America first, geo-economic logic last


April 27, 2017

America first, geo-economic logic last

by Gary Hawke, Victoria University of Wellington

http://www.eastasiaforum.org

Image result for tomahawk over syriaTrumponomics–Military Power over Geo-Economics

The Trump Administration has introduced a new set of challenges to the international economy. It has profoundly changed the role of the United States in international economic diplomacy, ceasing to be a champion of multilateralism.

Within the first 100 days of the Trump administration, reality has overwhelmed a good deal of campaign rhetoric, and individuals experienced and skilled in conventional public management have prevailed over some who epitomised revolt against elites. But ideas that challenge longstanding US positions on the world economy and international integration remain at the core of the Trump administration.

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Get the Message, Theresa May?

Bilateral trade balances have long been known to be an inappropriate policy objective. Yet the Trump administration is pursuing this without any sound argument. Its belief is that only bilaterally balanced trade (or an excess of US exports) is ‘fair trade’. This nonsense is reinforced by concentrating on trade in goods, ignoring surpluses on services trade. And the capital account is ignored entirely.

Trump expands the idea of bilateral balance to the trading relationship with every other country. He insists on what Gary Hufbauer has called ‘mirror-image reciprocity’. Every component of a deal, every individual tariff rate, any provision about rules of origin for specific products, and any condition for foreign investment must be no less favourable for US exporters than the corresponding rule applied to the United States. This is misplaced concreteness has gone mad.

The idea of a win-win overall deal is rejected. The very idea of complementarities between economies is ignored. That this is endorsed by the chair of the newly established National Trade Council Peter Navarro, who holds a Harvard PhD in economics, is a conclusive argument for an enquiry into Harvard standards.

Two of Trump’s executive orders on trade deficits and trade laws would both fail the most elementary of economics examinations.

Under the Trump Administration, history is no more respected than economics. It has been argued that the WTO and its predecessor GATT were intended to apply only to developed economies. Those who were at the Havana conference in the 1940s and those who negotiated with developing economies in the Uruguay Round saw no such belief among their US colleagues.

This is a thin disguise for wishing to continue using subterfuge rather than economic logic in consideration of so-called ‘countervailing duties’ and ‘anti-dumping penalties’ against China. The idea that there is an indisputable definition of a ‘market economy’ is absurd, but then so is the underlying idea of dumping. Artificial lowering of prices with the intention of raising them after forcing a competitor out of business should be countered — if it were ever properly detected.

Even more absurd is the notion that ‘over capacity’ is something that requires government intervention. Consumers gain from cheap products. When producers cannot sustain output levels at such low prices, the appropriate response is for the least efficient producers to exit. In the case of steel, ‘least efficient’ is probably not the same as ‘Chinese’.

Most concerning is an attack on the WTO dispute resolution system. US opposition to it predated the Trump administration. The Obama administration vetoed the reappointment of a judge to the Appellate Body for the little-disguised reason that his decisions were uncongenial.

US resistance to the dispute resolution system has never been far from the surface. It is often rationalised by a constitutional principle that only the US Congress can create laws which bind US citizens. Some US judges can nevertheless make positive use of international reasoning, and previous administrations have recognised that membership of international institutions could require them to persuade Congress to amend US law or to compensate a foreign party.

The language in the final statement of the WTO dispute resolution system is in no way an exemption of the United States from the dispute resolution system. The words of the dispute settlement understanding that a ruling can’t ‘add to or diminish the rights or obligations’ of a member country — relate to member countries’ commitments, not US law, and their interpretation is not a US prerogative.

Rhetoric about a ‘rules-based international order’ or the ‘modern liberal international order’ is now entirely empty when set beside the declared intentions of the Trump administration. Again, the problem is deeper than Trump. No country can be an effective advocate of the rule of law when its partisan politics dominates the choice of its most senior judges. Fundamentally, the United States has to adjust to no longer being able to dominate global affairs.

Economic integration now has to be led by countries other than the United States. But successful integration elsewhere will cause responses within the United States as businesses miss profitable opportunities and as voters see that they are missing out on consumption and employment gains.

Gary Hawke is retired Head of the School of Government and Professor of Economic History, Victoria University of Wellington.

