The Intellectual Journal of Trumpism Is Born

March 11, 2017

The Intellectual Journal of Trumpism Is Born

by Jonah Goldberg
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Can a new magazine launched to defend Trump take ideas seriously? Our former colleague Eliana Johnson has a short profile of the guy launching American Affairs, the forthcoming intellectual journal of Trumpism, rising Phoenix-like from the ashes of the Journal of American Greatness.

A 30-year-old conservative wunderkind is out to intellectualize Trumpism, the amorphous ideology that lifted its namesake to the presidency in November. Until recently, the idea itself was an oxymoron, since Trumpism has consisted in large part of the President-elect’s ruthless evisceration of the country’s intellectual elite. But next month, Julius Krein, a 2008 Harvard graduate who has spent most of his admittedly short career in finance, is launching a journal of public policy and political philosophy with an eye toward laying the intellectual foundation for the Trump movement. If his nerdy swagger is any indication, he has big ambitions: He noted wryly that he is — “coincidentally” — the same age that William F. Buckley Jr. was six decades ago when he founded National Review, the magazine that became the flagship of the conservative movement. No offense to Krein, but he should keep the comparisons to Bill Buckley to a minimum. No one wins from such comparisons (except Buckley), and raising expectations you can’t meet strikes me as a bad idea. But other than that, I’m glad someone is doing this.

The conservative movement needs more idea-development, not less. I agree with Yuval Levin, who tells Johnson, “Not nearly enough of that is happening around the changes we’ve seen in this election.” Also, a thing like “Trumpism” deserves an intellectual effort to define it in non-pejorative terms. That said, I’m skeptical of some of Krein’s larger ambitions. Johnson reports that American Affairs will “launch in both a print and digital version, and a substantial portion of the funding will come from Krein himself. He said donors to traditional conservative institutions have been ’surprisingly’ receptive to his pitch, though he declined to name the additional contributors.” How receptive could the donors be if the editor is largely self-funding?

But that’s nitpicking. Krein also said, “We hope not only to encourage a rethinking of the theoretical foundations of ‘conservatism’ but also to promote a broader realignment of American politics.” That’s a pretty tall order for a hedge-fund guy in his spare time. It’s even harder when Donald Trump is your lodestar. I’m quoted in the piece: “It will take a good deal of time for even Trump’s most gifted apologists to craft an intellectually or ideologically coherent theme or narrative to his program,” said Jonah Goldberg, a senior editor of National Review.

“Trump boasts that he wants to be unpredictable and insists that he will make all decisions on a case-by-case basis. That’s a hard approach for an intellectual journal to defend in every particular.” My point there is you beat ideas with ideas. You can challenge the “theoretical foundations of ‘conservatism’” (perhaps starting with an explanation for why you put it in scare quotes) or you can defend a theoretical program. Unless you’re just going to defend Pragmatism and/or the instinctual, infallible, wisdom of Donald Trump in all cases, you’ll either need your own theory of the case or you’ll need to allow for writers willing to criticize Trump outright.

There’s nothing wrong with that, except American Affairs is being launched to defend Trump and Trumpism. If Krein isn’t willing to tolerate serious criticism of Trump in furtherance of Trumpism, then he should skip the journal and go work directly for Sean Spicer. If he does allow criticism, (a) good for him and (b) he should be prepared for his pro-Trump journal to be denounced by Trump himself. While I am perfectly comfortable saying that Krein is no William F. Buckley — because no one is — I would note that great magazines and journals are often born out of such chaos and internal contradictions.

Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell founded The Public Interest (which was more of an inspiration for neoconservatives than was The National Interest, contrary to what Eliana wrote). But they had some pretty profound disagreements, causing Bell to walk away early on. Irving Kristol solved these, and similar, problems by making the PI a magazine for writers, not editors.

At National Review we had an even more stormy beginning, with libertarians, Machiavellians, Ultramontane Catholics, Straussian philosophers, social conservatives of every flavor, and a wide variety of ex-Communists squabbling and debating everything under the sun. The creative tension was invaluable in forming the foundation of modern conservatism. Bill Buckley made it work through sheer force of personality. We didn’t have a fan in the Oval Office until Ronald Reagan. Great magazines and journals are often born out of chaos and internal contradictions.

