The Quiet Demise of Austerity


July 21, 2017

The Quiet Demise of Austerity

by James McCormack

James McCormack is Managing Director and Global Head of the Sovereign and Supranational Group at Fitch Ratings.

https://www.project-syndicate.org

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It has been several years since policymakers seriously discussed the merits of fiscal austerity. Debates about the potential advantages of using stimulus to boost short-term economic growth, or about the threat of government debt reaching such a level as to inhibit medium-term growth, have gone silent.

There is no mistaking which side won, and why. Austerity is dead. And as conventional politicians continue to take rearguard action against populist upstarts, they will likely embrace more fiscal-policy easing – or at least avoid tightening – to reap near-certain short-term economic gains. At the same time, they are not likely to heed warnings of the medium-term consequences of higher debt levels, given widespread talk of interest rates remaining “lower for longer.”

One way to confirm that an international fiscal-policy consensus has emerged is to review policymakers’ joint statements. The last time the G7 issued a communiqué noting the importance of fiscal consolidation was at the Lough Erne Summit in 2013, when it was still the G8.

Since then, joint statements have contained amorphous proposals to implement “fiscal strategies flexibly to support growth” and ensure that debt-to-GDP ratios are sustainable. Putting debt on a sustainable path presumably means that it will not increase without interruption. But in the absence of a definite timeframe, debt levels can undergo lengthy deviations, the sustainability of which is open to interpretation.

Objections to austerity were understandable in the period following the 2008 financial crisis. Fiscal policy was being tightened when growth was languishing below 2% (after bouncing back in 2010), and sizeable negative output gaps suggested that overall employment would be slow to recover.

In late 2012, at the peak of the post-crisis austerity debate, advanced economies were in the midst of a multi-year tightening equivalent to more than one percentage point of GDP annually, according to cyclically-adjusted primary balance data from the International Monetary Fund.

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But just as fiscal policy was being tightened when cyclical economic conditions seemed to call for easing, it is now being eased when conditions seem to call for tightening. The output gap in advanced economies has all but disappeared, inflation is picking up, and world economic growth is forecast to be its strongest since 2010.

In 2013, Japan was the only advanced economy to loosen fiscal policy. But this year, the United Kingdom appears to be the only one preparing to tighten its policy – and that is assuming recent political ruptures haven’t altered its fiscal orientation, which will be reflected in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Autumn Statement.

Most observers would agree that government debt levels are uncomfortably high in many advanced economies, so it would be prudent for policymakers to discuss strategies for bringing them down. Moreover, there are several options for doing this, some of which are easier or more effective than others.

In the end, government deleveraging is about the relationship between economic growth and interest rates. The higher the growth rate relative to interest rates, the lower the level of fiscal consolidation needed to stabilize or reduce debt as a share of GDP.

As economic growth continues to pick up while interest rates lag, at least outside the US, fiscal authorities will have further opportunities to reduce debt, and create fiscal space for stimulus measures when the next cyclical downturn inevitably arrives. But policymakers are not doing this, which suggests that they have prioritized largely political considerations over fiscal prudence.

After the recent elections in the Netherlands and France, a growing chorus is now proclaiming that “peak populism” has passed. But one could argue just as easily that populist ideals are being absorbed into more mainstream political and economic agendas. As a result, politicians, particularly in Europe, have no choice but to favor inclusive growth policies and scrutinize the potential impact that a given policy could have on the income distribution.

This political environment is hardly conducive to fiscal consolidation. Any tax increases or spending cuts will have to be designed exceptionally well – perhaps impossibly so – for leaders to avoid a populist backlash. Some people will always lose more than others from fiscal consolidation, and deciding who those people are is never a pleasant exercise.

So far, those decisions are being delayed on political grounds. But the economic implications of high government debt cannot be ignored forever. Monetary policy is already starting to change in the US, and it could be on the verge of changing globally. One way or another, fiscal authorities will have to confront challenging tradeoffs in the years ahead.

Martin Khor looks back at the East Asian Financial Crisis 1997


July 5, 2017

Martin Khor looks back at the East Asian Financial Crisis 1997

http://www.thestar.com.my

It is useful to reflect on whether lessons have been learnt and if the countries are vulnerable to new crises.