International Finance Ministers Discuss Growth Strategies at The George Washington University


April 26, 2017

International Finance Ministers Discuss Growth Strategies

GW-hosted event, “Growth Strategies in a De-Globalizing World,” brought finance ministers from Colombia, Indonesia and Paraguay.

Finance ministers Mauricio Cárdenas, Sri Mulyani Indrawati and Santiago Peña

Finance Ministers Mauricio Cárdenas, Sri Mulyani Indrawati and Santiago Peña discussed their countries’ growth strategies, including focusing domestically in an uncertain global market. (Logan Werlinger/GW Today)
April 20, 2017

 

https://gwtoday.gwu.edu/international-finance-ministers-discuss-growth-strategies

As the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group spring meetings loomed, the George Washington University on Wednesday hosted international finance ministers and other experts to discuss the global economic landscape and implications for countries trying to grow in a “de-globalizing” world.

The event—hosted by GW’s Institute for International Economic Policy, GW School of Business and the Growth Dialogue—brought together the current finance ministers from Colombia, Indonesia and Paraguay and was moderated by Danny Leipziger, GW professor of practice of international business and managing director of the Growth Dialogue.

“The world is not in a good place,” Dr. Leipziger said in framing the discussion, adding many “warning signs” show countries’ difficulties with growing their economies, particularly at a time when others, including the U.S., are questioning globalization.

Does that mean that countries’ development strategies need to shift? And if so, how? Many agreed that looking inward is important during times of global uncertainty.

“We have to rely on domestic forces,” said Mauricio Cárdenas, Colombia’s minister of finance and public credit, adding infrastructure and brokering national peace and stability are important factors in growing his country’s economy.

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Sri Mulyani Indrawati of Indonesia

Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Indonesia’s Minister of Finance, added that while increasing revenues is important for a country, so is a good spending plan when every dollar counts. “How you spend it, and how you spend it better, is going to also be very critical,” she said.

Looking at trade inter-regionally could also be an important tactic if engaging with the broader globe is difficult, said Santiago Peña, Paraguay’s minister of finance. Many countries in Asia have been able to do this and have coped better with global changes, he said.

Panelists also said growth worries are compounded by uncertainty surrounding some of the rhetoric and policy actions of the Trump administration with respect to globalization and declarations that certain countries have a trade surplus with the United States.

“I hope that GW is also playing an important role in this location because you have a moral responsibility to continue pushing back the policy trend which is worrying for many countries in the world,” Ms. Indrawati said.

Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, had some advice for the finance ministers with respect to engaging with the United States.

“One just has to assume for the next couple of years at a minimum that the U.S. is going to be, at best, a bad actor,” when it comes to trade and other international partnerships, he said.

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Cambodia: Time for the United States to cancel its 1970 Dirty Debt


April 16, 2017

Cambodia: Time for the United States to cancel its 1970  Dirty Debt

by Kongkea Chhoeun@www.eastasiaforum,org

The Cambodian government has once again called on the United States to cancel its US$500 million debt. In the 1970s, the Cambodian government borrowed about US$270 million to purchase food supplies. This debt was never repaid and has now swollen to US$500 million. This is equivalent to 15 per cent of Cambodia’s 2016 national budget and about half the total aid the country has received from the United States since the peace settlement of 1991.

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Cambodia and the United States have been negotiating the debt since 1995 but have failed to come close to an agreement. The latest appeal by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen likely stems from the Cambodian People’s Party’s (CPP) anxiety about its popular support ahead of the 2017 local government election. By exploiting public sentiment in support of debt cancellation, the CPP can position itself as the champion of the Cambodian people.

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Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger : The Bombers of Cambodia–Time for the US to atone for their criminality

But the call also has merit. The Cambodian government has consistently argued that this is ‘dirty’ debt. It maintains that the Lon Nol government, which came to power in March 1970 through a US-backed coup, borrowed the funds to buy weapons that were used against the Khmer Rouge in the civil war of the early 1970s. The CPP also argues that Cambodia deserves debt forgiveness because of illegal bombing carried out by the United States from March 1969 until August 1973.

During this period, US warplanes dropped more than 500,000 tons of explosives on Cambodian villages along the Cambodia–Vietnam and Cambodia–Lao borders. Up to 500,000 lives were consequently lost. Moreover, the secret bombing campaigns and the US-supported coup created the conditions for the rise of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime that killed almost 2 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979.

