China: Zero Tolerance for Academic Freedom, not unlike Malaysia


October 18, 2017

China: Zero Tolerance for Academic Freedom, not unlike Malaysia

Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for Fast for Word.

Universities will be closely scrutinised, professors will be evaluated and the Party will punish those lacking ideological firmness. Such is the program released by Xi Jinping’s government to coincide with the Communist Party congress, where Xi is seeking to reinforce his authority as a world leader.

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Dr Bill Chou Kwok-ping, a political scientist who was last month elected vice-president of Macau’s biggest pro-democracy group is the second Macau academic to lose his job after intervening in political debates in as many months, stirring concerns about academic freedom in the former Portuguese colony.

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Efforts to control universities and disregard academic freedom are also taking place abroad. In early September, Reuters and The Guardian exposed efforts by Chinese authorities to partially restrict access to the American Political Science Review from within China. The Review, one of the most reputable journals in its field, is published by the prestigious Cambridge University Press (CUP). Ultimately the publishing house resisted the Chinese pressure, but the news has sparked upset, coming just a few weeks after another controversy that shook the foundations of academia.

The “China Quarterly” affair

In August, China scholars from around the world learnt that Beijing had demanded that Cambridge University Press withdraw 315 articles and book reviews from China Quarterly, produced by University of London’s respected School of Oriental and African Studies and published by CUP.

These articles dealt with topics considered sensitive by the Chinese government: the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests; Mao Zedong and China’s Cultural Revolution; ethnic tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang; Taiwan; and anything relating to democratic reform.

CUP complied, pulling the offending articles from their Chinese site, explaining that it would rather withdraw a small number of articles of interest to a handful of academics, in order to ensure the continued availability in China of its numerous other academic and educational publications.

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Led by China Quarterly editor Tim Pringle, academics and NGOs expressed outrage that CUP would favour its own commercial interests above academic freedom, and threatened to boycott the publishing house.

Faced with protests, the Chinese government defended its actions in an editorial published in the August 20 edition of the Global Times, stating that, while it respects academic freedom in the UK, China has the right to decide what can be published within its borders.

Three days after the censorship came to lighy, CUP had a sudden change of heart, and made the 315 articles available again.

Around the same time, the US-based Association of Asian Studies (AAS) revealed it had received a similar demand but did not comply.

Ideological battle

The controversy highlights the oppressive nature of the government of the People’s Republic. Despite the undeniable international character of Chinese universities, higher education and research must tow the party line.

Deng Xiaoping’s late-1970s policies of economic reform and opening-up enabled the country to become a laboratory of ideas in the last quarter of the 20th century. But for the past decade or so, China appears to be engaged in an ideological battle against the West.

Following the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy, behind the US, which was itself weakened by the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the resulting severe recession.

Yet China quickly found itself facing dissatisfaction from those steamrollered by a policy of growth at all costs, in spite of the country’s economic and diplomatic successes. Many Chinese intellectuals began to think the lot of their fellow citizens should be improved with a final – political – reform.

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Led by writer, Nobel laureate and university professor Liu Xiaobo, one of the key activists of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, hundreds of intellectuals signed the Charter 08, a manifesto in favour of democratising the regime. For this Liu was sentenced in 2009 to an 11-year prison term. He was released in July 2017 and died a few days later.

Document #9, the “anti-subversion kit”

Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012-2013 signalled a new era in the curtailing of freedom of thought. Fearing any threat to the purity of their ideology, Communist Party of China (CPC) leaders released a handbook listing the subversive ideas to be eradicated, the infamous Document #9.

The following topics are now banned from public discussion: western constitutional democracy, the universal nature of human rights, the empowerment of civil society, multiple interpretations of history, and anything questioning the validity of Chinese economic reforms and socialism.

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While post-Mao China was not free of taboos, they were usually limited to the “three Ts”: Taiwan, Tiananmen and Tibet. Several things have changed since 2012. Firstly, the publication of Document #9 expanded the scope of unacceptable ideas: any subject, without exception, could now be censored.