The New Republic (now a pale shadow of its former self) was always at its best when it was at war with itself. I grew up on it in the 1980s, when many of the editors hated one another’s guts and fought over Reagan, the Contras, etc. The magazine’s early years were even more chaotic. The New Republic was founded, according to Walter Lippmann (a one-time New Republic staffer as well as an aide to Woodrow Wilson), “to explore and develop and apply the ideas which had been advertised by Theodore Roosevelt when he was the leader of the Progressive party.”

Pretty much TR was to The New Republic as Trump is to American Affairs. But when Wilson was elected, and started leading us to war, The New Republic was all over the map because of disagreements among the editors. Eventually, their old ideological hero Teddy Roosevelt charged into the offices of The New Republic like a Bull Moose to chew them out for their disloyalty. Realizing he couldn’t set them straight, TR shouted that the magazine was “a negligible sheet, run by two anemic Gentiles and two uncircumcised Jews.” If Trump tweets something like that at Krein & Co., he’ll know he’s on his way to “greatness.”

— Jonah Goldberg is a senior editor of National Review.



NY Times Book Review: Jesus Christ in Islam

March 4, 2017

NY Times Book Review

Recommended Read:  Jesus Christ in Islam

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Jesus in Islam

Mehdi Hasan

Muslims don’t worship Jesus, but they do revere him and believe about him much that Christians do.

So you’re telling me you believe in Jesus, as well as Muhammad?” I remember the perplexed look on my Christian friend’s face a few years ago. I had dropped a theological bombshell on him in revealing that Jesus was considered by Muslims to be a prophet of God.

“Not only do we believe in Jesus,” I replied, pausing for maximum dramatic effect, “we also believe in the Virgin Birth.” My friend’s eyes widened with surprise, his mouth agape.

Christians, perhaps because they call themselves Christians and believe in Christianity, like to claim ownership of Christ. It thus comes as a huge surprise to many of them – my friend included – to discover that the world’s second-largest faith, Islam, also stakes a claim to him.

Jesus, or Isa, as he is known in Arabic, is deemed by Islam to be a Muslim prophet rather than the Son of God, or God incarnate. He is referred to by name in as many as 25 different verses of the Quran and described as the “Word” and the “Spirit” of God. No other prophet in the Quran, not even Muhammad, is given this particular honour.

In fact, Islam reveres both Jesus and his mother, Mary (Joseph appears nowhere in the Islamic narrative of Christ’s birth). “Unlike the canonical Gospels, the Quran tilts backward to his miraculous birth rather than forward to his Passion,” writes Professor Tarif Khalidi, in his fascinating book The Muslim Jesus. “This is why he is often referred to as ‘the son of Mary’ and why he and his mother frequently appear together.” In fact, Mary, or Maryam, as she is known in the Quran, is considered by Muslims to hold the most exalted spiritual position among women. She is the only woman mentioned by name in Islam’s holy book and a chapter of the Quran is named after her.

But the real significance of Mary is that Islam also considers her a virgin and endorses the Christian concept of the Virgin Birth. “She was the chosen woman, chosen to give birth to Jesus, without a husband,” says Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra, an imam in Leicester and assistant secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain.

For Muslims, however, the Virgin Birth is not evidence of Jesus’s divinity, only of his unique importance as a prophet and a messiah. The Trinity is rejected by Islam, as is Jesus’s Crucifixion and Resurrection. The Quran castigates Christianity for the widespread practice among its sects of deifying Jesus (and Mary), and casts the criticism in the form of an interrogation of Jesus by God:

And when Allah saith: O Jesus, son of Mary! Didst thou say unto mankind: Take me and my mother for two gods beside Allah? he saith: Be glorified! It was not mine to utter that to which I had no right. If I used to say it, then Thou knewest it

Muslims cherish and venerate Jesus the prophet – but, I often wonder, are we paying only lip-service to his life and legacy? Where, for example, is the Islamic equivalent of Christmas? Why do Muslims celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad but not that of the Prophet Jesus? “We, too, in our own way should celebrate the birth of Jesus … [because] he is so special to us,” says Mogra.

