A Message to UMNO’s Hishamuddin Tun Hussein Onn: We MAF Veterans are Patriots and you are a Racist


January 18, 2018

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A Message to UMNO’s Hishamuddin Tun Hussein Onn: We MAF Veterans are Patriots and you are a Racist

By Major (R) Mior Rosli (TUDM) (received via e-mail)

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I wish the Defence Minister, the Deputy Defence Minister read and listen to what I have to say very carefully.

Yesterday, you, Hishammudin accused Persatuan Patriot Kebangsaan of being Racist. I demand your apology to us because it is not us who are racist. It is you. Don’t you remember when you were the UMNO youth chief? You unsealth the Keris, waved it in the air and demand for Chinese blood? Isn’t that Racist and dangerous? The Police should have charged you under ISA, put you behind bars and throw the key. We don’t need Racist people like you leading a multi-racial country. Now just because the elections is round the corner you have the cheek to talk about increasing the number of non- Malays in the Armed Forces. Something that we have heard many many times over many many years. It is pure hogwash.

Let me tell you and all your bloody UMNO goons. THERE ARE NO RACIAL CONFLICTS NOR SENTIMENTS AMONG SOLDIERS WITHIN THE MAF. We have gone through tough and team training day and night for 6 months for the other ranks and 12 months training for the officers. We ate, slept, trained, sweat, cried and laughed together. After recruit or cadet training we were enlisted and Commission into various corps and services. Except for the Royal Malay Regiment, in all corps and services we were never bothered if one is a Malay, Chinese, Indian, Punjabi, IBAN or kadazan. Our loyalty only goes to our Commander whatever race and religion they are, to our Corps/services, to the MAF, to our King and country. That’s was how we were taught and trained.

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During both the Emergencies (1948-1960/1960-1989), during the confrontation with Indonesia, and the war in Sarawak till the early 90s.. we fought like brothers to defend this country and  maintain the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of this country. We make sure people like you to be safe and maintain your freedom in this country.

You were never there to see our comrades die,got their legs and arms blown off. You were never there to see how their wives and children cried when their husbands came back in coffins or without legs or arms.

Image result for Hishamuddin Hussein Onn is a racistMalaysia’s Chickenhawk Defense Minister

 

You were born with a silver spoon. You are no more than a show off, a low down phony. Donning a military uniform, with a Commando beret, with senior airborne wings on your chest. You make many veterans sick, looking at your stupidity.

During the emergencies combating the CTs (Communist Terrorists) there were many non-Malays did clandestine operations, became agents inside the enemy troops and acted as rubber tappers,farmers, etc. Some were caught and killed.

Our pilots, many were non-Malays too were shot down, and when they did their rescue, bodivac and medical missions, don’t care the dead or injured were Malays, Chinese, Iban or Indians or what ever race they were.

Image result for kanang anak langkau the iban warriorKanang Anak Langkau of the 8th Battalion of the Royal Ranger  Regiment

 

Kanang Anak Langkau from the 8th Battalion of the Royal Ranger Regiment who became one of the most decorated war heroes in Malaysian military history was the grandson of an Iban headsman. Growing up in a remote part of Sarawak meant that a formal education was scarce, but Kanang was receiving a different kind of education as a child from his grandfather. Kanang would often follow his grandfather on hunting trips in the jungle where he was taught to read the signs of plants, the sounds of the animals, the smells in the wind, and the ways of becoming a tracker.

“Agi idup agi ngelaban!” ( “Still alive, still fighting”)

Today UMNO is kissing lips with the Communist Party of China (CPC). Having closed doors meetings…all for power and money and forgetting their sacrifice so that UMNO can continue to exist until today.

It is you and (UMNO) policy makers who try to separate and divide us racially. It is your party that makes the quotas for entry and promotions. It is your party that controls who should be generals and who should not.

Soldiering is a professional job. If you get unskilled people to be promoted, you will get a half-baked Armed Forces. A half baked Armed Forces will never be able to defend this country effectively.

If you want the Chinese to be seen of their loyalty, make the Armed Forces more professional and not political.

