4-Star General of RCAF Dr. Nem Sowath–Alumnus of the University of Cambodia


January 11, 2017

4-Star General Dr. Nem Sowath–Soldier, Author, Intellectual and Alumnus of the University of Cambodia

The University of Cambodia is naturally proud to present a brief video on  His Excellency General Dr. Nem Sowath of The  Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). He is a role model for young Cambodians of the present generation.

Dr. Nem is a historian, soldier diplomat, political scientist, and a distinguished alumnus who has written two books on His Excellency  Prime Minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen and His Excellency Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, General Tea Banh. The General also attended post doctoral programmes at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and The National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. –Din Merican

Cambodia: Sustaining high economic growth


January 1, 2017

Cambodia: Sustaining  high economic growth 

by  Heng Pheakdey, Enrich Institute

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/01/01/keeping-cambodia-competitive-beyond-2016/

Here Comes Cambodia: Asia’s New Tiger Economy

After decades of conflict and poverty that captured the world’s attention, Cambodia has enjoyed five years of high economic growth that is moving it toward becoming one of the new tiger economies of Asia, according to forecasts in the Asian Development Bank’s Asian Development Outlook 2016.

For the last two decades Cambodia has been one of the fastest growing countries in Asia with an average annual GDP growth rate of 8.1 per cent.

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Cambodia has been highly successful in embracing the ‘factory Asia’ model of growth, supplying its low-cost labour to export-oriented industries. Economic progress in recent years has allowed Cambodia to invest in physical and social infrastructure, attract foreign direct investment, create jobs and lift millions of its people out of poverty. The Asian Development Bank called Cambodia Asia’s new ‘tiger economy’.

Cambodia’s economic performance in 2016 remained robust, with growth continuing at 7 per cent. Strong garment sector exports and foreign investment in construction drove this economic performance. Exports in the garment and footwear industries rose by 9.4 per cent in the first half of the year, almost double the pace in the same period of 2015 thanks to improved production processes and high demand from the European market. As of September 2016, the value of approved commercial projects in the construction sector more than doubled to US$7.2 billion. Imports of construction equipment and materials also increased to support the construction boom.

But solid growth in the industrial sector has been offset by a slowdown in agriculture and tourism. Unfavourable weather conditions and falling commodity prices have resulted in agriculture’s sluggish performance, which grew at a rate of only 0.2 per cent in 2014–2016. Tourism also underperformed in early 2016 due to a decline in tourist arrivals from Vietnam, Laos and South Korea. 1.3 million tourists visited Cambodia in the first quarter of the year, a mere 2.6 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2015.

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The World Bank reclassified Cambodia in July 2016 as a lower middle-income country after its gross national income per capita reached US$1070 in 2015, surpassing the minimum threshold of a lower middle-income nation of US$1026. While this sign of progress should be welcomed, it comes with its own set of challenges. Analysts fear that this new classification will reduce Cambodia’s benefits from international foreign aid and preferential trade agreements that the country enjoyed while still a ‘least developed country’.

To prepare for the anticipated reduction in international assistance and trade privileges, Cambodia needs to strengthen its competitiveness, diversify its economy and upgrade its industries.

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Although garment exports have held up well so far, the sector remains narrowly based and concentrated on a few markets, making it vulnerable to external shocks. To preserve Cambodia’s attractiveness relative to its regional competitors such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, it must diversify into higher value products and services and strengthen labour productivity to reflect the rise of the minimum wage.

The modernisation of agriculture would also help to sustain productivity in the long run. Employing more than half of Cambodia’s labour force, agriculture has contributed significantly to poverty reduction. But high reliance on rain-dependent rice production, slow adoption of quality seeds and inadequate agricultural extension services and irrigation facilities remain key constraints in the sector. Diversifying to less water intensive crops, developing the agribusiness and agro-processing industry, promoting a modernised value chain and cost effective logistics are crucial to put agriculture back on a higher growth path.

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Efforts have been made so far to support economic diversification. The Cambodia Industrial Development Policy was launched in March 2015 to transform and modernise Cambodia’s industrial structure from a labour-intensive industry to a skill-driven industry by 2025. This implies increasing the GDP share of the industrial sector, diversifying goods exports including non-textiles and processed agricultural products and modernising the registration of enterprises. The policy also supports stronger regulations and enforcement and helps create a more favourable business environment.

Domestic investors also have an important role to play in the diversification process. Experts believe that the success of Cambodia’s economy will be driven by local entrepreneurs and the private sector, not by international donor assistance. Providing support to domestic investors in trade facilitation, logistics, infrastructure and human capital is just as important.

Cambodia faces many challenges to stay competitive. To realise its vision of becoming an upper middle-income country by 2030 requires strong commitments to address infrastructure bottlenecks, build a high-quality human capital base, strengthen natural resource management, enhance governance and improve financial services and the business environment.

Heng Pheakdey is the founder and chairman of Enrich Institute.

 

Democracy in Southeast Asia: A Conversation Between Michael Vatikiotis and Bridget Welsh


December 31, 2016

Democracy in Southeast Asia: A Conversation Between Michael Vatikiotis and Bridget Welsh

http://thcasean.org/read/articles/319/Democracy-in-Southeast-Asia-A-Conversation-Between-Michael-Vatikiotis-and-Bridget-Welsh

Journey through the ebbs and flows of democracy in ASEAN via a conversation between Michael Vatikiotis, a veteran journalist and writer living in Singapore, and Dr. Bridget Welsh, who is a Senior Associate Fellow of the Habibie Center in Jakarta. Their conversation on the state of democracy in Southeast Asia traces the history of the push for democracy in the different countries of the region, current challenges and future prospects. (This article is first published in special issue.)

