Big Challenge for Asian Modernization


March 30, 2017

Cultural-Intellectual Reinvigoration: Big Challenge for Asian Modernization

by Michael Heng Siam-Heng (received by e-mail with thanks)

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Asia has been experiencing an economic revival since the 1960s, first Japan, then the Four Little Dragons, the Asian Tigers and now China and India. With Asian economies doing relatively well against the background of global recession, many Asians hope that the 21st century would be the Asian Century. But what kind of Asian Century?

How would Asians like this period of their history to be understood and remembered in centuries ahead?  It could be a period of impressive economic growth but also known for its environmental degradation, crimes, corruption, social disparities, religious extremism, and social conflicts. Or it could be a period that draws on the best of human achievements and advances them.  The second case would contribute immensely to a new global civilization characterized by peace, social justice, cultural brilliance, technological advancement, and sustainable economic growth.

I will dwell on four points.  First, on what basis can we argue for an Asian cultural-intellectual rejuvenation? Second, is such a historical project necessary? Third, three challenges facing us. Fourth, being in Malaysia, I will briefly touch on roles that can be played by this country.

Conceptual Basis for an Asian Cultural Rejuvenation

History tells us that radical economic and social transformations are often accompanied by intellectual ferment and cultural effervescence. The transformations generate social dislocations that challenge existing cultural norms, ideas, and social institutions.  The problems are serious and they engage the best brains of the time. In attempts to solve the issues, these best and brightest draw on their intellectual heritage, learn from other sources, cross-fertilise them and creatively synthesize them to produce original thoughts.

Examples are Ancient Greece, the Spring-Autumn-Warring period of China, the Islamic golden age, and the Maurya and the Gupta period of India. The most recent experience is the European Renaissance and Enlightenment, which produced giants in the fields of philosophy, natural sciences, social sciences, fine arts, music, architecture, and literature. We all know at least a dozen of such names.  These European thinkers or cultural giants acted as a positive force during that critical period, functioning both as a social conscience and as sources of forward-looking ideas. Their works have shaped the character of modern European civilization and continue to exert an influence on our thinking and cultures even until today.

The Need for the Historical Project

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Deng Xiao Peng–China’s Great Modernizer–Pragmatist

Ever since Asia suffered defeat and humiliation in its encounters with Western imperial powers, Asian leaders slowly realized the crucial importance of reform and modernization in order to face the onslaught. Country after country began to borrow ideas from the West, not all of which were positive, as we see in the case of Japanese imperialistic aggression.

By the end of the 19th century, Japan, through its  Meiji Restoration (明治維新), was the most successful in modernizing its military and economy, fulfilling its national agenda of being both powerful and wealthy. Once powerful, Japan began to behave aggressively, turning Korea into its colony, seizing large tracts of Chinese territories and occupying Southeast Asia. It was a military adventure which ended in total defeat at the closure of WWII.  To use a  simple metaphor, modernization is like the flight of a bird.  It requires two wings to function in a harmonious manner.  Being wealthy economically and strong militarily is one wing.  The other wing is sound cultural-intellectual development.

Fast forward into early 21st century, Asia has regained much of its share of global economy.  Statistics provided by the IMF, the World Bank and transnational banks testify to this shift of economic power from the West.

To the ordinary public, this shift is visible, in the form of improved standards of living, and the new physical landscape.  The most visible is the super-tall buildings – architectural icons of modernity.  Of the ten tallest buildings in the world, 8 are in Asia, 2 in the USA.

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In contrast to the modern landscape in Asian cities, Asia has a string of disturbing social ills.  There is dysfunctional culture exhibited by the people at the top running the show.  State infrastructure projects are awarded to friends and relatives rather than to the most competent.  Newspapers are full of examples of practices that reflect mindsets that are out of sync with the demands of a modern economy. In societies where there are modern economic and legal institutions, many of these institutions lack integrity and independence.

Even in a modern economy and society operating efficiently, we need something more.  Again using the example of Japan.  It is the most modern Asian country. Yet its modernization is confined to the fields of economy, technology, and life styles. It has not undergone a philosophical development based on a foundation of critical rationality and humanism. The Japanese nation as whole has not been able to come to terms with its atrocities during World War II.

 Three Major Challenges

Asians face three major challenges at this juncture of their history, namely (a) drawing on their own cultural resources and rejuvenating them, (b) learning from others, and (c) learning from each other.

The first challenge can be formulated as: how and what Asians can draw from their own cultural and intellectual resources in the process of dealing with new problems.

With an open and inquisitive mind, old ideas take on new meanings and interpretations in the context of new social problems. If a new interpretation provides an effective way in solving problems, the new solution is likely to find easier acceptance because it is framed in language familiar to the people. A sense of continuity is useful in coping with change.

Interestingly, there is often a link between the old and the new. Even a new philosophy is dependent on the intellectual achievements of the preceding centuries and millennia.  A scholar of the European Enlightenment observes that “enlightenment philosophy simply fell heir to the heritage of those [preceding] centuries. It ordered, sifted, developed and clarified this heritage rather than contributed and gave currency to new and original ideas.  Yet in spite of its dependence with respect to content, the Enlightenment produced a completely original form of philosophical thought.”  In other words, old beliefs can put on modern attires and assume modern colours. The result is a new idea.

This sounds rather straightforward. But it is not so if we observe carefully around us.  Hardcore conservatives prefer a literal and rigid interpretation of their traditions, all the more so if these are written. There is also the fear that in rejuvenating local culture and tradition to cope with the demands of a modern economy, the local culture and tradition may disappear, and that future generations will become culturally rootless.  Another problem is what to select from the past.