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Former US Secretary of State John Kerry and US Ambassador to Cambodia William Heidt

The United States has consistently refused to completely cancel the debt but has long indicated that it is willing to negotiate a partial cancellation. US Ambassador to Cambodia William Heidt was recently quoted in local press as saying that the United States has, ‘never seriously discussed or considered cancelling the debt’ but is willing to ‘[work] out a deal that works for both sides’.

The deal that the United States has in mind is no doubt similar to the one it struck with Vietnam in 2000. That year, the United States enacted a repayment-for-assistance program after Vietnam signed a bilateral agreement in 1997 and resumed making scheduled payments of its debt. The US Congress created the Vietnam Education Foundation, into which is channelled about 40 per cent of Vietnam’s total debt payments to the United States. The Foundation provides opportunities for Vietnamese nationals to pursue graduate and post-graduate studies in the United States and for US citizens to teach in Vietnam.

It is certainly in US interests to settle the Cambodian debt as soon as possible. Cambodia has drawn closer and closer to China over the last two decades. As a small, poor and insecure state surrounded by two bigger, historical enemies, Cambodia needs China as insurance against Vietnam and Thailand. More importantly, Cambodia’s political regime increasingly depends on China for foreign capital to sustain the economic performance needed to maintain its political legitimacy. Foreign direct investment from China reached US$857 million in 2015 or roughly 61.1 per cent of total FDI. Chinese aid to Cambodia amounted to US$320 million in 2015 or roughly 30 per cent of total aid received.

Cambodia’s closer links with China benefit China’s strategic interests too. Cambodia closed Taiwan’s representative office in Phnom Penh in 1997. In 2010, Cambodia deported 20 Uyghur nationals and Chinese citizens to China. In July 2012, Cambodia prevented ASEAN from issuing a joint statement over the South China Sea issue. Once again in July 2016, Cambodia blocked any reference in an ASEAN statement to a UN-backed court’s ruling against Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea.

Data from the Council for the Development of Cambodia shows that the United States has granted US$1.13 billion to Cambodia since 1992. But no matter how much aid the United States has already generously given to improve the lives of Cambodians since the early 1990s, if the United States wants to regain influence in Cambodia, it needs to forgive the debt.

It is unclear why a compromise similar to the US–Vietnam deal has not been struck between the United States and Cambodia. In any case, Cambodia appears to bear little penalty for not repaying its debt. It can access the foreign capital it needs, mainly from China. It also borrows from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

Given this, even partial repayment from Cambodia is unlikely. So the logical step forward is for the United States to write off the debt. But this is unlikely, especially under the Trump administration. The result will be to push Cambodia deeper into China’s orbit.

Kongkea Chhoeun is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

 

The Renminbi and the Rise of China in Global Trade and Finance


April 10, 2017

The Renminbi and the Rise of China in Global Trade and Finance

by Paola Subacchi, Chatham House

http://www.eastasiaforum.org

“…any suggestion that the renminbi may one day rival the dollar and seriously threaten the greenback’s dominance within the international monetary system remains wishful thinking. The renminbi is moving in the right direction, but much more needs to be done to make it into a pillar of this multi-currency system.”–Paola Subacchi

At times of big turmoil, currencies take the hit, but economic transformation can also create currency winners. Nowhere is this more apparent than when we compare the prospects of British sterling and China’s renminbi.

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Between February 2016 — when the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union (EU) was announced — and the end of January 2017, the sterling fell by 14 per cent against the US dollar. Then, at the beginning of October, when the UK government appeared to signal a preference for a clear break with the EU — a ‘hard Brexit’ — the sterling dropped again by 6 per cent.

As the British government is serving notice on the membership of the EU, it is not yet clear what the future relationship will look like. Will Britain remain a member of Europe’s single market? Or will it embrace a totally independent trade policy to maintain control at its borders?

Currencies not only reflect geopolitical dynamics, but also patterns of trade and debt. A weak currency is not much help for an economy that imports more than it exports. The UK has a significant deficit in its current account — roughly, it consumes more than it produces — at almost 6 per cent of GDP. Of course, a weak currency would lower the prices of exports, but only if these goods are produced with limited inputs from imports.