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Michael Vatikiotis is a writer and journalist living in Singapore. After training as a journalist with the BBC in London, he moved to Asia and was a correspondent and then editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review. He has written two novels set in Indonesia.

Image result for Michael VatikiotisMichael Vatikiotis

Dr. Bridget Welsh is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asia Democratic Studies of the National Taiwan University; a Senior Associate Fellow of the Habibie Center in Jakarta; and a University Fellow of Charles Darwin University in Darwin, Australia. She analyzes Southeast Asian politics, especially Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Indonesia.

Image result for bridget welsh national taiwan universityDr. Bridget Welsh

Bridget Welsh (BW): Michael, why don’t you begin. Where do you think the state of democracy is in the region?

Michael Vatikiotis (MV): Well, if you take a glass half-full approach, then I suppose you would look at the long arch of history of democracy over the last 40 years. I argue that in many countries of Southeast Asia there has been a gradual improvement in the forms of governments that have begun to look more and more institutionally like functioning democracies.

So to break that down, you have of course a wave of democratization that began with the People’s Power revolution in the Philippines in mid-1980s which was itself an outgrowth of Portugal’s Carnation Revolution in the mid-1970s that sparked what Samuel Huntington called the ‘third wave of democratization.’ This eventually reached the shores of Southeast Asia and manifested itself initially in left wing movements, student disruptions and protests in mid 1970s. Thailand saw a crackdown on student movements that led to people fleeing into the jungle and joining the communist insurgency. Similarly in Indonesia, there was the Malari incident which led to a crackdown on campus politics. In Malaysia too, there was a student agitation in the mid-1970s. By the early 80s things had come to a head in the Philippines with the implementation of martial law, the corruption of Marcos’ rule and the deep sense of unease that many people felt because of the way that they were treated by Marcos, either arrested, detained or worse. In 1983, with the murder of Benigno Aquino as he stepped out of a plane from Taiwan at Manila Airport, these finally weld up into a massive popular protest.

At the time I was a young journalist in BBC. I remember covering it from London, and it was a very exciting time, especially the whole notion of ‘people’s power.’ This was well before any of the colored revolutions that have taken place in this century. This was before the end of Cold War. It was also the very first time that CNN had covered this sort of story so far away with live camera shots of the protests. There was a sense that nothing like this had really happened before in postcolonial Southeast Asia. It was shown and reported in a very vivid manner and it also very quickly brought an end to very despotic ruler. Within a matter of weeks Ferdinand Marcos was on a plane to Hawaii.

As a side note, I think it was also very important time because up until the mid-1980s, the United States and other Western powers firmly back autocratic regimes because they were anti-communist. This changed with the ‘people’s power’ revolution on the streets of Manila. The color of the revolution was yellow, not red. You had this mild-mannered widow of Benigno Aquino who took over. She was not threatening. She didn’t seem to be communist. This allowed the United States and other Western powers to embrace a popular revolution without having to abandon their sort of anti-communist credentials. There was a sense of relief that they didn’t have to support an autocrat, because he was anti-communist.

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This set the region on the path where people expected greater openness and democratization, but it was a faltering path. It led in 1989 to a rash of students protests in Indonesia, where there was pressure on Indonesia’s government to become more open. Soeharto grudgingly allowed more openness, but it did not really bring about democratization. Similarly in Malaysia, we saw attempts to have more open system. This was met by a crackdown in Operation Lalang. Initial pressures on governments to be more open did not really work. Most tragically in Burma, the 1988 student uprising which did take its inspiration directly from ‘people’s power’ failed, spectacularly and tragically so with a huge loss of life. The assumption that ‘people’s power’ would lead to greater democratization essentially let us all down and we experienced another decade of demi-democracy at best.

Then we had the financial crisis. In 1997 there was another round of turmoil, and again there were assumptions made about the impact of the economic financial crisis on the way it would affect authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. It was assumed that now governments would need to be reformed, need to open up and be more transparent; and better serve the people. There was pressure in Malaysia. Obviously, what happened in Indonesia was the Soeharto regime fell, collapsed under the weight of its own authoritarian inefficiency. However, once again, we all felt that there was going to be a democratic dividend from the financial crisis. If one recalls the first few years of the Indonesia transition, the initial two or three years were disappointing. You essentially had a bunch of people who had served Soeharto who basically changed their shirts and became democrats all of sudden. There was marginally more open government, but it took at least five years for the reform period to have an impact. Decentralization of government in 1999 was a first good step. But, do not forget there was also a lot of violence associated in the reformasi period in Indonesia. Many people were generally unhappy with the first few years of that period.

There was no real democratic impact on the rest of the region. Burma continued to be ruled by a nasty military regime. Mahathir continued to rule the roost in Malaysia. In the Philippines during this period there was several setbacks to democratic government in a form of attempted military interventions and impeachments of politicians. So again, while there were these promises of reform and democratization, the overall regional democratic impact was less than expected.

BW: I think if we look at the situation now, we have three different patterns. The first of which is a democratic deficit in the region’s more democratic countries, namely Indonesia and Philippines. Here there are demands for better governance that are not being met by democratic governments. This is true particularly over the issue of corruption, but this extends to social services and economic policies that are not addressing the needs of the masses. This has fueled authoritarian nostalgia, support for more autocratic rule. This was evident in Indonesia’s 2014 election and more recently with the election of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines. Large shares of these societies want more strongman rule because of a lack of effective democratic governance. Furthermore, democratic conditions in democracies are contracting, with the rise of intolerance toward minorities and violations of civil liberties.