I believe that the proper attitude is to embrace change, and to see culture as something living, tradition as living tradition.  They are products of their times, and they will change with the demands of the time.

The second challenge is how and what to learn from others. To the extent that there are similarities in the issues involved in the transition from pre-modern societies to modern societies, we should learn from others’ experiences, both positive and negative. To quote the Indian philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan : “Similar experiences engender in men’s minds similar views”. Since the West has a longer history of modernization, Asia can certainly learn from them.

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Again like the first challenge, learning from others is not easy. Some believe that it is very difficult, or even impossible, to transplant ideas, values, and institutions that have sprouted and developed in a different culture and a different set of historical conditions.

Take the case of China’s difficult journey of learning after defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895. While the Chinese leadership welcomed the adoption of obviously more advanced technologies from the West, they had difficulties embracing the Western ideas and value system. The problem is less acute today but is not over.

What happened in China a century ago is happening in West Asia. The common belief was that “Eastern” culture of spirituality was superior to “Western” culture of materialism.  There is a fear that the spirit of local heritage and culture was threatened with destruction by the importation of western ideas and values.

Adoption and adaption of foreign ideas to local conditions is a long drawn out process, which requires creativity, flexibility, and openness. Though the process is complex, it has happened in history, in Southeast Asia, elsewhere in Asia, and Europe.

Evidence in history support the claim that we can borrow ideas that originated in a very different historical context, and adapt them to serve local needs or even improve upon them in the process of creative synthesis. Let me list briefly three examples. First example: Southeast Asia was able to adopt religious beliefs, ways of life, and institutions from India, China, the Middle East, and Europe. These influences from distant lands had originated in settings that were alien to Southeast Asia. Second example is Europe’s absorption of bureaucracy from China. Combining it with check and balance by civic society, the Western practice is more efficient and less prone to corruption, offering useful lessons for China. This is a vivid illustration of the Chinese saying, 青出于蓝而胜于蓝, or the pupil excelling the master. Third example: Buddhism was introduced to China, a country with a profoundly different culture. After centuries of acclimatization, we have a synthesis of the two cultural traditions known as “Chan” in Chinese and “Zen” in Japanese.

The sensible attitude of learning is to be open-minded and rational rather than be influenced by emotion and sentiments. We must be curious and humble while at the same be meticulous, critical and independent minded. Just as Asians should not feel a sense of superiority in being a source of Western modernization, they should not feel a sense of inferiority in borrowing from the West.  Learning from the findings of others can only increase the range of possible solutions.

The above two challenges are related. It is difficult to learn from foreign sources and adopt their useful elements if we are not culturally and intellectually confident. With confidence in our own cultural heritage, we are at ease to critically appreciate the achievements of others. And cultural confidence can only stem from a deep and critical understanding of our own cultural roots, to the extent of discarding outdated ideas and practices of our own traditions.

The third challenge is for Asians to know much more of each other’s history, intellectual achievements, and cultural traditions.  Though language may present a barrier, most Asian intellectuals use English as the second language which renders exchange of ideas possible. What holds them back is their attitude.  Asians tend to know more about Australasia, Europe and America than their Asian neighbours.  

Given the guarded attitude many Asians have regarding learning from the West, they have less misgivings regarding learning from each other. They can benefit from sharing their experiences in modernization.  In fact, Japan’s path of rapid economic development has provided valuable insights to Southeast Asia and later on China and India. This pattern of economic development is described as the Flying Geese, with Japan as the leading goose. In coping with the broader social and cultural issues arising from modernization, the Middle Eastern countries are more likely to consult the experiences of Malaysia and Indonesia than those from the West.

As a concrete project of mutual learning and co-operation among Asian countries, they can compile a set of books – the Great Books of the East, containing the cream of Eastern intellectual achievements. It is a doable project.  It serves as a platform for top scholars of Asian countries to work together, creating as a byproduct a network Asian intellectuals of similar interests.  It would produce a convenient reference work for libraries all over the world.  It world form a key component of common body of knowledge for serious minded global citizens.

Another concrete project is traditional medicine.  Asia is the home of traditional Chinese medicine, traditional Indian medicine, and traditional Middle Eastern medicine. It represents distilled knowledge accumulated over many centuries of medical practice, often under poor material conditions. It is thus evidence-based.  However, critics of traditional medicine often claim that it is not scientific because its research method departs from that of western medicine. Its theory needs a modern set of vocabulary and updated to take into account new medical findings. We can think of a productive sharing and conversation among the three streams of Asian traditional medicine. This is an area for active collaboration of Asian countries that can boost the cultural and intellectual confidence of Asia, while making concrete and valuable contributions to healthcare in the whole world.

Malaysia as the Italy of the Asian Mediterranean(Venice)

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Malaysia is unwilling to tap its rich diversity due to myopic Malay-centered leadership and  corruption–Bodoh Sombong

Cultural and intellectual rejuvenation is often a synthesis and product of the cross-fertilization of cultures and ideas.  Its birthplace is located at the cross-roads of diverse cultures and intellectual currents. For example, Italy, widely regarded as the birthplace of the European Renaissance, was an important meeting point of different cultures and intellectual traditions in the Mediterranean.

Malaysia can have an important role in such a historical process. Here, the four major currents of world civilizations (Chinese, Indian, Islamic and Western) are co-existing as mainstreams of social life. They represent invaluable resources. Southeast Asia is a region with a multi-layered sedimentation of diverse cultures. It is a vibrant, peaceful and forward-looking region when we compare it to other regions with similar historical background. If we borrow the language of the European Renaissance, Southeast Asia may be seen as a kind of Mediterranean region in the cultural revival of Asia and Malaysia can aspire to be the Italy of Asia (Venice).