In a world of global supply chains this is questionable. Even assuming that a weak sterling would help shift the UK model of growth from domestic demand to exports, this adjustment will take time and is unlikely to cushion the adverse impact of Brexit on real GDP growth in the next few years.

The ‘hard Brexit’ option, by reducing market openness, will affect investors’ confidence, have an adverse impact on capital inflows and undermine growth. If the UK becomes less attractive as an investment destination, and stricter immigration policies cause the labour force to shrink, then Britain may find it difficult to attract the quantity of foreign capital and labour necessary to sustain a domestic demand-driven economy.

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The sterling remains in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket of international reserve currencies. To some extent the sterling has been a proxy of British global influence: on the way down, but still ‘punching above its weight’. But the sterling’s protracted weakness coupled with the inclusion of the Chinese renminbi in the SDR basket — in effect from the beginning of October 2017 — may result in downgrading the pound when the composition of the basket is reassessed in 2020.

If currencies are an expression of national sovereignty, they also epitomise the limits of such sovereignty in an open economy. Exchange rate dynamics tend to reflect divergences between domestic politics and global markets. Thinking that domestic policy making can be insulated from the rest of the world, so that no coordination or cooperation is needed, is deeply fallacious. The sterling’s troubles are a reminder that foreign investors have an indirect say — and interest — in how a country is managed.

The inclusion of the renminbi among the currencies that compose the SDRs — the US dollar, the euro, the yen and the sterling — is a ‘milestone’ for China, as International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde said when she presented the IMF executive board’s decision on 30 November 2016.

The renminbi’s inclusion recognises the work that China’s monetary authorities have done in the last five years to push the renminbi’s transformation into an international currency — a currency that can be used to invoice and settle international trade and that is traded in international capital markets. The outcome of this process has been remarkable: approximately 25 per cent of China’s trade is now settled in renminbi — it was less than 1 per cent in 2009.

In addition, the inclusion somehow addresses the contradiction that China has faced for years: being the world’s second largest economy and the largest exporter without a currency that reflects that role. For years the dollar has been the currency used in China’s trade and investments, and this is still largely the case. This has suited China well throughout its transformation from a poor and isolated nation into an industrial powerhouse that is well integrated in regional and international supply chains.

But China’s dollar dependence no longer reflects Beijing’s ambitions for playing a more engaging and assertive role in international economic and financial affairs and governance. If ‘great nations have great currencies’, to paraphrase Nobel laureate Robert Mundell, then it is understandable that the Chinese leadership would push to turn the renminbi into a ‘great currency’.

Finally, and even more critically, being part of the SDR basket implicitly recognises the role that the renminbi, going forward, can play in the international monetary system. The hype that has surrounded the IMF decision — the SDR made headlines beyond the financial press, perhaps for the first time since its creation in 1969 — should not obscure the fact that the development of the renminbi is not a linear process, even if it is heavily policy-driven, and there is no guarantee that progress will continue at the same remarkable pace. The renminbi remains a currency with limited international circulation because of obstacles that are still in place to constrain capital flows into and from China’s domestic market.

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This is not the case for trade transactions, where the renminbi has been fully convertible since 2001 when China joined the World Trade Organisation. But what is the incentive for foreign businesses to hold renminbi if liquidity is constrained and therefore so are investment opportunities?

To make the renminbi into an international currency that foreigners want to hold as a store of value the Chinese leadership needs to continue the pace of reforms. Top of the list is the exchange rate and the abandonment of the system where the central bank intervenes every time the value of the renminbi moves outside a pre-determined range. Until foreign investors believe that the renminbi is liquid and trustworthy, any suggestion that the renminbi may one day rival the dollar and seriously threaten the greenback’s dominance within the international monetary system remains wishful thinking. The renminbi is moving in the right direction, but much more needs to be done to make it into a pillar of this multi-currency system.

Paola Subacchi is Director of Economic Research at Chatham House, London, and the author of The People’s Money: How China Is Building a Global Currency (Columbia University Press, 2017).

