Brexit–David Cameron led us to this calamity.


October 23, 2018

 

“David Cameron is a former PM. He not only has the right to offer his solution but a duty. If he is to earn the right to a hearing, however, he must first find not only self-knowledge and courage, but an un-English seriousness of purpose he has evaded all his life.”–Nick Cohen

John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown have warned of the dangers of Brexit. But where is the former Prime Minister who called the referendum that will blight Britain for as far ahead as anyone can see? Whatever happened to that likely lad? David Cameron doesn’t want to talk about it, one of his friends tells me. “He doesn’t defend the referendum, but won’t say he made a mistake either. Europe is like a family scandal. We know what’s happened but we don’t say a word: it’s his no-go zone.”

At a personal level, the consequences swirl around him. I may be exhausting your capacity for compassion but the smallest of the casualties of Brexit has been the good fellowship of the Chipping Norton set. Naturally, the Cotswolds’ wealthy Leavers are grateful. But Cameron must resent them. He must know that he has been the useful idiot who succumbed to the demands of Rupert Murdoch’s Rebekah Brooks, a member of the local nouveau gentry by virtue of her converted barn, in the crashingly stupid belief that no harm would come from his surrender.

Invitations to “kitchen suppers” from Remainers, however, can only include Samantha Cameron’s name – if, they are extended at all. Tania Rotherwick invited the Camerons to her pool at the magnificent Cornbury Park estate before she split from her husband and Cameron split Britain from Europe. She is now particularly contemptuous, I hear.

Cameron’s memoirs were meant to be published this month but have been delayed until next year. The early signs are ominous. A book has to be coherent if it is to find a readership: its opening must prefigure its conclusion. As described in the publishing press, Cameron’s effort will have no consistency. He will tell the story of the formation of the coalition, his contributions to economic, welfare and foreign policy, his surprise victory in the 2015 election and then – as if from nowhere – the conventional memoir will end with the author carelessly deciding he will settle the European question, without planning a campaign or preparing an argument and, instead, launching a crisis that will last for decades. Nothing will make sense. Nothing will hang together. It’s as if a romcom were to conclude with serial killers murdering the cooing lovers or Hilary Mantel were to have aliens invade Tudor England on the last page of her Thomas Cromwell trilogy.

The book Cameron cannot write would accept that his political battles and achievements were as nothing when set against his decision to appeal to the worst of the Tory party. It would begin with Cameron honouring the decision that won him the Conservative leadership in 2005. He would confess that he should have known better than to pull the Conservatives out of the centre-right group in the European parliament and align them with Law and Justice, the know-nothing Polish nationalists who are reducing their country to an ill-governed autocracy. The manoeuvre was pure Cameron: tactics above strategy; appeasement instead of confrontation.

The pattern continued throughout his premiership. He thought he could buy off the right by refusing to explain the benefits of EU membership to the voters. At one point in 2014 he threatened to leave the EU. He then turned around in 2016 and asked the public to believe that leaving would be a disaster and was surprised when 17.4 million men and women he had never treated as adults worthy of inclusion in a serious conversation ignored him.

If he were being honest, Cameron would admit too that Brexit ought to bring an end to a British or, to be specific, English, style that is by no means confined to the upper class, but was everywhere present among the public-school boys who ruled us.

‘One Etonian led the Remain campaign and another led the Leave campaign, and the English couldn’t see why that was wrong.’
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‘One Etonian led the Remain campaign and another led the Leave campaign, and the English couldn’t see why that was wrong.’ Photograph: Frantzesco Kangaris for the Guardian

I mean the ironic style that gives us our famously impenetrable sense of humour (which we will need now the rest of the world is laughing at us). The perfidious style that allows us to hide behind masks and has made England superb at producing brilliant actors for the West End but hopeless at producing practical politicians for Westminster. The teasing style of speaking in codes that benighted foreigners can never understand, however well they speak English. The cliquey style that treats England as a club, not a country, and allowed Jeremy Corbyn to say that Jews cannot “understand English irony”, however long their ancestors have lived here.

