Book Review: Participation without Democracy: Containing Conflict in Southeast Asia


April 16, 2019

Book Review:

Participation without Democracy: Containing Conflict in Southeast Asia

Garry Rodan (Cornell University Press, New York, 2018)

 

Those of us who study politics differ on whether our discipline is rightly termed a “science”. People who weigh in on the “scientific” side tend to emphasise, alongside the permeation of numbers and deductive hypothesis-testing, the stock of knowledge we have accumulated: core concepts and theories, tested and refined over time. With his provocative latest book, Participation without Democracy: Containing Conflict in Southeast Asia, Murdoch University’s Garry Rodan puts years of field research and insight honed over decades to work to prove that such pretensions are more aspirational than well-founded. His argument, taken to its logical conclusion, impugns much of what political scientists study when we study “democracy”. It suggests we have missed the crux both of what distinguishes regime types, and of what sorts of political dynamics spur, constitute, and emerge from transitions. And his argument is convincing.

Southeast Asia—home to a bewildering array of institutional innovations—offers Rodan a trove of variation to mine, as he probes how these states really function. Those readers familiar with Rodan’s extensive oeuvre will note points of continuity with his earlier work: the inseparability of politics from economic forces, the salience of civil society, the crafty ways in which regimes and their leaders sustain dominance. With its rich detail and critical perspective, this book seems something of a capstone as Rodan approaches formal retirement, bringing his rich, career-spanning material on Singapore as well as Malaysia into conversation with a similarly nuanced discussion of the Philippines, and weaving together theoretical threads.

Participation without Democracy places modes of participation (MOPs) front and centre, characterising regimes in terms of both the extent and the type of participation and contestation possible. The book is explicitly oriented toward theory; hopefully the words “Southeast Asia” in the title will not deter readers focussed on other regions. But Rodan builds his analysis with fine-grained evidence, astutely assessed, from his three cases.

He proposes that elites meet the challenges that contradictions of capitalism pose—rising inequality, social disruption and others—by introducing new modes of popular participation. Elites use these MOPs to contain and channel dissent, while deepening concentrations of power and wealth; opponents sometimes hope these same modes offer tools to dismantle elite power. The “central paradox” Rodan traces is the extent to which “expanded political representation—in both its democratic and nondemocratic forms—is serving more to constrain political contestation than to enhance it”. Regimes and the elites at their helm find ways of serving their own interests by strategies that may look participatory on paper but, in practice, narrow the space for contestation and fragment or co-opt challengers.

Political scientists have long placed participation and contestation at the fore of definitions of democracy, but usually with a primarily electoral focus and more as indicators to be measured than as patterns requiring qualitative evaluation. Rodan demonstrates that we need to delve deeper: to ask not just whether participation happens, but who can participate and via what modes, which questions are open to debate and what happens to input gathered. He brings ideology squarely into the frame, not just vis-à-vis neoliberalism—he presumes elites are devout capitalists and popular opponents, less so—but also as shaping how citizens and states engage and pursue their respective interests.

Rodan argues that consultative and particularist ideologies predominate in the Southeast Asian cases he studies. The former favours technocratic, seemingly apolitical problem-solving without political competition while the latter favours discrete communities’ or identities’ rights to specific representation. He also finds germane, though, democratic ideologies (those that facilitate challenges to inequalities inherent to a hierarchical order) and institutionally unbounded (and infirming) populist ideologies. By embedding their preferred ideological frame in institutions—MOPs—elites may fragment or delegitimate challengers and corral the scope of debate. While these ideologies of representation are not mutually exclusive, the “struggle over the permissible boundaries of political conflict” is central to what constitutes politics.

MOPs emerge from relationships within capitalism, developed over time. History matters—especially legacies of Cold War-era suppression of the left and its institutions. Also, the sites of participation under different modes shape the sort of inclusion they allow. On the menu are autonomous individualised political expression, extra-state civil societal expression, collective societal incorporation, and state-sponsored, individual administrative incorporation. This framework shifts our gaze from democratic elections or authoritarian coercion to, for instance, the extent to which civil society is organised and articulated with or independent of political parties, and the breadth of elite-challenging issues and alliances.

Rodan uses two broad initiatives or patterns from each of his three countries to illuminate distinct MOPs and tease apart how each regime functions. Singapore exemplifies societal and administration incorporation, driven by a largely consultative and particularist ideology of representation. Rodan homes in first on the explicitly nondemocratic Nominated Member of Parliament scheme, designed to pre-empt partisan parliamentary opposition by incorporating unaccountable and appointed representatives of sectors and under-represented social segments (who might otherwise find common purpose and/or drift toward opposition parties) for their apolitical expertise. He parses, too, a series of institutions and initiatives for soliciting individuals’ policy feedback, from elaborate ongoing mechanisms to periodic mass “conversations”—albeit with largely pre-set agendas and without necessary influence. This vision of incorporating feedback demonstrates, Rodan explains, a technocratic ideology of politics as the “noncompetitive technical exercise of solving problems”.

In the Philippines, state institutions and capacities serve the interests of oligarchs, who are challenged by opponents ranging from moderate social democrats to anti-capitalist revolutionaries, all with differing visions of democratic representation. Rodan’s first case, the party-list system for electing a share of members of Congress, encourages fragmentation of challengers (as by a three-seat-per-contender cap). The system has been co-opted by forces of traditional politics; it does more to contain than amplify threats to elite privilege.

