Sabah and Sarawak: Give Us Our Freedom and our Rights Back

September 2018

Sabah and Sarawak: Give Our Freedom and our Rights Back

by Dr. Lim Teck Ghee

Be Forewarned–Cry Freedom

The recent announcement by Tun Dr. Mahathir that the Pakatan Government is committed to returning Sabah and Sarawak their rightful status as equal partners in the federation can be seen in two ways.

If this announcement made in the Prime Minister’s first address to Sabahans since the new government came to power is a sincere commitment and quickly implemented in the key areas of concern in which the two East Malaysian states have had their status and rights undermined and their legitimate needs neglected, then it can help open a more amicable, less contentious and more stable chapter in the nation’s history and development.

However, if it is another political wayang speech aimed at generating a feel good response in the local population, it will reinforce the skepticism and cynicism that the Bornean states will still be treated as “stepchildren” by the new Pakatan government and that nothing will come out from Pakatan’s election manifesto promise of returning the status of the two states according to the Malaysia Agreement of 1963 even after many more than 100 days of the new government has elapsed. Don’t open the flood gates of discontent and nationalism.

If the latter is the case and/or if the process of the return of local rights and autonomy is delayed by foot dragging or deflected by the politics of disruption and divide and rule as practised by the Barisan Nasional government since the establishment of Malaysia  in 1963, we should not expect a meek or restrained response from an awakened and politicized younger generation of East Malaysians.

Rather, watch out for heightened political resistance from the East Malaysian states which may put the entire Malaysia enterprise in jeopardy.

What is Equal Partnership?

The call for an equal partnership of the three component parts of Malaysia is not simply about a greater share of cabinet minister-ships for the politicians of Sabah or Sarawak or a greater share of oil royalties or better roads. It is also not about just mobilizing a two thirds majority in Parliament to support amendments in the Federal constitution for Sabah and Sarawak to be equal partners in the Federation with the process ending there. Or providing East Malaysians the solitary carrot of a Deputy Prime Minister.

It covers a much larger and complex spectrum of perceived injustices, discriminatory treatment and broken promises endured by the two states especially during the past 30 years.

According to pro-equal status activists, key grouses include the following:

• disproportionally meager returns from the two states’ oil and gas resources

• de-secularisation and creeping Islamisation

• internal colonization by the federal civil service establishment which has marginalized local Sarawakians and Sabahans in the running of their own states

• Putrajaya’s collaboration with corrupt state leaders which has enriched a small minority and despoiled the environment at the expense of the native communities

• Dr. Mahathir’s infamous “project IC” which resulted in a massive influx of illegal immigrants, their registration as voters in Sabah, and the consequential adverse repercussions on the local citizenry.

• Politically parties from West Malaysia should not allowed to establish branches in Sabah and Sarawak.

It is noteworthy that when the Cobbold Commission set up in 1962  to determine whether the people of North Borneo supported the formation of Malaysia submitted its report, it had deemed necessary to emphasise the following:

“It is a necessary condition that from the outset Malaysia should be regarded by all concerned as an association of partners, combining in the common interests to create a new nation but retaining their own individualities. If any idea were to take root that Malaysia would involve a ‘take-over’ of the Borneo territories by the Federation of Malaya and the submersion of the individualities of North Borneo and Sarawak, Malaysia would not be generally acceptable and successful.”

This concern has now come home to roost. Today we are seeing more than resistance to the loss of local autonomy promised in the initial Malaysia agreement. New local parties that are emerging are not simply seeking the rescinding of the constitutional amendment of 1983 which downgraded both the states from equal status to one of the 13 states of the Federation. They are also pushing for a larger agenda of socio-economic and political change through return of the rights and interests of the states as enshrined in the 20/18-point Agreements, the London Agreements and the Inter-Governmental Reports.

At the same time, less restrained individual and unorganized groups (through the social media) are also now in larger numbers posing the unthinkable and potentially seditious question as to whether the two states are better off independent than to remain in Malaysia.

What will happen next is in Putrajaya’s ball court.We can expect constitutional change to be a slow and protracted process and to possibly take more than a few years to be successful.

Meanwhile issues of local autonomy especially in economy, education and religion resonate strongly among all communities, especially with the more urbanized and highly educated. The sentiment that the two states has been badly treated by Putrajaya is a widely shared one especially among the young who resent what they perceive as the re-colonization of their state by federal officials pushing the Putrajaya line. These issues can and should be corrected immediately.