Secondly, Chinese universities are now the reluctant front-line soldiers in this ideological battle: in 2015, the Minister for Education urged universities to ban the use of textbooks promoting Western values. Lastly, any contravening of the new norm is now subject to severe repression, and the CPC has no qualms about openly resorting to totalitarian tactics.

A violent crackdown

On top of routine intimidation, 248 human rights advocates were rounded up in a brutal mass arrest in July 2015. In the resulting atmosphere of fear, liberal intellectuals no longer think it wise to answer questions from foreign journalists; they practice broad self-censorship and, when possible, wind up living in exile abroad. For those who remain, harassment is commonplace.

These attacks against fundamental rights and specifically academic freedom are now extending beyond mainland China, starting with the special administrative regions. In 2014, several Macau professors were abruptly dismissed; in Hong Kong, the 2015 disappearances of five book-sellers and publishers is still unresolved. These cases reveal the widening cracks in the “one country, two systems” model. Yet Beijing’s influence does not stop there.

n the summer of 2014, the European Association for Chinese Studies had several pages of its program ripped out by the Confucius Institute the day before its biannual conference in Portugal.

The institute apparently objected to advertising from Taiwanese sponsors. That same year, the American Association of University Professors initiated calls for the closure of Confucius Institutes, claiming they undermine freedom of speech on US university campuses.

Last month Australia acknowledged Chinese government interference in its universities. Beijing has been carrying out unprecedented influence and control operations targeting Chinese students as well as Chinese and non-Chinese professors. In response, the Group of Eight (Go8), a coalition of the top eight universities in Australia, has called for a coordinated and measured response.

In 2016, more than a quarter of the 550,000 overseas students enrolled in Australian universities came from China. They represent a significant financial boon for Australian universities, who don’t want to offend the Chinese government. The question is, can the core values of academic institutions be preserved without incurring the wrath of Party leaders?

This article was originally published in French

 

‘Minister of Finance Inc’ – A Political Economist’s Study of Minister of Finance Incorporated and GLICs in Malaysia–Terence Gomez


September 30, 2017

‘Minister of Finance Inc’ A Political Economist’s Study of Minister of Finance Incorporated and GLICs in Malaysia–Terence Gomez

by M Krishnamoorthy @www.malaysiakini.com

 

Dr. Terence Gomez, in his latest book, “Minister of Finance Incorporated: Ownership and Control of Corporate Malaysia”, traces the government’s role in the corporate sector. He provides an assessment of Malaysia’s new political economy, with a focus on ownership and control of the corporate sector.

Gomez, who is a Professor of Political Economy at Universiti Malaya, is also the author of “Politics in Business: UMNO’s Corporate Investments”, a pioneering publication in 1990, which traced how UMNO secured a huge equity interest in Malaysia’s corporate sector.

 

In “Minister of Finance Incorporated”, Gomez (photo above) and his team of researchers offer another pioneering assessment of Malaysia’s corporate sector, though their focus is now government-linked investment companies (GLICs), a type of state enterprise that has long prevailed in the economy but has not been analysed.

Gomez argues that corporate power is now concentrated in these GLICs that are ultimately controlled by the Minister of Finance. Interestingly, Gomez admits that these GLICs are well-managed by highly qualified professionals, though these people can be subservient to the dictates of the Minister of Finance.

By focusing on the GLICs, “Minister of Finance Incorporated” ignites interesting debates about the role of the government in the economy, an issue that requires thoughtful consideration given their dominant presence in the corporate sector. Through in-depth research, novel insights are provided into this question of government ownership and control of corporate Malaysia.

This review is presented as a question-and-answer dialogue with the author, to draw attention to this study’s major findings. Much of what is outlined below is from this book.

The Interview

Professor Gomez, in your latest book, “Minister of Finance Incorporated”, what are your major findings?

Malaysia’s political economy has undergone a major transition since the 1990s that has escaped public attention.

Corporate power has shifted from UMNO and well-connected businessmen to the government. Huge business groups controlled by the government have emerged, seen in the dominance that a mere seven GLICs have over the corporate sector.

During this transition, one extraordinary outcome was the removal of UMNO, its members and the business associates of party leaders as owners of publicly-listed government-linked companies (GLCs).