Meanwhile, proponents of bottom-up budgeting, introduced in 2012, pressed hard-to-reconcile the goals of first, reforming undemocratic institutions via fortified civil societal organisations and second, problem-solving efficiency. That divide served to diminish its role even before Duterte nixed it altogether, and was exacerbated by the program’s ideologically consultative approach of incorporating stakeholders and expertise into cooperative deliberation on elite-defined policy problems.

Lastly, in Malaysia, we find the challenges of a deep-set and structurally reinforced particularist ideology, rendering any sustainable, shared alternative vision elusive. Rodan details how the deep permeation of that ideology has effectively scuttled periodic, carefully delimited initiatives for high-level economic policy consultation and transformation. Any real challenge to extant privilege, as well as critique of the integrity of state institutions, have been put beyond the pale. Last May’s electoral upset may have loosened strictures on the latter front, but to question racial privilege remains, for now, verboten. Over time, these initiatives have disabused many reformers otherwise willing to accept administrative incorporation of hopes of genuine influence. Overall, there are fewer consolidated state-sponsored, extra-parliamentary MOPs in Malaysia than in Singapore or the Philippines, even despite the launch, post-publication, of new consultative initiatives.

The more independent modes that have emerged in Malaysia also face hurdles. Efforts to coordinate within civil society, Rodan argues, as for restoration of local-government elections or broader electoral reform, had made headway even before the 2018 elections. This could be seen most notably in the at least minimal inclusion of nonpartisan local counsellors in opposition-controlled Penang and Selangor after 2008 and the wide-ranging, if more catch-all than coherent, Bersih coalition. But the vagaries of Malaysia’s political economy, as well as NGOs’ preference for prioritising liberal ideological notions of good governance and individual liberties rather than economic issues, intercede. Bersih, for instance, lacks “a socially redistributive reform agenda to address structural inequalities”, without which “UMNO’s particularist ideologies of race and ethnicity would remain seductive for many disadvantaged Malays”. The new government’s embrace of ethnic particularism as a core plank of its campaign strategy in 2018, he suggests, was an unsurprising result.

As Rodan illustrates, these three countries manifest different patterns of capitalist development, including the role of the state and parties, such that they may even adopt similar MOPs with different motives. In all, though, we see starkly the gap between participation and even discursive, or issue-based, representation. In all, we see the balance among and implications of different MOPs as encoding and reinforcing ideas about how power is organised and what it means to be represented—from being permitted to help hone pre-defined policies to being able to change policy agendas, and from participating qua individuals or officially sanctioned categories to seeing promise in and space for novel collective mobilisation. This all presses us to assess regimes less in terms of their institutional structures than per a deeper evaluation of whether those institutions serve more to consolidate elite control or empower outsiders—an issue less of whether the institutions “work” than of how they are designed, and in whose interests.

Rodan’s analysis throws down the gauntlet to scholars of regimes. He offers a trenchant, if polite, rejoinder to more superficial assessments, and ups the ante by concluding with sketches of how an MOP framework helps us to understand contemporary populist challenges or transitions to other institutional forms. He considers how an MOP framework may also assist in making sense of the permeation of depoliticising consultative and particularist ideologies in established democracies such as the UK. The agenda Rodan presents recommends a fundamentally different approach to understanding and classifying regimes—one which will surely call into question the status of most purported democracies by scrutinising how the policy/political process actually works. Illiberalism at home, and pro-market ideologies abroad, are putting pressure on Southeast Asian civil society organisations’ financial health.

Moreover, and in keeping with his intellectual roots, Rodan asks that we not pretend a distinction between politics and economics: it is the “dynamic societal conflicts” economic processes generate that produce political institutions. That said, the language of capitalism’s contradictions seems at times a bit forced. Presumably any other economic order would yield its own contradictions and its own similarly skewed MOPs. Still, given the near-hegemony of capitalism in Southeast Asia and globally, whether state- or market-led, Rodan’s critique of this particular structuring of production, wealth, and interests is understandable.

But it is not just scholarly observers, but domestic reformers, who may find Rodan’s analysis challenging. Rodan stops short of describing what MOPs would enable effective challenges to elites and their privileges—real democracy—or from what quarters we might expect such a push. Which interests understand themselves sufficiently as silenced that they seek another path, and how might institutions be remade (or opposition parties be induced) to engage with those perspectives and preferences more directly? There is an underlying assumption here of a politically neglected non- or anti-neoliberal core in all three states, not just the Philippines, ready to be mobilised.

One might ask, though—particularly given the now-protracted enervation of organised labour, plus mass investment in capitalism (for example, cross-class participation in stock markets), however manifestly inegalitarian—whether alternative ideologies are now more decrepit or discarded than actively suppressed. And are there positive examples operating alongside, and perhaps at cross-purposes to, these institutions: have these patterns of social conflict yielded also more progressive, perhaps even scalable, MOPs? Put differently, where do we go from here, beyond trudging resignedly toward an elitist, contention-stifling future? Uplifting this book is not —but Rodan’s provocative exegesis is not just a good read, but a call to rethink how we study as well as pursue participation, representation and elite-challenging reform.