In recent years, the right-wing press in Britain has railed against alleged attempts by “politically correct” local authorities to downplay or even suppress Christmas. Birmingham’s attempt to name its seasonal celebrations “Winterval” and Luton’s Harry Potter-themed lights, or “Luminos”, are notorious examples. There is often a sense that such decisions are driven by the fear that outward displays of Christian faith might offend British Muslim sensibilities, but, given the importance of Jesus in Islam, such fears are misplaced and counter-productive. Mogra, who leads the MCB’s interfaith relations committee, concurs: “It’s a ridiculous suggestion to change the name of Christmas.” He adds: “Britain is great when it comes to celebrating diverse religious festivals of our various faith communities. They should remain named as they are, and we should celebrate them all.”

Amid tensions between the Christian west and the Islamic east, I believe a common focus on Jesus could help close the growing divide between the world’s two largest faiths. Others agree. “We don’t have to fight over Jesus. He is special for Christians and Muslims,” says Mogra. “He is bigger than life. We can share him.”

Cold War Freud and Freud: An Intellectual Biography review – the Politics of Psychoanalysis

March 2, 2017

Cold War Freud and Freud: An Intellectual Biography review – the Politics of Psychoanalysis

A pair of rich, illuminating studies epitomise a new wave of thinking about the Freud wars and the history of analysis

Still many strands to pursue … Sigmund Freud.
Photograph: Bettmann Archive

If Freud, as Auden wrote in his 1939 elegy, is “a whole climate of opinion / under whom we conduct our different lives”, then it would be fair to say that the local weather patterns around him shift from temptestuous to clement with uncanny regularity. Geography inevitably plays into the picture.

There are actually only two (relative) constants in the diffusion of Freud’s invention, psychoanalysis, from 1906 on. One is the acceptance of the fact that each of us has an unconscious life: parts of ourselves that are hidden from our own view inform dreams, and shape unwitting remarks and behaviour. The second is the talk and listening technology of two people – the free-associating patient and the analyst engaged in an intimate therapeutic conversation. The rest of the huge and often subtle panoply of Freud’s ideas, developed and revised over a lifetime of practice and writing, has been – and is – up for grabs.

There is a wealth of material to pick over. From Freud’s first book, On Aphasia, published when he was 35, to his last, Moses and Monotheism, written just before his death at 83, there are 23 volumes of the standard edition, not to mention many thick tomes of reflective and revealing letters to his fiancee (then wife), Martha, and to friends and colleagues, plus proceedings of international psychoanalytic meetings. Followers, interpreters, critics and bashers, reinventors and film-makers, slipper and watch manufacturers, in America, India, China, Europe, Africa and Latin America, can thus dispute, develop or make jokes about everything from the importance of the sex drive or libido to the dynamics of memory and repression; the relations between ego, id and superego; identification; therapeutic practice; cultural liberation and much more, including, of course, Freud’s own integrity – his scientific and medical status.

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As Dagmar Herzog, an eminent historian of religion, gender and sexuality, points out in the introduction to her excellent Cold War Freud, the derestriction of the now fully digitised Sigmund Freud Archives in the Library of Congress from 2000 on has ushered in a new era in Freud studies, one rich in contextual detail. Joel Whitebook’s illuminating intellectual biography is part of this fresh and buoyant wave of thinking.

It marks a welcome change from the bile of the Freud wars, that wholesale attack during the last two decades of the 20th century on Freud’s reputation and work (or what might lurk under his capacious mantle). In the US, the virulence of the assault was undoubtedly linked to the postwar centrality of psychoanalysis in both popular and medical culture, where it formed part of psychiatric training until the roll out of drug therapies from the 70s on.

Herzog shows with telling detail how the variety of psychoanalysis that was developed in the US after the second world war had little in common with Freud’s initial project. A wholesale flight from sexuality and an insistence on conservative conformity within the patriotic family dominated many analysts’ repertoire. The sign of “cure” for the ego psychologists became an individual’s ability to control her impulses and adapt to reality. What was understood by “reality” was delimited by the norms of the 50s. The analyst’s task was to work through internal conflicts with the patient, never bringing in shaping social or political conditions. Even analysts for whom Freud’s libidinal emphases were in play sent women back to sterile marriages and worse. Convention ruled, undeterred by the famous emigres from the Frankfurt School who married Freud to social critique and had started publishing in the US.

Herzog brings fascinating documents to bear to show how US psychoanalysts formed alliances with Christian clergy who themselves wanted treatment. In 1952, Pope Pius XII even granted his imprimatur to analysis – as long as it didn’t arouse too many sexual appetites. It was against this cold war analytic ethos that the women’s movement reacted so vociferously, often blaming Freud for a practice that wasn’t his.