However, whilst Putrajaya continues with soothing words about the rebalancing of state and federal rights and powers, the actions of various agencies of government indicate that the old regime’s mindset on race and religion as operationalized by key civil service agencies still remains; and the opposition and intolerance to democratic aspiration for equal status and rights has not changed.

The case of the recent arrests and alleged manhandling of young protesters calling for stronger state rights and demanding equal education opportunities, better public transport and job opportunities among 10 demands is a salutary example.

As one of the leaders of the youthful assembly calling itself Pandang Ke Sabah (Look Towards Sabah) rally noted after the police crackdown on the group of protestors:

“It’s the morning of Malaysia Day, for God’s sake and it was really peaceful. We thought now that we are living in the era of Malaysia Baru, we are free to speak our minds.”

More disappointing and shocking was the recent written reply by the Education Ministry in Parliament that the use of English as a medium of instruction in schools in the two states would violate the Federal Constitution, National Language and Education Act. The new Minister of Education must have approved of this contentious and highly questionable ruling.

In response, Sabah’s  deputy chief minister, Datuk Seri Madius Tangau pointed out that the right to use English as a medium of instruction in national schools was in accordance with the Malay­sia Agreement 1963 and was in no way illegal nor an attempt to challenge Bahasa Malaysia,the national language. He also noted that It was not only not unconstitutional, but a right and the way forward.

Sarawakians and Sabahans can expect many similar instances of Putrajaya’s intransigence and inflexibility before they can win back their equal status and rights.

Sabu’s smelling roses compared to those crooked UMNO Ministers

August 5, 2018

Sabu’s smelling roses compared to those crooked UMNO Ministers at Defence Ministry

by Phar Kim Beng@www.malaysiakini.com

Dapper looking Mat Sabu

COMMENT | It is odd that former premier Najib Razak has reportedly called Defence Minister Mohamad Sabu a “joker,” who talks about “fish curry” while on board a warship.

Having lost the 14th general election (GE14) badly on May 9 and is now caught in a legal imbroglio over 1MDB and potentially many “mini 1MDBs,” the last thing Najib wants to be doing is to cast the first proverbial stone in a glass house.

Imagine the shards of glass that will come crashing down. In fact, the cracks are already there to see.

The Defence Ministry has been helmed twice by Najib. No one has had that privilege. Not “King Ghaz,” the late Ghazali Shafie, who is known as a foreign policy maestro.

Not even Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the Seventh Prime Minister, who is known to take the bulls by the horns; as he did when he ripped UMNO and PAS apart in GE-14.

A double stint of Najib, therefore, should have allowed the Defence Ministry to stay clear from any unfortunate controversial issues. Yet, neither tenure did, despite a combined service of some 14 years clocked by Najib.

In fact, when one is in the military barracks, there are jokes galore about the ineptness of Najib but potentially Hishammuddin Hussein too, his cousin, who too donned the mantle of Defence Minister.

The Joker of Lahad Datu–Hishamuddin Hussein

Wasn’t the latter who tweeted that the terrorists in Lahad Datu were clad in “slippers” and “sarongs,” and not to be deemed a threat?

Yet precisely a day later the terrorists went on a rampage, resulting in the first armed invasion of Malaysia since the end of Konfrontasi in 1965. Najib and Hisham, for the lack of better word, appeared to have muck things up when they were at the top of the food chain.

If the joke is on Mat Sabu, so far still a well-regarded Defence Minister, Najib has to be mindful of his legacy both as a Defence and Prime Minister. They reek of indolence (the lack of oversight) and insolence insofar as basic supervision is needed.

Indeed, what the ministry faces now is a litany of issues that remain unresolved. Be it the French submarine Scorpene scandal, or the plea of Shaariibuu Setev that the murder case of his daughter, Altantuya, be reinstated (for a thorough reinvestigation), the echoes from the past seem unrelenting.

Cancer of corruption

If one cares to listen, the cancer of corruption has seeped deepest into the marrows of the ministry. A tile at a military hospital, for example, can allegedly come at a quote of RM13,000, according to reliable sources. Drugs and pharmaceuticals that are supplied to the hospital are allegedly 300 percent more expensive than the regular tender.

If the invoices of these items are compared side by side with other genuine tenders, it would expose the scams and more shenanigans that have manifested in cooking the books.

The best services at such hospitals go the military supremos and top guns, and not the rank and file, who bore the scars of their service.

