November 2, 2018
Lecture: Climate Change and Governance
November 2, 2018
September 30, 2018
July 10, 2018
The Trump administration in Washington has invoked security threats under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose punitive tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium. The next target is automobiles and parts and US$34 billion of Chinese imports. While it may sound plausible that dependence on these crucial industrial imports from potential adversaries might affect national security interests, there’s absolutely no responsible analysis that suggests they do. Security policy is dominating broader national strategy in the United States, while economic considerations affecting security in more important ways are taking a back seat.
Only 2 per cent of US military steel supplies are sourced abroad. As for automobiles, as the global auto association recently pointed out, ‘America does not go to war in a Ford Fiesta’. The national defence requirement for imported cars and parts is virtually zero. If US capacity for the production of civilian autos and trucks is relevant to national defence, it is stronger now as a result of trade and import competition than it has ever been. As the US National Association of Manufacturers says, import restrictions simply give an edge to foreign production. The unilateral imposition of tariffs or quotas under Section 232 would undermine the sector and broader manufacturing production and jobs in the United States, the association suggests. A weaker American economy undermines America’s military power.
Donald Trump declares a Tariff War on China
National security arguments for these tariffs simply provide a fig leaf of ‘legal’ authority for President Trump to impose penalties on US trading partners, including Europe, Japan, China (which incidentally supplies only 3 per cent of US steel imports), South Korea and Canada — Australia having done a WTO-illegal deal to wriggle out — for totally spurious reasons.
False claims about the relationship between trade and national security are not just a figment of Mr Trump’s fantastical imagination. They are reflected in US National Security statements and the pronouncements of national security authorities in other countries, including in Australia. The Trump administration’s first National Security Strategy called China a ‘revisionist power’ that seeks to ‘displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region’ and ‘shape a world antithetical to US values and interests’. It said that the engagement policy had ‘failed’ and that ‘great power competition’ had returned between the United States, China, and Russia. Soon after, the National Defense Strategy changed the primary focus of US strategy from fighting terrorism to preventing the threat to ‘US prosperity and security’ and ‘international order’ posed by China’s quest for ‘global pre-eminence’ and the leadership of an ‘authoritarian’ world.
It’s not that these claims should not be seriously evaluated; that’s exactly what should happen. But they should not be accepted as unchallengeable holy writ and dominate the national strategies of the United States and other countries. The issues in national economic strategy at stake for the people of the United States and other countries extend well beyond the competence of the security policy establishment, just as security issues extend beyond the competence of the economic policy establishment. Each needs to inform the other.
Peter Drysdale and Shiro Armstrong in our lead essay this week look at better processes for getting the hard choices that Australia faces in strategic policy right. Like a number of other countries in Asia, the United States is Australia’s principal security partner and its major trading partner is China. Australia’s national interest comprehends both China and the United States — and security and economics need to be integrated into strategic decision making from the outset. Australia needs to be better placed to deal with the ongoing challenges from both countries (and others) in a world that’s become more complex.
‘The problem’, Drysdale and Armstrong suggest, ‘lies in how Australia’s strategic policy choices are currently being framed and made’.
‘Strategic policy is overwhelmingly framed from a security perspective in political–military terms. Yet the economic dimension of national power and influence is also central to the hard choices to be made on strategic policy. Economic policy and engagement reinforce and habituate a rules-based international order and, significantly, they create bigger, broader interests and pluralities in countries. Incorporating economic options with political–military elements in thinking about strategic policy broadens options for attaining both national security and prosperity’.
Drysdale and Armstrong illustrate the problem through the lens of responses to China’s infrastructure initiatives such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The security community in the United States frames these initiatives in concerns about territorial disputes and political developments in China, and represents them to their allies in Asia as designed to compromise willing partners in Chinese debt. That’s clearly not the whole story: though the AIIB and BRI do provide China with a means ‘to increase its influence, as other countries like Japan have in the past, [they are] also a way for China to support economic development and poverty reduction by building infrastructure and creating economic links between countries, and [for China] to become a responsible global and regional player commensurate with its growing economic size and power’.
‘The responses of the security specialist and the economist are each inadequate in themselves. But bringing them together offers a path of constructive and active engagement that can support both security and prosperity. Drawing away is not going to stop China pursuing the BRI, while engaging intelligently and systematically can mitigate some of the downside risks and help lift global prosperity and security’, Drysdale and Armstrong point out.