The second trajectory is the continued stranglehold of one party dominant systems in the region.  This is the case in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia and, of course, Singapore. The trend has been increasing use of authoritarian measures against opponents. While opposition in all of these countries has expanded with greater access to information and rising aspirations of new generations, perhaps with the exception of Laos, Southeast Asians governments have used their control of political systems to stay in office. From the manipulation of electoral rules to arrests and control of the media, the incumbents are holding on. Some of these measures are more blatant than others, such as Malaysia’s Najib Tun Razak’s government’s arrest of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim and more recently the imprisonment of Bersih chairperson Maria Chin-Abdullah for ‘terrorism,’ but the trend has been across the region. We have witnessed a broad democratic recession in Southeast Asia in the past five years, especially in the one-party dominant countries.

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A Thai Protester

The third pattern is one of regime change in two Southeast Asian countries. The first is military takeover in Thailand with the May 2014 coup. The Prayut government has arguably been one of the most repressive military governments in Thai history, with fear and repression deeply felt. Sadly, the other country affected by Huntington’s third wave, which began democratizing gradually from the late 1980s, is serving as the prime example of the region’s growing authoritarianism. The second has been in Myanmar, where the election of Aung San Suu Kyi National League for Democracy (NLD) has fundamentally opened up the system.  Myanmar is facing the same troubles you spoke about just now after 1999 in Indonesia. There is violence especially on the periphery, contributing to the serious humanitarian conditions of the Rohingyas, and other concerns for ethnic minorities. There are real challenges in weakening the power of the military as well, which extends to the economy as well as security situation. Democracy in Myanmar remains fragile.

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Protest in Myanmar

MV: The question to answer is why. If we move from glass half full at the end of last century to the glass half empty at the beginning the 21st century, the question is what can explain the democracy deficits? To be honest, it is quite hard to find a simple explanation that embraces the breadth of situations in the region. I believe we must categorize the failures.  I think the first failure is institutionalization. In all the countries where we see democratic progress, one of the weakest elements of the reform program has been institutionalizing the changes that have been made. That is mainly because the nature of political culture in Southeast Asia is personal. It largely involves groups of followers owing allegiance to individuals whether they are in bureaucracy or in the political establishment. There has never been a need to institutionalize these networks, because they are fluid and rest on a great deal of patronage. It is very paternalistic and in a paternalistic system you do not actually want to build an institution that would succeed you. I think this sort of combination of personality politics and leadership has contributed to a lack of institutionalization.

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For me, the best example is Indonesia. It is one of the tragedies of Indonesia. While there is no real question that Indonesia’s democratic foundation is firm, and no one would say that there is a danger of moving back to the system that they had before, an authoritarian leader would be unaccountable or even perhaps the military playing a role in politics. Although I think one can never completely rule these out.

BW: Indeed, we should never said ‘never.’

MV: Yes. If you look at the real weaknesses of the system and its hostage to extreme elements of prejudice whether they are racial or religion, it is because the political parties are weak. There are no platforms to speak of. The institutions for mature political debates and exchange are simply underdeveloped and not respected.

You have at the same time have successful decentralization. Many people would argue that the strengths lie here. The elections at regional and local levels are among the most successful. They are bringing forward the future politicians. They have already given Indonesia a president. Having said that, institutional weaknesses plaque Indonesia’s democracy and those of the region.

BW: I would take this issue of institutionalization a little bit further, Michael. It is not just about the relationship between the personal and institutions in places like Indonesia and Philippines and in political parties, but rather we see the weakening of political institutions that did exist. Previously functioning institutions have become personalized.

Perhaps the best example is that of Malaysia where the line between the dominant party UMNO and the system is not there anymore. Essentially all of the checks on executive power have been removed in a systematic way as power has become concentrated around the person who holds the executive office. The office is the person and the person is the office.  We see this pattern throughout the region, in Cambodia and Singapore as well. In the latter institutions function, but they closely reflect the leadership of the PAP.

MV: Well, I tend to agree, but I would break it down into two different factors. One is whether or not this was avoidable or unavoidable. I think in the case of Malaysia, it was avoidable, because the institutions and checks were working. Mahathir weakened many of them, with his very firm, autocratic sort of style of rule. Don’t forget there was this interregnum with Abdullah Badawi when many of different power centers and institutions came a life again because he allowed them to.

BW: Because he was so weak rather than due to any genuine desire for democracy. He needed to look like a reformer to win power, but when he left office there was actually very little substantive reform.

MV: Because he was weak. Najib came to power in 2009, essentially promising further reform. Many of people of the time including myself saw Najib as a competent parliamentary politician but weak. He was weak as a personality, and therefore did not seem as necessarily much of a threat if things would not go his way. As we see, things did not go his way. The precipice that Malaysia has fallen down from in terms of the undermining of the last remaining institutions of democracy essentially was brought about by the 1MDB scandal. He suddenly found himself led in that direction.

BW: Najib was doing the leading, he is the key person in the 1MDB scandal. He was weak and greedy and has abused his office to prevent prosecution.

MV: Exactly, because of that, the 1MDB scandal, he has completely turned everything on its head for democracy in Malaysia. He needs to defend his position to assure that he does not go to the jail. I have known Najib for many years. I do not recognize him now at all. He is the man who is actually more English than Malaysian. He does not even speak the Malay language properly, who essentially was led there because of the wife.

BW: There is this tendency to blame her, as women are often blamed. It is a partnership. For me he is the prime minister and he is ultimately responsible.

MV: Fundamentally he is weak. for whatever reason. He is never going to stand up either to his wife or to anything that is the least bit trouble and so therefore everything had to change. The direction has to change. The thing that I least understand and this gets back to the what we said earlier, is why there has not been any real opposition to him. Najib is not a particularly strong person. I know that a lot of people have talked about the use of the money and the payments that have been made to keep people in line. This is the idea that people are selfishly essentially going along with it because why bother to resist, why make trouble for yourself when you could essentially make money out of this situation. In that sense I shift the blame a little bit away from Najib onto a generation of politicians, many of whom I knew when they were quite young, who essentially don’t appear to have any moral principles either.