 

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The deferential style that allowed one Etonian to lead the Remain campaign and another to lead the Leave campaign and for the English to not even see why that was wrong. The life’s-a-game-you-shouldn’t-take-too-seriously style that inspired Cameron to say he holds “no grudges” against Boris Johnson now the match is over and the covers back on the pitch.

The gentleman amateur style that convinced Cameron he could treat a momentous decision like an Oxford essay crisis and charm the electorate into agreeing with him in a couple of weeks, as if voters were a sherry-soaked don who could be won round with a few clever asides. The effortlessly superior style that never makes the effort to ask what the hell the English have to feel superior about. The gutless, dilettantish and fatally flippant style that has dominated England for so long and failed it so completely. The time for its funeral has long passed.

A politician who bumped into Cameron said he thinks the referendum result must be respected, but that Britain should protect living standards by going for the softest Brexit imaginable and staying in the single market. This is a compromise well to the “left” of Theresa May and Corbyn’s plans and is worth discussing. Whatever his critics say, David Cameron is a former PM. He not only has the right to offer his solution but a duty. If he is to earn the right to a hearing, however, he must first find not only self-knowledge and courage, but an un-English seriousness of purpose he has evaded all his life.

Nick Cohen is an Observer columnist

Lessons from Europe


October 20, 2015

“In 2008, crisis resolution was also possible thanks to the concerted effort of key central banks. Nowadays the power of unelected bodies is rightly questioned and scrutinised. The main lessons from the long financial crisis in Europe may be lost amid economic nationalism. Experts tend to be the repository of such lessons, but there is little respect for experts in today’s politics “.–Paola Subacchi

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More than a decade on from the most devastating financial crisis since the crash of Wall Street in 1929, politicians and commentators have been extremely careful in offering predictions on when the next crisis will occur. Playing with economic predictions is like playing with fire. Nobody knows this better than former British prime minister and chancellor of the exchequer Gordon Brown, who repeatedly promised ’no return to boom and bust’.

But there are reasons to be concerned. The gradual normalisation of US monetary policy could generate adverse spillover effects and disrupt global financial stability. Red lights are already flashing in Turkey and Argentina. A major correction in the United States’ stock market could trigger a significant shock for the rest of the world. High levels of debt, maturity mismatches and carry trades financed by short-term debt could fuel contagion through financially integrated markets. In addition, the deterioration of multilateral economic relations in the last 18 months might make crisis resolution more difficult than it was in 2008–09.

As things stand, even if we don’t know how the next crisis will materialise, where the epicentre will be and which countries will be hit, we can infer that it will likely be more disruptive than its predecessor.

What lessons can be drawn from Europe and its experience during the global financial crisis?

The European economy is expected to grow, in real terms, by 2.5 per cent in 2018, a slight slowdown from 2.7 per cent in 2017. Countries that were badly hit by the crisis have finally come out of the tunnel and some, like Ireland and Spain, are in very good shape. Against this overall positive background the European Central Bank (ECB) is slowly and gradually preparing to normalise monetary policy.

For years the economy was Europe’s key problem, now it is politics. The integrity of the European Union (EU) and its single currency is being challenged by populist politics that is building consensus on voter disaffection with rising inequality and the deterioration of living standards. Brexit, refugees and tensions between Germany and Italy on fiscal leeway are now threatening the entire EU project.

Europe’s brand of populism is anti-migration and anti-financial globalisation, and resents a supranational construction like the EU that by definition is at odds with economic nationalism.

Italy is the country that could trigger a perfect storm. Some members of the Italian cabinet have been playing with the idea of severing the ties with the Europe’s monetary union in order to regain control of monetary policy. Italy has been struggling for years with poor productivity growth and GDP growth. After some recovery in the past two years, the latter is now slowing down. Youth unemployment is at 35 per cent, one of the highest rates in the EU. Interest rates are on the rise, making it more expensive to pay interest on public debt that currently stands at 132 per cent of GDP. And the expansive fiscal policy promised by the two populist parties now in government is undermining investors’ confidence.