Indeed, contracts and tenders that are non-competitive have given to the same company over and over. For example, when a tender requires eight items to be scrutinized or supplied, those companies with close political connections to the previous regime continue to win the bids time and again, even though they offer nine of 10 exhibits, thus inflating the cost and breaching the terms of the tender.

The legacy of Najib appears to be anything but spotless. Thus Mat Sabu is right that Najib has tried to “hit him below the belt” by choosing to raise the issue outside of the Parliament.

If Najib wants to critique the Defence Ministry, an institution that can be redeemed by Amanah, he better find a stronger excuse than hurling abuse at Sabu.

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PHAR KIM BENG is a Harvard/Cambridge Commonwealth Fellow, a former Monbusho scholar at the University of Tokyo and visiting scholar at Waseda University.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.

 

‘New’ or ‘old’ Sabah in New Malaysia?

July 18, 2018

by Dr. Bridget Welsh@www.malaysiakini.com

Congratulations, Sir. May God Bless and Guide You

COMMENT | On the streets of Kota Kinabalu, there is open delight of the appointment of one of their own, Richard Malanjum, as the new chief justice. Across the diverse multiethnic mosaic of the state, many respond with the phrase “I feel Malaysian.”

Given the continued resentments of unfairness of the federal government that percolate, these sentiments highlight that inclusiveness and appointments based on merit do resonate, much more than the handful of narrow-minded, peninsula-based views featured in the media. Sabahans, in their open and optimistic style, celebrate the successes of their own across communities, as arguably the silent majority in the country does as a whole.

The question of the federal-state relationship and treatment of different ethnic communities were very much at the heart of why Sabah voted for Parti Warisan Sabah and Pakatan Harapan parties – and why they not only were critical for the coalition to form the numbers for their majority sworn into Parliament yesterday, but why there is a new Warisan coalition government in the state.

While acknowledging it is still early days, this article focuses on whether there are signs of change in Sabah, and suggests that the ‘old’ Sabah will constrain the ability of the new government to bring about meaningful changes in the short-term – but that in the longer-term, there are indications that a new political landscape is being formed with the emergence of a ‘new’ Sabah.

Local dynamics shaped GE14

The story of the electoral outcome and the new government in Sabah is quite different from the national picture. 1MDB and former prime minister Najib Abdul Razak, for example, were less central than the perceived corruption of the family of Musa Aman (photo) and their continued hold on power.

Slating five members of the Aman family as candidates in GE14 did not go down well with many in the electorate. After 15 years in power, Musa and his cartel of interests still play a major role in the Sabah economy.

GST was an important issue, seen as a federally imposed tax that did not help the local economy. The tourist tax is seen the same way.

State rights and representation embedded in the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) were also mobilised and remain so, as Sabahans expect a meaningful review of the federal-state relationship with greater respect, inclusion, and political autonomy and control over their own resources and economy. A crucial element in the review is protections for religious freedom, as the impositions on freedom are seen to be driven by developments in the peninsula.

Local racial differences, particularly differences between the rights of immigrants and resentments of the indigenous Kadazandusun Murut communities, played out in many local contests. This made the results in a handful of seats quite close, and brought to the post-GE14 the reality that, like the Malay support deficit that Harapan faces at the national level, the Warisan government faces the same from many of the Kadazandusun Murut, especially in more rural and semi-rural areas.

This has been ameliorated somewhat by the addition of United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (Upko) into the state coalition post-GE14, but it does not take away from the fact that most Kadazandusun Murut did not vote for Warisan or Harapan parties. The political swing that took place was largely one along the east coast of Sabah and in the urban areas, representing primarily a Bajau/Suluk victory supported by ethnic Chinese and urban-based Kadazans.

Nevertheless, a majority of Sabahans showed that they were open to change, as they had been in 1985 when they voted in the Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) government. Many of the same political demands for rights and representation were echoed, but the results reflect a different social base of mobilisation than in the past.

Legacies of the ‘old’ Sabah

Given Sabah’s mixed experience with a new state government in the past, expectation of change is relatively low. They place more hope in change coming about through a new federal government – namely, a new federal-state relationship that might emerge – and pressures for reform at the national level that will hopefully extend into the state.

The nexus between the federal and state is intertwined with the issues that make the management of the state so challenging. Three legacies in particular complicate the Sabah context.

