Timor Leste as 11th ASEAN Member any time soon?


June 20, 2017

Timor Leste as 11th ASEAN Member any time soon?

by Kavi Chongkittavorn

http://www.aseannews.net/will-timor-leste-finally-join-asean-2017a/

Image result for Dili's wellknown landmark
Cristo Rei–Dili, Timor Leste

BANGKOK, June 15 (Reporting ASEAN) – By the time ASEAN turns 50 years old next year, Timor Leste could already be its eleventh member state. After filing its application six years ago, Timor Leste is poised to join ASEAN under the chairmanship of the Philippines, which is very keen to bring the region’s young democracy into its embrace.

Image result for Indonesia and Timor Leste

Indonesia’s President Widodo Jokowi with Timor Leste’s President  Taur Matan Ruak 

What made headlines regarding the admission of Timor Leste, or East Timor, was the comment by Rahmat Pramono, Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN, that ASEAN was closer to welcoming Dili. This was, after all, the first time a senior ASEAN official revealed the status of ongoing discussions on ASEAN’s fourth enlargement.

“In 2011, when Indonesia was the head of ASEAN, Timor Leste submitted an application to join ASEAN. The ASEAN member countries agreed to conduct a feasibility study of the new country,” Pramono said. Earlier, Timor Leste’s prospects for gaining membership had been blocked by Jakarta, which said that the country was not ready due to political instability, weak economic infrastructure and insufficient human resources to engage ASEAN. These assessments were shared by other member states at the time.

But a change of heart came about as the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Timor Leste improved under the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Today, Jakarta is actively pushing for Dili’s inclusion in ASEAN. New ASEAN members such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar are likewise inclined to accept Timor Leste.

Looking back, Timor Leste had expressed its intention to join ASEAN as early as a year after its independence in 2002. At the time, Thailand and Cambodia were the only two countries backing the young nation’s bid to join ASEAN right away. They thought that the best way to help was to include it in the ASEAN family as soon as possible. As a young democracy, Thailand at the time also viewed ASEAN’s expansion as a way to strengthen openness and democratization in its member states.

But other ASEAN countries were reluctant about Timor Leste’s entry. Among the old ASEAN members, Singapore was very succinct in its position that Timor Leste needed some time to prepare for membership in ASEAN because it lacked the capacity to join the economic community. The island republic feared that Timor Leste’s entry would slow down the grouping’s community-building progress.

The feasibility studies done as part as of processing Timor Leste’s membership application looked at three aspects by which to evaluate the country’s overall qualifications as ASEAN’s 11th member. These three are the pillars of politics and security, economy and socio-cultural issues. The political and security as well as economic aspects have been assessed, while the socio-cultural assessment is expected to be completed soon by Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and Security Studies.

The two completed studies on the politics and security pillar and the economic pillar concluded that Timor Leste must improve human resource development and undertake capacity-building in order to boost its economic growth and skills. When the ASEAN Community was launched at the end of last year, all members pledged to implement new action plans in the three pillars under the new framework from 2015-2025.

In July this year, the ASEAN foreign ministers will meet in Vientiane to discuss whether Timor Leste can join the regional organization by next year.

Earlier this year, in a surprise move, Dili agreed to host a meeting among the ASEAN-based civil society organizations because Laos, ASEAN chair in 2016, was reluctant to do so. Since 2005, as part of the effort to transform ASEAN into a people-centred community, ASEAN leaders have been having an interface with representatives of civil society organizations. But so far, these dialogues have been held irregularly, and often depend on the ASEAN chair’s decision.

When ASEAN admitted new members in 1995, 1997 and 1999, these new members – Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia – were admitted without any pre-conditions or preparations. They learned from daily engagements with their ASEAN colleagues, gradually absorbing the ASEAN way. In meeting after meeting, they worked together with officials from other member countries, at all levels. Within a short period, they mastered the ways and means to interact with the rest of ASEAN family.

To prepare for its membership in ASEAN, Timor Leste has opened foreign missions in all 10 ASEAN member countries and dispatched officials to be attached to the Jakarta-based ASEAN Secretariat. Since there remain few Timor Leste officials who speak or write in English – Tetum and Portuguese are the country’s official languages – quite a few other ASEAN countries have been diligently helping them out in English-language communication.

Currently, ASEAN has 10 members comprising Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. (END/Reporting ASEAN – Edited by Johanna Son)

*Kavi Chongkittavorn is a columnist with ‘The Nation’ newspaper, and senior fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand.

 

 

Book Review: ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia


April 17, 2017

ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia

Book Review by Malcolm Cook

ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia. By Lee Jones. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012. Hardcover: 262pp.

