Malaysia’s Greatest Crisis: Loss of National Pride and Unity


by Murray Hunter

Malaysia’s Greatest Crisis: Loss of National Pride and Unity

Love him or hate him, Mahathir Mohamed during his first stint as prime minister was able to instill a great sense of national pride and unity.

Mahathir went on a massive infrastructure drive. Most Malaysians were proud of the Penang Bridge that finally linked the island with the mainland. The North-South Highway project changed the nature of commuting up and down the peninsula. Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) was built and the development of Putra Jaya gave the country a new seat of administration.

Mahathir’s fait accompli was the building of the KLCC towers in central Kuala Lumpur, which were the tallest in the world at the time. These buildings are now the country’s major icon. Langkawi became a must holiday place for Malaysians. He brought elite Formula One motor racing and built a special purpose circuit for the event. He promoted the Tour de Langkawi as a local version of the Tour de France. He spared no expense on building massive new sporting complexes at Bukit Jalil to host the Commonwealth Games in 1998.

When the member nations of ASEAN abandoned the idea to build a regional car, Mahathir went alone, picking up old technology from Mitsubishi, creating the Proton Saga for better or worse although the national car project has been roundly criticized for losing hundreds of millions of dollars and costing more in terms of consumer lost opportunity.

Nonetheless, Malaysia became an Asian Tiger and Mahathir himself became an outspoken leader internationally. The country was proud of what it had achieved.  He knew the value of national symbols. The slogan Malaysia Boleh (Malaysia Can) was often heard along with the waving of the Jalur Gemilang (stripes of glory – Malaysian Flag) at public displays of national pride and unity.

The Barisan Nasional was a working government coalition that symbolized national unity through the make-up of the cabinet and its true multi-ethnic flavor. Ministers like Samy Vellu from the Malaysian India Congress and Ling Liong Sik from the Malaysian Chinese Association had high public profiles.

Although Mahathir was labeled as an ultra-conservative Malay, he worked with anyone who could help him fulfil his vision. Businessmen like Vincent Tan, Robert Kuok, Lim Goh Tong, Ananda Krishnan, and Tony Fernandez all had very close relationships with Mahathir. Malaysia Inc. was more important to Mahathir than Malay supremacy.

That’s now 30 years ago. The prime casualty has been national pride and unity. The generally positive perception of the Mahathir era drastically changed when he abruptly sacked his deputy Anwar Ibrahim from office in 1998. The accusations and conviction of Anwar for sodomy polarized the population. The goodwill that Mahathir had built up over more than 25 years in public life was put into question.

Although it was his intention to eliminate his nemesis Anwar from politics, he made sodomy a household word in a conservative society, taking luster away from his legacy.  He was painted by the Anwar propaganda machine and the alternative media as a tyrant with millions of dollars hidden away in foreign banks. In addition, two years of headlines and court reports about Anwar’s sodomy trial took away a sense of innocence, showing Malaysia’s ‘dark side’ with TV pictures showing a stained mattress being carted into and out of court every day on which Anwar was convicted of performing sodomy.

Under weak successors, belief in government further faltered. Respect for national leaders took another hit with Mahathir’s successor Ahmad Badawi painted as someone who slept on the job and enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle while many suffered economically. Badawi was painted by the PKR propaganda machine as corrupt. The dealings of his son-in-law and political adviser Khairy Jamaluddin were portrayed as corrupt nepotism.

Mahathir engineered an ungraceful exit for Badawi, replacing him with Najib Razak in 2009. The Najib premiership was tainted from the outset with rumors of murder and corruption. Najib’s wife Rosmah also became an object of ridicule, bringing respect for the institution of government to an all-time low.

However, it’s not just the corruption of politicians that destroyed respect for Malaysian institutions. The rakyat (people) have always wanted to believe in royalty. Even with stories about royal misdoings, there is no real talk of abolishing the monarchy. Whenever a member of one of the royal families acts in the interests of the rakyat, there has always been public praise and support. However, when members of a royal family act against the interests of the rakyat, the social media react.

Stories have been circulating for years about the misdeeds of Johor Royal Family. The current spat between Tunku Ismail, the Johor Crown Prince, commonly known as TMJ and Mahathir is extremely damaging for the royal institutions. Only the sedition act, a de facto lese-majeste law, is protecting the institution from much wider criticism.

Royal decorations and titles, VVIP service in government offices and special treatment for some citizens over others, shows a muddled Malaysia still clinging to the vestiges of feudalism. These artefacts are doing nothing to unite the country, a hangover from the old days of colonial class distinction.

However, the most powerful source of destruction for national pride and unity is the ketuanan Melayu (Malay Superiority) narrative which has become much more extreme. One of the basic assumptions is that bumiputeras — indigenous peoples – are the rightful owners of the land. From the point of view of the ketuanan proponents, land is not seen as a national symbol and non-Malays are excluded. This is a great barrier to developing any sense of national pride and unity.

The gulf between Malay and non-Malay has widened dramatically over the last two generations as Islam has grown into a major aspect of Malay identity. Citizens once celebrated their diverse ethnicities in harmony. Decrees made in the name of Islam now discourage this. No longer are Hari Raya, Chinese New Year, Deepavali and Christmas shared Malaysian experiences.