First, the corruption in Sabah is deep, extending from business to the (mis)management of its borders. Decades of exploitation of the state’s resources by its political elites have bequeathed a governance mess. Early investigations of the state’s finances echo the financial mismanagement and indebtedness left by the Najib administration at the federal level, with allegedly millions missing and foundations and other state bodies plundered.

Sadly, this pattern of graft has happened all too often in Sabah, but what distinguishes the current situation is the sheer amount of greed involved. Chief Minister Shafie Apdal (photo) has inherited limited state coffers and a bureaucracy seen as tainted. Graft in the state has been accentuated by its large resource economy and rapid land development.

‘Contributions’ and ‘payoffs’ are everyday practices. Much of what has happened in the past few months have focused on assessment and clean-up. There have been early efforts to address illegal logging, but these are slow-going, given the scope of the problem.

Corruption is also connected to the thorny and sensitive issue of illegal immigration. This problem has its roots in the 1970s, in the era of United Sabah National Organisation (Usno) and later Sabah People’s United Front (Berjaya), but came to a head in ‘Project IC’ during Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s first tenure as prime minister. The systematic granting of citizenship to foreigners in the state was the subject of the Royal Commission of Inquiry in 2013, which provided recognition but little in the way of solutions.

Today, illegal immigration directly involves an estimated quarter of Sabah’s 3.9 million population, with thousands of stateless people, especially children, lacking access to education and basic healthcare. The exact number involved is unknown, as there are persistent concerns of continued streams of undocumented immigrants who are seen to undercut wages and have transformed the social fabric. Resentments run as deep as the corruption, if not deeper. The issue affects the state as a whole, its social fabric, economy and security.

The Warisan government has promised to move toward ameliorating the problem, but will need meaningful cooperation from the federal government to address underlying concerns about immigration, citizenship and the financial and social costs.

Many of those tied to the Bajau/Suluk community are expecting the Warisan government to act, given their electoral support in GE14, while others are anxious that solutions will be exclusionary and inadequate.

Mahathir has an opportunity to address a serious problem he himself exacerbated in his first term by working with a Warisan partner that has its roots within the migrant community, to move towards a more just Sabah and improve its welfare. Now is perhaps the best time in decades.

Closely related to the two legacy issues above is the incidence of poverty and economic vulnerability. Of all the states in the country, Sabah has the highest rate and numbers living in poverty. Officially, 2.9 percent of citizens live in poverty, according to statistics published in 2016, but in practice this number is much larger, with sharp income disparities and relatively low wages.

The federal government is often blamed, but the responsibility should be shared by state leaders as well, who have not done enough to address inadequate roads to Pitas, isolation in Pensiangan, nutritional deficits in Keningau and insufficient water supply across the state.

The new state government has only two of its leaders with experience in government, but many of its ministers are sincere. Nevertheless, there are grouses among the public that there have been few deliverables to date.

Reducing economic disparities needs to be a priority, as should integrating social justice with a plan for the economy. There are ideas percolating regarding localisation, but to date it is not clear what the priorities of the new Sabah government are, and if the team as a whole is working together.

Special care will be needed in managing the area of infrastructure – historically one of the more lucrative areas of graft – to assure that this is not a vehicle for further wealth aggrandisement and party patronage.

The emerging ‘new’ Sabah

If what the Warisan-led government faces is indeed challenging, changes in political conditions offer promise.

A younger generation of Sabahans are open to embrace change, eager to build their state and embrace new ideas. Nearly a third – 31.3 percent – of the population is under 40, offering energy and momentum for change. Younger voters were an integral part of the Warisan-Harapan victory.

Civil society in Sabah has grown and is eager to be a partner in bringing about greater prosperity. There are a plethora of local civil-society partnerships in education and the environment that can be strengthened. The sense of state nationalism that put the new government into office is a strong foundation to build on, one that can be embraced. Capitalising on this goodwill is essential.

Musa’s flight abroad has also brought forward an inevitable development – the end of UMNO in Sabah. Warisan has taken over UMNO’s political base on the east coast, decimated the latter’s base throughout the state, and cut off its access to the main ingredient of its political survival – money.

While UMNO still holds support among some Sabahans – with some of this base tied to the old Usno and Berjaya days – its strength came from its ties to the federal and state governments, relationships that it no longer holds. Already, four leaders have moved and hundreds of ordinary members are flocking away from the party.

Sabah UMNO faces the same problem that the party is beset with nationally – a leader refusing to leave gracefully. The money is on Musa not returning to be sworn in as an assemblyperson before mid-August, which will trigger a by-election and render moot his electoral petition for state leadership.