BW: Well, I think there is something more fundamental going on. There is no question that in a serious moral vacuum in terms of the incumbent Malaysian leadership. I would extend this to the Islamist party as well, that has turned away from decent political principles and in effect endorsed corruption. I would say, however, that this is not just about the politicians. It is about the whole state-business nexus, the way the economies in the region work. They are driven by those who control political power, and businesses have very strong crony relationships that feed corruption and buttress incumbent elite rule. Look at the Economist’s list of the top countries in the world for crony-capitalism. The proportion of Southeast Asian countries in top is striking, Malaysia is no.2; Philippines is no. 3 Singapore is no. 4; Indonesia is no 7 and Thailand is no 12.

MV: This is the second factor that I was going to bring up after institutionalization, the utter selfishness of elites. They really do not care. If you take the corruption issue, why would you address corruption when in a case of Thai, Cambodian, Malaysian or Indonesian elite, it means you would have to queue up; it means you would have actually dismantle this system that essentially enhances your status and gives you a privileged position. Why would you dismantle a system where you benefit from it so directly? You just perpetuate it; it keeps your family and your relatives basically in a much better position than everyone else. This has been going on for decades, and this has meant that whatever happens to the economy, there is a consistent and very discernible increase in inequality. Even with the middle class now, the middle class now is so far remote in terms of income from members of elites in many of these countries. The elite share of the amount of money accumulated perpetuates their position. They can buy whatever political process, whether is semi-democracy or even a more democratic context. They can simple buy their way into power.

BW: I think you place too much emphasis on individual politicians in the system. The political-economic relationship has evolved for years, shaped by decades of business-political ties. The structure is as important as the agents.

MV: We have variation. In Indonesia, you have a much more horizontal society because of the geography. You have more cities of more than a billion than another part of the region, and that actually breaks things out a little bit.

BW: Agreed, but Indonesia is still very hierarchical. At a fundamental level, they are few incentives to engage in fundamental economic and political reforms. The role that elites, especially business elites play, should not underestimated. When we look at a place like Malaysia and its trajectory, the business elites have been Najib’s enablers, his bankers and business partners. This extends across borders. Businessmen prefer to work with someone who they can pay off and make a deal with. Najib as minister of finance was the par excellence deal maker. Sadly, most Malaysians have been on the losing end of the deals.

MV: I think this brings us to the third reason for the region’s democratic deficit: a complete lack of sufficient counterbalance by the rule of law to political or corporate power. I have seen this situation fairly close up in Malaysia, in Thailand, less so in Indonesia. There are huge problems with a functioning judiciary. You see this in Thailand in particular, where there has been aggressive politicization of the judiciary. There is a misplaced sense that the judiciary should be politically controlled rather than apply moral pressure to the corrupt politicians. In a case of Malaysia the judiciary was one of the strongest institutions bequeathed by the British at the end of colonial period. It is striking to go back and look at some of the High Court decisions that were made in early years of independence, cases that were referred to the High Court of United Kingdom before Mahathir stopped this practice. Kelantan actually tried to bring a case to a High Court to succeed before the Federation was fully formed. That case was allowed. None of that would not happen today.

BW: Never said ‘never’. Pressures in East Malaysia are growing.

MV: Indeed, never said never. Nevertheless, the insufficiency of the law to provide a check and balance on what we talked about earlier in terms of weak institutions and elite power is a major factor in the deficit of democracy.

BW: I’m not sure whether or not this is also a reflection of public opinion. We find in multiple surveys that many Southeast Asians do not support checks and balances such as an independent judiciary in any meaningful sense. I am drawing from the Asian Barometer Survey. Southeast Asians do not conceptualize horizon accountability with check and balances, because in part of the legacy of strongman rule and the personalized and hierarchical nature of politics that we spoke about earlier. The problem goes beyond the judiciary. It is the lack of other effective horizon accountable institutions such as independent election commissions and anti-corruption bodies. These institutions do not have any real power in most of the countries of the region. Southeast Asians have few meaningful checks within the system. Laws surrounding these bodies are often manipulated in a very fundamental way to suit those in office. It is a vicious cycle, the lack of operating checks contributes to a lack of support of these institutions and further political manipulation of these institutions for political ends.

MV: We have to consider the other side of situation which are the responses by ordinary people. This is much less clear. For example, impunity is another major problem in Southeast Asia. The lack of resolution of issues does not mean people do not suffer and do not want redress. Throughout this period, there have been successful ways in which civil society has brought pressure and staved off, in some cases, some of the worst excesses or abuses of power. It is not completely a black and white picture. I would say that civil society has in some cases made considerable progress. But, maybe not enough, as they too have hampered because by the strong or selfish grip of elites in the system. They are often just scratching at the surface of some of the problems. Nonetheless it is important to acknowledge the aspirations of people and those who have been on the frontline in the struggle for democratic change.  In the thirty plus years I have been in the region, I have met some of the most inspiring people who work in small NGOs, small law offices or in opposition political parties. They really struggle. It is not always a violent struggle, although at times it is. We see Southeast Asia punctuated time and time again by needless violence, more often than not violence for political reasons. It is very often a mundane, sometimes lonely, fight for change.