We, the veterans Armed Forces Officers and the ex-senior police officers are the real Patriots, more Patriotic than any of you, “power and kleptocracy” crazy politicians. DON’T EVER BELITTLE US. IF THERE IS A WAR TO DEFEND THIS SOIL, WE WILL BE THE SECOND OR THIRD LINERS BEHIND THE REGULAR FORCES TO DEFEND THIS COUNTRY… PLEASE DON’T MESS US UP WITH YOUR POLITICAL DREAMS!

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What your party are doing towards the MAF is degrading them, making them weak, making the Generals like puppets on strings until they do not know to differentiate between what is right and what is wrong.

You are making the Rakyat live in a “BOILING FROG SYNDROME”. The moment the Rakyat realised what happened to this country, it will be too late.

The problem with politicians like you is because you rose up not from grassroots leaders. From the beginning until now you are just “A TORTOISE ON A POLE”. Don’t know how you got up there. You are where you are because your father was the Prime Minister, if not you are nothing.

We who served from 1948- 1989/91, the majority are still very much alive. Your party betrayed us, ignored us, lied to us and many of us are struggling to live on with our lives, while over all these years you and your party members became kleptocrats and took away what actually belongs to us and the Rakyat.

May Allah curse all of you if you don’t realise what you did wrong.

Wallahualam.

Maj Hj Mior Rosli TUDM (Bersara)

 

The Great Han — Race, Nationalism and Tradition in China Today–Kevin Carrico


January 16, 2018

Book Review

The Great Han — Race, Nationalism and Tradition in China Today–Kevin Carrico

https://www.asiasentinel.com/book-review/the-great-han-race-nationalism-and-tradition-in-china-today/

Image result for The Great Han:Race, Nationalism and Tradition in China Today book

“Make China Great Again” is officially now the agenda of President Xi Jinping. Can “Make the Han Great Again” be far behind? In this interesting if somewhat academic work, Australian China scholar Kevin Carrico has examined the rising influence of traditionalist, racially based sentiments within modern China, particularly through study of the Han Clothing Movement (Hanfu yundong) and associated ideas.

At one level, the movement, established in 2001, is a curiosity, seemingly on the fringe of a society rapidly modernizing and engaging with the world. Han clothing is the symbol of a wider commitment to belief in restoration of a largely imaginary era of Han greatness and cultural purity and rejection of foreign-influenced money obsession of China today. But it has important elements in common with the officially promoted emphasis on Confucian principles, and on long held beliefs in the genetic division between Han and the rest.

Nor does this merely appeal to aging traditionalists and those who hanker after a return to traditional script and other pre-Communist aspects of the nation. The book begins with a quote from a Han Clothing Movement supporter, an IT professional based in that hub of Chinese modernism, Shenzhen:

“You can’t have nationalism without race (minzu zhuyi). That’s what we want to do: promote Han racial nationalism (Han minzu zhuyi) …. The multiracial nationalism we have now in China, with 56 races as part of a larger “Chinese race” (Zhongua minzu) is a big scam. It was imposed upon us by the Manchus, forcing us Han, the core of China from the beginning of time, into submission. All that this nationalism has done is to weaken China.  You can’t just destroy the distinction between civilization and barbarism (Hua yi zhi bian), incorporate a bunch of barbarians into our nation and then expect a strong nation. All this talk of “wealth and power” (fuqiang) is empty and meaningless without Han nationalism.”

The principal villains, from this Han perspective, are not the western powers and Japan and the one hundred years of humiliation, they are the Manchus. The dynasty may have been overthrown in 1911, but Manchu ideas, customs and (allegedly) Manchu money continue to prevail. The queue may have gone but the Manchu qipao and magua – both designed originally for horse-riders –are is still viewed as the standard Chinese traditional dress, as for example provided to delegates to the APEC Summit in China in 2015.

The Han movement’s intent is to remove all such foreign impurities, which has also to include inter-marriage with inferior foreign genes, a problem which has supposedly been enhanced by the one child policy.

The movement shows up the uncertainty which often exists in China around the meaning of the word minzu. Does this simply connote a nation-state? Or does it imply a specific racial identity? Under the foreign Manchus, there was no problem as all the ethnicity came under a single political entity under a Manchu monarch. But are the 55 identified as non-Han equal nationalities or simply colorfully dressed dance groups for the amusement of tourists? At least according to Carrico’s Han Clothing advocates, they must be kept at apart – but under Han control. They are incapable of prospering on their own, but have become a drain on the Han.