The way of life has become Islamized to the point where there is little place for other religions and traditions. Food, dress codes, entertainment, education, the civil service, government, police and the military are all Islamized.

Shared apprehensions about what Malaysia will be have caused the Chinese to close ranks. The influence of Ketuanan Melayu in government policy excludes non-Malay participation in many fields like education, civil service and the military, etc. The younger generation of Chinese today tend to see themselves as Chinese first and Malaysians second. Chinese schools promote language and a strong sense of Chinese culture over a Malaysian identity as a mass defence mechanism.

The New Economic Policy, put in place in 1969 after disastrous race riots as an affirmative action program for the majority Malays, has also done a disservice to those it was designed to help. The thesis of Mahathir’s book The Malay Dilemma was that Malays were basically lazy and needed help from the government is the faulty grounding assumption. The NEP is actually an attack on Malay self-esteem.

Rather than offering something spiritual, Islam has become a doctrine of conformity, where particular rights and rituals must legally be adhered to. Failure to do so in the case of not fasting during Ramadan can lead to punitive legal action.  Any views outside narrow social norms lead to heavy criticism. Just recently the Islamic authorities (JAKIM) in Selangor started investigating a discussion forum on women’s choice about wearing the hijab. Not just freedom of discussion is stifled, but also the right to be creative.

Islam has buried the principles of Rukun Negara (national principles), the supposed guiding philosophy of the nation. Rukun Negara was once a symbol of national pride and unity but has almost totally been replaced by a Doa (or prayer) before public events. A sense of nation has been sacrificed for the Islamization of public gatherings.

Today we see much less flag-waving during the Merdeka season. There are more divisional narratives on all ethnic sides. There is disappointment with the political system. Islam is seen by many as something overpowering rather than emancipating. People feel they need to conform to be accepted in society.

National pride and unity are at their lowest ebb since independence, where after 30 years of education the younger generations of Malays see Islam as more important than nationalism. Chinese and Indians are apprehensive about what Malaysia is turning into. Even the Orang Asli – the original inhabitants of the peninsula before the arrival of ethnic Malays from Indonesia — and non-Muslim indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak identify as second-class.

Malaysia has travelled far away from the aspirations of Tunku Abdul Rahman when the Jalur Gemilang was raised for the first time over a free Malaya in 1957. Malaysia’s economic prosperity is relatively declining in the region and the nation is increasingly strangled by the need to conform. Malaysia appears to be a ship without a rudder, its reform agenda locked away under the Official Secrets Act.

The possibility of racial violence festering once again cannot be overlooked. Divisive narratives are being pushed until one day an unknown tipping point could be reached. The strong sense of social conformity, the exclusion of a national sense of ownership to all, the current totalitarian nature of authority and ketuanan Melayu narratives are a very dangerous mix.

Murray Hunter is a regular Asia Sentinel contributor. He is a development specialist and a longtime resident of the region.

An interview with Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Saifuddin Abdullah


April 13, 2019

An interview with Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Saifuddin Abdullah

An interview with Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Saifuddin Abdullah

Image result for saifuddin abdullah

Editor’s note: New Mandala’s guest editor for the “Changing Malaysia” series, Prof Meredith Weiss, interviewed Malaysian Foreign Minister Dato’ Saifuddin Abdullah on 12 February 2019, at Wisma Putra (the Foreign Ministry) in Putrajaya, Malaysia. The transcript has been lightly edited and condensed. The discussion makes reference to the recently promulgated “Foreign Policy Framework of the New Malaysia”.


How did you come to be Foreign Minister and what most excites you or makes you nervous about the post?

As a politician, if I told you I didn’t expect to be appointed as a minister, I’d be lying. But if I told you I did not expect to be Minister of Foreign Affairs, that is the truth—I never thought I’d be Minister of Foreign Affairs; I thought I would be Minister of Education, or this or that. The worst part of being Foreign Affairs Minister is that you travel quite a bit and because of that, you have less time in your own constituency. That’s the worst thing. So you really have to navigate your time. As much as possible, once you are back home, you have to be in your constituency.

But the best part of it is, is the golden opportunity to show the New Malaysia to the world.

You have come on the job at a rough time in some ways for global foreign policy, with Trump, Brexit, the refugee crisis, trade tensions, other challenges for democracy abroad … How does that change the nature of your work?

There are two things to note here. Number one, regardless of those challenges, I have the benefit of having Tun Mahathir as a prime minister. Most literature on IR [international relations], on foreign policy, will tell you that the head of government is actually the de facto foreign minister, and especially so when the head of government is actively involved in international issues. Prime Minister Mahathir was prime minister and he is well-known worldwide. Also, he’s still very actively involved in international issues. So that is a big, big plus for me, because it actually opens doors in meeting people, because they say, “Oh, who’s this rookie? He’s the new foreign minister of Malaysia. Oh, they have a new prime minister, but it’s Dr Mahathir”.

The second point to note, yes, it’s very challenging in some sense, because suddenly you are faced with multi-disciplinary situations where, say, we have to come up with a policy as to how we handle trade sanctions Then, I sound like I am minister of MITI [Ministry of International Trade and Industry]. And perhaps this is also the reason why our ministry and MITI are working very closely together, perhaps more than ever before in the history of Malaysia. In fact, one of our policy statements states that one of our objectives now, and one of the types of work that we do, is economic diplomacy. I am organising joint and interagency meetings with MITI. It helps that Darell [Leiking, the Minister] is an old friend, a good buddy. You will see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MITI working very closely together.