Meredith L Weiss is Professor and Chair of Political Science in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany, State University of New York. She has published widely on political mobilisation and contention, the politics of identity and development, and electoral politics in Southeast Asia, with particular focus on Malaysia and Singapore. Her books include Student Activism in Malaysia: Crucible, Mirror, Sideshow (Cornell SEAP, 2011), Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia (Stanford, 2006), the forthcoming The Roots of Resilience: Authoritarian Acculturation in Malaysia and Singapore (Cornell), and ten edited or co-edited volumes, most recently, Political Participation in Asia: Defining and Deploying Political Space (with Eva Hansson, Routledge, 2018) and The Political Logics of Anticorruption Efforts in Asia (with Cheng Chen, SUNY, forthcoming). She co-edits the Cambridge University Press Elements series on Southeast Asian Politics and Society. Current projects focus on “money politics” in Southeast Asia, urban governance in the region, and reform processes in post-GE14 Malaysia.

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Musings on a nation gone half-mad


April 14, 2019

Musings on a nation gone half-mad

Opinion  |  Azly Rahman

Published:  |  Modified:

 

 

https://dinmerican.wordpress.com/2019/04/14/musings-on-a-nation-gone-half-mad/

COMMENT | Like all of you esteemed readers, I sometimes do not know what to make of the world we are living in. Especially that of our beloved country. But think about it, we must.

The wealthy and the powerful are having a field day, during the remains of their day perhaps, in a world ever changing wherein information wants to be free and the cybernetic world can help the maddening masses bring mad leaders down. In my half-wide awakeness, these past few days, I thought of these:

Malays and the syndrome of Harry Houdini

Reading about the state of things, I see academics continue to sell their soul to the forces of idiocy, to the deep state of decadence guised as traditional authority! Academics loyal to the power of hegemonic-idiocy, possessed, diseased hearts and minds, unfit to be teachers of ethics in society.

But that is their right to be intelligent or to be ignorant. Their right to give advice, to make things better, or to make matters worse. Their right to be ideologues, intelligentsia, or purely intelligent beings who will not sell their soul for any pound of gold. To be a sophist or to be a Socrates.

In my musings, I thought of these: No society will need monarchs to protect it, if each member takes pride in being a natural-born aristocrat with a free spirit.

Malays are too slow in releasing themselves from the shackles of feudal fear and mentality. Move faster. Question authority! Malay feudalism is merely a social construct borne out of a historical accident, lasting as long as the rakyat continue to surrender their mind, body and spirit.

Modern-day slavery continues to define our economic condition. The system of social injustice prevails, like a cultural logic of late capitalism gone illogical.

There is this cultural disease in Malaysia, manufactured. It is self-fear. Like a selfie of a one’s fear. Fear of other races instilled in the Malay mind is for the benefit of the powerful, political, and the feudal. For survival.

Malaysians must understand that today’s war is not about race and religion, but about class: of the powerful versus the powerless. Of the have-a-lots versus have-nots. A long war ahead, to redefine the way of the world and act upon it.

Too much bad history has plagued this most-obedient-people in the world. Only when Malays are taught critical reasoning, critiquing feudal ideology, and “liberation theology” will they be free.

The political and the feudal deep states have been using the old British colonial strategy of divide and enslave in order to maintain the status quo. In the Malay tradition, the idea of blind loyalty to feudalism must be dismantled. It is unfit for Malay intelligence of the Industry 4.0 era, especially.

In all cultural traditions, there are enabling and disabling aspects. Extract, reflect upon, revise and reconstruct those which are useless to the advancement of human cognition and liberation.

There is now a battle of cognition over culture in the Malay psyche. I presume a liberated Malay mind will never kowtow to any monarch, politician, ayatollah, or any master of slavery. We must end this form of mental imprisonment.

We must, especially, set the youth free. But freedom for Malay youth does not mean freedom to join Mat Rempits or neo-Nazi groups. That will be suicidal freedom.

There is this malaise in the south. This idea brought me to a related notion of hegemony and false consciousness. “Bangsa Johor” is an invented “nation” living in an oxymoron: being fearful of feudalism, yet showing absurdist freedom.

Today’s grand hypocrisy

In countries ruled by “Muslim monarchs,” you seldom find true Islam, mostly hypocrisy. Abuse of Islam is everywhere. Look around. In Malaysia, the more politicians claim Malay-Muslim parties will defend and protect Malay-Muslims, the more you find national robbery done nicely. Even the Pilgrimage Fund, the holiest of holy investment body, got robbed holistically, done religiously.

In today’s political chaos, we need a Napoleon with the heart of Socrates, the mind of Plato and Cicero, to return. In today’s politics, the Malay masses is the ageing Hang Tuah, blind-obedient, watching Jebat and the King fight over wealth. People are helpless, drained by the hope they held for 60 years. After a year of regime change, hope is slowly turning into yet another period of hopelessness.

In the case of the recent U-turn decision on the Rome Statute, are you justified to pull out of the Rome Statute when one has always wanted to be known as a “Third World warrior”? Aren’t we tired of claims of political conspiracy and coup d’état when the real issue is of no principle and the leaders involved could not make a stand? However dumb and dumber a president is, at least Americans have two terms maximum to suffer. Malaysia?

Let us take seriously the comical North-South Malaysian Cold War brewing. Today’s Pakatan Harapan–Johor government squabble is opening up an exciting dialogue on the role and responsibilities and limits of the monarchy.

The debate on the balance of power, the nature and future of the monarchy, and the growing voice of the people in deciding who is abusing power and what then must the rakyat do – these are demonstrations of a mature Malaysian democracy. Cultivate this wisely, but surely.

The wealthy and the powerful

Wealth and power have intoxicated those who are supposed to make Malaysia a better democracy. Arrogance will be overthrown. Race, religion, and the royalty will no longer be conveniently used as weapons of disharmony when information is set free.