 

UMNO now has direct equity ownership of only one quoted company, the media-based Utusan Melayu, while no UMNO member figures as a major corporate player.

UMNO’s absence from the corporate sector has major implications. The power nexus involving politics and business has fundamentally shifted at the federal level.

If this political-business nexus once involved numerous powerful UMNO politicians who had enormous influence over the corporate sector, economic power is now concentrated in the Office of the Minister of Finance.

Who are the GLICs?

Seven institutions have been classified by the government as GLICs. These are the Minister of Finance Incorporated (MoF Inc), the government’s holding company, which participates actively in corporate manoeuvres and owns a diverse range of firms known as government-linked companies (GLCs).

The sovereign wealth fund, Khazanah Nasional Berhad, is policy-based and implements major plans, including venturing abroad to support the government’s business internationalisation effort.

 

 

The investment trust fund, Permodalan Nasional (PNB, or National Equity Corporation), is portfolio-oriented, though with a policy agenda to redistribute wealth more equitably between the nation’s ethnic groups.

Two savings-cum-pension-based funds, the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) and the Kumpulan Wang Persaraan Diperbadankan (KWAP, or Retirement Fund Incorporated), are portfolio-based with an equity interest in a vast number of companies.

Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT, or Armed Forces Fund Board) is also a savings-cum-pension-based fund but is active in the management and development of large businesses in various sectors.

 

 

Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH, or Pilgrims Fund Board), though portfolio-based, has an organic form of enterprise development, active in the development of Islamic-based products and services.

How are these GLICs owned and controlled?

The Ministry of Finance sits at the apex of a complex business group structure comprising its holding company, MoF Inc, as well as other GLICs, quoted GLCs and a huge number of unquoted private firms.

MoF Inc is the “super-entity”, given its enormous influence over the corporate sector through its substantial ownership and control of the other GLICs and the financial sector, comprising Malaysia’s leading commercial banks. Through its ownership of these commercial banks, the government can control the economy indirectly by acting as a lender to private firms.

However, MoF Inc’s vast network of business interactions constitutes only one part of the government’s complex system of control over the corporate sector. State governments have a similarly sizeable interest in the corporate sector.

In this system, the Board of Directors are important. Directorships function as a primary avenue through which the government can dictate decision-making within GLICs and GLCs.

Our comparison of ownership and directorate patterns in 1996 (prior to the 1997 currency crisis) and 2013 revealed a new phenomenon.

 

Only a small number of UMNO members remain as directors of these government-owned enterprises. These findings are particularly astonishing as Umno remains a party riddled with money politics, patronage and rent-seeking.

How did Malaysia get to this point?

Three major events have contributed to these transitions where the Prime Minister and GLICs have emerged as economic powerhouses. The first was the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, which allowed these enterprises to gradually acquire a major presence in the corporate sector.

The involvement of the GLICs in the corporate sector diminished with the active promotion of privatisation from the mid-1980s. With this spate of privatisations, major enterprises fell under the ownership and control of UMNO and well-connected businesspeople.

The second defining event was the 1997 currency crisis and the momentous intra-elite political feuding that ensued the following year. The GLICs’ bailout of ailing well-connected companies and their takeover of firms associated with ousted Umno leaders led to their re-emergence as major actors in the corporate sector.

 

The third defining moment was when reform of the GLICs and GLCs was initiated by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in the late 1990s, though actively implemented by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (photo) from 2003. Najib Abdul Razak continued these reforms when he took office in 2009 as Prime Minister.

The current concentration of economic power in the office of the Prime Minister is particularly salient because when Najib took office in 2009 he voiced his intention to transfer GLCs to the private sector, arguing that the private sector should function as the primary engine of growth.

Unlike Mahathir, Najib appeared personally uninterested in business as a government tool for economic and corporate development when he came to power. Najib, however, soon came to realise the significant economic influence that the GLICs have over the corporate sector.

Why was this type of corporate control structure created?

This complex system of ownership and control of the corporate sector is not one that was designed or envisioned by ruling elites.