IT’S been 20 years since the Asian financial crisis struck in July 1997. Since then, there has been an even bigger global financial crisis, starting in 2008. Will there be another crisis?

The Asian crisis began when speculators brought down the Thai baht. Within months, the currencies of Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia were also affected. The East Asian Miracle turned into an Asian Financial Nightmare.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/14/Suharto_resigns.jpg

Despite the affected countries receiving only praise before the crisis, weaknesses had built up, including current account deficits, low foreign reserves and high external debt.

In particular, the countries had recently liberalised their financial system in line with international advice. This enabled local private companies to freely borrow from abroad, mainly in US dollars. Companies and banks in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand had in each country rapidly accumulated over a hundred billion dollars of external loans. This was the Achilles heel that led their countries to crisis.

These weaknesses made the countries ripe for speculators to bet against their currencies. When the governments used up their reserves in a vain attempt to stem the currency fall, three of the countries ran out of foreign exchange.

They went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for bailout loans that carried draconian conditions that worsened their economic situation. Malaysia was fortunate. It did not seek IMF loans. The foreign reserves had become dangerously low but were just about adequate. If the ringgit had fallen a bit further, the danger line would have been breached.

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Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamed and Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin introduced selective capital controls and pegged the Ringgit at RM3.80 to USD1.00.

 

After a year of self-imposed austerity measures, Malaysia dramatically switched course and introduced a set of unorthodox policies.These included pegging the ringgit to the dollar, selective capital controls to prevent short-term funds from exiting, lowering interest rates, increasing government spending and rescuing failing companies and banks.

This was the opposite of orthodoxy and the IMF policies (The Washington Consensus). The global establishment predicted the sure collapse of the Malaysian economy. But surprisingly, the economy recovered even faster and with fewer losses than the other countries. Today, the Malaysian measures are often cited as a successful anti-crisis strategy.

The IMF itself has changed a little. It now includes some capital controls as part of legitimate policy measures.

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The Asian countries, vowing never to go to the IMF again, built up strong current account surpluses and foreign reserves to protect against bad years and keep off speculators. The economies recovered, but never back to the spectacular 7% to 10% pre-crisis growth rates.

Then in 2008, the global financial crisis erupted with the United States as its epicentre. The tip of the iceberg was the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the massive loans given out to non-credit-worthy house-buyers.

The underlying cause was the deregulation of US finance and the freedom with which financial institutions could devise all kinds of manipulative schemes and “financial products” to draw in unsuspecting customers. They made billions of dollars but the house of cards came tumbling down.

To fight the crisis, the US, under President Barack Obama, embarked first on expanding government spending and then on financial policies of near-zero interest rates and “quantitative easing”, with the Federal Reserve pumping trillions of dollars into the US banks.

It was hoped the cheap credit would get consumers and businesses to spend and lift the economy. But instead, a significant portion of the trillions went via investors into speculative activities, including abroad to emerging economies.

Europe, on the verge of recession, followed the US with near zero interest rates and large quantitative easing, with limited results.

The US-Europe financial crisis affected Asian countries in a limited way through declines in export growth and commodity prices. The large foreign reserves built up after the Asian crisis, plus the current account surplus situation, acted as buffers against external debt problems and kept speculators at bay.

Just as important, hundreds of billions of funds from the US and Europe poured into Asia yearly in search of higher yields. These massive capital inflows helped to boost Asian countries’ growth, but could cause their own problems.

First, they led to asset bubbles or rapid price increases of houses and the stock markets, and the bubbles may burst when they are over-ripe.

Second, many of the portfolio investors are short-term funds looking for quick profit, and they can be expected to leave when conditions change.

Third, the countries receiving capital inflows become vulnerable to financial volatility and economic instability.

If and when investors pull some or a lot of their money out, there may be price declines, inadequate replenishment of bonds, and a fall in the levels of currency and foreign reserves.

A few countries may face a new financial crisis. A new vulnerability in many emerging economies is the rapid build-up of external debt in the form of bonds denominated in the local currency.

The Asian crisis two decades ago taught that over-borrowing in foreign currency can create difficulties in debt repayment should the local currency level fall.

To avoid this, many countries sold bonds denominated in the local currency to foreign investors. However, if the bonds held by foreigners are large in value, the country will still be vulnerable to the effects of a withdrawal.