Reinventing prevalent social-cultural practices is quite common in societies undergoing structural changes.  It is part of the efforts of a society to refine and refurbish the inner resources of their societies. It is through such processes of renewal that societies try to overcome internal stagnation and meet external challenges.

The process touches societies profoundly, involving ideas, values, morality, belief systems, culture, and institutions. It requires us to revisit our concepts of goodness, truth, and beauty.  The blossoming of culture represents the sublimation of the human spirit, the enrichment of human experience and the nurturing of human nature towards goodness. It is a project with both social and spiritual dimensions. It is a project with a historical soul.

Economic resurgence in itself does not guarantee a corresponding intellectual ferment and cultural effervescence. There are formidable obstacles in the long journey. First, Asian intellectuals may not rise to the call. Second, there is lack of freedom and internalized self-censorship that originates from a culture of fear. Third, there is no critical mass of thinkers to stimulate each other. Fourth, there are as yet no powerful social groups willing to adopt and champion new philosophies developed by their people.

The rise of Asia may thus be conceived of as an opportunity for an Asian cultural revival, which may or may not happen. Much depends on how Asians will make use of the opportunity. Will they translate the opportunity into a mission, and turn it into a reality?

The project of an Asian cultural rejuvenation is an ambitious undertaking.  It is likely to last for several generations. It has no walls and borders. Contributions from all corners of the world are warmly welcome. Though the stage is in Asia, the cast and audience are global.   This opens up a new arena of international cooperation for all those who aspire to contribute to the long term well-being of humanity.  As co-operation and competition with the West can be expanded to include friendly co-operation and competition in the field of ideas, this new arena could well be an alternative to the geopolitical rivalry between an emerging China and a US in decline.

Let us imagine that East Asia or South Asia could provide a case of cultural revival together with economic modernization.  It would be an attractive alternative to the current Western model for the Middle East. It may offer new insights and solutions for solving the whole array of social, economic and political problems there.

If and when Asian cultural and intellectual reinvigoration does happen in its full glory, it will lift Asian civilization to a higher level. In so doing, it will contribute to the cultural resources of the world and indeed to a richer modern civilization.  It will also impart a more profound and enduring meaning to the term Asian Century.

 

The Two Levels of Russia’s South China Sea Policies


March 29, 2017

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Number 376 | March 28, 2017

ANALYSIS

The Two Levels of Russia’s South China Sea Policies

by Alexander Korolev
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Russia’s policies regarding the South China Sea (SCS) dispute are more complex than they might seem. Moscow’s official position presents Russia as an extra-regional actor with no stakes in the dispute. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia “had never been a participant of the South China Sea disputes” and considers it “a matter of principle not to side with any party.” However, behind the façade of formal disengagement are Russia’s military build-up in the Asia-Pacific region, and the multi-billion dollar arms and energy deals with the rival claimants. These factors reveal that even though Moscow may not have direct territorial claims in the SCS, it has strategic goals, interests, and actions that have direct bearing on how the SCS dispute evolves.

One-fourth of Russia’s massive military modernization program through 2020 is designated for the Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok, to make it better equipped for extended operations in distant seas. Russia’s military cooperation with China has progressed to the point that President Putin called China Russia’s “natural partner and natural ally.” The two countries’ most recent joint naval exercise – “Joint Sea 2016” – took place in the SCS, and became the first exercise of its kind involving China and a second country in the disputed SCS after the Hague-based tribunal ruling on China’s “nine-dash line” territorial claims. However, Russia’s relations with Vietnam are displaying a similar upward trend: Russia-Vietnam relations have been upgraded to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” comparable to the Russia-China relationship. Russia and Vietnam are developing joint gas projects in the SCS, and Moscow also is trying to return to the Cam Ranh naval base and selling Hanoi advanced weapon systems that enhance Vietnam’s defense capabilities.

Moscow’s actual behavior, therefore, hardly conforms to the neutrality of its official statements. The simultaneous enhancements of military cooperation with both Beijing and Hanoi – two of the major direct disputants in the SCS – make Russia’s intentions hard to interpret, and require a more holistic framework that encapsulates different levels of Russia’s foreign policy interests. Great powers play multi-level foreign policy games that may overlap in specific issue-areas. For Russia, the SCS issue is where two levels of its policies – systemic anti-hegemonic balancing and non-systemic regional hedging – intersect.

The first level – systemic balancing – is driven by the global power distribution and perceptions of major threats. As a systemic balancer, Russia challenges the US-led unipolarity in multiple ways, as evidenced by its policies in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. The drive to balance the system leader (the United States) makes Russia seek alignment with China, which, like Russia, also challenges American unipolar dominance and perceives the US “Pivot to Asia” as a major threat to its security. Thus, Russian and Chinese assessments of external threats coincide in that both countries consider US policies – NATO’s eastward expansion in the Russian case and the “Pivot to Asia” in the Chinese case – threatening. The pressure originating from the US-led international system and the resultant incentives to resist it generate a strong bottom line that pushes Russia and China together. From this perspective, the SCS for Russia is a part of a bigger global game that dictates that Russia does not go against China’s interests, but rather provides some tacit, if not open, support.