 

Illiberal Stagnation


April 9, 2017

Illiberal Stagnation

by Joseph E. Stiglitz

https://www.project-syndicate.org

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Today (April 2), a quarter-century after the Cold War’s end, the West and Russia are again at odds. This time, though, at least on one side, the dispute is more transparently about geopolitical power, not ideology. The West has supported in a variety of ways democratic movements in the post-Soviet region, hardly hiding its enthusiasm for the various “color” revolutions that have replaced long-standing dictators with more responsive leaders – though not all have turned out to be the committed democrats they pretended to be.

Too many countries of the former Soviet bloc remain under the control of authoritarian leaders, including some, like Russian President Vladimir Putin, who have learned how to maintain a more convincing façade of elections than their communist predecessors. They sell their system of “illiberal democracy” on the basis of pragmatism, not some universal theory of history. These leaders claim that they are simply more effective at getting things done.

Russia is now enabling the Taliban’s disingenuous diplomacy by pretending that ISIS is the more worrisome threat. It’s a game the Russians have been playing for more than a year.–Russia’s New Favorite Jihadis: The Taliban

That is certainly true when it comes to stirring nationalist sentiment and stifling dissent. They have been less effective, however, in nurturing long-term economic growth. Once one of the world’s two superpowers, Russia’s GDP is now about 40% of Germany’s and just over 50% of France’s. Life expectancy at birth ranks 153rd in the world, just behind Honduras and Kazakhstan.

In terms of per capita income, Russia now ranks 73rd (in terms of purchasing power parity) – well below the Soviet Union’s former satellites in Central and Eastern Europe. The country has deindustrialized: the vast majority of its exports now come from natural resources. It has not evolved into a “normal” market economy, but rather into a peculiar form of crony-state capitalism.

Yes, Russia still punches above its weight in some areas, like nuclear weapons. And it retains veto power at the United Nations. As the recent hacking of the Democratic Party in the United States shows, it has cyber capacities that enable it to be enormously meddlesome in Western elections.

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There is every reason to believe that such intrusions will continue. Given US President Donald Trump’s deep ties with unsavory Russian characters (themselves closely linked to Putin), Americans are deeply concerned about potential Russian influences in the US – matters that may be clarified by ongoing investigations.

Many had much higher hopes for Russia, and the former Soviet Union more broadly, when the Iron Curtain fell. After seven decades of Communism, the transition to a democratic market economy would not be easy. But, given the obvious advantages of democratic market capitalism to the system that had just fallen apart, it was assumed that the economy would flourish and citizens would demand a greater voice.

What went wrong? Who, if anyone, is to blame? Could Russia’s post-communist transition have been managed better?

We can never answer such questions definitively: history cannot be re-run. But I believe what we are confronting is partly the legacy of the flawed Washington Consensus that shaped Russia’s transition. This framework’s influences was reflected in the tremendous emphasis reformers placed on privatization, no matter how it was done, with speed taking precedence over everything else, including creating the institutional infrastructure needed to make a market economy work.

Fifteen years ago, when I wrote Globalization and its Discontents, I argued that this “shock therapy” approach to economic reform was a dismal failure. But defenders of that doctrine cautioned patience: one could make such judgments only with a longer-run perspective.

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Today, more than a quarter-century since the onset of transition, those earlier results have been confirmed, and those who argued that private property rights, once created, would give rise to broader demands for the rule of law have been proven wrong. Russia and many of the other transition countries are lagging further behind the advanced economies than ever. GDP in some transition countries is below its level at the beginning of the transition.

Many in Russia believe that the US Treasury pushed Washington Consensus policies to weaken their country. The deep corruption of the Harvard University team chosen to “help” Russia in its transition, described in a detailed account published in 2006 by Institutional Investor, reinforced these beliefs.

I believe the explanation was less sinister: flawed ideas, even with the best of intentions, can have serious consequences. And the opportunities for self-interested greed offered by Russia were simply too great for some to resist. Clearly, democratization in Russia required efforts aimed at ensuring shared prosperity, not policies that led to the creation of an oligarchy.

The West’s failures then should not undermine its resolve now to work to create democratic states respecting human rights and international law. The US is struggling to prevent the Trump administration’s extremism – whether it’s a travel ban aimed at Muslims, science-denying environmental policies, or threats to ignore international trade commitments – from being normalized. But other countries’ violations of international law, such as Russia’s actions in Ukraine, cannot be “normalized” either.