Some of this may seem too extreme to be worth bothering much about. It is not too different from the racism and nativism which thrives among many – mostly Trump supporters – in the United States. Nonetheless it is relevant to China’s perception of its relations with the world in general, and its immediate neighbors in particular.

In his “The Discourse of Race in Modern China,” Frank Dikotter explored the history of the Chinese views of race and identity and their application today. It includes the concern with the whiteness of skin color. In particular this provides a crucial demarcation between Han Chinese and their mostly browner southeast Asian neighbors – let alone Indians and Africans.

The Han Clothing adherents of Carrico’s book indulge in rants against Africans in particular. But as residents of Hongkong and Singapore will be aware the color divide has more mundane manifestations – domestic helpers are only recruited from brown Asians, not Chinese.

It may be that as China becomes great again, it will become less concerned with ethnicity, more with being a benign empire accepting of all races and religions under its wing. But at least as likely is the prospect of Han chauvinism advancing in step with Chinese power.

Pro-UMNO Ummah: Get Your Facts Right


January 16, 2018

Pro-UMNO Ummah: Get Your Facts Right

http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/we-have-our-scars-chinese-army-vets-slams-ummah-for-denying-minorities-part#IGGMJvigPVc1uSm1.97

by  Anith Adilah

Macva president Major Tan Pau Son during Malaysian Armed Forces Chinese Veterans Association press conference at  The Boulevard Mid Valley City January 15, 2018. — Picture by Firdaus LatifMacva President Major Tan Pau Son during Malaysian Armed Forces Chinese Veterans Association press conference at The Boulevard Mid Valley City January 15, 2018.

Ethnic Chinese army veterans have railed against Malay-Muslim coalition Ummah today over the latter’s erroneous claim that only Malays had resisted British colonists, Japanese occupiers and Communist insurgents.

At a press conference today, Malaysian Armed Forces Chinese Veterans Association (Macva) President Major (Rtd) Tan Pau Son said cleric Ismail Mina Ahmad’s remarks were not only historically and factually wrong, but had belittled the contributions of the non-Malay veterans including the Ibans, Indians, Sikhs.

“We participated in defending our country and some of us still have scars to show that we were there — risking our lives,” Tan told a press conference at Mavca headquarters at Midvalley Boulevard here.

Tan said Mavca, with a membership close to 1,000 veterans since inception on August 31, 2016, and thousands who have passed on before them is a true testimony of a large group of Chinese veterans who had served loyally in military campaigns.

“Needless to say there were also Chinese veterans who sadly lost their lives and limbs in the defence of the nation. All Malaysians should rebutt all these inaccurate and irresponsible assertions made by Ismail,” he said.

iMalaysian Armed Forces Chinese Veterans Association pose for group photo after press conference at The Boulevard Mid Valley City January 15, 2018. — Picture by Firdaus LatifMalaysian Armed Forces Chinese Veterans Association pose for group photo after press conference at The Boulevard Mid Valley City January 15, 2018. — Picture by Firdaus Latif

Tan also pointed out that there were six Chinese members of the armed forces who were bestowed with the Panglima Gagah Berani medals for their extreme bravery: Colonel Maurice Lam Shye Choon, Major (Rtd) Lee Ah Pow, Second Lieutenant (Rtd) David Fu Chee Ming, Sergeant (Rtd) Choo Woh Soon, Sergeant Cheng Eng Chin, and Ranger Mat Isa Hassan.

Meanwhile, three others, Lieutenant Colonel Chong Kheng Ley, Lieutenant Colonel Leong Fook Cheong, and Captain Tien Sen An, were awarded Pingat Tentera Udara for their valour.

“We have Chinese veterans who receive gallantry awards and this alone is a testament that the Malays were not the only ones who protected the nation,” he said.

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On Saturday, Ismail who is the chairman of the Ummah umbrella group for Muslim organisations, also asserted that only the Malays had battled the Communists, which he claimed made the community a target of the predominantly-Chinese Insurgency that lasted for forty years.