BW:  I think you quite rightly point to the bravery of ordinary people. Here too, however, when we look at society, we see two very worrying trends. The first of which has been the deepening of political polarization across the region, the red and yellow shirts. You talked about the yellow shirts of the Philippines in the 1980s. Now we have open clashes in Thailand and Malaysia, large splits in Cambodia and Singapore with very different perspectives shown in survey research and divides in Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines as evident in recent elections. Even in Myanmar where everybody talks about the Aung San Suu Kyi’s ‘landslide,’ she only won 57% of the popular vote. Prabowo almost won in Indonesia in 2014. Duterte only won with 38% of the vote. Across the board in Southeast Asia, we have very deeply politically polarized societies. Governments often use this polarization to their advantage, either to as an excuse for intervention in the case of Thailand or they perpetuate this polarization in a place like Malaysia. Divisions are used as a way to justify authoritarian rule and perpetuate their power in the name of stability. Sadly, large shares of the political aspirations of Southeast Asian societies have been dismissed politically, as they are being so economically as well.

MV: Yes, I think the polarization has always been there. Now certainly there is a greater ability to mobilize and simultaneously to exploit the polarization as you pointed out. I think one of the things that interests me about the polarization is the limited channels for addressing differences and grievances. I am struck by the steady narrowing of opportunities for different ideologies, for the ideology of sort of the socialist’s nature that would revive channels for people to actually ask for more in a political context. The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War is still to a large extent being felt across the Southeast Asia. This great fear of the left wing persists.  What is happening is that people channel a lot of the polarization into sort of racial or religion sentiments. The reality is that people do suffer and despair under the weight of equality. They yearn for some kind of inspiration, a motivational ideology that gives them an avenue for protest. If it is in fact cut off because communism is still banned in places such as Indonesia, or frowned upon the Philippines and Thailand. In Thailand the leader of the red shirts is in fact a former communist. She has tried to establish a party that aspires to represent the massive of people. It is very difficult then to actually channel that polarization into something less violent, more constructive.

BW: We know that in terms of research, most Southeast Asians conceptualize democracy in terms of equality disproportionately compared to other parts of the world. We also know that there are no real substantive open policy debates taking place in most of the region’s political environment. Admittedly, there are some areas and some pockets that we do not want to dismiss those, but at the sense of meaningful discussion of the directions of development policy or allocations of funding, there are real discussion vacuums. In the last five years especially, a lot of government policies had been low hanging fruit, basically throwing money to stave off problems. If there is one area that has been focused it has been infrastructure, hard development, an area that has created few jobs for the region’s youth and reinforced corruption. Regional governments are not meaningfully dealing with underlying challenges that these countries are facing in terms of moving their economies forward and transforming their societies towards the future, especially for the younger generations. The promise of greater social mobility is not being realized.

A second worrying concern in society involves the violations of others by members of society themselves.  Disproportionately, governments are not intervening on the significant human right violations that are being conducted by non-state actors, whether they are in the name of religion, drugs or greed.

MV: That is true. Let me come back to that. There is something else needs mentioning. In the early period of independence in Southeast Asia, many of these countries were conceived of as democracies, the pre-1965 period in Indonesia, pre-1962 period in the Burma, even in the very first year after 1954 in Cambodia. These formation democracies were led by a group of people who had been imbued with the notion of democracy from the outside. They had received education outside. If you look at some of the early leaders of Indonesia, they were essentially were Fabian Socialists. They brought these values to the establishment of the republic. That had all gone by the 1980s. One of the things that I find most interesting about what is driving this democratic deficit is the emergence of a generation of leaders who actually did not share democratic values in the same way. They simple didn’t. Mahathir never went to the West for his education. Lee Kuan Yew is another example. The whole ‘Asian values’ debate in the 1990s, was built around a lot of resentment and frustration by a generation that succeeded the founding fathers. In a patronizing way, the departing colonial powers left it to the founding leaders to set up democracy, because they were imbued the same values. That was all gone by the 1980s. Instead you have a generation who were imbued with traditional notions of power and politics.

BW: I think you continue to place considerable emphasis on leaders and their values. For me, this was broader, it was about the wealth they were accumulating and the synergy between economic and political power. Many of these leaders allied with business and other elites, and were willing to challenge those that challenged them. They were not really willing to share power.

MV: The successive generations emerging in power were not imbued in these democratic values. That is why it was very difficult for them to accept change or reform.

Now we come to the issue of human rights. In my view Southeast Asians have a really good sense of survival, family and land. Security for themselves and their families was the most important. Very often these things are prioritized against more universal things you think might be important to people. You know, if you look at the victims of 1965 in Indonesia, maybe what they want in return is not so much justice, but compensation.

BW: There should not be a trade-off. They should get both.

MV: They should get both, but I think in the end what people often settle for is the material and not the other. There helps us understand the issue of human rights not being enshrined or carried out properly. Weak institutions and power holders are simply not interested. You also have a society that is unfortunately less interested than you expect them to be in pushing for these things.

BW: Advocated for human rights are clearly minority across Southeast Asia, but this is not as simple as you suggest. A majority of Southeast Asians want better, fairer and moral governments. It is much more than the material you suggest. Survey research in the Asian Barometer Survey provides insights. For example, there is no majority of public opinion supporting a secular government a single country in Southeast Asia, including Singapore.

MV: Indeed, the growth of Christian community in Singapore is one of the most understudied phenomena in Southeast Asia.

BW: I also think have the emergence of a religious nationalism that is intolerant and undemocratic. This is not just the extremism we associate with terrorism, but an intolerance that is eating away at the fabric of society. There are clearly counter forces, but the authoritarian rhetoric and closed education systems of many governments reinforce this lack of nuance, empathy and understanding. Civic education is missing, as many governments often work against creating problem-solving and critical thinking in their education systems. Many of the forces that are challenging democracy are coming from below, shaped of course by the institutional and leadership context in which they operate.

MV: Indeed, many dynamics are coming from below. In Indonesia there is more primordialism

BW: Well, it is broader than primordialism in my view.