As an example, almost half of Malaysian government securities, denominated in ringgit, are held by foreigners.

Though the country does not face the risk of having to pay more in ringgit if there is a fall in the local currency, it may have other difficulties if foreigners withdraw their bonds.

What is the state of the world economy, what are the chances of a new financial crisis, and how would the Asian countries like Malaysia fare? These are big and relevant questions to ponder 20 years after the start of the Asian crisis and nine years after the global crisis.

 

Martin Khor (director@southcentre.org) is executive director of the South Centre. The views expressed here are entirely his own.
Read more at http://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/global-trends/2017/07/03/the-asian-financial-crisis-20-years-later-it-is-useful-to-reflect-on-whether-lessons-have-been-lear/#EEkW3MiZXu87cFZM.99

Britain’s Deepening Confusion


June 27, 2017

Britain’s Deepening Confusion

by Robert Skidelsky* @www.project-syndicate.org

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Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May leading a confused Britain

*Lord Skidelsky, Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University and a fellow of the British Academy in history and economics, is a member of the British House of Lords. The author of a three-volume biography of John Maynard Keynes, he began his political career in the Labour party, became the Conservative Party’s spokesman for Treasury affairs in the House of Lords, and was eventually forced out of the Conservative Party for his opposition to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

 

“Enough is enough,” proclaimed British Prime Minister Theresa May after the terrorist attack on London Bridge. Now, it is clear, almost half of those who voted in the United Kingdom’s general election on June 8 have had enough of May, whose Conservative majority was wiped out at the polls, producing a hung parliament (with no majority for any party). Whether it is “enough immigrants” or “enough austerity,” Britain’s voters certainly have had enough of a lot.

But the election has left Britain confusingly split. Last year’s Brexit referendum on European Union membership suggested a Leave-Remain divide, with the Brexiteers narrowly ahead. This year’s general election superimposed on this a more traditional left-right split, with a resurgent Labour Party capitalizing on voter discontent with Conservative budget cuts.

To see the resulting political terrain, imagine a two-by-two table, with the four quadrants occupied by Remainers and Budget Cutters; Remainers and Economic Expansionists; Brexiteers and Budget Cutters; and Brexiteers and Economic Expansionists. The four quadrants don’t add up to coherent halves, so it’s not possible to make out what voters thought they were voting for.

But it is possible to make out what voters were rejecting. There are two certain casualties. The first is austerity, which even the Conservatives have signaled they will abandon. Cutting public spending to balance the budget was based on the wrong theory and has failed in practice. The most telling indicator was the inability of George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer from 2010 to 2016, to achieve any of his budget targets. The deficit was to have vanished by 2015, then by 2017, then by 2020-2021. Now, no government will commit to any date at all.

The targets were based on the idea that a “credible” deficit-reduction program would create sufficient business confidence to overcome the depressing effects on activity of the cuts themselves. Some say the targets were never credible enough. The truth is that they never could be: the deficit cannot come down unless the economy grows, and budget cuts, real and anticipated, hinder growth. The consensus now is that austerity delayed recovery for almost three years, depressing real earnings and leaving key public services like local government, health care, and education palpably damaged.

So expect the ridiculous obsession with balancing the budget to be scrapped. From now on, the deficit will be left to adjust to the state of the economy.

The second casualty is unrestricted immigration from the EU. The Brexiteers’ demand to “control our borders” was directed against the uncontrolled influx of economic migrants from Eastern Europe. This demand will have to be met in some way.

Migration within Europe was negligible when the EU was mainly West European. This changed when the EU began incorporating the low-wage ex-communist countries. The ensuing migration eased labor shortages in host countries like the UK and Germany, and increased the earnings of the migrants themselves. But such benefits do not apply to unrestricted migration.

Studies by Harvard University’s George J. Borjas and others suggest that net immigration lowers the wages of competing domestic labor. Borjas’s most famous study shows the depressive impact of “Marielitos” – Cubans who immigrated en masse to Miami in 1980 – on domestic working-class wages.

These fears have long underpinned sovereign states’ insistence on the right to control immigration. The case for control is strengthened when host countries have a labor surplus, as has been true of much of Western Europe since the crisis of 2008. Support for Brexit is essentially a demand for the restoration of sovereignty over the UK’s borders.