It was quite noticeable in the framework that you discuss a new emphasis on economic objectives. Especially with the prospect of a global downturn and the need for complex coordination across agencies and actors, public and private, domestically and internationally, how do you as Foreign Affairs navigate that?

Well, on the one hand, as we were writing the framework, I was asking the basic question, what do our ambassadors actually do? Our three main objectives are, of course, security, economics, and our cultural identity. When it comes to security, we are not at war with any other country, but we want to be a trading nation, and we want to be friendly with all. That was when we decided that economic diplomacy should be an important part of our work. Which is to say that from now on, we have already started asking our missions to work more closely with MATRADE [Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation] and all the other MITI agencies overseas. But also I think when it comes to preparing our future ambassadors, business acumen is going to be one of the criteria. Yes, you are a diplomat, you are not a businessman, but you have to have some business acumen. Because otherwise, you will not be able to implement what we are calling economic diplomacy.

On the other hand, sometimes challenge makes you work in a certain way. A good example is palm oil. We are facing a lot of challenges from Europe. I was recently in Brussels for the ASEAN–EU ministerial meeting, and I was thinking, this palm oil issue is not just about palm oil; it is about protectionism, it’s about deforestation, it’s about climate change, and so on. So immediately after I came back, I held an informal inter-ministerial meeting. We invited the minister in charge of Primary Industries, which includes palm oil; the minister in charge of MITI; the minister in charge of Environment; and the minister in charge of Natural Resources, which includes forests. I thought we had a very good discussion. We were very clear that the lead agency is the minister in charge of Primary Industries, but we need to coordinate our work. The Minister of Primary Industries has organised a palm oil “war room” and they have things that they need to do or want to do. But during that meeting, we told the minister that we all want to help out when it comes to palm oil. You see, when it comes to palm oil, you will find when the minister in charge of Primary Industries, Teresa Kok, goes overseas to campaign for or to promote palm oil, she will also have to answer questions on environment and deforestation. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have to do the same thing. But you also want the minister in charge of Environment to go out and talk about palm oil, and not just talk about plastic or the sea; and you want the minister in charge of Natural Resources to go out, not only to talk about natural resources issues, but also to talk about palm oil, because it is related. So these are the kinds of things we are doing now.

You mention in the framework document that your goal is to push for fairer international trade and financial systems, not just Malaysian interests. From the perspective of the Foreign Ministry, how do you do that?

There is an ongoing debate, from the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] to what is now known as CPTPP [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership]. More often than not, when it comes to international trade treaties, the lead agency is MITI. But what normally happens in Malaysia is that a treaty will come from somewhere and you are reacting to a proposal. But now we are saying, look, this proposal is not plucked from thin air. Ideas leading to this proposal would have been already put on the table, in various discussions and seminars, perhaps a decade ago. So what we are saying is that there are already some treaties that we have signed, we may want to review. There are treaties we are about to sign and ratify; we will have to look at each in detail and make decisions. But we also must be able to focus on what is going to happen five years or ten years from now. For example, internet governance. We can’t wait until somebody comes up with a text, or until a letter comes to my office saying, please look at this proposal. I think we need to be more proactive, we should be able to pre-empt whatever kind of treaties are coming and be involved in the discussion, because by the time you go from four or five texts and agree on a single text, there have been discussions and seminars and conferences and meetings. And I think we need to be proactive by looking at what is to come five, ten years from now, rather than only react once those things come knocking on your door.

One of the things that’s quite striking about the foreign policy framework is the consultative framework you have set up. Could you say more about the process of developing the framework and how the consultations worked?

There is a history to this framework. There was a group assembled in around 2013 and 2014, while I was in GMM [Global Movement of Moderates], of about 60 people, comprising leading former diplomats, leading academics, and professionals, including businesspeople and civil society representatives. They came out with a report. The editor was Professor Muthiah [Alagappa]. That paper was presented to the prime minister back then, but nothing happened. I read the paper when I was CEO of GMM and I thought, this is a very good paper. Never thought I would become Minister of Foreign Affairs. So the moment I was assigned here, the first thing that came to my mind was, can I have a copy of that paper? So we studied it again. And if you look at our framework, you’ll see a lot of it came from that paper. Now, that by itself was a consultative process. I think they spent three to four months working on that paper. Sixty people, the who’s who in foreign affairs were involved. So who is Saifuddin, who suddenly became Foreign Minister, to think that I know better? So I used that paper as a guide.

We formed the Consultative Council, involving people from the ministry, former diplomats, academics, and people from civil society. I penned it in Malay, and then, once we agreed on it, translated the whole thing to English. We had one proper meeting with the Consultative Council, and then we shared the document online and they gave their feedback. Besides that, there were other consultations. We had a series of meetings with academics, with university lecturers, and with students. With the students, it was town-hall meetings. I presented the skeleton of the foreign policy, and then there were questions from the students – bear in mind that they’re not IR specialists, they’re not even students of IR, most of them. Their questions tell you the kind of sentiments they have, or the kind of aspirations they have for the country. We took notes on points that were raised. If you see Palestine and Rohingya mentioned in the framework, it’s not just because we want to do work on Palestine and Rohingya—of course we want to address Palestine and Rohingya—but because these are the two most common questions that come from the floor, everywhere you go. What the questions were leading to was, as a Muslim country, what else can we do? So we had different ways of consulting.