Homosexuality was a highly fraught arena, judged by the analysts to be a perverse condition that could be successfully treated. Freud himself had hypothesised that everyone was bisexual and could experience homoerotic feelings and fantasies. He often enough noted them in himself. Not so the US cold war analysts, who also condemned the Kinsey Reports with their challenges to the accepted face of monogamous heterosexual marriage. Herzog meticulously charts the long campaign to eradicate homophobia from American psychoanalytic ranks. Though individual analysts, such as the pioneering Robert Stoller, had long stood against the general trend, it wasn’t until 1991 that the American Psychoanalytic Association officially allowed openly gay practitioners.

Like an anthropologist engaged in fieldwork, Herzog moves from site to site to give us a textured understanding of complex historical matter. She zeroes in on German psychoanalysis, where the naturalising of aggression served to exonerate a troubled postwar nation in which Nazis were still everywhere. She scrutinises the politically radical post-68 Anti-Oedipe by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, grounding the book and its huge impact in its times, and stressing that it initiates a conceptual shift in how to think about the interrelation between psyche and politics.

Herzog also focuses in on the ascent of trauma theory or PTSD – post-traumatic stress disorder. During the 50s, when postwar reparations were being sought from Germany, it was disputed that the camps could have long-term psychic as well as physical damage on individual survivors, particularly since psychic damage seemed only to manifest itself after the event. A large dose of antisemitism was at work in these deliberations. Only with the Vietnam war (and the work of NGOs with torture survivors) did PTSD become a recognised mental disorder.

Whitebook argues that Freud was never able fully to explore the unruly, pre-linguistic, pre-Oedipal maternal sphere

Whitebook’s Freud is an elegant foray into the man and his mind by a philosopher who is also a psychoanalyst. Freud was notoriously suspicious of biographers (as Adam Phillips’ recent anti-biography of the young Freud stressed). Perhaps he intuited that, once he had given us something of a Proustian autobiography in The Interpretation of Dreams, the very readings his own work prompted would be turned back on himself. Whitebook is both questioning and respectful. He is also shaped by present intellectual currents, so a discomfort with enlightenment universals and an alertness to gender underpin this book far more than they did, say, Peter Gay’s classic Freud: A Life for Our Time or Ernest Jones’s first enthusiastic portrayal of the Freud who was his friend and mentor.

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Whitebook persuasively positions Freud as a thinker of the dark enlightenment, “a deeper, conflicted, disconsolate, and even tragic yet still emancipatory tradition within the broader movement of the enlightenment”. Freud understood the forces of the counter-enlightenment, the pull of the irrational, the sway of belief, and integrated all this into his vision. Whitebook’s Freud broke with his own Jewish tradition to forge an identity as a secular and sceptical scientist, but was alert to the shaping distortions of the passions he so skilfully reinterpreted. He offers new insight into Freud’s move away from philosophy to science and medicine, and gives a gripping and even-handed rendition of Freud’s homoerotic yet thoroughly intellectual friendships with the zany but charismatic Berlin doctor Wilhelm Fliess and later with Carl Gustav Jung.

My only reservation with Whitebook’s account is his attributing a modish traumatic significance to Freud’s early family life. He speculates that Freud was traumatised by the oddness of his relations with his mother, Amalia. He was her first, idealised son, but in the aftermath of her next son’s early death, she purportedly developed depression, leaving little Ziggy to the whims of his Catholic nanny. Amalia was a generation younger than Freud’s father, which also meant that one of Freud’s nephews was a little older than him. As a result of this family constellation, Whitebook argues, Freud was never able fully to explore and theorise the unruly, pre-linguistic, pre-Oedipal maternal sphere. Mothers are far less central to Freud’s thinking than fathers. But as a child of the second half of the 19th century, Freud’s early experience was historically hardly uncommon. The powers of patriarchy may have had as much to do with the “Missing Mother” in his work (a figure also important in much Victorian literature) as his own intra-psychic state. In later life, partly under the influence of female analysts, he began thinking about the pre-Oedipal far more.

That said, Whitebook’s is a rich and illuminating intellectual biography, and like Herzog’s Cold War Freud kindles new thought. Together, the books signal that there are still many areas to pursue in the field Freud sparked. The Freudian weather currently feels clement.