But Italy is not an isolated case. Euro-scepticism is on the rise, especially in countries in eastern and central Europe that joined the EU in 2004. In Britain it has been driven by the idea that an independent trade policy would better serve the interests of the United Kingdom. Having served notice to the EU on March 2017, the UK is due to leave Europe’s single market and custom union in March 2019.

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It is unclear what the new relationship between the EU and the UK will look like. Political rifts inside the British government and the ruling Conservative party have resulted in a deadlock. In the meantime, a number of foreign companies, especially those in the banking and financial sector, have announced that they will relocate to the continent to maintain access to the EU market.

The prospect of a hard Brexit has taken a toll on sterling, which has dropped by almost 12 per cent against the US dollar between mid-April and mid-August 2018. The British economy is expected to grow, in real terms, by 1.6 per cent in 2018. But increasing interest rates forced by inflationary pressures and a weak sterling may pose further constraints on economic growth. The UK is a deficit country, with a deficit in the current account of 5.2 per cent of GDP and a high level of personal debt. A series of corporate collapses — most recently, the bankruptcy of the infrastructure company Carillion — may trigger some financial instability.

If there is a lesson from Europe’s experience with the financial crisis, it is to consider the long-term effects of crisis resolution. In 2011 and 2012, at the peak of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, that followed the global financial crisis, efficiency in crisis resolution took priority over legitimacy. Draconian measures were imposed on Greece while fiscal austerity became the norm across the whole region. People, especially those in southern Europe whose economies had been decimated by the crisis, felt the hit and resented being told what to do by unelected bodies such as the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF. Today’s dysfunctional politics is significantly a response to those mistakes.

In 2008–09 international cooperation played a key role in crisis resolution. Even if the G-20 did not deliver overall reform of the international monetary and financial system, its broad-based governance system, inclusive of emerging markets, managed to get member states to work together.

Today this cooperation would be more difficult to achieve. While in 2008 politics was fairly neutral, today it is hugely divisive. The United States is in retreat and increasingly unwilling to lead. China is not ready yet to take over and to provide the financial safety net that would be necessary in case of a crisis. Europe, especially the leading countries such as Germany, France and the UK, are primarily focussed on domestic politics.

In 2008, crisis resolution was also possible thanks to the concerted effort of key central banks. Nowadays the power of unelected bodies is rightly questioned and scrutinised. The main lessons from the long financial crisis in Europe may be lost amid economic nationalism. Experts tend to be the repository of such lessons, but there is little respect for experts in today’s politics.

Paola Subacchi is a Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and a visiting fellow at ANU.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Asian crisis, ready or not’.

 

Safeguarding A Rules-based Trading System against America First Trade Economics


October 16, 2018

Safeguarding A Rules-based Trading System against America First Trade Economics

by Dr. Mari Pangestu, Universitas Indonesia

http://www.eastasiaforum.org

 

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“Without concerted effort and a coalition of willing leadership, including from the EU and East Asia, the future of the rules-based trading system will remain under threat.”–Dr. Mari Elka Pangestu

Despite expectations that the US Federal Reserve would raise interest rates, capital flows to the United States have led to the appreciation of the US dollar against most major currencies.

The hardest hit countries are Argentina and Turkey, which are experiencing fiscal issues complicated by their political situations. Brazil, South Africa and the emerging countries in Asia have also been affected — albeit at a lower rate of depreciation of their currencies in the 10 to 12 per cent range. Even Australia and China have experienced depreciation of around 8 per cent and 5 per cent respectively.

The level of depreciation experienced by different economies reflects how investors perceive their different fundamental macroeconomic conditions, especially the level of their current account and fiscal deficits and policy outlooks.

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The rising US dollar raises questions about the capacity of emerging economies to service their dollar-denominated debts and the vulnerabilities this could expose in their financial systems. Even if the current economic conditions point to a low potential for contagion from Argentina and Turkey, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde recently warned that ‘these things could change rapidly’. The uncertainty that already exists is a clear and present danger.

The uncertainty in the world economy has been increasing since Brexit and the election of President Trump in 2016, and in 2017 as the United States left the Trans-Pacific Partnership and announced many threats to impose trade restrictions. This uncertainty has heightened since January 2018 when US President Donald Trump made good on his threats to remedy bilateral trade deficits — what he sees as ‘unfair trade’ practices against the United States — by imposing tariffs on imported solar panels and washing machines, followed by aluminium and steel.