And we proposed the formation of a foreign policy select committee in Parliament. Before the consultation started, I tabled a motion in Parliament. It started with the Prime Minister’s speech on 28th September 2018 [at the United Nations]. We knew from Day 1 that the main points of our foreign policy would be from that speech. And then I presented a motion in Parliament [on 15 October 2018], and we actually had one whole day in Parliament. I presented the framework, in skeletal form, in my oral presentation to Parliament. And then there was a very good debate; about 14 MPs participated and I did the summing up. And then there was a vote, unanimous: people agreed on the parameters or the main gist of the framework. And from there we continued writing with the aid of consultative and town-hall meetings, etc., until we produced the final version. The final version was then distributed to all the relevant ministries for them to comment, and then it was presented to Cabinet where it was also passed. And we’ve promised that we will continue consulting people as we go on trying to implement the framework.

Do you know if other ministries are doing anything similar?

The Ministry of Defence is coming up with a white paper to present to Parliament. I think they have also organised consultations. Besides that, there are a few other ministries who have also established some sort of consultative council, for example, the Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Agriculture—these two I’m very sure, but I know there are at least one or two more. Which is to say that consultation is almost like a cornerstone of the new approach of the new administration—something that was not very often done before.

In the framework, you say that you desire to present Malaysia “as an exemplary Islamic country” and Maqasid Syari’ah as “a vital reference in charting the nation’s development strategy”. Could you say more about how you intend to do that?

You see, when you look at the individual Muslim countries, the OIC members, for example, and you compare our achievements on some of the international rankings, when you look at the top ten countries in many of those indexes, of justice or happiness or whatever, sometimes not even one of the Muslim countries appears to be in the top ten. Which means the room for improvement is so massive. So what do we do? What can we contribute, as Malaysia, to the Muslim world? Surely our foreign policy is not just about fighting for the oppressed. We will continue doing that, and we will try to do even better, for the Palestinians, for the Rohingya, and for other minority groups. But surely there is more that we can offer the Muslim world. We have been doing some substantive work, for example, on education, by inviting students from the Muslim world to come to our universities. We have scholarships for students and for civil servants—this is called the MTCP, the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program, which we offer to, basically, developing countries, and many of them are Muslim countries. But what about democracy, what about human rights, what about others? Surely we can also offer something, and this is why we write our foreign policy in that manner, with the Maqasid Syaria’ah. Issues or topics like Muslim democrats should be brought to the OIC platform—but not just to Muslim countries, even to the world. I think we also have the responsibility to show to the world that Islam is not just about ISIS and IS, or what Trump tweets about, but there is—though I don’t like to use the word—the “real Islam”.

Do you resent having to make up for the less exemplary actors who claim to be acting in the name of Islam, in terms of that image?

I think there is a responsibility to show to the world what Islam is all about, and especially so when you are faced with the threat of terrorism and radicalism, especially now, when we have Daesh. We know that Daesh, though they seem to be fading away, will re-emerge somewhere else, with a different style, a different name. And also we are facing an Islamophobia challenge, coming from the West. I think we need to share the actual narrative of Islam, and we take that as part of our foreign policy responsibility..

You may also find mention of the “Malay World” in there [the foreign policy framework].[1] Well, the Malay world has a unique civilisational experience with Islam and culture. Remember Huntington talked about the clash of civilisations? You don’t see that in the Malay world. The Malay world is really a place where civilisations meet and those looking toward the advancement of Islam in the future can look not just at the Middle East, but also at the Malay world as an example.

You note ASEAN as the cornerstone of Malaysian foreign policy. How does the change of Malaysia’s government affect Malaysia’s position within ASEAN?

Well, not politically. Because politically, we change our chairmanship every year, so on the official side, I think things will go on as the tradition has been. But Dr Mahathir is a big name, and many people in the ASEAN community, including heads of government, look up to Dr Mahathir for some form of leadership. And I think Malaysia can play its own role, like providing moral leadership to the grouping. It’s not just because of the new government, but Malaysia is taking this opportunity to impress upon the other members that the natural cooperation for ASEAN is really to strengthen its economic standing. There are three things that Malaysia is trying to assess and to provide some kind of leadership on.

Number 1 is to increase intra-ASEAN trade. The numbers will show you that we are nowhere close to what is happening in the EU, but of course we know that the EU is really something quite different. But having said that, surely we can improve our intra-ASEAN trade. Especially when you are faced with the trade war between China and the US, herein lies an opportunity—or rather, all the more reason why you need to work together.

Number 2: every time when I talk to my counterparts from outside the region, especially my counterparts from the EU and North America, one item on their wish-lists is that they prefer talking to ASEAN as one single market. Again, we cannot compare ourselves with the EU, but we have to be able to work as a grouping, making full use of the 640-odd million population, which is really a big market. So we may not be able to behave or act like a single market, but it is a big market, such that we should optimise this market that we have.