In fact, since the 1980s, all Prime Ministers – Mahathir, Abdullah and Najib – have persistently advocated privatisation of the GLCs on the assumption that these enterprises would function far more effectively and productively if under private ownership.

Even when the NEP was conceived, the plan was to transfer corporate equity acquired by the GLICs to bumiputeras, in order to redistribute wealth more equitably among the ethnic groups.

When Mahathir’s vision of creating business groups led by corporate captains was dismantled by the 1997 currency crisis, the GLICs and GLCs were deployed to bail out well-connected ailing, debt-ridden enterprises.

 

When a bitter feud ensued between Mahathir and his Minister of Finance, Anwar Ibrahim, over these bailouts, Anwar was ousted from public office and his business allies lost control of their corporate assets.

When a similar feud ensued between Mahathir and Daim Zainuddin, Anwar’s replacement as minister of finance, companies controlled by his allies and UMNO were channelled to the GLICs. Having had persistent feuds with his trusted allies who he had appointed as Minister of Finance, prime minister Mahathir then took charge of this ministry.

The new structure of Malaysia’s political economy has also arisen out of the need for the UMNO President to reduce the influence of party warlords.

UMNO’s major businesses now under the GLICs include media companies that own the major newspapers, The New Straits Times and Berita Harian, as well as TV3, the party’s cooperative KUB, the huge construction-based UEM Group, the hotel-based Faber Group (now UEM Adgenta) and the Bank of Commerce, now a part of Malaysia’s third largest banking enterprise, CIMB Group. Control of these companies ultimately falls under MoF Inc.

If UMNO members once had many sources of patronage, what is the situation now?

UMNO members now have only one source if they wish to obtain access to federal government-generated economic concessions. This is profoundly problematic in terms of public governance as the minister of finance concurrently holds the position of prime minister, a situation that does not prevail in democracies.

In this governance structure, there is the possibility of checks and balances being deeply undermined, opening space for abuse of power that can have serious implications on the economy and the corporate sector.

Who is accountable for the running of the companies?

The board of directors of these companies are accountable. While most of these directors are professionals who manage the GLCs in a productive manner, since they are appointed by the minister of finance, they can be compelled to follow his dictates.

There are also serious concerns in some GLICs. In LTH, a number of its directors, including its chairperson, are UMNO members who are elected representatives but hold no position in government. LTAT is led by Lodin Kamaruddin (photo), a longstanding close business associate of Prime Minister Najib.

 

There is sufficient evidence that these GLICs could be vulnerable to political interference unless sufficient oversight measures and institutional reforms are introduced to ensure they are well-insulated from such abuse.

In the boards of directors of the GLICs and GLCs, what has also increased is the number of former bureaucrats. These ex-civil servants, like the professional elite, have no political influence. However, they also appear to function as mere figureheads.

The most influential decision-makers are the chairpersons of these boards and the managing directors who, when necessary, take the cue from the Minister of Finance, further indicating his overwhelming influence over the corporate sector.

There is evidence of “inner circles” among the GLICs. One inner circle revolves around Nor Mohamad Yakcop, until recently the deputy chairperson of Khazanah. Professional managers groomed by him lead the GLICs and GLCs.

An inner circle is also evident in the media sector. An obscure private firm, Gabungan Kesturi, controls the leading media enterprise, Media Prima, along with PNB.

The directors and shareholders of Gabungan Kesturi are Shahril Ridza Ridzuan and Abdul Rahman Ahmad, both groomed by Nor Mohamad. Shahril is the CEO of EPF, which also owns a huge interest in Media Prima. Rahman was appointed the CEO of PNB in 2016.

The use of private companies like Gabungan Kesturi obscures the identity of the ultimate shareholder, the Minister of Finance, as well as the extent of the state’s control over major media companies.

Did our leaders groom and place executives in GLICs for their vested interests?

Daim Zainuddin (photo) groomed and placed professionals he had trained as executives and owners of companies associated with UMNO.

 

A similar practice of grooming young professionals as executives and CEOs emerged in the late 1990s after well-connected firms came under the control of the GLICs. Professionals trained by Nor Mohamed took over the management of these enterprises.