MV: We have reached a point in the second decade of 21st century, where we have to all ask ourselves are we going to see incremental progress. Can we assume that these hiccups along the way for democracy that we have described will continue to be hiccups and ultimately these societies are reaching the goal of becoming more democratically countries? I am doubtful frankly. I see continuing cycles of upheaval. It is possible for instance in Indonesia that what we saw in the last couple of weeks, the ability of hardline extreme group to put pressure on a very popular elective president could see the undermining not so much of his legitimacy, but of his power. People will exploit the weakness of the presidency. They will not think of the institution of the presidency. They will simply think of their own interests. They all are thinking of their own interests. This could spin-off into a cycle of instability.

Similarly, Cambodia is facing elections in the next two years, the commune election this year and general election after that. It is clear that a younger generation of voters, increasingly a majority of voters, want change. It is also clear that the ruling party and Hun Sen is not prepared to provide them with that change. He wants his son to take over the prime minister eventually when he decides to retire. He wants to retire not according to the electoral schedule.

In Thailand, we have a military that is now entrenched in power. It is not likely that they will give up power in a time soon. There might be an election in 2018. In Myanmar as you point out democracy is fragile.

BW: Democracy is definitely stagnating. but let me take an alternative view. You may be doubtful about the future, but I am hopeful. I think these authoritarian leaders, the Najib, Hun Sen and others are not delivering on expectations either. There are very serious governance deficits in Southeast Asian societies, especially in many of those led by autocrats. This is why we have seen the democratic recession in the region; they are fighting to hold on. Today we have the big catch: we have a contracting economy. We have a very different global and regional economic conditions now. It is not increasing as it was in the 1990s or even in the 1980s. The democratic pendulum can swing back. I am confident it will. There are large shares of Southeast Asians ready to accept change, with the poles on the other side ready and waiting for the tipping point to move in their direction.

MV: I am doubtful. We had exactly the same conditions in the late 1990s, and there was no a hint of the time that there was a Duterte on the horizon or that the military was going to come back to power in Thailand. We cannot use that kind of analysis because economies contract and grow again; leaders do not rise and fall in that basis. We are not see the evidence of autocrats losing power. In fact, quite the opposite. Look at Duterte, who only basically decided to run for election a few months before the election itself. He is widely popular. This is in spite the death of four thousands or more people without the judicial process. We simply can’t predict that won’t happen again.

BW: Populist autocrats are a real possibility in democracies. This is happening across the world, especially in democracies. Trump’s election is case in point. Southeast Asia is different, as the dominant mode is more authoritarian governments rather than democracies. Authoritarianism rather than democracy will be targeted. Failures of economic reform are important and now more than ever this lack of economic and political reform is affecting the system. We are not in the 1990s. There is more information and reservoirs ready to embrace change, the excludes political poles. There is unprecedented pressure on autocrats in terms of their abilities to deliver and serious shortcomings in this regard. The leaders lack the same level of legitimacy than earlier leaders, with more impatient, diverse and demanding societies. This opens up the possibility for hope.

MV: It opens up the possibility but more people like Duterte will come along

BW: Maybe, maybe not.

Dean Keo Chhea addresses University Of Cambodia Alumni on Techo Sen School of Government and International Relations


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University Of Cambodia  SECOND ALUMNI  REUNION– December 24, 2016

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Dean Keo Chhea (pic right) who assumed Deanship of Techo Sen School of Government and International Relations on December 1, 2016 was a diplomat and served for  more than decade with The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia. A graduate of Monash University in Economics and International Trade and served as a high ranking Cambodian diplomat to India and Brunei, he brings his wealth of diplomatic experience to bear on his current post at The Techo Sen School. It is my pleasure to be working with the affable, intelligent and very experienced Dean Chhea.–Din Merican

Dean Keo Chhea addresses University of Cambodia Alumni on Techo Sen School of Government and  International Relations on December 24, 2016 at the Second UC Alumni Reunion.

Excellency President,

 VPs, Deans and Directors,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Fellow Alumni,

 Good Afternoon.

The Techo Sen School of Government and International Relations (TSS) was established in 2014 as integral part of the University of Cambodia with an aim to train and develop our young leaders and researchers, preparing themselves to be marketable for government institutions, multinational corporations, regional and international organizations, and civil society institutions.

During the dark era of 1975 – 1979, Cambodia plunged into the abyss of the despicable crime of genocide by the Khmer Rouge regime, millions of people were killed, currency and markets were destroyed, schools and educational systems, especially our intellectuals were completely exterminated.

After the collapse of the KR regime, the  subsequent Cambodian governments have spent tremendous efforts in restoring and reforming the education system in Cambodia. We can see lots of improvements in this field with numerous young intellectuals and smart people entering the job market to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding economy. Nevertheless, our human resources need further improvement and refinement, and that is why, we from the private sector also need to contribute to reinforce the Royal Government’s effort in building up our future human resources.

Cambodia needs its own intellectuals to do research and analysis. It is about time that we stop relying totally on outsiders to analyze our own issues and development. It is time we do it ourselves, and that is what our Tech Sen School is doing just that. Let us begin doing things in the Cambodian way and in the progress that contributes to our society, our community, ASEAN and the world.

It is a great pride for us that Cambodia, which has just emerged from ashes and is less dependent  today on foreign aids and assistance, has for the past two decades, re-positioned ourselves strategically within ASEAN and within international community, including the UN. From receiving UN aid and assistance, we are now contributing to UN peace keeping and demining efforts in many crisis areas such as Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Mali, Central African Republic, Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria.

Our economy also enjoy steady growth of 7 plus percent till 2020, according to the ADB index. Politically, we are also able to manage to contain the influence of two major powers, United States and China contributing to peace and stability in the region, and enable the stable economic growth in Southeast Asia.