It’s crucial now that our education system be transformed to teach the history of the people more than the history of the monarchy. In the Age of Post-Humanism, The Age of Kings will give way to The Age of Reason and Malay Enlightenment.

Over the decades, the intelligence and rationalism of the Johoreans have been eroded by this sense of false consciousness. Power and wealth held by the display of the sword, gold, and mental and physical enslavement cannot be sustained.

There was never a “protection of Malay rights”. Only a licence and reason to plunder, propped as an absurd symbol of tradition. The 1MDB fiasco and many others swept under the carpet or yet to be uncovered, are testaments to the magnitude of plunder.

Never in my life have I humiliated my mind by kowtowing to any form of modern and traditional authority. Never will. I

I believe Johoreans should be obsessed with books, and not just with football. The latter can be a passage to mind control and mob mentality. Besides, there is no Bangsa Johor. There is only Rakyat Malaysia.

Our goal as a nation is to treat each citizen with equality under the shadow of the Constitution’s supremacy. Young Johoreans, who do not know history, are cemented with fear, football, and false consciousness. Free them!

Thomas Jefferson revisited

Thomas Jefferson, statesman, author, an admirer of the Enlightenment thinkers and, most importantly, the author of the American Declaration of Independence did not want King and Religion to be foundations of the new nation.

In the case of what is happening in the Islamic world, we see chaos. Islam hates hypocrites. So, why do hypocrites appoint themselves as defenders and rulers of Islam?

In difficult cognitive times like these, I seek refuge in the work of, amongst other philosophers, the humanists such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot. And Marat and Robespierre.

Will we ever get out of this madness? Like Harry Houdini, the escape artist?

This is the question of our times. We are in a black hole.


AZLY RAHMAN is an educator, academic, international columnist, and author of seven books available here. He holds a doctorate in international education development from Columbia University, New York City, and Master’s degrees in six areas: education, international affairs, peace studies communication, fiction and non-fiction writing. He is a member of the Kappa Delta Pi International Honour Society in Education. Twitter @azlyrahman. More writings here.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.

 

 

Mahathir, royalty and democracy


April 13,2019

Mahathir, royalty and democracy

Opinion  |  S Thayaparan

Published:  |  Modified:

 

“I am opposing a social order in which it is possible for one man who does absolutely nothing that is useful to amass a fortune of hundreds of millions of dollars, while millions of men and women who work all the days of their lives secure barely enough for a wretched existence.” ― Eugene Debs

COMMENT | The agitation in the Malay power structures continues with the democratically-elected Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad skirmishing with the royalty of Johor on the question of the appointment of the state’s menteri besar. This is not only a political issue but rather – nobody wants to admit this – a moral issue as well.

Think back when Tommy Thomas was the nominee of a democratically-elected government for the post of attorney-general and the Council of Rulers held back their consent for a couple of weeks because it was concerned that Thomas – a non-Muslim and non-Malay – would not defend certain rights and the sanctity of Islam.

As reported, Anwar Ibrahim said, “The Malay rulers had made it known they did not want the special rights to be belittled, and I told them I agreed with them and explained they would never be threatened,” he said. “We then had to explain to the Agong our intentions and stance for reform, and stated clearly that the special rights of the Malays would not be affected.”

Here was a Malaysian, with impeccable credentials, a history of using the law as means to illustrate the corruption and bigotry of the former regime and a successful lawyer in his own right, vilified because of his race and religion and for his views which were grounded in a rational interpretation of the Federal Constitution.

This was good enough for the people who elected a government because they wanted change but not for the royal institution which was considering the views of political parties – PAS/Umno – and non-governmental organisations which did not have a mandate from the people. Consider that while one former attorney-general’s career was mired in sycophancy, corruption, collusion and legal legerdemain, this apparently this was enough to stay his eviction from the post of AG.

Mahathir warns of the dangers of an absolute power but so far Pakatan Harapan has not demonstrated that it wants to empower democratic institutions and defang fascist institutions of the state. While the prime minister is correct when he claims that history demonstrates that the rulers had no problem “selling off” their states to foreign powers, the reality is that this kind of culture is pervasive in mainstream Malay power structures.

Before the election, the prime minister and his coterie of followers were warning that Umno was selling off the country to China, for example. This kind of polemic was meant to inflame the Malay polity in the same way how the far-right uses such themes to galvanise their base. Post-election, there have been all these overtures to China and backpedalling and spinning on deals; deals which should not have been used as racial fodder by the then opposition but were convenient tools to rile up sentiment.

The prime minister is correct when he questions the need to hold elections if the royalty can, without restraint, meddle in the policies of a democratically-elected government. When the government was forced – this, of course, is a matter of opinion – to retreat from the Rome Statute, the crown prince of Johor wrote, “Long Live the King. Demi Agama, Bangsa dan Negara. Daulat Tuanku.”

Since when was the Rome Statue an issue about religion and race? Think about it this way. When a far-right politician or when a Harapan political operative uses such a phrase, what would the response have been? They would have been vilified as being racist or a bigot and the discourse – and rightly so – would have centred on race politics.

Instead, what happened? The comment section was closed down for certain news stories when it came to the crown prince. This, in itself, is a kind of protection because Malaysiakini would be liable for comments made as the Harapan regime is “considering creating legislation that takes action against news portal operators who do not take action against readers who leave comments that touch on racial, religious and royal institution sensitivities”.

See? Absolute power in the hands of elected officials is also a threat to democratic freedoms.