The crux of the issue is political legitimacy. Until modern times, markets were largely local, and heavily protected against outsiders, even from neighboring towns. National markets were achieved only with the advent of modern states. But the completely unrestricted movement of goods, capital, and labor within sovereign states became possible only when two conditions were met: the growth of national identity and the emergence of national authorities able to provide security in the face of adversity.

The European Union fulfills neither condition. Its peoples are citizens of their nation-states first. And the contract between citizens and states on which national economies depend cannot be reproduced at the European level, because there is no European state with which to conclude the deal. The EU’s insistence on free movement of labor as a condition of membership of a non-state is premature, at best. It will need to be qualified, not just as part of the UK’s Brexit deal, but for the whole of the EU.

So how will the shambolic results of the British general election play out? May will not last long as Prime Minister. Osborne has called her a “dead woman walking” (of course without acknowledging that his austerity policies helped to seal her demise).

The most sensible outcome is currently a political non-starter: a Conservative-Labour coalition government, with (say) Boris Johnson as Prime Minister and Jeremy Corbyn as his deputy. The government would adopt a two-year program consisting of only two items: the conclusion of a “soft” Brexit deal with the EU and a big public investment program in housing, infrastructure, and green energy.

The rationale for the investment program is that a rising tide will lift all boats. And an added benefit of a thriving economy will be lower hostility to immigration, making it easier for Britain to negotiate sensible regulation of migrant flows.

And who knows: if the negotiations force the EU to re-cast its own commitment to free labor movement, Brexit may turn out to be a matter less of British exit than of an overhaul of the terms of European membership.

Reactions to DOJ Lawsuits reflect Ignorance of Malaysian Officialdom


June 27, 2017

Reactions to DOJ Lawsuits reflect Ignorance of Malaysian Officialdom

by Dr. M. Bakri Musa, Morgan-Hill, California

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Najib Razak, Rosmah Mansor and Riza Aziz (inset): Their Day will come,only a matter of time

America is a Rorschach Test to most foreigners. What they view as America reveals more of themselves than of America; likewise, how they react to events in America.

One visitor to Washington, DC, would see only the homeless under the bridges, potholes on the streets, and “adult” stores at very corner; others, The Smithsonian, Georgetown University, and the National Institutes of Health. The contrasting observations reflect volumes on the observers.

Consider the Malaysian responses to the US Department of Justice (DOJ) lawsuits relating to alleged illicit siphoning of funds from 1MDB. I am not referring to the kopi-o babbling in the echo chamber of UMNO-paid “cyber-troopers” that pollutes the social media. They are pet parrots; babbling whatever is coached to them. With a different master offering more leftovers they could be made to change their tune.

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Where is Mr. Lodin Wok Kamaruddin now?

What interests me instead are the responses of ministers and commentators. Their utterances expose their appalling ignorance of the American justice system. They also reveal much of themselves, as per Rorschach’s insight.

One Minister, eager to be seen as his master’s favorite lapdog, asserted that DOJ is being influenced by the Malaysian opposition. On cue, the other hounds and bitches piled on. A hitherto severe critic of the establishment pontificated that a former champion college debater together with Mahathir and Daim Zainuddin were involved.

Heady stuff for a young man! Though flattered, Syed Saddiq went ahead and filed a police report against that blogger! Mahathir described best those who believed such canards: “Bodoh luar biasa!” (Extraordinarily stupid!)

Those characters must also believe that the American judicial system is like Malaysia’s, where prosecutors could be influenced or paid off a la one Shafee Abdullah. Sarawak Report alleged that he was paid RM9.5 million from Najib’s slush fund before being appointed special prosecutor in Anwar Ibrahim’s case. Shafee has not denied that.

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The RM9.5 million Shafee Abdullah–who else are the beneficiaries of the bounty?

Another Minister declared DOJ’s charges ‘mere’ allegations. Sorry, no marks for stating the obvious. A former journalist-turn-blogger echoed that, and proceeded, for emphasis, to reprint in bold the DOJ’s caution.

Of course DOJ’s accusations, like all court complaints, are “alleged” until adjudicated by the court. DOJ must have credible evidence to not waste taxpayers’ money on frivolous lawsuits. The jury would not buy it. DOJ does not allege any Joe on the street of corruption.