Lee Jones’ new book on ASEAN and the states of Southeast Asia is refreshingly iconoclastic. It tackles one of the core tenets of ASEANology that has been intellectually reinforced by the Constructivist turn in the analysis of this regional organization. The icon that Jones’ book takes aim at is the scholarly near consensus “on the absolute centrality of the non-interference principle for ASEAN states” (p. 2). A consensus that Jones’ correctly notes echoes the official rhetoric of ASEAN and its member states.

Image result for ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia. By Lee Jones

There are three steps to Jones’ argument that this consensus is misplaced. First, he establishes that a range of Constructivist, Realist and English School scholars of ASEAN uphold this consensus despite their intellectual differences and debates over other aspects of the organization.

Second, he establishes the case that ASEAN member states have repeatedly intervened in Southeast Asia both in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods in apparent contradiction to ASEAN’s commitment to non-interference. Where he sees other scholars of ASEAN as downplaying or ignoring these interventions, he makes them the empirical core of his argument.

Third, Jones posits a theoretical explanation for when member states uphold ASEAN’s “cherished norm” of non-interference and when they violate it. He adopts the multi-variable critical political economy approach that Jones argues, for Southeast Asia, “was pioneered by scholars based at or linked with the Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University, Perth” (p. x). Befitting this social conflict approach’s Marxist roots, Jones focuses on state-capital relations in the different member states of ASEAN and the role of the state and state institutions in supporting powerful owners and managers of capital in their domestic conflicts and transnational expansion.

This approach sees “state managers” in the ASEAN member states invoking the non-interference norm and its purported centrality to ASEAN as a “technology of power” to hinder external interventions in favour of domestic marginalized groups such as the people of East Timor (Timor Leste) when it was under Indonesian control and communist rebels and their sympathizers in the Philippines [End Page 303] and Thailand.

These managers violate the same norm when they perceive external threats to their states such as during the invasion of Cambodia by communist Vietnam during the Cold War or threats to foreign market access such as Western pressure on ASEAN over Myanmar’s membership.  In the case of Cambodia, both in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods and Myanmar in the post-Cold War period, it has not only been ASEAN member states that Jones argues have violated this “cherished norm” of ASEAN but ASEAN itself.

Jones links Myanmar’s decision to seek ASEAN membership, ASEAN’s acceptance of Myanmar and ASEAN’s subsequent pressure on the junta to reform politically all to dominant state and capital interests. The junta was interested in joining ASEAN to benefit from the protection of ASEAN’s non-interference norm while providing more economic opportunities for state-linked firms. Myanmar’s membership benefited dominant capital interests in ASEAN states as shown by the rapid increase in Thai and Malaysian foreign investment in Myanmar. However, Western disdain at ASEAN’s acceptance of Myanmar and the importance for ASEAN member states and dominant capital interests of continued good relations with Western powers, particularly after the Asian financial crisis, strongly underpinned ASEAN pressure on Myanmar to reform politically.

ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia is most effective at establishing the existence of this near consensus in favour of the ASEAN commitment to non-interference and this consensus’ empirical and analytical shortcomings. This definitely is a worthwhile independent contribution to the literature and our understanding of ASEAN’s development.

The author repeatedly shows how the most quoted scholars of ASEAN, particularly those of a Constructivist bent, downplay examples of interventions as isolated or, counter-intuitively, as supporting the general principle of non-intervention. In the second half of the book that looks at the post-Cold War period, Jones insightfully analyses how ASEAN’s rhetorical embrace of good governance, democratization, human rights and ASEAN community building all.


Timor Leste–The Easy to Forget 11th ASEAN Member


April 6, 2017

Timor Leste–The Easy to Forget 11th ASEAN Member

by Khoo Ying Hooi@www.newmandala.org

The longer Timor-Leste’s membership is delayed,it will only reflect negatively on ASEAN’s decision-making process, writes Khoo Ying Hooi.

Image result for Timor Leste

2017 is a pivotal year for the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) as it celebrates its 50 years since its founding in 1967. Among the puzzles that need to be solved is whether Timor Leste will be formally accepted as the regional bloc’s 11th member.

As the newest country in Southeast Asia, Timor Leste and its place in the region is often overlooked. Timor-Leste is vulnerable not only as a small and relatively young state. The fact that it has suffered an Indonesian occupation that destroyed its economy and infrastructure prior to the restoration of independence in May 2002, means it faces various post-conflict challenges, including having its voice heard in regional and international forums.

Image result for cristo rei of dili

Cristo Rei of Dili

Timor-Leste expressed its desire to be part of ASEAN right after the restoration of independence in 2002. In July 2005, it became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and it signed the ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Cooperation in 2007. As outlined in its Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, Timor-Leste’s aspiration to join ASEAN is based on geographical location, the wishes of the country’s leaders and people, and its cultural affinity with its neighbours.