Since March, the greatest uncertainty has been from the brewing tit for tat trade conflict between the United States and China, which started with the imposition of 25 per cent tariffs on US$50 billion worth of China’s exports to the United States. China retaliated with the same sized tariffs on the same amount of trade from the United States. Trump then escalated the trade war further in September with the announcement of 10 per cent tariffs on US$200 billion worth of China’s exports to the United States.

The US–China trade conflict and the uncertainty surrounding it is expected to have knock on effects on global trade and investment flows. The impact of the reduction in China’s exports to the United States on China’s growth will reduce China’s imports, which in turn will impact the many countries that China has become a major trading partner for.

This means that China and other countries facing US trade restrictions will look for new markets for their goods. The situation has already led some countries to impose restrictions or initiate trade remedy investigations, for instance on steel. This uncertainty has and will continue to influence trade and investment, as businesses evaluate how the increased restrictions will affect their supply chains.

It is too early to tell how large the disruption will be, as it is not easy to dismantle supply chains. But the costs down the line could be great as businesses re-evaluate their trade and investment decisions to insulate themselves from tariffs rather than to maximise their competitiveness.

The most concerning aspect of all this is that, after 75 years of being its greatest advocate, the United States is now the biggest threat to the future of the rules-based trading system that has provided predictability and fairness in the way the world engages in trade. There is no clear light at the end of the tunnel.

The key question is: what is Trump’s intention? Is it to change the rules of the game to benefit the United States and address China’s ‘non-market-oriented policies’ or is it just anti-trade and America First? Assuming it is the former, there are at least three important responses needed.

First is safeguarding the stability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the overarching framework to provide predictability, fairness and stability. To this end, it is vital that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism continues to operate. The test case is the Chinese and EU case against US steel and aluminium tariffs and getting past the blocking of panel judge nominations by the United States.

Ensuring that the United States does not use blunt unilateral instruments to address its concerns also means that reforms to the WTO rule book are needed. More must be done to address concerns around intellectual property rights, investment, the environment, labour, competition policy, subsidies, tax, digital data and the treatment of developing countries.

Second, the process of opening-up must continue, with or without the United States. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership is a good start. And it is of the utmost importance that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations are concluded in November this year. These are all important processes to signal the continued commitment of East Asia to expanding markets and fostering flows of trade and investment.

Third, and what most will agree is the most important process, is unilateral reforms. Given increased global uncertainty and limited policy space for fiscal stimulus, structural reforms are a must for East Asian countries, especially China. These range from trade and investment reforms, as well as reforms related to competition policy, intellectual property, the role of state-owned enterprises and sustainability. As in the past, unilateral reforms are more successfully undertaken when there is peer pressure and benchmarking from international commitments.

Without concerted effort and a coalition of willing leadership, including from the EU and East Asia, the future of the rules-based trading system will remain under threat.

Dr. Mari Pangestu is former Indonesian trade minister and Professor at the University of Indonesia.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Asian crisis, ready or not’.

No deal is often better than a bad deal. Not with Brexit


August 6, 2018

No deal is often better than a bad deal. Not with Brexit–Soft BREXIT,says The Economist

Britain’s dangerous bluff betrays a misunderstanding of its negotiation with Brussels

 Print edition | Leaders

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IN MOST negotiations, the maxim that “no deal is better than a bad deal” makes perfect sense. If you are buying a car, you must be ready to walk away or the seller has you over a barrel. The way to drive a hard bargain is to persuade him that he must offer you a good deal or there will be no deal at all.

Theresa May has made this commonsense principle the foundation of her talks with Brussels over Britain’s exit from the European Union. “No deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain,” she said in January last year, setting out her red lines. With less than eight months until Britain is due to leave the EU, and only about four months left to reach an agreement on the terms of its exit, her government is still stressing its readiness to depart with no deal in place.