Latheefa Koya is right when she points to the silly and immature argument put forward by the crown prince, but James Chin is also right when he observes the average rakyat is fighting with both hands tied behind his back, unlike Mahathir. You get away with a lot when you are free to use social media as you see fit and your detractors are not afforded this privilege.

“You know where to find me” does not work for the rest of us because the state security apparatus will definitely find you and slap you with sedition charges even if your comments are valid. See the state’s case against Fadiah Nadwa Fikri (above).

The sultan of Johor, when thanking the government from withdrawing from the Rome Statute, said this, “I hope the government will always prioritise the people’s interest over political interest.” But the interest of the people was not prioritised. In fact, by pulling out of the statue, the government was prioritising their political interests. Anwar said the Rome Statute was good for democracy and transparency, hence any inference that it was not “good” for the people is illogical.

Speaking of transparency, A Kadir Jasin is being investigated for sedition when he posted something about the royal upkeep. And what did Anwar say? “While I support democracy and freedom of expression, what was said was inappropriate. We have worked very hard to get the Malay rulers to appreciate this new administration” and that this (Kadir Jasin’s view) was “unhealthy”.

For those Malaysians who want democracy and worry of the corrosion of our democratic institutions, the people who are doing this are not only unelected officials (which include the bureaucratic class) who make statements which are contrary to their constitutionally-mandated roles but also politicians who use race and religion as a means to constrain democratic principles and rule of law.

Mahathir has positioned himself as the people’s champion even though he has a history of undermining democracy. Indeed, when it comes to the role of race and religion in mainstream Malaysian politics, democracy is always under threat. And this is with a moderate government. Let me be very clear – Harapan’s numerous laws against free speech and for “cultivating” national harmony are all anti-democratic. This does not include the religious component which also impedes democracy in this country.

It is no point blaming the Malays on their feudal mentality when the reality is that all Malay power structures have used the rhetoric and the apparatus of the state to carry out agendas which go against the fundamentals of democracy.

Meanwhile, on the other side, there are the royalty who never bothered to flex their muscles when the country was being looted and the Najib regime then thought up something like the National Security Council Act which undermined the power of the royalty.

Now, with the backing of the far-right, we get a ludicrous situation where Johor Umno names their preferred candidate for the menteri besar’s post and wants to “advise” the Johor sultan to dissolve the state legislative assembly.

Ultimately, we have to choose a side. Or choose no side if the choice is meaningless. What the prime minister has to do, what Harapan has to do, is to demonstrate that the support of the people for their side is a meaningful choice. What they have to do is demonstrate that elected representatives are empowering institutions and dealing with anyone who thinks they are above the law regardless of their station in life, the colour of their skin or their religious beliefs.

Democracy could go down when elected officials do not fulfil their constitutionally-mandated roles and instead give up power to unelected officials or be drowned out in a vox populi. The latter is cold comfort but at least we had a choice, which is also why it is silly and immature to claim that the people stand with Mahathir. The reality is that Mahathir, the arch-proponent of strongman politics, finds himself standing with people who have a different vision for this country, which history has shown he does not share.

Absolute power in anyone hands is dangerous especially if we, the people, give it to them.


S THAYAPARAN is Commander (Rtd) of the Royal Malaysian Navy. A retired barrister-at-law, he is one of the founding members of the National Patriots Association.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.

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Should Mahathir go now? Certainly not!


April 12, 2019

Should Mahathir go now? Certainly not!

Opinion  |  Mariam Mokhtar

Published:  |  Modified:

 

COMMENT | Let’s be clear about one thing. The only thing I share with Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad is our initials – MM. That is all. I have been his critic for decades and was persuaded, just a few months before GE-14, to support/endorse Mahathir by two of his former critics, Zunar and Hishammuddin Rais.

Today, there are calls for Mahathir to step down. No! He should not.

The most dangerous political scandal, since GE-14, is finally cracking open like a ripe durian. It is an attempt to bring down Mahathir, his cabinet and Pakatan Harapan.

Mahathir said Malaysia’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute was not because the international treaty was bad, but the confusion created by “one particular person who wants to be free to beat up people”.

He added, “I find that this particular attempt to get the rulers involved so that they can get leverage, and even trying to get the rulers to sign some order against me.”

You may have missed the bit about “getting the rulers to sign some order,” because most of us would have been fixated on the “one particular person”.

Can you imagine the dangers brought about by a power vacuum after Mahathir’s removal? Think Iraq or Libya.

Guess who has been whipping up anti-Harapan sentiments, and re-engineered his image on social media.

Guess who despises Mahathir, because he is the only one with the guts to stand up against them.

Their fatal attraction has been festering for 26 years. How can the rakyat act against people whose business interests are so powerful that they swamp the small-time trader? How can the nation be protected against powerful people who forge long-term business deals with foreigners?

Guess why the ulama have an intense dislike of Mahathir. He dares to scold them and tell them to understand their religion better, instead of confusing their flock with their own warped interpretations.

Guess who else abhors Mahathir. The civil servants who benefited from Najib’s largesse, some elite Malays who are crippled by their crab mentality, and the insecure Malays with their siege mentality. These form a volatile mixture.

Mahathir has started the job of cleaning up Malaysia, and he should continue. Moreover, he has to sort out the mess that lies between Putrajaya and that “red dot” across the Causeway.

Only Mahathir has the guts and political will to do this, but ironically, many Malays, on whom he has showered the most help, are among the most fractious, most fragile and most flippant. This is part of his unfinished business, and to ask Mahathir to leave now would be premature.