This problem is not limited to choices about China. Australia and its partners in Asia are now confronted with the reality that the United States, their primary security alliance partner is actively engaged in seeking to destroy the rules-based economic regime on which their prosperity and their political security is fundamentally based. This is an immediate and existential threat. The medium to longer term consequence of the United States’ own self-inflicted harm will, on all rational calculations, shrink its economic power and political influence. Where’s that reflected anywhere in Australia’s national strategy at this time?
The Drysdale–Armstrong analysis leads to the powerful conclusion that Australia’s national strategy policymaking is deeply flawed in the marriage of these two arms of the national interest. The system worked well when Australia’s main security and economic partners were the same. But that world has changed, and the way in which top political decisions on national strategy are framed as well as the foundations of policy advice on which they depend are overdue for significant reform.
The EAF Editorial Board is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.
July 6, 2018
by Hana Hanifah and Askabea Fadhilla, The Habibie Center
ASEAN countries are no strangers to conflict and violence. As a region comprising diverse nation-states, Southeast Asia has experienced a number of inter- and intra-state conflicts. Political stability in the region has improved over the last decade, especially due to a decline in inter-state disputes. But intra-state disputes in the form of ethnic conflicts, violence against minorities and violent extremism — including terrorism — are gaining ground.
There are ongoing reports about Rohingya trying to escape from Myanmar and seeking refuge in Malaysia. Amid the Myanmar army’s denial of its alleged atrocities against the Rohingya, about 700,000 Rohingya have reportedly fled the country since August 2017.
Meanwhile, according to the Global Peace Index, the Philippines is one of the least peaceful countries in the region due to its bloody war against drugs and crime that has resulted in increasing rates of homicide, incarceration and extrajudicial killings. Based on the same report, Indonesia had the greatest performance drop in the Asia Pacific in terms of peacefulness due to an increase in politically-motivated terrorism and growing tensions between hard-line fundamentalists and minority groups. Indonesia is also more and more vulnerable to the threat of an alliance between the so-called Islamic State, Darul Islam and some local violent extremist groups, as shown in the recent Surabaya bombing.
Even decades before the United Nations’ An Agenda for Peace report in 1992, ASEAN had committed to maintaining peace in the region without using the label of ‘preventive diplomacy’. From its inception, ASEAN was intended to be a regional conflict-prevention mechanism that internalised the practices of peaceful dialogue, consultation and consensus building among its members, amid the geopolitical uncertainty and diplomatic breakdowns that characterised the Cold War period.
The ASEAN Regional Forum defined preventive diplomacy for ASEAN in 2001 as member states’ diplomatic or political action to prevent disputes or conflicts that could pose a threat to regional stability, with the purpose of preventing such disputes from escalating to armed confrontation and minimising the impact of those conflicts and disputes on the region.
But in practice, preventive diplomacy in ASEAN is limited to the execution of forums and meetings that do not necessarily producing binding mechanisms to resolve potentially destabilising intra-state conflicts. ASEAN seems to be stuck in confidence-building measures and has not completely implemented preventive diplomacy as envisioned by the United Nations.
Critics point to the development gap and significant political differences between ASEAN member states. The ‘ASEAN way’ that rests on the principles of consensus building and non-intervention is often cited as one of the factors that undermine a deeper commitment to implementing preventive diplomacy. ASEAN’s limited definition of preventive diplomacy is also criticised for constraining the practice of preventive diplomacy in the region to only include conflicts between and among states. This excludes non-state and intra-state conflicts or violence, which are seemingly growing in the post-Cold War era.
But the biggest challenge to preventive violence in ASEAN yet to be taken seriously is the lack of knowledge about conflicts and violence. To this day, it remains a challenge to pinpoint the general trend and exact number of violent events and conflicts within ASEAN. Some instances were allegedly perpetrated by the state, while others were committed by non-state entities and individuals. Although some reports intuitively indicate that violence in ASEAN is increasing, it is hard to identify the exact number of incidents because the data is scarce and rarely updated.
The limited reliable data that is available reveals that each country in Southeast Asia has its own patterns and characteristics of conflict and violence. In terms of intensity, there are also differences in the number of casualties and frequency of incidents. The types of violence also differ and include civil wars, insurgency, crimes, communal conflicts and violence against minority groups.
Relatively little data on violent incidents existed until recently, and the data is generally focused at the national level. Data on regional trends is patchy and scattered across various sources, which makes it difficult to generate a quick and accurate analysis to aid policy making processes. Not all countries have the capacity to record such data, which itself can be a controversial process in a number of ASEAN member states where conflicts are sometimes highly political.