However, while Nor Mohamad and Daim groomed and placed professionals in control of major quoted enterprises, their reasons for doing so differed.

As Minister of Finance, Daim, also UMNO’s Treasurer and a longstanding businessperson, appeared intent on securing enormous control over the corporate sector to serve his vested business interests. The professional-managerial team groomed by Nor Mohamed was not necessarily trained to manage the GLICs and GLCs.

What are the possible repercussions of this ownership and control mechanism?

Through this pyramiding system, with the Minister of Finance at the apex, the GLICs and GLCs can be subjected to considerable abuse. This pyramiding system allows the minister to secure numerous political and business benefits from the GLICs and GLCs, as well as abuse them.

It is noteworthy that MoF Inc has ownership and control of controversial companies such as 1MDB and the National Feedlot Corporation (NFC).

The GLIC-based business groups have control over companies through majority equity ownership, which accords them significant voting rights. This has serious implications for minority shareholders, and the economy, in the event of abuse of the companies.

Our study noted that the EPF appears to have been forced to take control of RHB Capital from a firm linked with the former Chief Minister (and now Governor) of Sarawak, Abdul Taib Mahmud (photo above ). This financial institution has long been an enterprise that has come under the control of a number of well-connected people and GLCs.

Politics evidently matters, influencing how these enterprises are run. Policies also matter as they shape the different ways in which these institutions are managed.

There can be a link to between politics and policies, especially redistributive policies and enterprise development strategies when determining how these enterprises are employed.

After his party fared badly in the 2013 General Election, Najib announced that contracts and other concessions would be channeled through GLICs and GLCs to bumiputeras, justified by his new ethnically-based affirmative action policy that targeted this ethnic group. This was evidently to consolidate the political support of this ethnic community. 

What reforms are required to deal with this issue?

These powerful GLICs are a clear manifestation of high concentration of corporate ownership in the state. This concentration of corporate wealth is justifiable only if GLICs are managed in an accountable and transparent manner.

Inevitably, to inspire confidence among private investors, political reforms are imperative to enforce stringent institutional checks and balances by independent oversight institutions.

 

The technocratic professional elite at the epicentre of this GLIC-GLC network can remain, but must be subjected to close scrutiny by parliamentary action committees led by the Opposition. And the Prime Minister cannot also serve as the Finance Minister since it is an obvious case of conflict of interest.

Trump appeases an authoritarian Malaysian Prime Minister to The White House


September 13, 2017

Trump appeases an authoritarian Malaysian Prime Minister to the White House

By Editorial Board, The Washington Post

The Post’s View

Opinion

 

Malaysian PM Najib Razak reviews an honour guard at The White House. Romeo Ranoco/Reuters

PRESIDENT TRUMP has made a habit of embracing authoritarian rulers he regards as friendly, without regard for their subversion of democratic norms or gross human rights violations. Yet his meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak at the White House on Tuesday sets a new low. Not only is Mr. Najib known for imprisoning peaceful opponents, silencing critical media and reversing Malaysia’s progress toward democracy. He also is a subject of the largest foreign kleptocracy investigation ever launched by the U.S. Justice Department.

U.S. investigators have charged that Mr. Najib and close associates diverted $4.5 billion from a Malaysian government investment fund for their own uses, including $730 million that ended up in accounts controlled by the Prime Minister. Justice first filed civil suits seeking the freezing of some $1.7 billion in assets in the United States, including real estate, artworks and stakes in Hollywood movies; more recently, the department asked that those actions be put on hold while it pursues a criminal investigation. Mr. Najib has not been charged with a crime and denies wrongdoing, but the U.S. investigation prompted speculation in Malaysia that he could be arrested if he set foot on American soil — not good PR for a leader who is obligated to call an election sometime in the next few months.

[Here’s what President Trump should tell Malaysia’s prime minister]

With his White House invitation, Mr. Trump has neatly gotten Mr. Najib off that hook and provided him with what the regime will portray as a tacit pre-election endorsement. Despite his repression, Mr. Najib could use that sort of help: In the last election, in 2013, his party lost the popular vote and retained power only because of the gerrymandering of election districts.