Number 3 is very much Tun Mahathir’s idea: that ASEAN should be a real producing hub, and not just individual countries exporting raw materials to  other parts of the world. Every time he meets his counterparts, he keeps trying to impress that there must be some joint-venture projects among ASEAN countries. Maybe it is difficult to get all ten countries to work on a single product, but surely two or three countries can work on a product and market it together. So these are the three items that are now on the table.

I think it is more the latter. I think there are a lot of expectations, and we have to walk the talk, otherwise people will look at you and say, hey, what are you guys trying to do?! So because of that, this is where I normally go back to my favourite phrase, that foreign policy begins at home. Until and unless you prove that you are doing it seriously at home, no one will believe you outside. So I’m very pleased that the prime minister is taking this issue very seriously. He has just recently launched an anticorruption plan of action, which I think is a very strong document. He has before this launched an inter-agency anticorruption committee, and he took the trouble to travel to Vienna to speak at an international conference on anti-corruption. He attended that, I think, to prove that he is very serious about it. So in my conversations with my colleagues from outside, I think they understand very well that we are serious about fighting corruption. They know that it is not easy, and of course we have to prove ourselves.

There is a lot in the framework about developing a knowledge culture and developing the ministry’s human-capital resources. You have spoken in the past about lack of awareness of or interest in foreign policy, even among MPs. Do you find that there is sufficient interest and expertise, not just within, but also outside, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have the sorts of consultations and to play the sorts of roles you would like to sustain?

Not many people really understand what foreign policy is all about. We need to sensitise people that foreign policy is not an elite thing, that it is about everyday life, and that foreign policy is directly impacting whatever is happening at home, and vice-versa. I think we need to inform people that foreign policy is very much a domestic matter—much as it sounds like it is out there, it is very much in here.

I am quite happy that, generally speaking, the officers at the ministry are professional; they are well-trained. But we also need to improve in certain areas. For example, of course, we have to keep on improving our English, but I think we need to have a good pool of officers who have a sound proficiency in all of the UN’s working languages. Number two, in future, we have to ensure that in every mission abroad, we have someone among our rank and file who speaks the native language—this is not the case now. Like for example, our ambassador to China does not speak or write Mandarin, but we do have someone there who speaks Mandarin. And also not all of our ambassadors in the Middle East speak and write Arabic, although we always have someone. In the future, we have to ensure that we have ambassadors and senior officers who speak the native language, or at least the working language of the country. Because the world is becoming more complex, and sometimes decisions have to be made almost on the spot, where we no longer have the luxury of time to contact the capital to translate.

The next thing is content experts. We need to start seriously training our officers to become not only experts in diplomacy, but also content experts. For example, there are some very broad international areas of concern that everyone should have a good understanding of. You don’t have to be an expert on all those broad agendas, but you need to at least be very good with one of them, if not many of them. For example, on issues like human rights—under human rights, there are various themes, like religious freedom, children’s rights, women’s rights, and so on. And then you have environment. Again, there are numerous themes. And so too with free and fair trade. So we need to have people who are content experts.

And finally, negotiation skills. I find that not everyone can negotiate. Negotiation is not just a skill: it is both an art and a science. And we need this.

We need to train our own people, but we also have to be very open in outsourcing or using experts from outside, from business, academia  and from amongst professionals. For example: in a recent conference in Holland, I thought the ministry did the right thing by bringing Professor Gurdial Singh Nijar as part of the delegation, because Gurdial has some experience in dealing with negotiations. Gurdial is one of the members of our Consultative Council, and the reason why we roped him in is also because there may be occasions where we need experts like him to be part of our delegation at conferences.

You note quite ambitious goals for developing think tanks, such as Malaysian ISIS [Institute of Strategic and International Studies]. Why has Malaysia slipped on that front or not advanced, and how can you as a ministry nurture organisations that by nature need to be at least substantially independent and critical-minded if they are to be effective?

ISIS is an independent organisation. It was until recently under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Department, but now it is under us. But we have an understanding with ISIS. I met with the board and I told them, you are going to remain independent. We take it that the only reason they are with us is for administrative purposes. You have to park ISIS somewhere, to put it bluntly. Somebody has to sign the cheques, that’s all. I told them that they have to remain independent. There was a time when ISIS was very highly respected, but they slipped quite a bit because I think they had the wrong emphasis, to a certain extent, instead of doing their core business. To me, their core business, is, number one: international and strategic studies, which includes security. Number two would be economics, international economics. They should be looking at trends and advise the government, and further ideas and so on. But also it has something to do with, perhaps, the previous administration’s way of controlling ideas or limiting freedom. I think the current administration is very clear about the meaning of freedom. And I told ISIS, you are free to even criticise the government if you need to. If not in public, then in private, but you have to be thinking on your own, you have to be seriously independent. And when you look at the growing numbers of think tanks being established for the past five to seven years, I think the ones that prosper are the ones that are really independent. And there’s no way you can control think tanks, because by definition, they are not supposed to be controlled by any one.

How do you balance the need to be closed-door and decisive in some policy making versus advancing transparency and openness?