One particular war veteran who narrowly escaped death while fighting a battle in Southern Thailand in 1978, said he was hurt and angered by Ismail’s remarks in the convention outlining the demands of the Muslim lobby.

 

Warrant Officer Patrick Lee Kai Tong said Ismail’s statement was not only ignorant but hurtful to armed forces who had witnessed countless deaths and suffered various injuries in the name of the country.

Lee, now 71, walks around with a hole in his left arm after being shot by the communists who had zeroed in on the Nuri helicopter he was in while landing to provide ammunition supply to his own troop.

“Does he even know what it is like to be in a warzone? He can say what he want but do not hurt people’s feelings,” Lee said.

“Maybe this scar from an M-16 is not enough for me to prove that I was there fighting for the country but know that every memory, every death — even the smell of it stays with me.”

Tan also chided Ismail for conveniently forgetting that there were many Malay members among the Communist insurgents.

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“In Ismail’s speech, he failed to mention that the 10th Regiment Malayan Communist Party was predominantly a Malay regiment unit operating in the jungles of Northern Malaysia and Southern Thailand. The leader was Abdullah CD and his followers Suriani Abdullah, Shamsiah Fakeh, Abu Samah Mohamad Kassim and Rashid Maidin,” Tan said.

Michael Wolff Says That Washington Will Bury Trump


January 11, 2018

Michael Wolff Says That Washington Will Bury Trump

The NY Times Book Review: Max Boot’s The Road not Taken


January 9, 2018

The NY Times Book Review: Max Boot’s The Road not Taken

by Fredrik Logevall

 THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam

By Max Boot
Illustrated 715 pp. Liveright. $35.
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Could it have turned out differently? Even before the guns fell silent in Vietnam, Americans began debating whether an alternate strategy might have brought success in the war. For some revisionist analysts, the path to victory would have involved more firepower from an earlier point on more parts of enemy territory. In this interpretation, overcautious civilians compelled the United States military to fight “with one arm tied behind its back.”

Never mind that this ostensibly “limited” war saw eight million tons of bombs dropped by American and allied aircraft on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia between 1962 and 1973, killing many hundreds of thousands of civilians, or that the United States sprayed some 19 million gallons of defoliants on South Vietnam in an attempt to deny enemy forces jungle cover and food. Never mind that the American troop commitment at its height reached more than half a million men, or that more than 58,000 of them never made it back alive.

The more interesting and at first glance attractive argument is the opposite one: that the answer in Vietnam was to deploy less military force, not more. Washington planners, this perspective holds, erred in seeing the struggle principally as a conventional military conflict when what really mattered was the human dimension. They forgot that in a war of this kind it was not enough to be against Communism; one had to be for something. The key to victory lay in meeting the needs of people where they lived, in responding to their aspirations, in winning, as the saying went, their “hearts and minds.”

Max Boot’s latest book, The Road Not Taken, discusses his contention that the Vietnam War could have been avoided if American leaders had listened to a visionary CIA Agent, Edward Lansdale, who called for a focus on hearts and minds, not bombs and body counts. Come hear a fascinating tale of spy craft, bureaucracy and combat.

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Note: Boot is a military historian and foreign policy analyst who has been called one of the “world’s leading authorities on armed conflict” by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He’s a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and the Los Angeles Times, a columnist for Foreign Policy, and a regular contributor to The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.

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Boot served as an adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was also a senior foreign policy adviser to John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2007–08, a defense policy adviser to Mitt Romney’s campaign in 2011–12, and the head of the counterterrorism working group for Marco Rubio’s campaign in 2015-16. Boot was born in Moscow and grew up in Los Angeles. He holds a bachelor’s degree from UC Berkeley and a master’s degree in history from Yale University.–https://www.eventbrite.com

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One man personified this outlook more than perhaps anyone else: Edward Lansdale, the larger-than-life intelligence operative of America’s Cold War who is the subject of Max Boot’s judicious and absorbing, if not fully convincing, new book, “The Road Not Taken.” A dashing champion of counterinsurgency who helped thwart a rebellion in the Philippines and plotted to oust Fidel Castro, Lansdale was present at the creation of South Vietnam in 1954 as an important adviser to Prime Minister (and later President) Ngo Dinh Diem. His influence would fade, but not his belief that the struggle for Vietnam had to be won — and could be, provided American strategists employed the right combination of political and military measures.

Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, brings solid credentials to this enterprise, having written well-received histories of guerrilla warfare and America’s “small wars.” Here he draws on a range of material, official and personal, including a stash of love letters between Lansdale and his Filipino mistress. The narrative dispenses briskly and effectively with the details of Lansdale’s early life, including his college years at U.C.L.A. and his successful entry into the advertising industry, where he learned strategies of psychological manipulation that he later applied as a covert warrior in Southeast Asia. A stint as an intelligence officer under “Wild Bill” Donovan in the wartime Office of Strategic Services convinced him that this work should be his life’s career.

What emerges is a picture of a man who from an early point possessed an unusual ability to relate to other people, a stereotypically American can-do optimism, an impatience with bureaucracy and a fascination with psychological warfare. All these qualities were on display in Lansdale’s first major postwar posting, in the newly independent Philippines, where on behalf of the C.I.A. he helped suppress the left-wing Hukbalahap insurgency in the early 1950s.

But it was in Vietnam that Lansdale would achieve his greatest renown — and frustration. Neil Sheehan’s assertion, in “A Bright Shining Lie,” that “South Vietnam, it can truly be said, was the creation of Edward Lansdale,” is surely an exaggeration, but it speaks to Lansdale’s fundamental importance. Beginning in mid-1954 he ran a covert intelligence operation that sent sabotage teams to North Vietnam and helped facilitate the flow of refugees from north to south.

More consequentially, Lansdale was from the start the closest American adviser to Ngo Dinh Diem, his car often parked outside the Saigon leader’s residence deep into the night. When in early 1955 the regime faced violent challenges to its rule from sects within South Vietnam, Lansdale persuaded the Eisenhower administration to stand firm with Diem, a critical move that in all likelihood preserved Diem’s hold on power.

This proved to be the high point of Lansdale’s influence in Saigon — and, for that matter, Washington. Diem grew tired of the American upbraiding him for undemocratic moves like closing opposition newspapers. “Do you think that’s the right thing for ‘the father of his country’ to do?” Lansdale asked, to which Diem replied, “Stop calling me papa!”

Even as his clout diminished and his worries grew over the regime’s coercive actions, Lansdale extolled Diem’s achievements and urged continued American support. No other plausible leader existed who could take the fight to the Vietcong. For Lansdale, as for Boot, Diem’s ouster and murder in a coup d’état in late 1963 backed by the United States was a watershed moment, a calamitous development from which the war effort never fully recovered.

There’s something to this argument — it required about four years for the politics in South Vietnam to settle, and the Communists took advantage of the turmoil — but it misses how bleak and unsustainable the situation was with Diem. Communist forces were already gaining momentum in the countryside after 1962, which is partly why the South Vietnamese military had grown so disgruntled and why the Kennedy administration wanted a change. With his shallow conception of leadership and easy resort to repression, Diem, a Roman Catholic, had long since alienated powerful segments of South Vietnamese society, including the leaders of the Buddhist majority, and his regime enjoyed scant support among the peasantry. The coup against him was enormously popular. It’s hard to see Diem surviving in power for long regardless of what John F. Kennedy did in the fall of 1963.

To his credit, Lansdale always emphasized the need to focus on developments within South Vietnam. More than many American officials, he understood that even if one somehow stopped the flow of men and matériel from the North, the southern insurgency would remain a formidable threat to the Saigon regime. Bombing North Vietnam was therefore no solution. Unshakable in his conviction that the American way was right for everyone, Lansdale nevertheless insisted on the need to show empathy for local values and practices, to spend time with villagers, and he perceived — to a degree at least — the dilemma at the heart of American strategy: What do you do when the destruction deemed necessary to defeat an insurgency alienates the very population you seek to bring over to the government’s side?