Those who believe otherwise must think that DOJ and American courts are like Malaysia’s where prosecutors could be bought to bring on cases with the flimsiest of evidences and still find judges to convict, as with Anwar’s case.

That is not a far stretch. A few years ago, a defense lawyer V.K. Lingam known for his amazing ‘skills’ in getting his clients acquitted was caught on videotape assuring his listener that he had the judge in his pocket. The lawyer’s utterance, “Correct! Correct! Correct!” would forever be embedded in the annals of shame in the Malaysian Judiciary.

Then there was the character who insinuated that the ‘inactivity’ of DOJ since its first filing a year earlier reveals its sinister political motive. Had he followed the court’s calendar he would have noted the flurry of activities. Among them, the successful challenge by the new trustee of some of the seized properties to be represented.

This character went on to opine that since her initial filing in July 2016, US Attorney-General Loretta Lynch had been “fired,” implying that the lawsuit was without merit. Such willful ignorance reveals a deliberate attempt to mislead. Lynch was a political appointee, and with President Trump’s election all such appointees were replaced. Further, the second filing was by her successor.

Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid, a local PhD, implied that all the furor over 1MDB were fake news, the concoctions of hostile foreign media! It is instructive that this character did his dissertation on the local media. To him, the likes of The Wall Street Journal are like Utusan Melayu. His response reveals as much about him as the institution that awarded him his doctorate.

A junior minister accused the Americans of trying to topple Najib, in cahoots with the opposition. Not too long ago he and others were lapping at pictures of Najib golfing with President Obama. That minister however, did not see fit to lead a demonstration at the embassy in defense of Malaysia.

It is unfortunate that this non-too bright character’s remarks resonated with simple villagers. A senior Minister, a little brighter being that he was a London-trained lawyer, dismissed the whole DOJ affair. Malaysia had other far more important issues to attend to, he sniffed. If the staggering sums of the loot did not impress him, what about the charges of corruption levelled at the highest government official, cryptically referred to as “Malaysian Official 1.” That should be his and all Malaysians’ top priority.

Yet another minister advised everyone not to panic. The lady doth protest too much, methinks. Nobody was panicking except her crowd.

Attorney-General Apandi was miffed that DOJ did not consult him. DOJ’s lawsuits were prompted to protect American financial institutions from the corrupting influences of dirty foreign funds. It does not need Malaysia’s ‘help,’ more so considering that Apandi had declared no wrongdoing.

Apandi was also upset at the criminal insinuations against the Prime Minister. His comment unwittingly revealed what he thinks of his job, less as chief prosecutor, more as Najib’s private attorney. No wonder his “investigations” exonerated Najib! Apandi also unwittingly confirmed that MO1 is, in fact, Najib and that the activities he was alleged to have been engaged in were criminal in nature.

If the responses were revealing, the non-response or silence was even more so. The lawsuits allege that billions were illicitly siphoned from the company, and it is mentioned umpteen times in the complaints. Yet 1MDB did not seek to be represented as a party of interest. This reflects its management’s inability to separate the company’s interests from those of its officers’. Najib is 1MDB’s chairman. The management confuses Najib with the company. Management is not looking after the company’s interest in not seeking representation, which was how the mess started in the first place.

Malaysian officials’ responses to DOJ’s lawsuits did not reflect well on them or Malaysia. I can hardly wait for their reactions or “spin” when this DOJ investigation goes on to its next inevitable phase, the filing of criminal charges and or when one of the defendants becomes a prosecution witness.

Meanwhile, fake news or not and collusion or not, MO1, his spouse, or stepson will not be stepping foot in America any time soon, if ever. That is revealing.

IMF on Malaysia–Report Card


May 3, 2017

International Monetary Fund on Malaysia–Report Card

by The International Monetary Fund

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Putrajaya–The Administrative Capital of Malaysia

The IMF conducts an Annual Review of member country economic situation. At the conclusion of the consultations the Executive Board considers the findings which are also conveyed to the Government. A Press Release is issued  together with access to the full staff report on the Fund’s website. The Report  is in the nature of a “Report Card”.

The text of the Press Release is reproduced below. The full report can be accessed and downloaded from  ::

http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/04/28/Malaysia-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-44869

On March 15, 2017, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation1 with Malaysia.