The second level – regional hedging – is motivated by domestic and regional considerations and materializes in a combination of policies aimed at diversifying Russia’s regional links and averting potential instability that could affect Russia’s economic interests in the Asia Pacific. It also heads Moscow’s commercial desire to profit from energy, infrastructure, and arms deals. By strengthening connections with Hanoi, including arms exports, military-technical cooperation, and joint energy projects, Moscow creates a more balanced power-and-interest configuration around the SCS, and simultaneously diversifies its portfolio of Asian partners, with Vietnam also serving as an inroad to the ASEAN community. This explains why Russia, while not opposing China’s policies, also appears sympathetic towards Vietnam’s concerns in the SCS. The intersection of the two levels creates the intrinsic ambiguity of Russia’s SCS policies.

The main implication of this “two-level game” is that the nature of the SCS dispute for Russia, as well as Russia’s corresponding policy responses, is a variable rather than a constant: the more the SCS dispute deviates from a regional issue of sovereignty into the realm of China-US confrontation, the more Russia’s behavior in the region carries the features of anti-unipolar balancing. Conversely, the less the United States is involved, the more Russia’s policies in the area remain aloof from the system-level balancing and the more likely they are to carry features of regional hedging.

So far, the aforementioned two layers of Russia’s policies in the SCS have worked well without contradicting each other:

Vietnam has benefited from cooperation with Russia not only because such cooperation is valuable in its own right, but also because given the closeness of China-Russia relations, it provides an extra gateway for improving relations with China, which Hanoi values. Unlike relations with the United States, partnership with Russia provides Vietnam with needed access to advanced arms and energy technologies while simultaneously helping to avoid being locked between the hammer and the anvil of China-US competition. Plus, Hanoi has long experience using Russian arms and military equipment.

Russia’s policies also resonate with Beijing’s strategic calculations. While the Russia-Vietnam strategic partnership with its strong military component may look anti-China, in reality it works for Beijing’s interests because it helps to prevent the consolidation of a Hanoi-Washington alliance. While being unhappy about Russia’s arms transfers to Vietnam, Beijing recognizes that a decline or termination of such transfers would result in Hanoi shifting from its current policy of diversifying military contacts, to a stronger lean towards Washington; this shift would close the US-led containment ring around China. Therefore, despite the emphatic resistance against the internationalization of the SCS dispute, Beijing accepts Russia’s greater involvement as well as Russia-Vietnam military cooperation.

Russia, by engaging both China and Vietnam, realizes its regional and global goals. It increases its stake in the Asian balance of power, slows down the US-Vietnam entente, and shapes the SCS dispute so that there is more room for multilateral negotiations. For Russia, maintaining the status quo, however imperfect it is, is better than dealing with a victory of one party over another.

About the Author

Alexander Korolev is a Research Fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, of the National University of Singapore. He can be reached at akorolev@nus.edu.sg.

The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue.

Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options.

The Asia Pacific Bulletin (APB) series is produced by the East-West Center in Washington.

APB Series Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye, Director, East-West Center in Washington
APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente, Project Assistant, East-West Center in Washington

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with which the author is affiliated.

For comments/responses on APB issues or article submissions, please contact washington@eastwestcenter.org.

Trump’s Engagement with Asia on America’s Terms


March28, 2017

Trump’s Engagement with Asia on America’s Terms–creating new opportunities for US businesses 

by Mieczysław P Boduszyński and Tom Le

http://www.eastasiaforum.org

Former US President Barack Obama sought to move the United States away from what he saw as costly, distracting and unwinnable entanglements in the Middle East. Instead, he pivoted his foreign policy efforts towards Asia where he believed that US military, political and economic engagement could reap much greater rewards for the country.

Obama championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as part of his signature ‘pivot to Asia’. Obama’s pivot served as a security reassurance for US allies in the region and fortified linkages among those allies, encouraging, for instance, reconciliation between Japan and South Korea. Most importantly, the pivot signalled to Asian allies that they would never be just an afterthought or a region only important when it was useful for US grand strategy. The future lay in Asia and the United States would be a part of that future.

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Today, many of the pivot’s achievements are at risk under President Donald Trump’s brand of isolationism and a transactional ‘America First’ approach to foreign policy. The TPP is dead and alliances may be next. Trump has repeatedly stated that the United States is ‘losing’ and has suggested plans to re-evaluate Washington’s security guarantees in Asia. Despite more recent backpedalling, Trump’s apparent affection for Russia and his early willingness to barter Taiwan’s sovereignty for a good trade deal with China has signalled to longstanding US allies that the security reassurances of the Obama era are a thing of the past.

While the ‘liberal internationalist’ tenor of Obama’s pivot may have passed, a Trumpian worldview can and should still build on Obama’s momentum in Asia. If Trump can enhance, repair and deepen alliances without committing to a US-led regional order in the mould of the Obama administration, he could stay true to his worldview by creating new opportunities for US businesses while encouraging Asian allies to play a more active role in their security. The pivot need not be reversed and there are steps Trump should take to ensure it remains.

In lieu of the TPP, Trump could work to build new bilateral free trade agreements in East Asia, modelled on the existing US–South Korea and US–Australia Free Trade Agreements.  The region’s support for the TPP, and its potential replacement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), suggests that Asian countries are willing to negotiate new trade deals. But the Trump administration must be ready to make some concessions. Trump can also capitalise on the positive personal relationships he has with Asian leaders.

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Obama had a very poor relationship with Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte, who flung insults, threatened to kick out US troops and sought closer relations with China. While Obama was highly critical of Duterte’s bloody anti-drug campaign, Trump’s focus on US business interests presents an opportunity to repair the US–Philippines alliance. Duterte expressed a very positive view of Trump after a brief phone call. The Philippines have longstanding historical ties to the United States and it is a crucial alliance to preserve.