Knowledge about the distinct features of violence in ASEAN is crucial to enable policymakers and stakeholders to identify shortcomings in the region’s approach to responding and preventing conflict. Such knowledge would also equip them to come up with effective policies and strategies to promote peace and stability in ASEAN.
A knowledge-based approach would enable stakeholders to resolve conflicts more effectively — not only by managing the impacts but also by preventing the escalation of future conflicts and violence. It would also encourage better practices of data collection and recording violence in and between ASEAN member states — which is essential to monitoring and evaluating preventive diplomacy and progress towards peace in the region.
Hana Hanifah and Askabea Fadhilla are Researchers at the ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center, Jakarta.
June 14, 2014
by Evan Osnos
Honestly, I think he’s going to do these things,” President Trump told reporters in Singapore on Tuesday night, after signing a page of loose declarations with Kim Jong Un. “I may stand before you in six months and say,‘Hey, I was wrong.’ I don’t know that I’ll ever admit that, but I’ll find some kind of an excuse.” Perhaps no truer words were spoken at the Singapore summit, where Donald Trump, with a handshake and a shrug, opened a new phase in Asia that will eventually reveal him to be either a visionary who saw a path to peace where others did not or a dupe who squandered American credibility. He announced the opening of contact with North Korea with the bonhomie of a developer at a groundbreaking: he hailed an “excellent relationship” with a “talented” counterpart, and shooed away questions about timetables and the risk of default. He made no mention of Kim’s accelerated testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, or of his own threats, via Twitter last year, to “totally destroy” North Korea. He handed off the substantive work to his Cabinet, a team that is already sharply divided between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who has expressed high hopes for peace, and the national-security adviser, John Bolton, who has argued for years that North Korea cannot be trusted.
Kim-Trump Singapore Summit
Compared with the expectations for the summit—or with previous agreements—there was much that Trump failed to get. There was no exchange of liaison offices and no pledge to improve human rights. “I do not see what can really possibly hold in this remarkably imprecise and nonbinding document,” Andrei Lankov, a longtime North Korea watcher at Kookmin University, in Seoul, said. “It is truly remarkable how Donald Trump, being in such a strong negotiating position, has managed to get so little from the North Koreans.” For Trump, the goal, apparently, was the handshake itself. In his view, cheerful patter is easy and inexpensive, and he can renounce the positive vibes on a whim, as needed. In the annals of diplomacy, though, the risks of casual declarations abound. Most apropos in this case is George W. Bush’s first official trip to Europe as President, when he was asked if he trusted Vladimir Putin, and famously replied, “I looked the man in the eye. I found him very straightforward and trustworthy—I was able to get a sense of his soul.” (Condoleezza Rice later lamented that response, writing, “We were never able to escape the perception that the President had naïvely trusted Putin and then been betrayed.”)
Trump appears to have decided that the chance of a breakthrough is worth the risk of looking naïve. “I do trust him, yeah,” he told ABC’s George Stephanopoulos, in answer to the inevitable question about Kim. “He really wants to do a great job for North Korea. He’s de-nuking the whole place, and I think he’s going to start very quickly. He really wants to do something, I think, terrific for their country.”
What Kim really wants, however, may not be what Trump has in mind. “North Korean media wrote at remarkable length about Kim Jong Un’s trip to Singapore,” Lankov told me. State cameramen made a point of filming attentive, prosperous Singaporeans, a montage that will be used to fortify Kim’s image and to promote the prospect of economic reforms. The Rodong Sinmun, North Korea’s major official newspaper, dedicated a large part of its front page to celebrating Singapore’s authoritarian capitalism. “The island state was praised on a scale one seldom sees in the North Korean newspapers,” Lankov added. But, in its early reports, North Korean media made conspicuously little mention of the substance of the summit, and Pyongyang gave no sign that the state is preparing its public to stop celebrating nuclear weapons as a singular achievement.
In fact, as expected, North Korea made no specific commitments about dismantling its nuclear program. In the joint statement, Kim “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”—a reference to previous agreements, going back to 1992, which have not held. By far, the largest concession in the talks came from Trump, who announced his willingness to freeze joint military exercises with South Korean forces. For months, Trump’s aides described a freeze as a non-starter, but, on Tuesday, he adopted North Korea’s view that the exercises are, as he put it, “very provocative” and said that the suspension would “save us a tremendous amount of money.”