Despite a challenging global economic environment, the Malaysian economy performed well over the past few years. Notwithstanding the impact of the global commodity price and financial markets volatility, the economy remained resilient, owing to a diversified production and export base; strong balance sheet positions; a flexible exchange rate; responsive macroeconomic policies; and deep financial markets. While real GDP growth slowed down, Malaysia is still among the fastest growing economies among peers. The challenging global macroeconomic and financial environment puts premium on continued diligence and requires careful calibration of policies going forward.

Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, originating from both external and domestic sources. External risks include structurally weak growth in advanced and emerging market economies and retreat from cross-border integration. Although the Malaysian economy has adjusted well to lower global oil prices, sustained low commodity prices would add to the challenge of achieving medium-term fiscal targets. Heightened global financial stress and associated capital flows could affect the economy.

Domestic risks are primarily related to public sector and household debt, along with pockets of vulnerabilities in the corporate sector. Federal debt and contingent liabilities are relatively high, limiting policy space to respond to shocks. Although the household debt-to-GDP ratio is likely to decline, household debt also remains high, with debt servicing capacity growing only moderately.

Real GDP growth rate is expected to increase moderately to 4.5 percent year-on-year (y/y) in 2017 from 4.2 percent in 2016. Domestic demand, led by private consumption, continue to be the main driver of growth, while a drag from net exports, similar to 2016, will remain.

Consumer price inflation is projected to rise and average 2.7 percent y/y in 2017 on the back of higher global oil prices and the rationalization of subsidies on cooking oil. The current account surplus would be largely unchanged as impacts from an improved global outlook and higher commodity prices would be offset by the strength of imports on the back of a resilient domestic demand.

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Bank Negara Malaysia—in full control of the Pulse of the Malaysian Economy

Executive Directors commended the resilience of the Malaysian economy, which reflects sound macroeconomic policy responses in the face of significant headwinds and risks. While Malaysia’s economic growth is expected to continue in 2017, weaker-than-expected growth in key advanced and emerging economies or a global retreat from cross-border integration could weigh on the domestic economy. Against this background, Directors urged vigilance and continued efforts to strengthen policy buffers and boost long-term economic growth.

Directors agreed that the authorities’ medium-term fiscal policy is well anchored on achieving a near-balanced federal budget by 2020. The planned consolidation will help alleviate risks from elevated government debt levels and contingent liabilities and build fiscal space for future expansionary policy, as needed.

Directors recommended that the pace of consolidation reflect economic conditions and that any counter-cyclical fiscal policy measures be well-targeted and temporary. They noted that improvements to the fiscal framework, such as elaborating medium term projections and preparing and publishing an annual fiscal risks statement, would help anchor medium-term fiscal adjustment and mitigate risks.

Directors agreed that the current monetary policy stance is appropriate. Going forward, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) should continue to carefully calibrate monetary policy to support growth while being mindful of financial conditions.

Directors emphasized that global financial market conditions could affect the monetary policy space and should be carefully monitored.

Directors noted that the banking sector is sound overall and that financial sector risks appear contained. Nonetheless, they cautioned that potential pockets of vulnerability should be closely monitored. They noted that household debt remains relatively high, while in the corporate sector, there are emerging vulnerabilities in some sectors. Directors suggested that macroprudential measures be adjusted if needed.

Directors underscored the central role of macroeconomic policy and exchange rate flexibility in helping the economy adjust to external shocks. In this regard, they welcomed the authorities’ commitment to keeping the exchange rate as the key shock absorber. They recommended that reserves be accumulated as opportunities arise and deployed in the event of disorderly market conditions. Noting the authorities’ aim to improve the functioning of the onshore forward foreign exchange market, Directors urged the BNM to monitor the effects of the recent measures introduced in this regard, recognizing their benefits and costs.

They emphasized that close consultation and communication by BNM (Bank Negara Malaysia–Central Bank) with market participants will be essential in further developing the foreign exchange market and bolstering resilience.

Directors underscored that steadfast implementation of the authorities’ ambitious structural reform agenda is key to boosting long-term economic potential. They supported the emphasis on increasing female labor force participation, improving the quality of education, lowering skills mismatch, boosting productivity growth, encouraging research and innovation, and upholding high standards of governance.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.