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It is time to drop the pretence. Leaving without a deal was never a wise option. The government ought to have spent the past two years steering the public through the painful trade-offs of leaving the EU. As we have argued, Britain’s interests are best served by a “soft Brexit” that preserves markets and security. Instead, big-mouth ministers have kept expectations sky high, claiming that the deal “will be one of the easiest in human history” and that “there will be no downside to Brexit”.–The Economist

 

The trouble is that Brexit is nothing like buying a car. In most negotiations “no deal” means sticking to the status quo. If you are not prepared to pay the asking price, you can walk away none the worse and try somewhere else. The Brexit talks are different. If no deal is reached Britain will not maintain the status quo of its EU membership, but find its links to the continent abruptly and acrimoniously broken off. The metaphor is not buying a car, it is buying a parachute—having already leapt out of the aeroplane. “Walking away” would land Britain in a situation so calamitous that it should not even be on the table.

A no-deal outcome would be bad for the EU, too, particularly Ireland, whose small, open economy is closely linked to Britain’s. But Britain would be hurt most by a hard landing. Trading with the EU on the terms of the World Trade Organisation, which would raise both tariffs and regulatory barriers, would reduce Britain’s GDP by 4% within five to ten years, according to the IMF. The EU’s GDP would fall by about 1.5%. Worse still—again, for everyone, but chiefly for Britain—would be the turmoil from leaving without agreements in place over everything from airline safety to the transfer of radioactive material. The supply of such essentials as food and medicine could be disrupted, too (see article).

A hard landing

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Boris Johnson–The Ambitious Tory Iago

For this reason, the EU has never taken seriously Mrs May’s claim that Britain is ready to walk away from the negotiating table. It sees her threat as a bluff—and it is right, judging by the lack of preparation in Britain for a no-deal outcome. Even with extensive (and expensive) planning, leaving the EU without a deal would have been difficult. As things stand, almost no work has been done to prepare for such an eventuality. Lately, Britain has taken to outlining desperate-sounding plans to stockpile medicine and set up electricity generators. Chaos would be hard to avoid.

Yet, although the EU’s negotiators in Brussels do not buy it, Mrs May’s slogan that “no deal is better than a bad deal” has struck a chord with the voting public. As the talks have dragged on and the EU has extracted concessions, such as a promise by Britain to pay a large exit bill, the desire to walk away has only grown. Polls show that nearly twice as many Britons would leave the EU with no deal as would support a compromise along the lines Mrs May proposed last month. By this logic, her eventual settlement with Brussels, if she reaches one, will look even more like a bad deal because Britain will have to give more ground. Many voters will thus quote the prime minister’s own slogan back to her, and argue to crash out.

The government is trapped by its own rhetoric. The louder it shouts in Brussels that it is ready for no deal, the more it emboldens voters and Brexiteer MPs to call for just such an outcome. Yet the more the government argues at home that Brexiteers should avoid the miseries of crashing out by embracing Mrs May’s compromise, the more it convinces Brussels that, except as a disastrous accident, “no deal” is not credible.

It is time to drop the pretence. Leaving without a deal was never a wise option. The government ought to have spent the past two years steering the public through the painful trade-offs of leaving the EU. As we have argued, Britain’s interests are best served by a “soft Brexit” that preserves markets and security. Instead, big-mouth ministers have kept expectations sky high, claiming that the deal “will be one of the easiest in human history” and that “there will be no downside to Brexit”.

Mrs May has belatedly come to accept the need for compromise—to the fury of a small coterie of hardline Brexiteers who would sooner crash out of Europe, kamikaze-style, than maintain any kind of obligation to the EU. The prime minister’s continued claims that Britain can simply walk away play into their hands. She must cease such talk. With a bit more compromise on both sides, a deal is reachable. Britain must seize that parachute before it is too late.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline “No ordinary deal”

US Foreign Policy: Donald Trump’s humiliation in Helsinki


July 23, 2018

US Foreign Policy: Donald Trump’s humiliation in Helsinki

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/21/donald-trumps-humiliation-in-helsinki

How to interpret a shameful press conference with Vladimir Putin

“Perhaps, as some suspect, Mr Putin really does have material compromising Mr Trump. Either way, where America once aspired to be a beacon, relativism rules. That leaves all democracies more vulnerable.”- The Economist

Image result for US Foreign Policy: Donald Trump’s humiliation in Helsinki

How to make America Great? By Making Russia Great Again. That was what the POTUS did in Helsinki, Finland. He made Putin smell roses.