 Excellency President,

Fellow Alumni,

The TSS with your help and guidance, President, is designing its programs to equip its students with self-awareness, let them know who they are, where they come from, and where they should go. TSS will also guide them to wisely use information and analyze it, balance foreign policies, brainstorming through our own think tank and make political and economic recommendations for our government as well as for private sectors. We seek to train young leaders in every field and make them competitive and productive for the skilled labor markets, both domestically and internationally.

To date, we have 22 staff, which includes 19 teaching staff and 2 admin staff, among which there are 15 PhD holders and 19 Master holders.

TSS holds 6 subjects for Master program, 6 subjects for PhD program, 4 subjects for other programs and 3 subjects for Think Tank.TSS currently has 186 students, among which 78 students are from the first intake and 108 students from the 2nd intake.

In the way forward, TSS is working to expand its programs for both Masters and PhD to cover political science, economics, international law, defense, security and strategic studies. TSS also plans to increase the number of teaching staff and its student intakes to reach triple of what we have by the end of 2017. We are establishing our own think tank to work on current contemporary political and economic issues and publish articles and make recommendations for both public and private sectors. Apart from this, we are also designing short courses for govern officials, private entrepreneurs, foreign companies, and non-governmental organizations, to meet their needs.

We are also working to establish formal linkages with centres, institutions, and think tanks of similar goals and interests in the region as well as in Europe and America, and work toward joint activities, courses in the near future, aiming at raising image of Cambodia and of course our UC to the highest level in the international arena. We also actively contribute to the hygiene, cleanliness and greenery of our University.

Fellow Alumni and students, education is a life long journey and there is a home here for you to do just that, so let join the TSS, for together we can make Cambodia proud, prosper and respected by the world outside!

Thank you.

Back in Time –Pol Pot’s Cambodia


December 12, 2016

Back in Time –Pol Pot’s Cambodia

HE RAN the country for less than four years, yet between April 1975 and January 1979 Pol Pot killed up to a fifth—some think a quarter—of the Cambodian people to whom he said he was bringing a new and better life. In its way, it was the worst of the 20th century’s totalitarian horrors, unless the eventual unlocking of North Korea’s doors reveals something even grimmer. Hitler murdered about 6 million Jews and others in his concentration camps; Stalin’s “anti-party” toll was close to 20 million; Chairman Mao’s Great Leap Forward starved over 20 million to death, before moving on to the Cultural Revolution. But Pol Pot’s victims were a much bigger proportion of little Cambodia’s 7 million people, and few of them could even vaguely be called “enemies of the regime”. His killing fields were the most mind-boggling of them all.

Philip Short, who wrote a good book about Mao’s China, has now done a spectacularly efficient job of describing what happened, and how. He has spent four years in Cambodia, talking to survivors of the killing-fields, and perpetrators. He has dug up piles of revealing documents. Some of the brightest illumination comes from the handful of westerners who watched what was going on, not least the diaries of Laurence Picq, an honest young Frenchwoman who went to Cambodia thinking she could help a good cause.

The result is a chillingly clear portrait of Saloth Sar, the man who became Pol Pot (and also Grand Uncle, First Brother and sundry other pseudonyms). From a comfortable background—his sister was one of the king’s concubines—he went to a smart lycée in still French-run Phnom Penh, and then won a scholarship to study in Paris. There he fell in love with Marxism-Leninism in its especially intellectual French form, and from France he went back to the emerging guerrilla war in Cambodia, to bring communism to his countrymen. Calmly and firmly, he worked his way to the top of the party; and in April 1975 his men marched into Phnom Penh.

It then became pure Orwell. Pol Pot at once ordered the total evacuation of all towns and cities—not just the middle class, but labourers, mechanics, street-cleaners, war refugees, everybody. All Cambodians were to become workers on the land. There were to be no wages. Meals were to be provided by collective kitchens (“unity of feeding”). Each Cambodian had to refer to himself or herself as “we”, forbidden to use the first person singular. When one region found it did not have enough food, supplies were not sent from better-off places; rather, the hungry were marched off to look for them.

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Of course, it did not work. Up to 1 million people died of starvation. Protests began, including among party members. The leadership of the party denounced such “microbes”. The protesters were put into camps, including Camp S-21 at Tuol Sleng, the sole task of which was to extract confessions. Many “confessions” turned out to be pure invention, yet all confessors were executed. At least another 100,000 people, maybe 250,000, died at this stage of the proceedings. As Pol Pot’s central committee put it, it was necessary “to avoid a solution of peaceful evolution”, which could “corrode” the revolution.

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Why was Pol Pot’s Cambodia even worse than Mao’s China, Stalin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany? Here Mr Short, so good at finding out what happened, is less good at explaining why it did.

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Samdech Techo Hun Sen–Making a  huge Difference for Cambodians

He suggests that Pol Pot, like many other Cambodians, was driven by resentment over his country’s loss of glory since the great days of the Angkor empire. But that was 600 years earlier. Lots of other countries have had far more recent puncturings of national pride without being pushed into anything quite as horrible.

Mr Short then wonders whether Buddhism, Cambodia’s main religion, lay near the root cause, because it believes in “the demolition of the individual”. This is nonsense. Buddhism, a gentle faith, believes that individual human beings eventually dissolve into nirvana when in successive lives they have earned it. This is not the explanation of Pol Pot’s slaughters.

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No, it was the bug he picked up in Paris that poisoned Pol Pot. An ideology which believes, as communism did, that a small group of self-selected possessors of the truth will get everything right is bound to produce disaster. Perhaps things were made worse by Pol Pot’s desire to outshine the communists in Vietnam; and maybe also by some still unexamined twist in his psyche. All the same, it was the pseudoscientific certainty of Marxism-Leninism, that malformed child of the Enlightenment, which was chiefly to blame.

