait for the rest of the world to figure out how to shift their own economies and communities to new sources of growth.

In the absence of leadership from the advanced economies, a shared leadership model in the region should be the answer. The key then is the response of the increasingly influential ‘second-tier’ economies. No actors are more important than Indonesia and Southeast Asia, operating through ASEAN and the ASEAN-plus regional agreements that are already in place and being consolidated under RCEP.

Recent statements by leaders in Indonesia indicate recognition of the role it can play and wants to play. But Indonesia’s contribution will be so much greater and more effective if it acts in concert with others. Concerted action could take multiple forms. It might include unilateral reforms, or working on sustainability initiatives that are in both local and global interests.

Effective concerted action depends on a few factors. Foremost, it depends on shared principles. Part of this is agreeing on a purpose, such as the basic principles of non-discrimination, transparency and support for the rules-based trading system. Other principles can relate to specifics, such as the management of open data flows. These principles provide important reference points as countries take their own actions. There is value in sharing experience and aligning countries’ expectations about each other’s reform programs.

These are not new approaches. Readers with long memories will recall efforts like the APEC non-binding investment principles and Individual Action Plans. But this is the point — we already have relevant structures for mobilising this cooperation that can be rejuvenated.

APEC is the most relevant example. Putting weight on APEC does carry a risk. But APEC has a well-developed network of second-track structures that can be engaged more deeply. Given the complexities of the new issues facing the regional economic order, it is even more imperative that there be wide, multi-stakeholder participation and input.

Even more importantly, APEC remains a forum in our region where key economies in the multipolar world and the leading second-tier countries can interact effectively, and where the major protagonist, the United States, can still be engaged.

Mari Pangestu is former Indonesian trade minister and Professor at the University of Indonesia. Christopher Findlay is Professor and Executive Dean of the Faculty of the Professions at the University of Adelaide.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Trade Wars in Asia’.

 

 

 

If an esteemed historian like PJ Thum can be fooled by fake news, what hope is there for us?

July 4, 2018

If historian PJ Thum can be misled by fakes…

 

https://www.unscrambled.sg/2018/07/03/

 

TL;DR – But if you take some effort to google, actually, you can avoid embarrassing yourself.

Singaporean Historian PJ Thum became famous after he was grilled by Minister Shanmugam at the hearing of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods for six hours. Back then, he had made the audacious claim that the politicians of the PAP were the “clear source of fake news”. He based that claim on his work as a historian.

And PJ Thum appeared to be a historian with glowing credentials. He graduated from Harvard with a bachelors in East Asian Studies. He then went on to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and got a second degree in Modern History and Politics. He returned to Oxford on a Commonwealth Scholarship to get his Doctor of Philosophy. Since 2014, PJ has been a Research Associate at the Centre for Global History, University of Oxford; a Fellow of Green Templeton College, and coordinator of Project Southeast Asia, an initiative of the University of Oxford to expand its range of scholarly expertise on Southeast Asia. In 2015, PJ was elected as a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum.

Sounds impressive, right? A historian with such sterling credentials must be a really smart person. Someone who won’t be easily fooled by fake news. Someone who would think critically of the things he reads, cross-references multiple sources to ensure that he comes to the right conclusions. Right?

Well… not quite. At least not in this particular instance.

PJ Thum posted this on Facebook recently:

Just in case it gets taken down, it’s a post with this cartoon:

 

Two versions of the same event. What is the truth?

Accompanying the cartoon, PJ Thum had the following remarks:

“Another from the archives:

“At the end of (Lee’s speech to the joint session of the US Congress), there was a sustained standing ovation… Even before he started his speech, there was a standing ovation – such is the Prime Minister’s reputation.” – Straits Times, 10 October 1985.

“(Lee) was addressing a sparsely attended joint session and drew polite applause.” – International Herald Tribune, 10 October 1985.

Hmmm… now I’m wondering just how much of what Singaporeans believed to be LKY’s vaunted global reputation was actually manufactured by the government-controlled media, in the days when there were no alternative news sources?”

PJ Thum questioned whether the media, controlled by the Singapore government, had manufactured Mr, Lee Kuan Yew’s “vaunted global reputation”.

Is he once again insinuating that the Singapore government is a source of fake news?

Thankfully, there’s a video of the speech

Someone added this video in the comments to PJ Thum’s post, and the video proved PJ Thum wrong.

It’s a video of Mr Lee Kuan Yew speaking at a Joint Session of the US Congress taken off C-SPAN.

And at the 3:13 mark, and also 4:09 mark the video shows people applauding in a packed room.

At the 9:47 mark, the video shows Mr Lee Kuan Yew receiving a standing ovation when he wrapped up his speech.

Now we can’t possibly know from the video alone if the Congressmen really respected Mr Lee Kuan Yew, but the fact was that the Joint Session was well attended, and that Mr Lee Kuan Yew had received a standing ovation.

Those are facts.

Captured on video.

Facts which directly contradict what PJ Thum had insinuated. Facts which can be found if Thum had taken a little bit care and effort to verify and check.

Which unfortunately makes PJ Thum look rather bad

This could mean one of two things.

The first possibility is PJ Thum is a sloppy historian who doesn’t dig deeper and look for more sources of information so that he can come to a proper (and accurate) conclusion.

Or the second possibility is that he had deliberately put up the post and asked a question in such a way that would induce people to conclude that the Singapore government is a source of fake news.

Of course, we don’t know which is the truth. We don’t believe that PJ Thum is that malicious as to deliberately spread fake news. But we also don’t think PJ Thum is stupid. So… It’s hard to say. Having said that, if PJ Thum can be so wrong on this incident, what else could he or we have gotten wrong?

Whatever the case is, this incident has again demonstrated that we should all learn to google. And don’t automatically accept anything we read or what we’re told to be true.

ALWAYS check and look for more sources of information. Otherwise, we might end up looking like fools for believing that some piece of fake news is true.