Lisa Appignanesi is the author of Mad, Bad and Sad: A History of Women and the Mind Doctors, and, with the late John Forrester, of Fre

Jeffery Sachs on his new book, Building the New American Economy

February 27, 2017

Jeffery Sachs on his new book, Building the New American Economy–Smart, Fair, & Sustainable


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Money is politics is a serious problem in America today–Jeffery Sachs

Professor Jeffery Sachs discusses his new book, Building the New American Economy– Smart, Fair, & Sustainable. I agree with this Columbia University don that America needs a make over by a progressive President like a President Bernie Sanders. Unfortunately, Americans have to learn to live with a Republican President Donald J. Trump and a Republican controlled  House of Representatives and the Senate. To these politicians, sustainable development is a Grecian nightmare.

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Trust (s0cial capital) is diminishing in the Land of the Free and Home of the Brave. The last decade has been 10 years of greed and widening income inequality in American polity. Politics ought to return to the politics of IDEAS, says Sachs. Listen him and decide what you think of his book.  –Din Merican

Don’t be discouraged. Just click and you can watch it directly on

Book Review : The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper

February 26, 2017

Book Review:

The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper by Herbert  Keuth

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Herbert Keuth, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 384pp, $28.99 (pbk), ISBN 0521548306.

Reviewed by Robert Nola, , University of Auckland

This book is one of the best introductory accounts of Popper’s philosophy and is to be recommended. It is wide-ranging, covering, in its three parts, Popper’s philosophy of science, his social philosophy, and his metaphysics. The summaries of Popper’s positions are clear and succinct; relevant critical points raised by others as well as the author are injected appropriately into the discussion. The book reveals that Popper’s philosophical concerns are broader than most other twentieth-century philosophers, whatever the critical response may be to his various doctrines in all these fields. In twentieth-century English philosophy perhaps only the concerns of Bertrand Russell surpass those of Popper in their scope.

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Part I, which is about half the book, is devoted to Popper’s methodology of science beginning with his anti-inductivism and then moving to his views on demarcation, methodological rules for science, the empirical basis of science, corroboration, truth and verisimilitude, the nature of theories, and finally his account of probability. Here some technicalities are unavoidable, but they are minimal and can be managed by most readers.

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Image result for karl popper open society quotes

Part II deals with Popper’s views on method in the social sciences and a number of themes drawn from The Open Society and it Enemies. Here Keuth reviews Popper’s views on Plato, Hegel, Marx, and his critique of the sociology of knowledge and his theory of democracy. There is a brief discussion of Popper’s role in the “positivist dispute” and his interaction with other philosophers such as Horkheimer and Habermas. Part III considers Popper’s metaphysical views concerning natural necessity, determinism, indeterminism, propensity, mind-body interaction, the doctrine of Worlds 1, 2 and 3, evolution, and the self.

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The book does not get mired in the controversies between Popper and his contemporaries, from some of the logical positivists to his erstwhile colleagues or pupils. Nor does it cover some of the later Popper, especially those writings which have appeared posthumously in English but which were sometimes available earlier in German. For example, it does not delve into Popper’s later work on the Presocratics. Keuth maintains that while Popper has many considerable achievements to his credit there are also some failures, especially in his late work. He makes a useful comparison with Kant whose claims about “transcendental knowledge” were known to be untenable even before Kant wrote on them. But just as Kant was an important influence in the Enlightenment, so Popper’s critical rationalism is part of the twentieth-century continuation of that tradition. For German-speaking Europeans, given their philosophical and political history since the time of Kant, the role of philosophers like Popper in the general intellectual culture is very important, a fact not often appreciated by those outside Germany and Austria.

Part I on Popper’s philosophy of science opens with a discussion of Popper’s first big manuscript Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie, only first published in German in 1979 but still not available in English. The two fundamental problems are what Popper calls ‘Hume’s problem’, the problem of induction, and ‘Kant’s problem’, the problem of demarcation. These are pervasive themes in Popper’s subsequent work which Keuth sets in context. Only the most diehard Popperians now adopt his anti-inductivism in all its aspects. But what of demarcation? This too has fallen on hard times, but perhaps not with equally good reason. Though papers like Laudan’s ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’ are not mentioned, there are materials in Keuth’s discussion of demarcation that show how the idea might at least be partially rehabilitated. Objections due to Kuhn, Kneale, and Grover Maxwell along with the “tacking paradox” (viz., if T is falsifiable them so is (T&X) where X is any arbitrary conjunct) are outlined, and ways around these objections are suggested. If no bright red demarcation line is to be drawn (perhaps never Popper’s intention) then at least a distinction can be drawn on the grounds that scientific theories must at least be brought into relation with the stream of actual observations of the world, however minimal that relation may be; in contrast, for other intellectual endeavours (logic, mathematics or metaphysics), no such relationship need be required.