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President Trump and other top American officials, left, met at the White House with Prime Minister Najib Razak of Malaysia and his delegation, right .The Post’s Editorial states: “The best way for the United States to build a stronger alliance with Malaysia and bolster its independence from China is to encourage those in the country who support liberal democratic values — while holding Mr. Najib accountable for his human rights violations, as well as any financial crimes he may have committed in the United States”.

If the White House received anything in exchange for that huge political favor, it’s not evident. That’s particularly unfortunate because Mr. Najib’s regime is not only a conspicuous violator of human rights but a relative friend to North Korea. The regime of Kim Jong Un has exported workers to Malaysia to earn hard currency. Kim Jong Un’s estranged half brother was murdered in Kuala Lumpur’s international airport — so far with no consequences for Pyongyang.

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Mr. Trump isn’t the only  U.S. President to pursue a policy of appeasement toward Mr. Najib. Barack Obama was the first appeaser who played golf with and visited the Malaysian Prime Minister in Malaysia.

Mr. Trump isn’t the first U.S. President to pursue a policy of appeasement toward Mr. Najib. President Barack Obama golfed with the Prime Minister and flattered him with the first visit by a U.S. President to Malaysia in nearly half a century. Like Mr. Obama, Mr. Trump may imagine that courting Mr. Najib is a necessary counter to China, which has hosted him twice in the past year and wooed him with promises of about $100 billion in investments. Yet Mr. Najib’s corruption and disregard for democratic norms mean he will inevitably prefer the values-free patronage of Beijing over alliance with Washington.

The best way for the United States to build a stronger alliance with Malaysia and bolster its independence from China is to encourage those in the country who support liberal democratic values — while holding Mr. Najib accountable for his human rights violations, as well as any financial crimes he may have committed in the United States. If Mr. Trump makes a start at that on Tuesday, he could begin to mitigate the error of inviting Mr. Najib to the White House.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-welcomes-an-authoritarian-to-the-white-house/2017/09/11/9d19f51c-9707-11e7-b569-3360011663b4_story.html?utm_term=.e59f606520a0

Malaysia Sdn Berhad: Book Review


August 11, 2017

Malaysia Sdn Berhad: Fox guarding the henhouse?

BOOK REVIEW | Minister of Finance Incorporated: Ownership and Control of Corporate Malaysia. Edmund T Gomez et al. Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), Kuala Lumpur.

by Prof. Dr. Jomo Kwame Sundaram

http://www.malaysiakini.com

In the late 1980s, the young Terence Gomez proved himself to be the worthy successor to a Malaysian research tradition begun by James Puthucheary in Singapore’s Changi Prison almost three decades earlier. Gomez single-handedly transformed our understanding of the role of politics in the ownership and control of the Malaysian corporate sector.

Employing novel methods as needed and appropriate, the auto-didact researcher showed how official policies and institutions had enabled an earlier generation of selected Malay business professionals to take over some commanding heights of the Malaysian economy.

Change and continuity

In their new book, Gomez and his team of researchers chart developments over the last three decades since he began his pioneering work, paying particular attention to developments following the 1997-1998 crisis. That crisis exposed the vulnerability of the earlier expansion closely associated with the Umno leadership then.

The corporate restructuring and refinancing institutions and processes that followed were not simply bailouts at the public expense, as alleged by some critics then. Instead, as the book shows, most major assets are now under new management, ultimately controlled by the current prime minister cum finance minister.

The authors focus on seven government-linked investment companies (GLICs), namely Khazanah Nasional, Permodalan Nasional (PNB), both under MoF Inc, Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP or EPF), Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (KWAP), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT) and Tabung Haji.

Malaysians may be comforted to learn that of the seven, only Tabung Haji is run by politicians, and the others by professionals. But after all, 1MDB too has been run by professionals (Jho Low is a Wharton graduate) while Felda Global Venture’s previous boss claimed to have a doctorate. The not-so-magnificent seven covered do not include others, such as those in the Felda group, controlled directly by the PM since 2004.