ASEAN still the critical catalyst for China’s future


December 4, 2016

ASEAN still the critical catalyst for China’s future

by Kishore Mahbubani, Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School@NUS

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China is making some serious strategic mistakes in its dealings with ASEAN. It is sacrificing its long-term interests in favour of short-term objectives and its global interests in favour of regional concerns. And in the process, it is undermining a critical catalyst to its peaceful rise.

China’s peaceful emergence as the number two power in the world is a modern geopolitical miracle. In 1980 its share of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms, was 2 per cent—far less than the 22 per cent the US accounted for. By 2014, China’s share had overtaken the United States. Normally such great-power transitions are accompanied by competition and conflict. Instead, China emerged peacefully. Why?

 

Many factors were responsible. Deng Xiaoping’s wise geopolitical advice to ‘hide and bide’ China’s strength was a key factor. He also called on the Chinese ‘to swallow bitter humiliation’. This they did. But it is impossible to swallow bitter humiliation forever. It was inevitable that China would eventually lose its patience and lash out against perceived maritime provocations by Japan and ASEAN. We can only hope that these recent outbursts have had a cathartic and calming effect on the national psyche.

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Yet China’s actions with ASEAN show that the anger has not abated. It is commonly believed that Chinese pressure led Cambodia to veto the ASEAN joint communique on the South China Sea in 2012. Similarly, China likely persuaded Cambodia, Laos and Thailand to walk away from the agreed ASEAN statement, later indiscreetly leaked by Malaysia.

China is one of the more rational geopolitical actors today. Unlike the United States and Russia, China’s geopolitical actions are not commonly driven by emotional paroxysms. Yet China’s atypical emotional defence of the infamous ‘nine-dash line’ in the South China Sea goes against its larger global interests.

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China is now the world’s number one trading power and has been since 2014. It is also the world’s biggest exporter of manufactured goods. Chinese toothbrushes and detergents arrive safely on African and Latin American shores because the world’s oceans are open to freedom of navigation and safe for commercial shipping. The US Navy is inadvertently doing the Chinese economy a big favour by keeping international sea lanes open. This has facilitated the near quadrupling of China’s global trade from US$600 billion in 2004 to US$2.2 trillion in 2015.

Yet in the same decade, when its reliance on freedom of navigation in the world’s oceans increased, China prioritised regional interests ahead of its global interests. The nine-dash line, which had remained dormant for decades, suddenly surfaced in the Chinese public consciousness and the Chinese media began to defend it passionately.

It is against Chinese interests to convert any international waterway into an internal lake. This is why Wei Zongyou of Fudan University has wisely advised that: ‘[t]o avoid a possible maritime trap that will not only be detrimental to China’s true national interests, but also negatively affect many other countries, China, as a major claimant, should think longer term and take steps to de-escalate the tension’.

The Chinese government has not decided to break up ASEAN. Indeed, it wants to strengthen ASEAN. Yet its actions have weakened ASEAN, a dangerous thing to do to an organisation that is inherently fragile—perhaps as fragile as a Ming vase.

More dangerously, China began to undermine ASEAN’s unity. In theory, China can afford to alienate the ten relatively weak ASEAN member states. In practice, China is shooting itself in the foot, since ASEAN’s exceptional success as a regional organisation has also facilitated China’s peaceful rise.

In the 1980s the strategic alignment of interests between ASEAN, China and the United States to reverse Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia enabled China to open up to the world. In the 1990s, after the West isolated China following the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, ASEAN kept engaging with China. In the 2000s, ASEAN reacted enthusiastically to China’s proposal for enhanced economic cooperation, which also coincided with China’s entry into the WTO.

China has also been exceptionally generous towards ASEAN. It stunned the world by being the first major economic power to propose a free trade agreement with ASEAN, motivating other powers to follow suit. China has been equally generous in its aid programs and was the first economic power to commit to enhancing ASEAN’s infrastructure. As a result, there were, until recently, massive reservoirs of goodwill towards China in ASEAN. It’s a tragedy that these reservoirs are now drying up.

ASEAN had responded positively to China’s generosity. It facilitated China’s rise in other salient ways. By converting the Balkans of Asia into one of the most peaceful regions in the world, ASEAN helped to change the chemistry of the larger East Asia region. China should look carefully at how Russia has been troubled by challenges in Ukraine and Syria. If Southeast Asia had emerged, like the Middle East, as a more troubled region, China would inevitably have been distracted.

Instead, ASEAN created a geopolitical oasis which helped maintain peace in East and South Asia. The annual ASEAN meetings provided the only safe and stable geopolitical platform for regional and great powers to talk to each other regularly. Whenever relations between China and Japan broke down, their leaders turned to the ASEAN meetings to restore matters.

ASEAN has therefore been a critical catalyst for the decades of peace that we have seen in the region. This is why the time has come for China to radically recalculate its interests in regards to ASEAN. Is the defence of the nine-dash line the ‘core interest’ of China in Southeast Asia? Or is it the continued success of ASEAN as a regional organisation promoting the culture of peace and prosperity in the broader region?

The answer almost seems obvious. This is what makes China’s recent actions towards ASEAN truly puzzling. China is jeopardising its own interests in undermining ASEAN unity.

More importantly, as China’s leaders frequently emphasise, China has not arrived as a modern developed power. Its per capita income is still only 25 per cent of the United States’. China still needs a few more peaceful decades to complete the job.

Ultimately, Deng Xiaoping was right when he called on the Chinese people to be patient. He was right in saying that the problem of territorial disputes should be passed to future generations. The problem of the South China Sea should be put on the back-burner. China’s larger interests in peaceful regional chemistry should push it towards preserving and strengthening the critical catalyst that has facilitated China’s rise so far.

Kishore Mahbubani is Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Managing China’.

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/11/29/asean-still-the-critical-catalyst-for-chinas-future/