Timor-Leste officially applied for ASEAN membership in March 2011 during Indonesia’s chairmanship after a number of years as an ASEAN observer. An ASEAN Coordinating Council Working Group (ACCWG) was then set up and tasked to assess Timor-Leste’s readiness to be part of the regional grouping, and the implications for ASEAN if it did join. It has been almost six years now since its official application in 2011.

With its domestic challenges, some questioned Timor-Leste’s aspiration for ASEAN membership, as well as the benefits and costs of membership.  For Timor-Leste’s part, ASEAN membership is hoped to provide access to an established forum where important issues such as security, economic development and integration, and socio-cultural matters can be pursued.

Timor-Leste has indeed come a long way. The nation’s independence came at a high price. Now, the country is gradually moving from fragility to a country that is consolidating and strengthening the necessary foundations of a state. But that is not without obstacles.

In ASEAN’s 50th year, many are hoping that the Philippines will use its chairmanship to accelerate  Timor-Leste’s formal membership to  the regional bloc. Under the theme of “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World” as announced by President Rodrigo Duterte last September 2016 in Laos, it is hoped that ASEAN could live up to its inspiration as a model of greater regional integration when it comes to Timor-Leste.

The longer Timor-Leste’s membership is delayed, it will only reflect negatively on ASEAN’s decision-making process that has often being criticised. It is time to demonstrate ASEAN’s commitment to a region made prosperous through the spirit of cooperation and integration, and most importantly, as a people-centred organisation.

Khoo Ying Hooi (PhD) is Senior Lecturer at the Department of International and Strategic Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Malaysia.

ASEAN Decision Making can be frustrating and self -defeating –Who is holding back Timor Leste’s Membership?


March 11, 2017

ASEAN Decision Making can be frustrating and self-defeating:Who is holding back Timor Leste’s Membership?

by Dr. Khoo Ying Hooi@www.newmandala.org

Image result for Dili

Delay in admitting Timor-Leste as 11 the member  will only reflect negatively on ASEAN’s decision-making process, writes Khoo Ying Hooi.

2017 is a pivotal year for the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) as it celebrates its 50 years since its founding. Among the puzzles that need to be solved is whether Timor Leste will be formally accepted as the regional bloc’s 11th member.

As the newest country in Southeast Asia, Timor Leste and its place in the region is often overlooked.

Timor-Leste is vulnerable not only as a small and relatively young state. The fact that it has suffered an Indonesian occupation that destroyed its economy and infrastructure prior to the restoration of independence in May 2002, means it faces various post-conflict challenges, including having its voice heard in regional and international forums.

Timor-Leste expressed its desire to be part of ASEAN right after the restoration of independence in 2002. In July 2005, it became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and it signed the ASEAN Treaty on Amity and Cooperation in 2007. As outlined in its Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, Timor-Leste’s aspiration to join ASEAN is based on geographical location, the wishes of the country’s leaders and people, and its cultural affinity with its neighbours.

Timor-Leste officially applied for ASEAN membership in March 2011 during Indonesia’s chairmanship after a number of years of ASEAN observer status. An ASEAN Coordinating Council Working Group (ACCWG) was then set up and tasked to assess Timor-Leste’s readiness to be part of the regional grouping, and the implications for ASEAN if it did join. It has been almost six years now since its official application in 2011.

With its domestic challenges, some questioned Timor-Leste’s aspiration for ASEAN membership, as well as the benefits and costs of joining.  For Timor-Leste’s part, ASEAN membership is hoped to provide access to an established forum where important issues such as security, economic development and integration, and socio-cultural matters can be pursued.

Timor-Leste has indeed come a long way. The nation’s independence came at a high price. Now, the country is gradually moving from fragility to a country that is consolidating and strengthening the necessary foundations of a state. But that is not without obstacles.

In ASEAN’s 50th year, many are hoping that the Philippines will use its chairmanship to accelerate  Timor-Leste’s formal membership to  the regional bloc. Under the theme of “Partnering for Change, Engaging the World” as announced by President Rodrigo Duterte last September 2016 in Laos, it is hope that ASEAN could live up to its inspiration as a model of greater regional integration when it comes to Timor-Leste.

Timor-Leste has done everything it can to be part of ASEAN. Now, the question is not what Timor-Leste will have to accomplish to be accepted formally as ASEAN’s 11th Member State. The test now lies with ASEAN leaders, and whether they can live up to the ASEAN aspiration as lauded in the ASEAN Community.

The longer Timor-Leste’s membership is delayed will only reflect negatively on ASEAN’s decision-making process that has often being criticised. It is time to demonstrate ASEAN’s commitment to a region made prosperous through the spirit of cooperation and integration and most importantly, a people-centred organisation.

Khoo Ying Hooi (PhD) is Senior Lecturer at the Department of International and Strategic Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya, Malaysia.