Most bumiputera entrepreneurs who emerged in the dozen years or so before the 1997 crisis also had impressive professional credentials. The apparently better performance of the more recent crop of professional managers may have less to do with their qualifications, than the ethos, checks and balances of the new institutional arrangements introduced and enforced by some GLICs.

Government control

The range of activities undertaken by government-linked companies (GLCs) overseen by the GLICs includes familiar ones from the 1980s such as utilities, finance, plantations, property and construction. Media, previously controlled by the ruling party and its trustees, are now held by GLCs, while investments in hospitals and other services have also grown. With development finance institutions now under GLCs, their original objectives and rationales have been undermined by commercial considerations.

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The Gomez team has done Malaysians a great service by describing how things have changed, tracing the bewildering variety of new arrangements. However, how to interpret this variety remains moot, and some informed readers will have their own bones to pick with what is considered most significant in their analysis.

Protracted crisis

Two economic developments help us better understand the recent growing unrest, especially among informed Malays. First, the Saudi-initiated oil price collapse in late 2014 precipitated a more general commodity price collapse. Meanwhile, lacklustre growth in Malaysia since 1998 has been exacerbated by premature deindustrialisation unconvincingly presented as inevitable in achieving developed country status.

Second, despite heavy censorship, news has been leaking out of corporate abuses involving not only 1MDB, but also FGV and other corporations associated with the legendary ‘Malaysian Official 1’. Easy money from China may have helped the regime with its immediate financing problems, but a generation familiar with mounting personal debt senses that this is at the public’s, taxpayers’ and future generations’ expense.

This ‘double whammy’ has been reflected in the much-weakened ringgit and by other indicators. Meanwhile, there have been heightened concerns about the recent foreign investor resurgence, especially with official non-disclosure of ownership data since 2008. Recent erosion of public faith in the state and ruling coalition has been accelerated by unprecedented recent abuses for personal gain and nepotism.

Don’t shoot the messenger

Even if successfully challenged on some details, this important book should open an important new debate on how Malaysia is to progress. Gomez offers some proposals, apparently at odds with the book’s sponsor. Others, especially participants in and observers of Malaysia’s corporate sector and political economy, will promote their own alternative purported solutions. The ensuing debate can only benefit the nation, as Gomez’s first decade of publications shaped the earlier debate and reforms, even if most outcomes may have disappointed him.

While this regime is undoubtedly associated with unprecedented abuses, there is little in the study to support the publisher’s faith in leaving things to the market and simplistic insistence on government withdrawal from the economy as a universal panacea to the myriad problems the nation faces. In the face of the wide-ranging and complex issues involved, this would be tantamount to throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Unsurprisingly, this publication on the regime’s role in ownership and control of contemporary corporate Malaysia is silent on the current political crisis as the nation approaches the next general election. Nevertheless, IDEAs must be congratulated for sponsoring and publishing this important work.

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JOMO KS received the 2007 Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

 

 

A Tribute to Mathematician Maryam Mirzakhani– A Beautiful Mind and a Gentle Soul


July 19, 2017

A Tribute to Mathematician Maryam Mirzakhani– A Beautiful Mind and a Gentle Soul

BOOK REVIEW: Muddy Boots & Smart Suits –Researching Asia-Pacific Affairs


June 18, 2017

BOOK REVIEW: Muddy Boots & Smart Suits —Researching Asia-Pacific Affairs

Nicholas Farrelly, Amy King, Michael Wesley, and Hugh White (eds) (ISEAS Publishing)

reviewed by Tom Pepinsky

http://www.newmandala.org

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Muddy Boots & Smart Suits is a sprawling volume, containing everything from a plea for the practice turn in international relations theory to an explanation of cross-validation in predictive quantitative modeling to reflections on internet access in rural Myanmar. It is also, paraphrasing the introductory chapter by Michael Wesley, an attempt at reflection on Asia-Pacific studies by researchers with current or past links to the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. Reading this volume as a big fan of (and occasional visitor to) the ANU, I had the sense that this volume reflects not just a larger conversation that has been happening for decades now between ‘area studies’ and ‘the disciplines’, but also something more special to the ANU.