The Mahathir of today is not the Mahathir of the past. There are flashes of his former self, but by and large, he has most probably realised his mistakes and acknowledged that he needs to correct them before he retires for good.

Mahathir may be dictatorial, in that he brooks no dissent, but he is not a dictator. Mahathir and Harapan were democratically elected. There was no North Korean type of election, with only one candidate.

The Mahathir of today is a “milder” version of his former self. In the “golden age” of Mahathir, newspapers would be in fear of having to stop publication, and people would be locked up under the ISA. He compromised many institutions. He was the architect of Project IC. Having previously been accused of interference, he is now reluctant to be seen as a meddler, or tyrant.

Some of you may have the experience of buying a house, but when you moved in and found that the inside was full of old junk, the floorboards rotten, the roof leaking? You cannot put your own furniture in it, nor decorate it, until the repairs have been completed.

Malaysia is like this old house. Team Mahathir has moved into government and found 61 years of rot. Until most things are fixed, they cannot fully initiate the reforms.

Last year, soon after he was made PM, Mahathir knew who he wanted for attorney-general, and who should helm the key ministries. He has acknowledged that some ministers are disappointing, and he has ordered them to improve their act. Does he have enough capable people to make sweeping changes to his cabinet?

It seems to have taken a long time, but disgraced, former PM Najib Abdul Razak, Rosmah Mansor, Zahid Hamidi, Abdul Azeez Rahim, Isa Samad and Muhammad Shafee Abdullah are being investigated. The rest are being processed. Their time will come.

The waters around Putrajaya are still choppy. Until Najib has been punished for his crimes against the people of Malaysia, we cannot rest; therefore, now is not the time to change leaders.

Nor is it the time to have two leaders; a functioning PM and a PM-in-waiting. There is nothing more destructive than to pit two men against one another, with daily comparisons of their performance, as if it were a tennis match.

We would like to move forward, as a nation, to repair race relations, increase integration and improve the economy. We are sick and tired of the three “Rs” of race, religion and royalty. They are a distraction, especially when there are more important matters.

Mahathir must resolve the Malay dilemma. He should think long-term, and not opt for short term gains. He should break that impasse.


MARIAM MOKHTAR is a defender of the truth, the admiral-general of the Green Bean Army and president of the Perak Liberation Organisation (PLO). Blog, Twitter.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.

 

Daim’s appraisal of our academics


March 23 ,2019

Daim’s appraisal of our academics

by Tajuddin  Rasdi

Daim Zainuddin recently made two important points in his speech at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia in Skudai.

Image result for daim zainuddin

Firstly, he said the Malays are being fed a narrative bordering on the idea that their race and Islam are both under threat, and that more affirmative policies will be needed in the new Pakatan Harapan government in the coming years and decades.

Secondly, and this is the main point of my article, he said Malay academics appear to be doing nothing at all but are letting this narrative play out to the opportunism of certain political parties and selfish NGOs.

I have been writing to the media for 20 years, saying absolutely the same thing, but it has earned me a negative perception from the Malay establishment especially in the public universities and even the previous higher education ministry.

Daim’s statement came as a sweet surprise to me as he was never one of my favourite politicians.

I know him as a savvy businessman who grew up within the Malay patronage system. As the economic and corporate worlds are outside of my understanding, I have shied away from trying to know anything about the man himself.

But a few days ago, I was surprised to find him articulating a historical, religious and political construct of what I consider a “Malaysia-Malay construct” as opposed to what I term a “Melayu-Malaysia” one.

A Malaysia-Malay construct is simply a Malay who understands his or her own heritage and faith within a Malaysian constitutional, multi-religious and multi-ethnic acceptance of co-existence, while a Melayu-Malaysia construct is a Malay who is just a Malay, then, now and forever, living in a land geopolitically defined as “Malaysia”. No compromise, no apologies.

The Melayu-Malaysia expects others to change for the sake of his race and faith, without the need to understand, tolerate or even acknowledge the importance of the existence of others as partners in nation-building.

The academics of this country have become purely self-serving and disinterested in nation-building.

The story of a disinterested academia began in the 1980s.

The Universities and University Colleges Act, or UUCA, was instituted to kill off or control student political activities and also that of the academics.

Under UUCA, no academic can speak or write to the media or the public without getting permission from the authorities. That basically sums it up.

A few academics were charged under the act, one of them the late Fadzil Noor who was the PAS president and an academic at a public university.

The involvement of the academia in nation-building basically died. With this law, the culture of academia turned inwards to a concentration on teaching until the idea of “world class” and being “internationally recognised” in rankings came into being in the late 1990s.

With this new mantra, academics are said to be successful if they publish in “high impact” or Scopus journals and receive million ringgit grants.

It would also sweeten the deal if an MoU were signed with European or American or Western universities deemed to be “world class” and “international”. Whether such ties would produce a culture of research and inquiry was disregarded as long as universities “dapat nama”, and a minister was there to observe the deals being signed. That’s it.

After the turn of the 21st century, public universities went full blast on rankings by journals with overseas publications. Locally published books, encyclopaedias and journals were regarded as third rate.

In the old days, books and media writings commanded a high percentage and weightage but now there is hardly a column to put them in on an evaluation or KPI form.

Once, I had to put my books, articles and 200 encyclopaedia entries in a column marked “other publications”.

I used to read Aliran, whose writers are academics from universities in the north. I found their writings to be fresh, bold and highly academic.

After 10 years, I noticed their designation was still “associate professor” and wondered when these people would be called “professor”.