DONALD TRUMP likes to boast that he does things differently from his predecessors. That was certainly true of his trip to Europe. In Brussels he chided Germany for a gas deal that left it “totally controlled by Russia”. In England he humiliated his host, Theresa May, blasting her Brexit plan before holding her hand and hailing “the highest level of special” relationship. From his Scottish golf resort he called the European Union a “foe” on trade. And in Helsinki, asked whether Russia had attacked America’s democracy, he treated President Vladimir Putin as someone he trusts more than his own intelligence agencies. It was a rotten result for America and the world.

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Americans were more than usually outraged. At the post-summit press conference in Helsinki, with the world watching and the American flag behind him, their head of state had appeared weak. He was unwilling to stand up for America in the face of an assault that had been graphically described three days earlier by Robert Mueller, the special counsel probing election meddling, in his indictment of 12 Russian military-intelligence officers . Republicans were among Mr Trump’s fiercest critics. “No prior president has ever abased himself more abjectly before a tyrant,” wrote Senator John McCain. Even Newt Gingrich, normally a staunch defender, decried “the most serious mistake of his presidency”. The reaction forced Mr Trump into a convoluted series of climbdowns, which did little to repair the damage.

Yet, for all his hostility towards allies and cosiness with Mr. Putin, the trip could have been an even bigger disaster. Fears that Mr Trump might torpedo the NATO summit, as he had the G7 one, proved overblown. He put his name to a communiqué reaffirming the allies’ commitment to mutual defence and their tough stance against Russia. Worries that with Mr Putin he might promise to roll back sanctions or recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea proved groundless—as far as we can tell (the presidents met with only their interpreters present).

Mr Trump even did some useful things. He was right to press NATO allies to spend more on defence, even if his claim to have raised “vast amounts of money” is an exaggeration. And talking to his Russian counterpart makes sense. To be sure, Mr Trump’s hopes for a tremendous relationship with Mr Putin may end in a familiar disappointment: George W. Bush looked into Mr Putin’s eyes and detected a soul, and Russia invaded Georgia; Barack Obama pressed a “reset” button, and Russia invaded Ukraine. But America and Russia have a lot to discuss, not least on nuclear-arms control.

America worst

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However, these gains come at too high a price. Mr Trump’s behaviour, a quixotic mix of poison and flattery, has further undermined Europeans’ trust in America. When asked about the Mueller probe and the decline in relations with Russia, Mr Trump said feebly that he holds “both countries responsible”. Perhaps his vanity does not allow him to treat seriously a Russian attack that he fears could tarnish his own election triumph. Perhaps, as some suspect, Mr Putin really does have material compromising Mr Trump. Either way, where America once aspired to be a beacon, relativism rules. That leaves all democracies more vulnerable.

Mr Putin, fresh from a successful World Cup, thus emerges as the winner in Helsinki. True, he may have scored an own goal in admitting that, yes, he had wanted Mr Trump to win the election. But a self-doubting West, damaged democracy and the spectacle of America’s president deferring to him on the world stage count as a hat-trick at the other end. In Helsinki Mr Putin looked smug. Mr Trump looked, at best, a mug.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline “Humiliation in Helsinki”

 

 

2018 Cambodian Elections: What Lies Ahead


July 22, 2018

2018 Cambodian Elections: What Lies Ahead

by  Vannarith Chheang, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

“Speaking the truth, acknowledging facts and seeking holistic solutions are key values that the CPP must embrace in order to strengthen public trust in the government. The ingrained culture of sycophancy that has protected leaders and stifled fresh ideas will need to be changed. Transformative leadership and institutional innovation are critical for the future of the CPP.”– Vannarith Chheang,

 

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Cambodia’s upcoming general election on 29 July looks set to be its most controversial since its first national election in 1993. In late 2017, the main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), was dissolved and 118 of its senior members were banned from politics based on what the ruling government deemed to be threats to peace and stability.