Musa and his economic cartel remain powerful, however, and limit the ability for alternative patronage networks to form. He – and others in Sabah UMNO – have the shadow of scandals and potential MAAC questioning hanging over them. As things stand, it is likely that UMNO supporters will morph into a locally-based party, rather than hold onto the baggage that Musa left them.

The pattern of political engagement in Sabah is also shifting. Traditionally, the state has been governed by elites and party warlords, who have served to distribute patronage with ordinary citizens getting the raw end of the deal. This sort of political patronage has been failing and in the longer term will be difficult to sustain.

The Warisan government will be forced to perform and yield deliverables as it is not in the same financial position to follow the previous model of engagement – at least not to the same degree.

It will also be forced to meet the expectations of change, to address the increasing demands of a greater informed population. This offers pressure, but simultaneously opportunity – funds now can move less into the hands of politicians and into solving problems and improving the well-being of Sabahans.

A new social contract can evolve for Sabahans. The promise of a ‘new’ Sabah is real, despite the legacies of old.

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BRIDGET WELSH is an associate professor of political science at John Cabot University in Rome. She also continues to be a senior associate research fellow at the National Taiwan University’s Center for East Asia Democratic Studies and The Habibie Center, as well as a university fellow of Charles Darwin University. Her latest book (with co-author Greg Lopez) is titled Regime Resilience in Malaysia and Singapore. She can be reached at bridgetwelsh1@gmail.com.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.

Katak (Frog) Politics in vogue for New Malaysia

June 24, 2018

by James Chin@www.newmandala.org

Reforming ‘cari makan’ politics can be the biggest change of all in ‘new Malaysia’.

Over the past several weeks, much of Malaysia’s elite has been playing the game of ‘pusing’ (Malay for turnaround), or as one businessmen told me, learning to ‘gostan’ (Malay contraction of “go astern”). In popular usage, it means to reverse back. This is how it works: many in the Malaysian elite are now claiming to be closet supporters of Dr Mahathir and the Pakatan Harapan (PH, or alliance of hope) coalition. Some claimed to have secretly “sponsored” the campaigns of PH candidates.

You can bet your sweet beepy that they were many frogs and carma types at his Open House. These types have no honour and dignity left in their  souls.

In an infamous blog entry, Making Beeline to Curry Favour with Dr M, by one of Mahathir’s closest political allies, Abdul Kadir Jasin wrote: ‘Last evening I was invited for a berbuka puasa with the Prime Minister, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, at the Perdana Leadership Foundation (PLF) in Putrajaya… I saw many familiar faces – men and women – who during good and bad times had stuck with THE man… But I also saw many who had been absent from his berbuka puasa and other functions for quite a few years. I felt no sense of remorse when I greeted them with disdain… When Dr Mahathir was in power they celebrated him as if he was a ‘Tua Pek Kong’ (Chinese diety) and man of miracle. He was lavishly praised and even more lavishly feasted… But when he left office but yet continuing to care for the country, many of these people abandoned him for fear that supporting or just being seen with him would jeopardise their billion-dollar contracts, projects concessions, or subject them to the scrutiny of the Inland Revenue Board… The mere mention of Dr Mahathir caused them to cringe…Their hypocrisy and lack shame put me off. But still I accepted their handshake for the sake civility and common courtesy…”

While crony capitalism is found throughout Southeast Asia (yes, even in Singapore), in Malaysia the cronies never had to ‘pusing’ or ‘gostan’ at such a rapid pace. The assumption was that UMNO and Barisan Nasional (BN) would remain in power for the foreseeable future. Thus the 9 May outcome was akin to suffering the first heart attack.

According to Malaysiakini 50,000 came to Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s Open House, what about the turnout at Najib’s Hari Raya gathering? Most of the Tycoons and his hangers-on have probably abandoned him in droves. That’s life, guys–Din Merican

Unlike the West, political hypocrisy and the practice of switching political support for personal gain in Malaysia is often regarded as simply ‘cari makan’ or earning a living. There is no political shame is ‘pusing’ if the ultimate aim is to ‘cari makan’. In other words, you do whatever is necessary to get the government contract, or better, to get into government. Former prime minister Najib Razak was fond of saying that his political philosophy is ‘Cash is king’. During Najib’s era, ‘dedak’ was the common term used to describe the use of bribes to buy political support.