Trump freezes joint military exercises with South Korean forces.That is no minor concession
That is no minor concession. The next round of war games with South Korea was scheduled to take place in August. After the announcement, Patrick Cronin, an Asia specialist at the Center for a New American Security, told me that joint exercises are designed to deter North Korea from attacks on the South, such as the sinking, in 2010, of the Cheonan, a naval vessel, which killed forty-six seamen. Deterrence relies on “a degree of professionalism and readiness for crisis response that can only come through military training and exercises,” he said. “If North Korea is not moving toward significant disclosure of its nuclear forces and then taking significant, verifiable steps in the direction of denuclearization, then we should resume pressure, including major exercises, by next spring.”
More surprising still, Trump raised the previously taboo prospect of withdrawing some of America’s nearly thirty thousand troops in South Korea. “I want to get our soldiers out. I want to bring our soldiers back home,” he said. That may have been improvisation. Hours earlier, Defense Secretary James Mattis had told reporters, “I don’t believe” that troops were up for negotiation. Senator Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican, and usually a Trump defender, said on NBC that he would “violently disagree” with any removal of troops from South Korea.
“Trump may have also precipitated an outcome that he does not fully grasp: by suspending military exercises, and alluding to removing troops from South Korea, he will stir doubts about the strength of America’s commitment to its allies in Asia, including Japan, Taiwan, and Australia. They will have no choice but to begin to reimagine America’s role in the region, and their relationships to Beijing.”–Evan Osnos
Nobody greeted the news from Singapore with more delight than China. For years, Chinese officials have urged Trump to freeze military exercises in South Korea, which Beijing regards as a threatening gesture in its neighborhood. Shortly after the announcement, the Global Times, a nationalist state newspaper in Beijing, hailed Trump’s move in an editorial headlined “End of ‘War Games’ Will Be a Big Step Forward for Peninsula.” Elizabeth Economy, a China specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me, “The Chinese are breathing a deep sigh of relief. They got what they most wanted.” She added, “And, best of all, it came out of President Trump’s mouth. The Chinese didn’t even have to rely on Kim Jong Un to do their bidding.”
Any negotiations in the months and years ahead will be fraught: the United States will need to get Kim to provide a full declaration of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. International inspectors will seek to verify them. Only then can the U.S. begin to imagine dismantling them. But, more immediately, Trump may have also precipitated an outcome that he does not fully grasp: by suspending military exercises, and alluding to removing troops from South Korea, he will stir doubts about the strength of America’s commitment to its allies in Asia, including Japan, Taiwan, and Australia. They will have no choice but to begin to reimagine America’s role in the region, and their relationships to Beijing. From Trump’s perspective, the encounter with Kim was an end in itself. For those who bear the consequences of his words and actions, this is just the beginning.
April 26, 2018
by Tim Hains
The French President took aim at several key points of Trump’s agenda in a historic speech to a joint session of Congress on Wednesday. Emmanuel Macron urged President Trump to stay in the Iran deal and got loud applause from Democrats when he said he knew the U.S. would rejoin the Paris climate pact “one day.”
The speech happened to coincide with the 58th anniversary of then-French President Charles de Gaulle’s address to a joint session of Congress.
“The 21st century has brought a series of new threats and new challenges that our ancestors might have never imagined,” Macron said. “We can build the 21st-century world order based on a new breed multilateralism, based on a more effective, accountable, and results-oriented multilateralism.”
He continued: “This requires more than ever the United States involvement as your role was decisive for creating and safeguarding this free world. The United States is the one who invented this multilateralism. You are the one who has to help now to preserve and reinvent it.”
On Iran, he said: “Our objective is clear. Iran shall never possess any nuclear weapons. Not now, not in five years, not in 10 years, never.”
“We should not abandon it if we don’t have something more substantial instead. That is my position,” Macron added. “Your President and your country … will have to take its own responsibilities regarding this issue.”
About climate change, he said: “Let us face it: There is no planet B.”
“We must find a smoother transition to a lower carbon economy,” he said.
“Because what is the meaning of our life, really, if we work and live destroying the planet while sacrificing the future of our children? … On this issue, it may happen we have disagreements between the U.s. and France, it may happen, like in all families. That for me is a short-term aggravation. In the long run, we will have to face the long-term realities… together”.
READ THIS: Macron tears down Trumpism and makes a strong case in favor of a 21st century new global world order.