I think the word is practicality. We want to be as open as possible, and to discuss matters with as many stakeholders as possible. But sometimes we also have to be very cautious, especially when dealing with some matters which may be considered sensitive by some quarters. In dealing with issues like trade relations, many of the discussions are conducted below the radar. For example, we inherited some contracts made by the previous administration, and we have decided to discontinue several projects, and this was quite easy because they have not yet taken off. Some are still under discussion and we are very careful about it.

So, there are things we have to navigate. For instance, on the Rohingya, we stop at nothing. We simply say what we want to say about the Rohingya, we are very open about it, and my counterpart, the foreign minister of Myanmar, understands very well. He will just keep quiet as and when we say something less diplomatic. He understands perfectly where we are coming from, but at the same time, we are saying that we also want to work with the Myanmar government, to make sure that things improve.

Our position on Rohingya is very clear, and we say it even in front of our counterpart from Myanmar. Number one, perpetrators have to be brought to justice. We are very clear about it, and they know it. Number two, we want repatriation to occur, in the best manner. And number three, we are of course committed to helping on the humanitarian side, both there and in Bangladesh. We have a field hospital in Cox’s Bazaar, run by MinDef [Ministry of Defence], it’s actually an army field hospital in Cox’s Bazaar—there are more than 140,000 Rohingya there, by UNHCR’s estimate. We want to enhance our humanitarian assistance, most of it through NGOs. And we are hoping that the pledge by the Qatari government will come through soon, US$50 million for humanitarian assistance, education, welfare.

You have “change in continuity” as your theme. What do you see as most important to maintain and what do you see as most important to change?

I think the basic fundamentals of foreign policy will remain intact. For example, we want to be friends with all countries, except Israel. We want to trade with all. We practice principles of neutrality and non-interference. That will remain intact… But there will be new approaches in the way we do things. For example, it has always been the practice that foreign policy is about government to government, party to party, and people to people. But more often than not, in the previous administration, foreign policy was very formal. We will maintain the formalities and formal structures, of course. But we are more open to engaging, for example, the business sector and especially civil society organisations. I think our office for the past nine months has received visitors who were at one time banned from coming into our office. Before the UPR [the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review] process, we had visits from both sides of the CSOs—the liberals and the conservatives. So we are more open to that. In fact, we engage with them. It’s not because they want to come, but actually, we invite them to us.

We are open to visits by any of the international rapporteurs. I had a meeting with the UN Special Rapporteur for Myanmar. Both of us happened to be in Bangkok at the same time, so I had a good meeting with her. She asked if she could come to Malaysia, I said any time. We did not say we have a standing invitation to all, but we say if people want to come, we will receive them. We will try our level best to accommodate all the international and UN special rapporteurs. Human rights issues are no longer taboo to be discussed openly—even issues like LGBT, which was previously off the table I think—we can discuss all kinds of things. Of course, economic diplomacy is something that we consider important as part of our work. Yes, ASEAN remains, if not the cornerstone of our foreign policy, still premium, but we are going beyond politics into the economics of ASEAN. Consciously we are saying, look, we want to do this. So it’s not just MITI talking about trade, but even MoFA is talking about trade. And when we look at the Muslim world, we are saying our role is not just to fight for the oppressed, but also to offer more in terms of progress and development. So continuity in terms of the fundamentals, but change mostly in the approaches, the way we look at things and the way we do things.


[1] The text reads: “Malaysia will also lead the efforts to improve the fortune and image of Muslim countries and the ummah by, among others, promoting the role of successful Malaysian Islamic institutions for example, in higher learning, as well as finance and banking; and unique experiences of the Malay World”.

About the interviewee: Dato’ Saifuddin Abdullah


Dato’ Saifuddin Abdullah is Malaysia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Member of Parliament for Indera Mahkota and Chief Secretary of Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope). Previously, he served as the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Member of the UMNO Supreme Council, CEO of the Global Movement of Moderates Foundation (GMM), and Director (Strategic and Social Development) of Institut Darul Ehsan. Saifuddin is a progressive politician who advocates New Politics, youth empowerment and social entrepreneurship, also actively promoting debate and basketball. During his tenure as Deputy Minister of Higher Education, he restarted the campus Speakers’ Corner and amended the University and University College Act to allow student involvement in politics—both of which had been restricted since 1975—and was openly critical of the BN Government’s suppressive policies on freedom and human rights, and racism. Saifuddin has also served as the President of the Malaysian Youth Council, a Member of the United Nations Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Youth Employment, a Consultant to the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and Joint-Secretary of Bosnia Action Front.
He was also a passionate student activist. He has published eight books, the latest of which being New Politics 2.0: Multiracial and Moderate Malaysian Democracy (2017). Born in 1961, Saifuddin studied at The Malay College Kuala Kangsar and received a BA (Hons) from Universiti Malaya. He is married to Norlin Shamsul Bahri and they have a daughter, Nur Madihah

ASEAN: Speak out against Brunei barbarism


April 10, 2019

ASEAN: Speak out against Brunei barbarism

Bangkok Post /Share:
ttps://www.khmertimeskh.com/50594315/asean-speak-out-against-barbarism/

Wikipedia

While the world is fixated on Brunei’s plan to fully implement Islamic Sharia law, which will see draconian punishments such as stoning to death for offences such as adultery and sodomy, as well as amputation for theft, ASEAN has remained silent on the matter. How disappointing.