The culture of ‘cari makan’ had such an omnipresence in Malaysian politics that almost all the tycoons you see today in Malaysia are linked either to Mahathir or Najib. It was an open secret which tycoon was linked to each leader, such that the stock market in Malaysia had ‘political counters’, where certain companies were owned by these tycoons. It is not uncommon for the shares of these companies to move according to the latest rumour regarding the tycoon’s relationship status with the incumbent PM.

Those who came up in the 1980s and 1990s were handpicked by Mahathir and former Finance Minister and now chair of the Council of Eminent Persons Daim Zainuddin. In the past decade, another group of tycoons came up under the patronage of Najib. It was taken for granted that you could not become a business tycoon overnight in Malaysia without connections to the incumbent PM.

‘Pusing’ and ‘cari makan’ politics is most acute in the Malaysian state of Sabah. Not only is it done openly at every elections, it is celebrated with a local word ‘katak’ (or political frog), which essentially describes what happens as entire political parties and just-elected individuals move to the winning side on elections night. For political parties, it’s mostly about getting into government. For individuals, it can mean a sudden cash windfall. Sometimes, you can even ‘katak’ twice or more for such gains.

The most recent example of this was on the night of GE-14, when it became clear that Parti Warisan were in a position to form a new state government – United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO), a BN-component party, announced it was defecting to Warisan to give it a clear majority to form the next state government. Two days later, four Sabah UMNO state assemblymen defected as well, giving Parti Warisan a clear majority in the state assembly.

In neighbouring Sarawak, two just-elected MPs joined the PH coalition once it was clear PH had formed the federal government. The sole MP from the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) tried but failed to defect to PH.

Across the sea, Malaya is fast catching up on ‘katak’ politics. Within a few days of PH’s victory, five BN state assemblymen defected to PH, giving the Johor and Perak PH state governments their majorities. More would actually like to defect but they cannot do so now because of the raw feelings generated in the recent campaign. It’s likely when things calm down, more elected BN representatives will move to PH.

While many would see these moves as opportunistic, many of those defecting justify it on the grounds that under the present political system, they can only resolve their constituency issues if they are part of the ruling coalition.

When BN was in power, individual BN MPs were given between RM1 to RM5 million ($337,000 to $1.69 million) to spend on their constituencies. Opposition MPs got zero funding. These funds are spent on any events or projects approved by the MP without the need for another layer of official approval. BN MPs would normally use this slush fund for small projects or events to increase their personal support among their constituents. Opposition MPs see the funds as nothing more than blatant vote buying.

The new PH government has continued the practice but with a slight modification. PH MPs will get RM500,000 ($169,000) while Opposition MPs will get RM100,000, or a fifth of what a government MP gets.

Over the next year, expect more UMNO businessmen and opposition politicians to move into the PH camp, all claiming to be closet supporters of PH. The ‘cari makan’ political culture may be the hardest thing to reform in Malaysia – I would say it’s impossible, even under a reformist PH government. It is, at the end of the day, human nature.

 

GE-14: Rafidah Aziz is elated and why not

May 11, 2018

http://www.malaysiakini.com

 

To the young, please remember that we, of the older generation, are doing all these for you, and the generations after you. Please look after our beloved and blessed nation as best as you can. Please help to make this new chapter in our history, a truly glorious one, InsyaAllah.–Tan Sri Rafidah Aziz, Former MITI Minister

 

COMMENT | Syukur Alhamdulillah. Praise be to the Almighty for having answered our collective prayers and for having prevailed, to enable us to realise what we wanted to achieve. What seemed almost impossible has happened.

A new day has begun for our beloved Malaysia and Malaysians. A new chapter in our history has started to be written.It is exactly 4.15 am on this historic day, May 10, 2018.

I am too excited to sleep.I never imagined that I would live to see this day. The day the rakyat showed their wisdom in choosing a new government for the next five years, and registering so strongly, their disdain and rejection of corruption, poor governance and abuse of authority.

Power is with the rakyat, not the government. The government only serves the rakyat, and the stakeholders of the nation. Not to serve those managing the nation.

The multiracial rakyat of Malaysia has rejected the politics of divisiveness, parochialism, and xenophobia. They have placed a premium on unity and togetherness. They have given the contract to manage Malaysia for the next five years to a new party Pakatan Harapan.