I soon found out that they had migrated to the National University of Singapore. There is no future in Malaysia for “public intellectuals”.

I was lucky enough to be appointed a full professor before all the crazy journal hype began to take place in universities. I managed to squeeze by with my books, papers and other writings after attending the professor interview twice.

As my writings increasingly touched on society and the nation, my appointments at committees on the national level became fewer and fewer.

I no longer got invitations to public talks from universities, because I was told that I am “controversial” in the corridors of the chancellery.

So the only appointment letters from public universities that came to me were to be an examiner for PhD candidates and evaluator of professorships and associate professorships in architecture.

The coup de grace came after I went on optional retirement, leaving after 27 years of teaching and writing at a public university, exiting the campus alone and uncelebrated.

My application as contract professor to two public universities was rejected on grounds of me being “controversial”.

I have mentioned that the key to our future is the reeducation process of the Malay mind by Malay academics who understand that Islam is strong only if you read and understand, and not sit in front of the TV or the mosque podium listening to an ustaz giving his half-baked ideas of religion and society.

The fate of our country hinges on academics changing the narratives of what is important for Malaysians in the coming decades and centuries, to be in line with the goals of sustainable development outlined by the United Nations.

We won’t go very far listening to Friday sermons condemning progressive thinkers or LGBT that may have caused Allah to turn the hot weather on us.

Forget about STEM education if academics do not speak about it.

We are facing a Malay-Muslim society that has grown up with the Islamic resurgence of the 1980s with most Malays conscious about the afterlife and religious values for their children and society.

The International Islamic University Malaysia as well as Istac and Ikim were supposed to guide the Malays into a new era of modern and democratic understanding of Islam vis-a-vis nation-building and coexistence.

But where were these academics when two muftis encouraged the use of “kafir” on non-Muslim citizens, or when calls for “jihad” against the enemies of Islam came from the national mosque?

Daim’s speech must give pause to all the vice-chancellors of public universities to rethink their KPI for academics.

We need more public intellectuals to reform and rewrite the narratives of the nation, to bring social and religious harmony and sustainable wealth to the country.

We don’t need “high impact” journals to measure our success.

Just ask the man on the street whether he should vaccinate his children or whether the world is flat or defending minority groups would start a tsunami somewhere.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.

 

Hopes and heroes: Malaysia in 2018


January 1, 2019

Hopes and heroes: Malaysia in 2018

Opinion  |by Bridget Welsh

Published:  |  Modified:

Hopes and heroes: Malaysia in 2018

Opinion  |by Bridget Welsh

COMMENT | Malaysia’s year of embracing change has been both euphoric and disquieting. After the victory of Pakatan Harapan in May and the rapid formation of a new government, high expectations have been met by hard realities.

Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s return has brought to the fore many of the problems of his earlier tenure and simultaneously showcased the burdensome financial mismanagement of the Najib Abdul Razak era.

Not only is the new government facing serious domestic political challenges and a growing public perception that it is not delivering, but Mahathir has also returned to power in unfavourable global conditions, of which the uncertainty and slowdown of the world economy are arguably the most serious and foreshadowing a difficult year ahead.

As the year ends, it is fitting to reflect on both positive and negative developments and to recognise that, despite disappointments and persistent divisions, 2018 was indeed a year of hope and heroes.

Citizen empowerment and freedom

Foremost in this list are the ordinary Malaysians. From across the political spectrum, citizens went to the polls and took to the streets to express their aspirations.

Malaysia had a peaceful transition of government and despite real anxieties over increased race-based mobilisation, rallies and protests have largely remained peaceful.

A grave exception to this was the Seafield Sri Maha Mariamman Temple riot in late November, which led to the tragic loss of life of firefighter Muhammad Adib Mohd Kassim. He was an extraordinary hero; his bravery in service to fellow Malaysians is a reminder of the sacrifices that many on the frontline of safety make for others, irrespective of race, and the need for responsible responses to honour his memory.

In the sadness and outrage over the loss, one cannot ignore the calls for outreach to maintain the richness of Malaysia’s diverse social fabric. In fact, Malaysians have taken on more responsibility and are no longer as afraid to speak out.

This is palpable in everyday conversations, and in both social and mainstream media. Despite the constant political gossiping and obsession with who and why a person is with whom in photos, another important feature of the year has been the welcoming of the widening of political space.

The challenge has been that many of the discussions have been shallow, mono-dimensional and highly personalistic, effectively minimising meaningful debate of the real problems Malaysians are facing. Yet, even within this constant political storytelling, there is greater attention to policy problems, from drug use to unemployment.

It takes time to change patterns of behaviour, but more Malaysians are showing comfort with more political freedom and greater political sophistication in how they process information.

Messaging and macro successes

The Harapan government has encouraged dialogue. It has opened itself for criticism in an unprecedented way compared to BN governments, but at the same time, its public engagement is episodic and reactive. Too many times over the year, it has appeared unprepared and defensive – aka old opposition mode.

The Harapan government faces a challenge of communication, as inconsistencies and conflicts in messages have not reinforced confidence and clarity in its direction of governance. A more effective media strategy and greater collaboration on messaging can go a long way to actualise the hopes all Malaysians have for their country.

While the year ends with intensive discussion of race in the wake of the December Icerd rally (photo) and the Harapan government’s U-turn on promised greater equal representation (at least symbolically in an international agreement), this year has been one in which substantive hopes have been actualised.