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The other nine Asean member states so far have not voiced any concerns about the enforcement of the law to its full extent, which blatantly violates human rights. Even the regional rights advocacy agency attached to the bloc – the Asean Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) – has yet to issue any statement on the harsh penalties. Its complete inaction can be interpreted as nothing but indifference.

Brunei is a tiny but rich Muslim-majority ASEAN state with a population of 430,000, which is ruled by Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, Asia’s last absolute monarch who is also the country’s prime minister.

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Last Saturday, Bandar Seri Begawan shrugged off global concerns, saying it will go ahead with the enforcement of full Sharia law that it first announced plans for in 2014. The implementation has been divided into three stages, and the government is set to go ahead with the final phase tomorrow.

In an announcement issued last week, Brunei’s prime minister’s office stressed that Brunei – as a sovereign and fully independent nation – has the right to “its own rule of law”.

The Muslim-majority state, which has always claimed that it practises a dual legal system based on Sharia law and British Common Law, has said that the two systems will continue to run in parallel with one another.

Prior to 2014, Brunei generally used legal principles derived from Sharia law only for issues relating to family, marriage and inheritance, while British Common Law formed the basis of its laws that dealt with everything else.

Since the outcry over its plan began, non-Muslim Bruneians and members of the international community have come out to criticise the law, saying that some aspects of the punishments are overly harsh, if not outright primitive.

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Last week, Hollywood actor George Clooney called for a boycott of hotels around the world that are linked to the Sultan of Brunei. He urged the public to join him to take a stand against such a brutal law, which he sees as tantamount to the “murder of innocent citizens”. The hotels mentioned by Mr Clooney are located in the US, Britain, France and Italy.

Later, British pop legend Elton John joined forces with Mr. Clooney to support the boycott.

The failure to take a stance against Brunei’s new penal code by other ASEAN countries is understood to be based on the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of other states”, which is the core principle of the bloc. The AICHR may have been obliged to behave under the same principle, which means that the AICHR cannot act without the full agreement of all 10 ASEAN members.

But saying nothing about the matter sends the wrong signal that Asean endorses such barbarism. The AICHR’s silence in particular gives the impression that its existence is simply unnecessary.

 

Cambodia–On what basis will there be reconciliation?


April 1, 2019

Cambodia-On what basis will there be reconciliation?

by Thomas Fowler

https://www.khmertimeskh.com

A few days ago, former parliamentarians of the late CNRP launched a call for national reconciliation, mentioning in particular the very short episode of the culture of dialogue. We can only rejoice at this state of mind that seems to mimic the CPP’s opponents.

Above all, Cambodia needs a form of democracy that is based on a desire for dialogue and a spirit of conciliation. The democracy of confrontation, with its winners and losers, so dear to Westerners – even if it offers for the moment rather puzzling examples as in Europe – is absolutely not what Cambodia needs.

Although today a very large majority of its population did not experience the extreme horrors of the 70s, Cambodia still keeps track of the traumas suffered and a collective memory forever marked by this dramatic past. All specialists of mass crimes agree that the victims’ children are also not immune to the shocks suffered by their parents.

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The Cambodian human and social fabric is still fragile. The extraordinary erasure of knowledge inflicted by the men of Pol Pot, but also the propaganda of his movement that lasted until 1998 are not without consequences. The Cambodian population is a fertile ground for those who conceive politics as a call to passions, lies and radical behaviors. The conditions are in place to allow the demagogues to prosper and sow the seeds of division.

This is what we have known since the day Sam Rainsy began to poison the political life of this country. The only candidate, in 1993, to be blamed by UNTAC for his calls for racial hatred, he built his entire political career on the most hateful form of demagoguery – the one that made the success of a Hitler or a Le Pen in Europe both of whom designated a popular scapegoat for all the problems of the country.

Using ignorance of historical realities, neglecting no opportunity to falsify the past as the present, resorting to opposition to power that create a climate of civil war, insulting, slandering, Sam Rainsy is rapidly hysterical when it comes to political debate.

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Don’t BULLY US– We are a sovereign Nation

With the support of Westerners, at all times careless of Cambodian realities, he has had considerable financial means to prosper in his political adventure. After unsuccessfully igniting the streets of Phnom Penh in 2013, he deigned to accept the prime minister’s proposal to practice a culture of dialogue. He sabotaged it, once obtained a reform of the electoral law he wished.

Everyone knows what followed. Today, some of those who have supported Sam Rainsy’s hateful practices speak of national reconciliation and a culture of dialogue. Very well! If there is in the opposition, including the former CNRP, women and men of goodwill, all the better. We can only rejoice. But we must glean from a quarter of a century of lessons why the attempt to establish a peaceful democracy failed.

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What has been lacking in the Cambodian people and their political class since 1993 is a national consensus on a number of fundamental issues. The lack of unity of views on these issues has allowed demagogy to flourish. Cambodia offers the spectacle of a country that is not reconciled with itself on essential issues. This is the lesson of the past 25 years: a democracy cannot work if there is no agreement among all political sensitivities on a common denominator.