As well as the logico-epistemological demarcation criterion that Popper proposes as part of his epistemology of science, there are also a number of methodological rules that spell out more fully other aspects of his “definition” of science. This includes a rule which bids us to adopt his demarcation criterion as part of the goal of science. This in turn realises a further goal, that of the maximization of the openness of science to revision by test against observation. This is a distinctive feature of science which the young Popper recognised when it abandoned one of its best-established theories, Newtonian mechanics. But Popper’s conception of science is not just the demarcation criterion; it is also to be understood as an activity bound by a further range of rules. A conception of pseudo-science then arises; these are systems of belief that do not evolve in accordance with the rules. Keuth lists at least twelve such rules in chapters 3 and 5. Oddly enough some of these rules are not given rule-like formulations by Popper (for example R1 and R5 cited in section 3.3); but these can be expressed as rules without too much difficulty.

Keuth comments that some of the rules are fairly trivial and can be readily accepted as definitive of science, but some other rules are problematic. For example, Popper’s anti-ad hoc Rule (given as R8) attempts to express an initially plausible stricture against certain modifications of our theories in the face of counter-evidence. Often Popper treats such rules as rigid categorical imperatives rather than the defeasible principles they really are. However it is their expression in terms of increasing degree of falsifiability, or of testability, that raises problems. The requirement is that any modifications to a theory ought always to increase its degree of falsifiability. However, the problem here is that it is hard to find measures of degrees of falsifiability on the basis of which one can compare a theory before and after modification. Keuth also argues that there are some auxiliary statements that we might alter to save a theory but these need not always be those which are conjoined to a theory to yield testable consequences.

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Sir Karl Raimund Popper

A commonly cited obstacle to Popperian falsification is said to be the Quine-Duhem thesis in one or other of its several forms. This is something which, as Keuth points out, Popper recognised in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (section 18) when he confessed that we falsify a whole system and that no single statement is upset by the falsification. Popper seems to pay little further attention to the problem of how falsification, or even corroboration for that matter, may arise by piercing through any surrounding accompanying statements, to target a hypothesis under test. However there is one out-of-the-way place where Popper does acknowledge Duhem’s problem and suggests a solution, The Poverty of Historicism section 29, the end of footnote 2. Keuth does make some moves that are similar to Popper’s suggestion; but it would have been useful to have had Keuth’s commentary on Popper’s explicit proposal, which has initial plausibility, viz., that we can construct a version of a “crucial experiment” and comparatively test two whole systems, one with and the other without some given hypothesis which is under test. (Glymour 1980 p. 34 has one negative response to this ploy.) Independently of Popper’s problem with the Duhem-Quine thesis, that very thesis has come under criticism by Bayesians who argue that testing of target hypotheses is possible despite their being embedded in auxiliary hypotheses, thus freeing theories for Popperian falsification, but in an un-Popperian manner.

Keuth also considers Popper’s falsificationism in relation to Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ and the view, which flows from the rejection of the dogmas, that ”the boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science is blurred” (p. 79) If correct, this would pose a challenge to Popper’s demarcation criterion in that all our systems of belief form a seamless web without the possibility of even a somewhat dull red demarcation line being drawn. One dogma is the view that there is a difference between analytic and synthetic statements; the other that there is a reduction of each meaningful statement to a construction out of terms which refer to immediate experience. Popper would concur with the rejection of the second dogma but perhaps reject the inference from this to the claim that the unit of significance is the whole of science (as Quine claims). It turns out that Quine is not just a holist about meaning (a matter which Popper makes clear is not one of his concerns) but also a holist with respect to the way in which the whole of science gets positive or negative support. In part this takes us back to the credentials of the Quine-Duhem thesis and theories of confirmation and disconfirmation. Keuth focuses on the first dogma and argues that since we can establish logical truths and propose definitions, there are aspects of each scientific theory in which something akin to the analytic/synthetic distinction is not only possible but appropriate. Once this is spelled out in the context of a given theory, then there are grounds for distinguishing such logical truths and definitions from other aspects of a theory which, still taken as a whole, can then be open to test; and if this is so, something akin to demarcation is also appropriate.