Among the most important successes to date of the Harapan government are greater inclusiveness (for youth, women and minorities); a strengthening of the checks and balances (with greater independence for the judiciary; a stronger Parliament, a reduction in powers of the prime minister and freer media); tougher (although uneven) enforcement for corruption to include not only perceived abuses by former elected officials but also that alleged of bureaucrats; increased professionalisation of appointments in the civil service (notably in the Election Commission and the Attorney-General’s Chambers); an extensive forensic internal government review of contracts; spending and institutional arrangements; and a return of pride for Malaysia on the international stage.

These accomplishments in less than eight months should not be underestimated and from a global perspective are indeed heroic. They reinforce the fact that hopes can yield results.

If Malaysia had followed the path of increased debt and mismanagement, the negative effects would be even more far-reaching for future generations.

However, it is important to note that many of these successes are not concrete for ordinary Malaysians, who are increasingly dissatisfied with the government’s performance. Take heed that the critical memes on shoes speak to growing discontent, not just among opposition supporters but even within the Harapan political base.

Plans needed for the economy

Importantly, the economy has slowed in public perceptions.

While shaped by adverse international conditions and heavy inherited financial burdens, the choking of the domestic sector through the ending of the contracts to previously BN-favoured business allies and contraction of pump-priming has been a painful process and contributed to a slowdown.

International investors face unnecessary obstacles and uncertainty in the business climate, exacerbated by conflicted messaging and uneven competencies in different ministries.

Consumers have not seen a meaningful change in the cost of living and economic opportunities and this has split over into a cacophony of complaints.

There is no real sense of what are the plans for the economy and the steps that will move Malaysia towards greater and fairer prosperity. There is an urgent need for perceived achievements.

Cynicism is setting in, especially in how the government-linked-companies (GLCs) are being (mis)managed.

Old faces at the core have not offered new ideas and new arrangements to conform to the new conditions.

Elite-oriented patronage is not a solution for domestic growth and opens up the new government to the temptations of corruption.

The need for meaningful economic reform, outcomes and direction is pressing – as this poses a real threat to Malaysia’s future and democratic opening, post-May 9.

Destructive power struggle

Along with economic woes, the perceived move from cooperation to competition among political elites, most notably between Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim, over national leadership has been destabilising.

PKR’s election – and both pre- and post-wrangling and petty positioning – has not instilled confidence that this party can govern effectively and carry out an election that respects fair processes.

Red-wearing Bersatu’s apparent embrace of tainted leaders from UMNOhas additionally upset an already delicate balance of relationships.

Harapan leaders have not learnt the lesson that conflicts should be kept inside the tent, nor fully appreciate that in this age of social media news (and conspiracies about that news) are the norm. The choice appears to be to position against each other, rather than to position for the people.

The dynamic provides considerable news fodder but does not appear properly functional. Before May, Harapan faced serious reservations about its ability to govern together and to date, these concerns have been heightened rather than dissipated.

The ongoing power struggle(s) are destructive as they have brought to the fore old “divide and rule” tactics and distracted leaders from doing the jobs they were elected to do – to govern.

In the contestation, there is little realisation that all the leaders are getting hurt. Making Mahathir into a “lame duck” undercuts the leader of a current prime minister and spreading rumours (with photos) serves to discredit future leaders – all leading to a spiral of fragmentation and distrust.

In the pattern of old Malaysia, today’s Malaysian leaders seem to be still caught up in taking each other down and too focused on themselves (and positions).

Narrow new opposition

This pattern is evident in the opposition as well. The last six months have witnessed the collapse of UMNO, with criminal charges levied against the former prime minister Najib and his close ally Ahmad Zahid Hamidi (photo), who recently stepped aside from the Umno presidency after being elected in a competitive fight in June.

The largely self-inflicted decimation of UMNO reflects the selfish search for safe landings by its elites and a failure to engage in party reform. In less than a year, UMNOo has essentially passed the baton of national opposition leadership to the Islamic party PAS, which sings a low-pitched song focused on a narrow religious conservative agenda.

Its governance at state levels to date has been lacklustre. Both UMNO and PAS have taken on a more confrontational racialised approach, one in which will essentially mean that they might dominate the national narrative but will not be able to assume the mantle of truly national leadership for Malaysia as a whole.

It is as short-sighted and corrosive as Harapan’s infighting. It has empowered resistance within the system and contributed to a worrying worsening of ethnic relations.

What then of hopes in this context? Are there heroes willing to buck the evolving negative patterns, to return to engage the sweet blossoms and promises of May?

The hard reality is that transitions are not easy, and given decades of decay of institutions, social trust and narrow-taught mindsets, expectations need to be recalibrated.

At the same time, politicians need to be reminded that they were elected to serve the people and the country, not themselves, and more that are expected of them, not least of which is a clear plan from the new government for succession and policy priorities.

If anything, however, 2018 has shown the capacity of elites to learn, regroup and re-engage. The year also has illustrated that breaks with the past are possible and given social pressures for better governance and deliverables from an increasingly sophisticated citizen electorate, the power of ordinary Malaysians – who want and deserve more than they have been given – is real.

Though dented, hope remains alive as the pressures of continued heroism extend into the new year.


BRIDGET WELSH is an associate professor of political science at John Cabot University in Rome. She also continues to be a senior associate research fellow at the National Taiwan University’s Center for East Asia Democratic Studies and The Habibie Center, as well as a university fellow of Charles Darwin University. Her latest book is the post-election edition of The end of Umno? Essays on Malaysia’s former dominant party. She can be reached at bridgetwelsh1@gmail.com.

The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.