Helmed by our remarkable Dr Mahathir Mohamad, I am confident that there will begin the process of righting the wrongs, and putting the nation back on the right track in the context of development, social cohesion, focus on the young generation and all that is needed to bring back Malaysia to its glory days, and more, including to rebuild our tarnished image and dignity, and proudly take our rightful place in the world’s fraternity of nations.

Najib Razak paid a heavy  price for taking us Malaysians for granted. His legacy is in tatters. The new government must talk less and act more. Focus on Deliverables. For that to happen, Pakatan Harapan must have a cohesive, honest, technocratic and competent Cabinet Ministers backed by new team of civil servants in all key ministries.–Din Merican

 

The world will be watching every step being taken, by the new government, and by us the rakyat. Let us continue to remain united, be proud to be Malaysians and be assets to Malaysia.

To the young, please remember that we, of the older generation, are doing all these for you, and the generations after you. Please look after our beloved and blessed nation as best as you can. Please help to make this new chapter in our history, a truly glorious one, InsyaAllah.

Sejathera Malaysia, Tanah Air Kita, Rumah Kita Bersama.

Syukur to the Almighty for the success of Pakatan Harapan.

RAFIDAH AZIZ is the former International Trade and Industry (MITI) Minister.

GE-14: A look at the rural Malay voter

May 3, 2018

With GE14 rapidly approaching, both sides of the political divide are trying to woo a vastly underestimated, non-homogenous rural Malay public.

by Serina Rahman

http://www.newmandala.org/rural-malay-voter/

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad is respected by the Malays. His impact on rural Malays cannot be discounted

 In the coming Malaysian general election, the grand prize seems to be the rural vote. With redelineation passed by parliament, the power of the rural voter in deciding the fate of an elected representative can be more than 10 times that of an urban voter. Both sides of the divide are trying to woo a rural Malay public that is often vastly underestimated. Based on a series of focus group discussions and informant interviews in both Johor and Kedah, as well as extensive immersion in rural, coastal and island areas over the past decade, here I examine Peninsular Malaysia’s rural voters to discern how they might vote and the issues that matter to them.

Most rural folk live off the land and sea as farmers and fishermen, while others supplement family incomes with menial jobs as cleaners, security guards and factory workers. Earnings are not high and are perennially stagnant. All focus group discussants and informants that I spoke to cited rising costs of living as the issue that mattered the most. The end of petrol subsidies, implementation of goods and services tax (GST), inflation and difficulties in buying land and property means that there is a constant struggle to stretch pay cheques. Any handout is gratefully received. Benefits such as BR1M, while often cited as too little to offset increasing expenses, help to alleviate financial pressures—even if only momentarily.

Rural voters are too preoccupied with making ends meet to contemplate macro issues such as allegations of corruption. Some that I spoke to said that political scandals are beyond them; what the politicians did at their level bear no consequence on rural lives and makes no difference to their survival. In fact, many said that no matter who is in power, they hardly get any benefits or assistance—except for when elections roll around.

Rural voters are not unintelligent. They are aware that corruption is rife, but there is a fatalism to their mindset. They have a tendency to accept their position on the bottom rungs of the social hierarchy and do not expect to get more than what that rank entitles them to. Many raised the issue of “cronyism” as a form of corruption that plagues the middle levels of society—where political branch heads, village and local committee leaders block their access to financial benefits, job opportunities and other forms of assistance. All focus groups mentioned that while government leaders had rural communities in mind, it was this middle level that held the purse strings and disbursed allocated aid to only friends and family.  Those in real need were often literally left stranded (such as during recent floods affecting both south and north Malaysia).

Hierarchy is an important component of rural Malay life. Historically feudal societies, today’s rural communities remain deeply traditional in many ways. At the top of the ladder is the king, and in place of those who would have been lords and noblemen in the past, are politicians and government heads. Respect for royalty is enshrined in the nation’s Rukun Negara (National Principles) which every child recites at morning assembly in school. The king is second only to God. Religion is a national concern and Islam is etched into the constitution as the main religion of the federation. Malay rights are inscribed into economic policy. It is to this mix of history, principle and policy that the rural Malay psyche responds, albeit in varying degrees.

Loyalty and indebtedness are characteristics that emerge from a history of feudalism. In election terms, this means that voters remain loyal to those that helped them get to where they are. A common local phrase is “kami kenangkan jasa dia” (we remember his good deeds). Older interviewees related how difficult life was before the ruling party gave them the comfort they enjoy now. This generation is quick to remind their offspring that voting for those that helped them is a family tradition and to break that practice is akin to breaking the norms of filial piety. Younger voters confessed that while they wondered about the value of their vote, they often toed the family line just to prevent tension at home.