Image result for sam rainsySam Rainsy and his ambitious spouse,Tioulong Saumura

In response, the outlawed CNRP has called for a boycott of the election. And some local civil society groups, such as the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia and the Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia, have opted not to observe the upcoming election.  In addition, the United States and the European Union have withdrawn their support from the Cambodian National Election Committee, while Japan remains supportive of electoral reforms (though there are some pressures from the supporters of the opposition movement and civil society groups calling on Japan to withdraw its electoral support).

With the absence of the main opposition party, it is a foregone conclusion that the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which has ruled the country for more than three decades, will win a landslide victory. The key question for the future of Cambodia now is how the upcoming election will shape the policy direction of Prime Minister Hun Sen’s administration.

The CPP policy platform stresses three immediate deliverables: raising incomes, reducing electricity prices and strengthening the social safety net. But it falls short of showing strong political will to reform state institutions — particularly in terms of corruption, which is believed to be the root cause of many social and economic issues in Cambodia. And voters expect to see genuine political will and concrete measures in building clean and efficient state institutions.

The CPP is also facing foreign policy challenges. Its human rights situation is under tight scrutiny from the United States and the European Union, which are the two main export markets for Cambodian products.

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Read On: https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/08/cambodia-2018-election-implications/

In May 2018, the US Congress introduced the Cambodia Democracy Act to put targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for undermining democracy in Cambodia. And in June 2018, the Chief of Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit, Hing Bun Heang, was sanctioned under Global Magnitsky Designations. The Cambodian authority has rejected the accusations and called the sanctions a violation of the country’s sovereignty.

In July 2018, the European Union sent officials to conduct a fact finding mission before it decides on whether or not Cambodia still deserves preferential tariffs under the Everything But Arms scheme. Following the mission, the European Commission issued a press release stating that ‘removing Cambodia from the trade scheme is a measure of last resort, if all our other efforts have failed to address these concerns’.

In an attempt to convince the international community that Cambodia is committed to democracy and human rights, the CPP announced its renewed focus on a social market economy, democratic values and putting people at the centre of the party’s political platform and development agenda, although details for this revised political doctrine are still scarce. Building its political identity based on ‘centrist democracy’, the CPP aims to address emerging issues such as income inequality and social injustice.

These changes sit among broader shifts in the CPP’s governance. The CPP is in the process of reforming its political ideology and identity to reflect the current realities in Cambodia. Historically rooted in communist ideology, the CPP (originally the Kampuchean People’s Revolution Party) reformed in the 1990s and shed its official commitment to liberal democracy. But institutional reforms within the CPP have been much slower due to factional tensions between conservatives and reformists.

Another challenge for the CPP-led government is its international image as a ‘client state’ of China. The CPP has acknowledged this and taken some concrete measures diversify its strategic and economic partnerships, particularly in strengthening strategic partnership with Japan. But Cambodia still lacks a nuanced foreign policy strategy. In particular, Cambodia needs to develop a strategy to convince other countries that its deep strategic partnership with China is not at the expense of good relations with other countries.

Speaking the truth, acknowledging facts and seeking holistic solutions are key values that the CPP must embrace in order to strengthen public trust in the government. The ingrained culture of sycophancy that has protected leaders and stifled fresh ideas will need to be changed. Transformative leadership and institutional innovation are critical for the future of the CPP.

The prospects for reform in Cambodia depend on two defining factors. First, young and competent leaders must be brought into the CPP’s senior ranks. Second, state institutions must be strengthened, made more efficient and more effective by prioritising meritocracy and empowering technocrats and bureaucrats.

Looking forward, only robust reforms and transformative leadership can help the CPP-led government earn trust and respect from the people and strengthen its legitimacy. The leadership deficit needs to be overcome by giving more opportunities to young leaders and implementing meritocracy. And the government has to address structural issues such as corruption, income inequality and social injustice. Most importantly, the CPP should genuinely respect democracy and human rights.

Dr. Vannarith Chheang is Associate Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.