 

A Must Read Book: The ASEAN Miracle


April 6, 2017

Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery SngThe ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace

This just released book is, in my view, a must read for all who are keen to learn about ASEAN, its history, achievements and challenges.   Is ASEAN a miracle? We can debate this, but  let us first let find out what  Dean Prof. Kishore Mahubani of The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and his co-author and colleague, Jeffery Sng have to say. I am reading it now and find it a well written and documented and timely book. ASEAN will be celebrating the 50th Anniversary this August. The ASEAN Miracle has received very favorable reviews (below) –Din Merican

The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a miracle. Why?

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Congratulations to Dean Prof. Kishore Mahububani, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Jeffery Sng

In an era of growing cultural pessimism, many thoughtful individuals believe that different civilizations – especially Islam and the West – cannot live together in peace. The ten countries of ASEAN provide a thriving counter-example of civilizational coexistence. Here 625m people live together in peace. This miracle was delivered by ASEAN.

In an era of growing economic pessimism, where many young people believe that their lives will get worse in coming decades, Southeast Asia bubbles with optimism. In an era where many thinkers predict rising geopolitical competition and tension, ASEAN regularly brings together all the world’s great powers.

Stories of peace are told less frequently than stories of conflict and war. ASEAN’s imperfections make better headlines than its achievements. But in the hands of Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng, the good news story is also a provocation and a challenge to the rest of the world.

“This excellent book explains, in clear and simple terms, how and why ASEAN has become one of the most successful regional organizations in the world.”
George Yeo

Image result for Book The ASEAN MiracleThe ASEAN Miracle Men–Mr S. Rajaratnam (right), then Singapore’s Foreign Minister, at the historic 1967 Bangkok meeting, which saw the founding of ASEAN. With him are envoys (from left) Narciso Ramos from the Philippines, Adam Malik from Indonesia, Thanat Khoman from Thailand and Tun Abdul Razak from Malaysia.–ST FILE PHOTOS

“ASEAN was born in Bangkok. Thailand can take great pride in the fact that this Thai baby has emerged as a world success story. Indeed, many significant ASEAN initiatives were initiated by Thailand, including AFTA and ASEM. Kishore and Jeffery have done the world a huge favour in documenting this exceptional success story, and in making proposals to strengthen ASEAN further. This is a must-read for all who have interest in ASEAN affairs.”
Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand

“A powerful and passionate account of how, against all odds, ASEAN transformed the region and why Asia and the world need it even more today.”
Amitav Acharya

“Kishore and I have written that the world is coming together in a Fusion of Civilisations. This book documents beautifully how ASEAN has achieved this fusion. The ASEAN story is hugely instructive and this book tells it very well.”
Larry Summers

“This book on ASEAN explains well how the pragmatic Indonesian philosophy of musyawarah and mufakat has been critical for ASEAN’s success. Indonesian leadership has led to the creation and development of one of the world’s most successful regional organizations, which has fundamentally transformed he geopolitics and geo-economics of Southeast Asia. As ASEAN begins a new, possibly perilous, journey into the next fifty years, we should read this book as an indispensable guide to ASEAN’s future. We cannot take our success for granted. We have to work even harder to strengthen and, if necessary, reinvent ASEAN. This book explains how.”
Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Sixth President of Indonesia

“Over the years, Kishore Mahbubani has been as eloquent and visionary as he has tireless in championing Asia’s growing role in world affairs. In this impressive volume, Mahbubani tells the story of Southeast Asia’s ascent and the often underappreciated role of ASEAN as a regional provider of peace and stability. As the book makes clear, it is an unfinished story – ASEAN is uniquely situated to work with regional and global great powers in the search for common ground, but ASEAN is also vulnerable to neglect and decline. In the end, Mahbubani offers a powerful argument for a new era of ASEAN leadership.”

G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University

Kishore Mahbubani is Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, and author of The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East.

Jeffery Sng is a writer and former diplomat based in Bangkok, and co-author of A History of the Thai-Chinese.

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Publication Year: 2017
286 pages, 229mm x 152mm
ISBN: 978-981-4722-49-0 Casebound