Trump’s budding relationship with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could also serve as his basis for diplomatic success. Although the Obama–Abe relationship improved over time, it was always marred by Obama’s criticisms of Abe’s revisionist tendencies. Yet thanks in part to Obama’s pivot, Japan passed new security laws increasing its ability to defend US forces during times of war directly related to Japan’s security.

Once South Korea chooses a new president, Trump could continue to support the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system and build upon the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between Japan and South Korea. Both are critical to counter the North Korean nuclear threat. But such actions are likely to draw the ire of China as the United States makes it clear that it is fully committed to its allies and the region.

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Vietnam’s Blossoming Relations with Xi’s China

Along with maintaining existing alliances, Trump could work towards forging new relations in East and Southeast Asia. Vietnam has been receptive to a US role in the region as it tries to prevent further Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea. The US–Vietnam relationship is exceptionally pragmatic and there are ample opportunities to build on an already solid foundation. Besides a free trade deal, moving forward with military linkages such as the base-sharing agreement that was announced, and cooperating in areas such as higher education and scholarships should be on Trump’s agenda.

The pivot to Asia was by no means a resounding success. Unfinished business in Obama’s pivot gives Trump the chance to craft his unique brand of foreign policy in East Asia — a willingness to work and trade with almost anyone. This way, the United States can maintain its pre-eminence in East Asia without pursuing a comprehensive security community. Unlike highly politically charged issues such as Russia and immigration, policy in Asia need not be divisive in domestic US politics.

By leading with direction without directing, the United States can influence its East Asian allies to take more responsibility for maintaining regional stability. As the country has long advocated a rules-based order in East Asia regarding freedom of navigation and trade, the Trump administration must be present to help write those rules.

Mieczysław P Boduszyński and Tom Le are Assistant Professors of Politics at Pomona College, California.

Focus on Policies, not Partisan Politics


March 26, 2017

Focus on Policies, not Partisan Politics

by Bunn Nagara@www.thestar.com.my

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Beyond the noisy protests over Trump’s presidency, there are important policy issues and implications that need better understanding – but which are still neglected.

NOT too long ago, there was hope, even a belief, that the fuss about Donald Trump’s fitness for presidential office would fade away after his inauguration. But even after more than two months into the presidency, critics are still carping and cynics are still canting. The real issues affecting people’s lives, badly neglected by the US media, are still being ignored.

Since US policies have a global reach, its actions affect other countries in various ways. So what can we expect from the Trump White House?In strategic terms, Trump has inherited some foreign policy challenges from the preceding administration. Then there are issues he has created on his own.

Nearest home is the controversy over the Mexican border “wall”. This is a typical issue blown out of proportion by Trump’s own grandstanding and his opponents bent on inflating it.

Trump first said he would build a wall, then added it could be a fence in parts. Since there is already a part-wall, part-fence on the border, what is his proposal and the objection to it about?

On Syria, Obama had already shifted from insisting on President Assad’s immediate removal to accepting his place as head of government. From being regarded as “part of the problem,” an Assad still popular with his people came to be seen grudgingly by Obama as part of the solution – but still one that had to resolve itself.

Trump is not keen on ousting Assad either. Assad has even suggested that Syria may host US troops dispatched by Trump to fight terrorism together.

For both leaders, exterminating such terrorist groups as IS is top priority while welcoming Russian support in the fight. Trump would openly receive what Obama would haltingly accept, with little or no difference on the ground.

Where differences largely comprise rhetoric, they become unbridgeable. In non-official Washington, this concerns “Russia”: not as a large Eurasian nation with a rich history, but as the bogeyman Other.

“Russia” is also a way for Trump’s enemies to dredge the swamp for issues to hit him with. This would at least deter any attempt at “resetting” relations with Moscow that would alarm the US deep state.

Since the issue of Syria is mostly a function of US-Russia relations, the Trump White House will soon have to decide what to do and how to do it. Beltway ideologues have already put a pugnacious Trump on the defensive over “Russia”, so his room for manoeuvre is limited.

Developing a clear and coherent position on Iran is just as delicate, especially after Trump had pledged to tear up the Iran nuclear deal. His primal aversion to Iran derives from a lack of familiarity, images of hardline mullahs, and limited contact with the Syiah sect.

Iran, however, can breathe a sigh of relief now that Lt-Gen Mike Flynn has been replaced as National Security Adviser. Flynn was exceptionally caustic about Teheran and dismissive of it.

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Since US-China ties are the world’s most important bilateral relationship, China should command most of Washington’s attention among all its foreign relations.The relationship was never pristine as Trump blamed China for currency manipulation and unfair trade terms. It crashed to a low after Beijing criticised Trump for speaking to the Taiwanese President, and Trump responded by questioning China’s core strategic interests.

China then moved to salvage the situation. President Xi Jinping spoke personally to Trump on the phone, followed by a visit to Washington by State Councillor Yang Jiechi to arrange a summit.

The White House is now planning to host Xi at Trump’s opulent Florida estate over April 6 to 7. Among the issues they will discuss is a lethally recalcitrant North Korea.

As expected, Trump will say China needs to do more to rein in North Korea, and Xi will say China is already doing all it can with this Jong-un of an upstart. On the economic front, matters may be less predictable but just as important.Trump may reach for a new deal with Xi in an early bid to establish his legacy in world trade. And nothing beats striking a new, productive deal with a rising China.

Elsewhere, Trump will be fettling the terms of new trade deals with various countries. These distinct new bilateral relations will be the “spokes” of a customised world trade wheel, with the US as the hub.