Malay rights and Islam are undoubtedly hot button topics. Distrust of the other (usually personified by the Chinese majority Democratic Action Party [DAP]) is widespread. DAP is often demonised on religious terms as a threat to Islam as the nation’s primary faith. Anyone who engages with them (voters or other opposition parties alike) are deemed to have crossed to the dark side and are tainted with similar distrust. There is a great fear that Malays will lose everything that they believe they are entitled to, and there is also a great need to demonstrate the strength of their faith by voting for the party with the best religious credentials.

While all of the above are common threads that surfaced from the research, there were also differences. The lack of homogeneity among rural voters cannot be overemphasized

As its birthplace, Johor has always been the bastion of UMNO. Even as he declares his political neutrality, Johor’s Sultan Ibrahim Iskandar has reminded his people that the party was born on palace grounds, funded by his grandfather. A 2017 study commissioned by ISEAS—Yusof Ishak showed that the Sultan is greatly respected by Johor citizens of all ethnicities and incomes, but even more so by the rural Malay. It is likely that the Johorean rural voter will take any opinion expressed by the Sultan into consideration when deciding how to vote.

This is very different from the situation in Kedah, where rural communities seem much more detached from their king. Loyalty is instead redirected to elder statesman Mahathir Mohamad who is fondly remembered for his contribution to both nation and state. His son, Mukhriz Mahathir, was chief minister between 2013 and 2016 until he was forcibly removed after internal party disputes. Kedahans were quick to offer unsolicited examples of projects and better times under their leadership. They also expressed their exasperation at the injustice meted out to Mukhriz and the disrespect that the remaining UMNO cadres had for Mahathir. Malay mores of respect for elders and good manners are cited as principles that politicians should never cross.

Differences between north and south also surface in the attribution of blame for daily difficulties. In Johor, rising prices are attributed to either Chinese businessmen or the federal leadership. The 2017 Johor Survey revealed that the average Johorean is satisfied with UMNO state governance. Interviewees have told me explicitly that there is nothing wrong with Barisan Nasional (BN)—as long as its federal leadership is removed. At BN rallies in Johor, successes are attributed to Johor Chief Minister Khaled Nordin. No mention is made of Prime Minister Najib Razak. The poster boy for Johor BN Khaled Nordin’s tagline is “Muafakat Johor” (Johor United); he and “Team Johor” have successfully captured the state’s support.

In Kedah, however, voters sing a different tune. Younger voters were impatient to vote for Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM). They were vocal and adamant in wanting to give the opposition a chance to govern, especially since experienced hands such as Mahathir and Mukhriz were part of the line-up. They were less distrustful of DAP. Older voters seemed a little torn between the party that they had always voted for and the man that they knew and loved but is now standing on the other side. Adding to the confusion is the presence of PAS who was once Kedah’s most credible opposition party and who holds the most visible religious credentials. One informant mentioned that if PAS was part of the opposition team, UMNO would be done for. Many others maintained that it was hard to decide. At times they would whisper their support for the opposition, or state that you just can’t say that you disagree with UMNO (meaning that they lean towards the other side).

A lack of homogeneity also exists within states. In east Johor, FELDA voters expressed unfailing support for BN. To them, those who have left the party are ungrateful disgruntled individuals; that corruption allegations are fake news; and that they were willing to vote across ethnic lines as long as BN wins. In west Johor, voters were more doubtful; some were apathetic as they felt that they suffered no matter who is in power. Some mentioned that if there is good fishing or bad weather on polling day, they would have better things to do than vote.

In Kedah too, there are differences. While the majority seemed to be in support of Mahathir no matter the party he stood for, many are recipients of BN’s recent generosity. Gifts of land grants, new homes, double the BR1M amount and myriad other goodies go a long way in solving financial problems. The question is whether these voters can look past election bounties when they vote.

The rural voter is not a single homogenous block. While survival is their priority, overarching Malay principles of hierarchy, loyalty and the need to preserve Malay rights and religion will have an impact on their decision at the ballot box. It is the person that has always been there for them in times of need (not a parachuting politician) and the one who can alleviate immediate difficulties that will win the vote.

All photos by the author. This article is an excerpt from her recent publication, Malaysia’s General Elections 2018: Understanding the Rural Vote, published by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.