 

Timor-Leste’s win against Goliath Oz


January 12, 2017

Timor-Leste’s win against Goliath Oz

by M. VeeraPandiyan@www.thestar.com.my

Image result for Dili Bay

Cristo Rei of Dili is a statue that depicts Jesus Christ on top of a globe, and is located in the capital city of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

The idyllic beauty of Timor Leste

A treaty that is unfair to one of South-East Asia’s poorest countries will be repealed to enable it to redraw a more realistic border with Australia.

I WAS in a village in Jakarta, Indonesia over the weekend and I was smeared by all and sundry.

This was a “smear campaign” of the joyous kind, though, held annually to mark the start of the year in Kg Tugu, near the port of Tanjung Priok.

The ritual is called Mandi Mandi but the water is only used to mix a beige talcum powder into a paste, which is then smudged on the faces of everyone, symbolising forgiveness in an atmosphere of fun.

The charming hamlet is the home of the descendants of slaves brought to Batavia (the old name for Jakarta) after the Portuguese lost Malacca to the Dutch in 1641. In later years, they were joined by others from the Moluccas, Celebes, Flores, West Timor and parts of India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines.

Now referred to as Keluarga besar Tugu (Big family of Tugu), they were once known as Mardjikers, a corruption of the Sanskrit Maharddhika meaning “prosperous”, which acquired the meaning of a free person in the region. The word Merdeka (independence), used in Malay and Bahasa Indonesia, can be traced to mardjiker.

In 1653, the original group of former slaves were offered freedom on the condition that they changed their faith from Catholic to Protestant. Eight years later, 150 people from 23 families were given a place to settle down.

Kg Tugu was then a harsh swathe of forests and mosquito-ridden swamps and many died from malaria. However, the community survived despite the odds and have kept part of their culture, traditions and music alive over the centuries.

Image result for Xanana Gusmao,

At the Mandi Mandi festival, the surprise presence of Xanana Gusmao, 71, the former guerrilla leader who led Timor-Leste to independence from Indonesia on May 20, 2002, made it a truly special event.

Yuk ke Atambua, Intip Pesona Wisata di Perbatasan RI-Timor Leste
Timor-Leste’s first President until 2007 served as Prime Minister for more than seven years before stepping down in 2015. He is currently Minister of Planning and Strategic Investment, a role overseeing the country’s quest for a better deal for its oil and gas resources from its bigger and richer southern neighbour, Australia.

East Timor was a colony of Portugal until it first declared independence in late 1975, only to be invaded and occupied by Indonesia until a UN-backed referendum in 1999 paved the way for independence three years later.

When I last met him in Malacca in June 2016, Gusmao was in the midst of resolving a bitter dispute over Timor-Leste’s maritime border with Australia through the United Nation’s 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

UNCLOS gives all coastal states the right to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from the sea surface to under the seabed.

Australia signed the convention in 1994 but in March 2002, two months before Timor-Leste’s independence, it pulled out of compulsory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals on matters relating to maritime boundaries. In 2006, East Timor and Australia signed a treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) but no permanent border was set.

Under the original pact, Timor-Leste received 90% of current oil revenues from the joint petroleum development area, and Australia 10%, but the further Sunrise IUA treaty gives Timor-Leste only limited claim over future exploitation of the larger Greater Sunrise field.

It prevented any negotiations on boundaries for 50 years, although the line should rightly sit halfway between the countries, placing most of the oil and gas in Timor-Leste’s territory.

In December 2013, Australian police and Security Intelligence Organisation officers seized files and computers from a lawyer advising Timor-Leste in the dispute over CMATS.

The lawyer, a former Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) agent, was reported to have prepared documents exposing Australian espionage to secure advantage for the country during negotiations for CMATS in 2004. His passport was cancelled, preventing him from travelling to The Hague, where the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) was due to hear an application to cancel the treaty.

The ASIS agents, who pretended to be aid workers, bugged the walls of an office where ministers met, gaining information that gave Australia advantage in the negotiations before the treaty was signed against an impoverished and vulnerable neighbour.

Gusmao described the raids as “unconscionable and unacceptable conduct” and when Australia refused to return the documents, Timor-Leste filed for a hearing at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

The episode sullied Australia’s “fair go” reputation and in September last year, the PCA agreed to take up the dispute.

On Saturday, before Gusmao’s face was smeared and he went around smearing others, he told me that things were going well and to expect a good announcement soon.

And on Monday, reports revealed that Australia had to eat humble pie. A joint statement from both countries said CMATS would no longer apply after three months.

“The Government of Australia has taken note of this wish and recognises that Timor-Leste has the right to initiate the termination of the treaty,” the statement read.

For now, it means Timor-Leste has won another “David vs Goliath” battle and the situation will revert to the 2002 treaty which set up the joint petroleum development area.

Media Consultant M. Veera Pandiyan