The question for Xi and Trump will be where China would be in the wheel, since it is too big to be just a spoke. The economic reality could be that China is fast becoming the axle for the entire wheel.

On the yawning trade deficit and colossal US debt, Trump will try hard to close the issues. Unlike most previous presidents, he sees their successful conclusion as a vital mission and a measure of his competence.

Given the circumstances, pledging to balance the budget and eliminate national debt in eight years as Trump did would be a fool’s errand. It may be no more than an incentive for voters to elect him for a second term.

Independent analysts expect Trump’s tax-cutting and public expenditure policies to add US$6tril (RM26tril) to US national debt over the next decade. At the same time, the Congressional Budget Office said Obama’s fiscal trajectory would have added US$10tril (RM44tril) debt over the same period.

Trump’s plan to cut taxes across the board is said to encourage business growth. This is expected to affect SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) if no other industry sector to expand their businesses.This approach to revive US industry is deemed conservative, but also somewhat unconventional. It is still trickle-down economics but in a different way.

Unlike most Republicans’ (and Democrats’) preference for encouraging corporations to expand abroad, reap economies of scale, multiply profits and then be taxed more on their higher turnover, Trump would cut taxes and encourage them to return home, hire more American workers and energise the economy that way.

This would mean less outsourcing abroad, fewer foreign relocations for manufacturing, more job creation at home and a healthier economy. Some of this has already begun.

Trump would also cut foreign labour content in the manufacture of US goods. This comes in restricting the entry of foreign migrants and the “export” of US jobs.

In the short to medium terms, this would see a measure of economic recovery as wages rise and consumption picks up. However, since the global economy is an integrated planetary entity, it would also mean higher prices for US goods and a decline in US competitiveness.

Developing sets of bilateral trade deals with various countries will also take time. Meanwhile, this region will see development of the ASEAN Community, besides the ASEAN-proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement and the China-proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).

The US will be without the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). Other countries averse to this situation for their own interests must now learn to accept it.

Superpowers act in their own self interests and not out of a charitable impulse to assist another country. Smaller and less able countries may want to ally with a larger and more powerful one, but not vice-versa.

Bunn Nagara is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.

East Asia must now overcome its geo-political challenges


March 20, 2017

East Asia must now overcome its geo-political challenges

by Jean-Pierre Lehmann

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/03/01/in-search-of-an-east-asian-geopolitical-miracle/

East Asia has amazed the world with its economic miracles. But the region must now overcome its geopolitical challenges.

Image result for The United States in East Asia missile defence system for Korea

 In the wake of World War II, Japan was widely assumed to be ‘finished’, South Korea was a basket case of underdevelopment and China was chaotic and poor — indeed the terms ‘Chinese’ and ‘poor’ were held to be synonymous. Taiwan was hardly worth consideration economically notwithstanding its importance geo-politically. When I first visited Taipei half a century ago its main economic activity seemed to be as a base for US soldiers on rest and recreation from the Vietnam War. As to Southeast Asia, it was mired in poverty, instability and conflict.

Reflecting the perception of backwardness accompanied by a degree of condescending hopelessness, the Swedish Nobel economics laureate Gunnar Myrdal published in 1968 a three-volume magnus opus entitled ‘Asian Drama: an Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations’. In 1993, 25 years later, the World Bank published its report entitled ‘The East Asian Miracle’.

Apart from confirming the fact that, yes, economists believe in miracles, the term has been quite widely used in describing economic developments in East Asia.

The first use of the term ‘economic miracle’ (to my knowledge) was applied to Japan in the 1960s. Contrary to expectations, the phoenix did rise from the ashes: in 1964 Tokyo held the Olympic Games, in 1965 it joined the OECD, in 1967 it surpassed West Germany in GDP, and from then on went about conquering international markets.

Following Japan’s rise there were the four ‘tigers’ — Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea — which rank among the few economies worldwide that succeeded in rising from third world status and overcoming the middle income trap. Over the course of the late 1970s and 1980s, Southeast Asia transformed from a battlefield to a marketplace with the notably high growth rates of Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. And then came the most awesome miracle of all — China.

These East Asian economic miracles had significant positive social consequences: tremendous reduction of poverty, rise of a robust urban middle class, increased life expectancy, improvements in education, cultural achievements (for example in music) and increased leisure activities such as foreign travel.

There are, however, a number of egregious qualifications to this.While the region’s economic edifice remains impressive, its institutional, historical and geopolitical foundations are alarmingly weak. The contrast between the post-war settlement in Europe and the post-war settlement in East Asia illustrates the East Asian situation.

One begins with the starkest contrast of all in post-war Germany’s attitudes towards its neighbours and those of Japan. One cannot imagine a senior German politician paying respects to a memorial dedicated to former Nazi leaders, as Japanese political leaders repeatedly do in respect to war criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine — most recently the Minister of Defence Tomomi Inada. One cannot imagine the mayor of Berlin publicly denying the existence of the Dachau concentration camp, as the former long-serving governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, publicly and repeatedly denied the occurrence of the Nanjing massacre. One cannot imagine a German chain hotel proprietor installing in every room a book praising Germany’s past military prowess as Toshio Motoya has done in his chain of APA hotels with a book he authored praising Japan’s past imperialist militarism.

Whereas Germany has been a major source of peace, reconciliation and stability in Europe, Japan, through its hubristically un-contrite behaviour is a source of friction, suspicion and instability in East Asia.