Many of Lansdale’s ideas, however, were kooky: He advocated distributing counterfeit official documents in North Vietnam to sow confusion and fear, providing the Vietcong with booby-trapped ammunition intended to blow up in their faces and having Saigon leaders give “fireside chats” à la Franklin D. Roosevelt — and he understood Vietnamese society and politics less well than this admiring book suggests. His well-founded concern about the problems posed by pervasive South Vietnamese official corruption (grasped, contrary to Boot’s claim, by virtually every American intelligence analyst after 1965) did not keep him from championing the unscrupulous, impetuous and flamboyant Nguyen Cao Ky for Saigon’s leadership — he of the aviator sunglasses, purple silk scarf and pearl-handled revolver. Ky’s embrace of American largess made him the very symbol of corruption in the eyes of a great many Vietnamese (and he once told stunned journalists that his only hero was Adolf Hitler).

There is power in Boot’s conclusion that Lansdale “never wanted to see half a million American troops thrashing around Vietnam, suffering and inflicting heavy casualties. His approach, successful or not, would have been more humane and less costly.” In this sense, the Lansdale way was indeed “the road not taken.” Whether that road would have led to the destination he so wanted to reach, however, is doubtful. As much as this irrepressible Cold Warrior might have thought otherwise, Vietnam for the United States was destined to be what it had always been: a riddle beyond American solution.

Fredrik Logevall, a professor of history and international affairs at Harvard, is the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning “Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam.”

A version of this review appears in print on January 14, 2018, on Page BR9 of the Sunday Book Review with the headline: Losing Hearts and Minds.

 

China’s Soft and Sharp Power


January 4, 2018

China’s Soft and Sharp Power

by *Joseph S. Nye

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-soft-and-sharp-power-by-joseph-s–nye-2018-01/english

When I introduced the concept of soft power in 1990, I wrote that it is characterized by voluntarism and indirection, while hard power rests on threats and inducements. If someone aims a gun at you, demands your money, and takes your wallet, what you think and want is irrelevant. That is hard power. If he persuades you to give him your money, he has changed what you think and want. That is soft power.

Image result for Joseph S. NyeHarvard’s Joseph S. Nye

Truth and openness create a dividing line between soft and sharp power in public diplomacy. When China’s official news agency, Xinhua, broadcasts openly in other countries, it is employing soft-power techniques, and we should accept that. When China Radio International covertly backs 33 radio stations in 14 countries, the boundary of sharp power has been crossed, and we should expose the breach of voluntarism.

Of course, advertising and persuasion always involve some degree of framing, which limits voluntarism, as do structural features of the social environment. But extreme deception in framing can be viewed as coercive; though not violent, it prevents meaningful choice.

Techniques of public diplomacy that are widely viewed as propaganda cannot produce soft power. In an age of information, the scarcest resources are attention and credibility. That is why exchange programs that develop two-way communication and personal relations among students and young leaders are often far more effective generators of soft power than, say, official broadcasting.

The United States has long had programs enabling visits by young foreign leaders, and now China is successfully following suit. That is a smart exercise of soft power. But when visas are manipulated or access is limited to restrain criticism and encourage self-censorship, even such exchange programs can shade into sharp power.

As democracies respond to China’s sharp power and information warfare, they have to be careful not to overreact. Much of the soft power democracies wield comes from civil society, which means that openness is a crucial asset. China could generate more soft power if it would relax some of its tight party control over civil society. Similarly, manipulation of media and reliance on covert channels of communication often reduces soft power. Democracies should avoid the temptation to imitate these authoritarian sharp-power tools.

Moreover, shutting down legitimate Chinese soft-power tools can be counter-productive. Soft power is often used for competitive, zero-sum purposes; but it can also have positive sum aspects.

For example, if both China and the US wish to avoid conflict, exchange programs that increase American attraction to China, and vice versa, would benefit both countries. And on transnational issues such as climate change, where both countries can benefit from cooperation, soft power can help build the trust and create the networks that make such cooperation possible.

While it would be a mistake to prohibit Chinese soft-power efforts just because they sometimes shade into sharp power, it is also important to monitor the dividing line carefully. For example, the Hanban, the government agency that manages the 500 Confucius Institutes and 1,000 Confucius classrooms that China supports in universities and schools around the world to teach Chinese language and culture, must resist the temptation to set restrictions that limit academic freedom. Crossing that line has led to the disbanding of some Confucius Institutes.

As such cases show, the best defense against China’s use of soft-power programs as sharp-power tools is open exposure of such efforts. And this is where democracies have an advantage.