The book succeeds in showcasing the breadth and diversity of scholarship on Asia and the Pacific within that community. Looking across the volume as a whole, some of the more useful contributions (to the mind of this reader) are those that touch on the policy process, and the ANU’s position as a national university serving Australia itself. There are also some interesting discussions of Australia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region, viewing the country as not just an outside observer but as itself a case.

Readers curious about particular topics or questions will also find much to learn in the individual chapters, which showcase scholars’ areas of expertise in an engaging and sometimes speculative manner. I suspect that this volume’s best use will be as a series of chapters, read individually by students and specialists who find the chapter topics engaging and wish to know more.

This leads me to my main criticism. Taken as a whole, the volume’s weakness is how disjointed the individual contributions are. This may have been inevitable given the volume’s charge, but there are missed opportunities for interesting and productive engagement across chapters that may have led to some more substantial conclusions. Here is one example: the chapter on strategic cultures by Peter J. Dean and Greg Raymond summarises various disagreements between first and third generation schools of strategic culture. Simplifying mightily, one axis in this debate is between whether behavior is just a dependent variable or is both a dependent and an independent variable.  It would have been revealing to put this into conversation with Paul Kenny’s chapter on design-based inference. If the first generation strategic culture theorists are right, what does this mean for a research strategy that requires a strict conceptual separation between causal variables and their effects? Is this tension irresolvable? If so, what’s next?

Another tension is between chapters that express a preference for microlevel details versus those interested in broad national trajectories. Evi Fitriani studies regional alignments in Asia with a conceptual focus on state-level processes. Nick Bisley’s chapter on power also operates at the state level. Contrast this with Cecelia Jacob’s preference for local-level studies of conflict and local-level understandings of international norms, each of which requires a focus on the individual or subnational community level. Should scholars following in Jacob’s tradition find Fitriani and Bisley’s analyses compelling, and vice versa? One argument—which I find overly simplistic—is that this is just a depth/breadth tradeoff. I suspect that the issues are more substantial, and would have enjoyed reading the authors grapple explicitly with them, in direct conversation with one another.

More narrowly, but importantly for the volume’s broader reach, I disagree with two characterisations of Asia Pacific studies in Wesley’s introductory chapter, which for better or for worse frames the entire volume. First, I take issue with the claim that Asia Pacific studies has been ‘remarkably non self-reflective’. It is impossible to list all of the volumes, workshops, seminars, and conference panels devoted to ‘rethinking’ or ‘reimagining’ or ‘refocusing’ the unwieldy body of intellectual inquiry captured under the term ‘Asian and Pacific Studies’, not just in Australia but in North America, Europe, and in Asia itself. There are at least four common themes that can be found throughout the subgenre of self-reflection: (1) the constructedness and artificiality of ‘Asia and the Pacific’; (2) discipline versus area studies; (3) positionality, hegemony, and Orientalism; (4) local versus global and sub-, cross-, trans-, and international studies.

The other disagreement I have is that ‘few methodological or conceptual debates have originated from within the study of Asian and Pacific societies’. The exceptions are just subaltern studies and the rise of great powers. How narrow a view of the contributions of Asianists this is! Just a glance at my bookshelf reveals so many additions. Margaret Mead on Samoa. Benedict Anderson on nationalism. Clifford Geertz on the Balinese cockfight. James Scott on the resistance and the state. Aihwa Ong and Michael Peletz on gender and identity. Chalmers Johnson on the developmental state in Japan. I could certainly go on—that list just reflects my idiosyncratic tastes and interests. These are major contributions by regional experts working on regional issues that have shaped entire disciplinary conversations, each with methodological implications that has occupied a generation of graduate seminars around the world.

The more general observation that emerges from this discussion has implications beyond Muddy Boots & Smart Suits as a volume. Research on Asia is important: the study of Asia and the Pacific has proven to be remarkably generative, providing major concepts and debates in the social sciences and humanities. Muddy Boots & Smart Suits reminds us of the value of self-reflection, and especially of the individual researchers, political incentives, and institutional support required to make these contributions.

Thomas Pepinsky is Associate Professor in Cornell University’s Department of Government, and a faculty member of its Southeast Asia Program.