This is especially critical in a region that is the world’s most geopolitically explosive. A number of situations in East Asian could foreseeably degenerate into World War III. Offensive military action in the Korean Peninsula, US intervention in the conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea or Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s threatened blockade on the South China Sea could all be triggers.These are the biggest flashpoints in the region but there are others.

Image result for The United States in East Asia missile defence system for Korea

Every East Asian state has tense relations with one or more of its neighbours. As ASEAN celebrates its 50th anniversary this year it can be commended for the significant achievements it has made in neighbourly confidence-building. Yet even the most ardent ASEAN fan would admit there are fragilities.

Since the end of the Vietnam War, the impact of the United States in East Asia has been on balance benign. This is partly due to the economic dynamism of the region and its integration with global markets and especially the US market. It is also because the United States has been militarily bogged down in the Middle East following its interventionism and thus limited in its ability to do harm in East Asia.

Not just China but the whole region can be construed as the proverbial ‘china shop’ into which the US presidential election has unleashed a bull. Great delicacy and diplomatic sophistication is required. Following East Asia’s economic miracles, what is urgently required in the Trumpian era is a geopolitical miracle.

Jean-Pierre Lehmann is Emeritus Professor of International Political Economy at IMD, Switzerland, founder of the Evian Group, and Visiting Professor at Hong Kong University. You can follow him on Twitter at @JP_Lehmann.

J

Malaysia-China’s Asymmetrical Partnership


March 6, 2017

Malaysia-China’s Asymmetrical Partnership

by Dennis Ignatius

Image result for Najib in China

Even the most casual observer of our nation’s politics will not fail to notice the growing influence of China in our national affairs. Not a day goes by when reports of some new investment, some new deal, some new initiative by China doesn’t make headlines. Suddenly, China is everywhere and not in a small way.

Dominant economic partner

China is already Malaysia’s dominant economic partner – it is our second largest export market, is increasingly critical to the health of our tourism industry (4 million Chinese tourists expected this year), our education sector (10,000 Chinese students currently studying in Malaysia), and the sustainability of our oil palm industry.

It will soon come to dominate our ports and railways as well as our housing and construction sectors. With the purchase of 1MDB-related Edra Global Energy Bhd. assets, it also became the second largest independent power producer in the country.

In the next decade or so, it is estimated that China will invest, lend and spend at least half a trillion ringgit on infrastructure, property development and other projects across Malaysia. Never has our country seen this much money pouring in from a single source in such a relatively short space of time.

Manna from heaven

Many, particularly those who stand to profit most from this new relationship, welcome China’s growing involvement in our country. To them, it is, of course, a once-in-a lifetime bonanza, manna from heaven, an unparalleled opportunity to make millions. They assume that what is good for them is automatically good for the nation as a whole.

Consequently, many of our political leaders and business tycoons are falling over each other to sing China’s praises and highlight the benefits of the blossoming relationship. To them, China is a great friend, a powerful benefactor, a genuine economic partner, a benign political power. And they can’t seem to get enough of China.

The dangers of asymmetrical relationships

However, the sheer asymmetrical nature of the relationship as well as the enormous political and economic leverage that China now wields cannot but be cause for concern.

And yet, concern is the one word that is missing from the lexicon of our relations with China. In our rush to embrace China’s largesse, we are being wilfully negligent of the political, economic and security implications.

It is surely axiomatic that as China’s stake in Malaysia increases, China will be more proactive in our domestic politics if only to ensure the continuity of parties, personalities and policies that favour China.

Malaysia, is in fact, far too important to China now to be left to the vagaries of Malaysian politics and the caprices of the local electorate.

Open endorsement of UMNO-BN

 The clearest indication of this is China’s increasingly open and forthright endorsement and support of the UMNO-BN government, the most pro-China government we’ve ever had. In fact, it can be argued that China’s grand strategy vis-à-vis Malaysia is, in many respects, contingent on UMNO-BN remaining in office.

It should therefore come as no surprise that we are now seeing Chinese diplomats not only attending local party political gatherings but also accompanying UMNO-BN politicians to political events and on constituency visits.

Last year, for example, the Chinese Ambassador accompanied Defence Minister Hishamuddin Hussein, MCA Deputy President Wee Ka Siong, and MCA assemblyperson Teoh Yap Kun on visits to Hishamuddin’s Semborong parliamentary constituency and Teoh’s Paloh constituency.

ambassador-raub

Since then Chinese diplomats have been spotted with MCA Vice-President Chew Mei Fun in Raub (where she is rumoured to be the candidate in the next elections), with MCA Youth chief, Datuk Chong Sin Woon in Nilai, with MCA President Datuk Seri Liow Tiong Lai when he officiated the opening of a meeting of the Federation of Hakka Associations, and with Gerakan President Mah Siew Keong in Teluk Intan.

And this is likely only the tip of the iceberg as many other visits go unreported.

During these visits, Chinese diplomats routinely take the opportunity to praise the Najib Administration, stress the importance of the MCA and press the point that the Malaysian Chinese community has a lot to gain from the relationship with China that is now being developed.

The Chinese ambassador has also urged Malaysian Chinese to support the MCA because without the MCA, “Malaysian Chinese have no say in the government.”

Champion of Chinese education

Having cast himself as ‘lord protector’ of the Malaysian Chinese community during the Petaling Street affair in 2015 and knowing the great importance Malaysian Chinese attach to Chinese education, the Chinese ambassador has now positioned himself as a champion of Chinese education in Malaysia.

He has tirelessly criss-crossed the country, often accompanied by MCA and even UMNO politicians, visiting dozens of Chinese schools and distributing hundreds of thousands of ringgit in assistance and scholarships. He has also promised to initiate a teacher-training programme that could see PRC teachers in our schools.