In Chapter 6 Keuth traces Popper’s views on truth from his initial position, expressed in The Logic of Discovery, that it is possible to do without the concepts of truth and falsity, to his later position in which he adopts Tarski’s theory of truth. But Popper’s account of truth embraces more than the set of bare equivalences given by the various Tarskian (T) schemas ‘X’ is true iff p (where ‘p’ is a sentence and ‘X’ is a name of the sentence), which constitute an adequacy condition imposed on any theory of truth. Rather, Popper understands Tarski to have embraced a correspondence theory of truth in which the Correspondence schema (CT) holds: ‘X’ is true iff X corresponds to the facts. Keuth’s treatment of Popper’s account of truth is instructive and shows that Popper’s version of his ‘Tarskian turn’ is in fact down a wrong, even blind, alley. His diagnosis is that Popper’s commitment to a realist understanding of truth, especially the truth of the statements of our theories, has taken him in this direction; but, as Keuth points out, it is possible to have a realist understanding of the truth of such statements without the correspondence theory of truth.

In the following chapter 7 Keuth reviews the role of truth as a regulative principle in Popper’s philosophy of science and his development of the idea of verisimilitude as a further articulation of that ideal. He also traces the development of Popper’s more formal treatment of verisimilitude in terms of the comparison of the truth and falsity contents of statements. As is well known, these attempts ended in a spectacular failure, which Keuth sets out. Not explored, and appropriately so in a book just confined to Popper, is the ongoing research programme that this failure stimulated which, with the successes it has had, does keep alive aspects of Popper’s important initial insight.

In Part I Keuth has further useful suggestions to make about Popper’s rather decisionist and conventionalist view of the acceptance of basic statements which we use to criticise our theories — a difficulty which many have raised about the rationality of Popper’s whole falsificationist approach. He also discusses the development of Popper’s ideas of probability. And he has a useful chapter on the development of Popper’s idea of positive support, that is, corroboration, and whether or not corroboration can avoid any aspect of inductivism. Keuth finds fault with Popper’s more formal attempt at a definition of corroboration. Even though corroboration is not obviously a probability, it is defined in terms of probabilities, including prior probabilities which, notoriously, are hard to define and so render any quantitative definition useless. However Keuth does defend the view, against many others, that corroboration does not need any associated principle of induction. When it comes to a choice of one of a set of theories as to the correctness, say, tomorrow, of their explanations, predictions, or technological applications, we choose that theory, T, which is the best corroborated up until today. Against the claim of many that there is an inductive step involved here, Keuth argues that no inductive principle is needed. All we need assume is that theory T is true; if T is subsequently falsified then our assumption was false. Induction is not needed, and we can get by without it. But the claim that it is not needed is not convincing. There does appear to be an element of induction in our keeping T on tomorrow, and the day after, when it does not succumb to falsification.

Most of this review has focused on Keuth’s account of Popper’s philosophy of science. Whatever shortcomings Popper’s view may have, it, or a revised version of it, has been influential in providing a critique of theories of society. This critique Popper began in his The Poverty of Historicism and his The Open Society and its Enemies. Popper claims that many historicists such as Marx and Marxists, and also many sociologists of knowledge, have a faulty understanding of the nature of science and its methods. Once they have a richer account of those methods, the bottom falls out of many of their arguments about the separate nature of the social sciences. This, amongst others, is a theme that appears in Part II of Keuth’s book; it can be extended to objections concerning an alleged misplaced scientism advocated in the writings of members of the Frankfurt School, such as Horkheimer and Habermas. Keuth’s book is not only a useful account of Popper’s views on science, along with promising revisions of these views; it is also a useful prophylactic when applied to some sciences, especially the social sciences. Keuth’s treatment of these issues in Part II, and the metaphysical issues in Part III not mentioned here, continue the standard found in Part I. Taken together they provide a fully rounded and fair assessment of Popper’s philosophy and its continuing interest.


Glymour, C (1980) Theory and Evidence, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press.