MCA-BN – China alliance

 China’s unequivocal message to Malaysian Chinese, therefore, is that they must support the emerging MCA-BN-China alliance if they wish to safeguard their rights, preserve Chinese education, have a strong voice in government, profit from business with China and ensure that relations with their ancestral homeland remain strong.

It is, as well, an exhortation to Malaysian Chinese to put aside their resentment and distrust of both UMNO and MCA and vote BN for the greater good of both countries.

Clearly, if this shrewd political strategy succeeds, the main losers will be the DAP.

dap-embassy

But such is the power and influence of China in our domestic affairs that even the DAP has now been forced to moderate its hitherto principled opposition to the sheer lunacy of some of the China-related projects and make peace with the Chinese Ambassador. All that this has accomplished, however, was to vindicate, in the eyes of DAP supporters, the MCA’s collaboration with China.

The MCA, for its part, increasingly behaves as if it is but an extension of the Chinese mbassy rather than a member of the ruling coalition. It recently established a PRC affairs committee as well as an OBOR centre and does more to promote OBOR than the Chinese Embassy itself. Some would argue that these actions make the MCA the main vehicle of PRC influence and propaganda in the country today.

 

Unchallenged and unchecked

And yet, these clear and troubling manifestations of foreign political interference in our domestic affairs, in contravention of established diplomatic practice, go unchallenged. That it is being done with the connivance of local political leaders does not make it any less troublesome.

One can only wonder how the UMNO-BN crowd would react if the Australian or American ambassador urged Malaysians to vote for the opposition if they wished to safeguard their democratic rights.

Once this door is open, there is no telling where it will lead to. UMNO-BN politicians make a big fuss over trivial things like the paltry sums given to a few NGOs to promote free and fair elections by the Open Society Foundation but think nothing of facilitating a far more insidious form of foreign interference that threatens to undermine what’s left of our democratic process.

Hijacked elections?

Image result for MCA and China

 

MCA playing the China Card to enhance credibility and isolate DAP

The question now is how far China will go to protect its interests in Malaysia. Will PRC money come into play in the next elections, taking money politics to new heights? Will the upcoming elections be the first elections in Malaysia when a foreign power will be actively working behind the scenes to influence its outcome?

The next general election is already shaping up to be one of the most critical we’ve ever had. The very future of our country is at stake – whether we will remain a secular democracy or not, whether corruption and cronyism will triumph over transparency and good governance, whether our constitution itself will survive in its present form.

Certainly, too much will be riding on these elections for us to allow a foreign power to hijack them for its own purposes.

And any political party which comes to power with China’s help will undoubtedly be subservient to China’s interests. What is at stake, therefore, is not just the sale of critical infrastructure assets but possibly the sale of the country itself.

A nation at its lowest ebb

The fact that China is knocking on our doors at a time when our nation is at its lowest ebb renders us particularly vulnerable.

We are today a nation more divided than ever before – not just Malay against non-Malay but Malay against Malay, Chinese against Chinese, Indian against Indian. It’s Muslim against non-Muslim, rural against urban, rich against poor.

Nearly 60 years after independence we are still arguing bitterly about language, citizenship, education, religion and race while decades of racial and religious manipulation have left us wary and suspicious of each other.

We are so suspicious of each other that we’d rather depend on foreigners than work together to find solutions to our pressing problems; we are so busy fighting each other that there’s literally no one to guard the front door.

In the meantime, corruption and abuse of power have rendered our national institutions and our political processes weak and dysfunctional, unable to provide the essential checks and balances, the steady hand, the careful and impartial analyses, the proper legal and regulatory framework that is a prerequisite for national resilience.

When we find ourselves in a situation, for instance, where suddenly almost every single port in the country needs to be massively expanded with Chinese money or that we suddenly need not one but three, and perhaps four, expensive railway systems built by China, we have to wonder whether projects are now being driven by economic necessity or pure greed and foreign pressure.

Malaysia First

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Many will, of course, dismiss these concerns as alarmist or reject them as anti-China or anti-government rhetoric.

China’s growing influence in our domestic affairs cannot, however, be easily dismissed.It is alarming and Malaysians ought to be deeply, deeply concerned.

At the very least, we ought to have an informed discussion of what is going on so that we understand all the implications and consequences and ensure that policies and projects serve the national interests rather than undermine them. It is simply much too important an issue to be left to vested interests to decide behind closed doors.

It’s not about being anti-China but about being pro-Malaysia. It’s not about being opposed to good relations with China or being against Chinese investments; it’s about ensuring that relations with China do not come at the expense of our independence and sovereignty.

It is most assuredly not about the loyalty and commitment of any of our own citizens or about marginalizing the very real concerns they have but about ensuring that a foreign power does not exploit our internal divisions to its own advantage.

As well, this isn’t about being pro-West or pro-China but about ensuring that no country – east or west – dominates us to the point where we lose our ability to chart our own destiny.

And if standing up against corruption, mismanagement, the abuse of power, the lack of transparency and the deliberate neglect of vital national interests makes one anti-government, than so be it.

The greatest challenge

If China turns out to be unique among the big powers for its beneficence, munificence, generosity and respect for smaller states, well and good; but if not, then at least we’ll be better prepared to face the challenges ahead.

Our nation now faces one of the greatest external challenges it has ever faced. The dangers are real. The stakes are high. There will be no winners save the corrupt, and a foreign power, if we fail to successfully manage this great challenge that lies before us.