The Kingdom needs a national consensus on its past, on the territorial configuration of the country before and after colonization, on the reality of the March 18, 1970 coup, on all the crimes committed by Pol Pot’s gang, on the role of Vietnam in the liberation of the country, and on the true pacification of the country.

To question the borders resulting from colonisation is to deny not only the historical facts (Cambodia lost Kampuchea Krom before the arrival of the French and Koh Trâl because of the French), but also the international law and its principle of uti possidetis, however successfully invoked when it comes to the border with Thailand. This is the first essential consensus: to accept the borders of November 9, 1953, and to take into account the consequences of 30 years of war that require modest and balanced adjustments.

This is a historical fact: it was the 1970 coup that plunged the country into a civil, regional and international war in the end of which Polpotism triumphed. To recognize and accept this fact must help to turn the painful page of divisions between Cambodians who survived these events. It is a second constituent element of a necessary national consensus.

The Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot was the one who systematically organized the physical elimination of more than two million Khmers. Evidence has been gathered of the responsibility of this regime and its leaders for the innumerable crimes against humanity and genocide perpetrated against the Cambodian people, between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979. To deny it, to attribute it to other than to the Pol potists, is to insult the victims and the survivors and to rewrite history. The third consensus that Cambodian democracy needs is to recognize that fanatical Khmer people blinded by a mortifying ideology have massacred their own people.

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The Pol potists launched in 1975 a war of aggression against the Vietnamese neighbor. For reasons of national security of its own and to answer the call for help from tens of thousands of Cambodians who fled to Vietnam, after failed negotiations during two and an half years followed by the rupture of diplomatic relations and the intensification of fighting, it ended Pol Pot’s regime by entering Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979.

Even though people may have a different opinion about what followed, there is no doubt that January 7, 1979 symbolizes the end of a regime of terror and massacres. Recognizing this fact is the fourth component of a necessary national consensus.

What followed was probably, for those who lived it, still too present to agree on a common appreciation and should therefore be restrained in political debates. As a fifth element of the common ground, it should not be difficult to unite all to recognize that the real pacification of the country took place at the end of December 1998.

And finally, to secure the future, an endorsement and commitment by all to give up the anti-democratic practices used by Sam Rainsy should be the sixth element of the political agreement sealing reconciliation.

How can national reconciliation and peaceful democracy be envisioned if those who govern and those who do not want a dialogue respecting mutual values do not agree on these six elements which constitute the historical and political heritage of Cambodia? Will the whole Cambodian political class have the wisdom to conclude a pact that recognizes these six elements of a national consensus and thus open a new era, looking to the future?

Thomas Fowler is a Cambodia watcher based in Phnom Penh.

Can Thailand’s junta manage the election’s outcome?


26 March, 27, 2019

Can Thailand’s junta manage the election’s outcome?

by James Ockey, University of Canterbury

ttps://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/03/20/can-thailands-junta-manage-the-elections-outcome/

For Thailand’s junta, the 2019 election is to be carefully managed so that the government can return to power with enhanced legitimacy, both among its own people and the international community. Yet the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) may have miscalculated its ability to control the elections effectively and so enhance its legitimacy.

Thailand's Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha talks with a man as he visits Lumphini Park ahead of the general election, in Bangkok, Thailand, 20 March 2019 (Photo: Reuters/Soe Zeya Tun).

The constitution and electoral laws were carefully designed to disadvantage the two large parties, Pheu Thai and the Democrats. Meanwhile, the junta leaders are allowed to appoint the 250 senators who will join with elected MPs to choose the prime minister. The constitution also allowed junta leader Prayut Chan-o-cha to be nominated for prime minister without membership in a party. This gives him greater flexibility in seeking the additional 126 elected MPs whose support is necessary for him to remain in his current position.

While writing a favourable constitution and electoral laws proved possible, managing the campaign process is much more difficult. Yet strong efforts are being made. Elections are under the purview of the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT). PNet, an NGO that independently monitors the election process, recently awarded the ECT an ‘F’ grade for its performance, stating that it ‘has failed to demonstrate it is not under undue political influence’.

So far, the ETC has decided that a government handout to the elderly and the poor just prior to the beginning of campaigning did not violate election laws and that the pro-government Phalang Pracharat Party (PPRP) had not accepted illegal donations at a fundraiser. Most recently, it ruled that the prime minister could actively campaign with the party that nominated him (a step too far even for Prayut himself, who instead has chosen to follow the party on the campaign trail).

In contrast, in the case of the anti-government Thai Raksa Chart party, the ECT recommended dissolution without following its own procedures in a rush to judgement. The Constitutional Court would later follow that recommendation.

In January and February, I interviewed candidates from a range of parties, in all four regions of Thailand. None expressed any faith in the ECT. Candidates of pro-regime parties thought the ECT was ineffective. Candidates of anti-regime parties not only questioned the ECT’s capability, but also feared that it was focused on identifying any small violation of the law that would justify banning opposition candidates and parties.

Opposition parties also have to defend themselves from the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC). The NBTC sought to shut down the opposition-oriented Voice TV for 15 days during the election, only to see the decision reversed by the courts. Other threats have come from criminal investigations, with leaders of the Future Forward party charged under the Computer Crime Act.

Ironically, but perhaps not surprisingly, attempts to manage the outcome of the election appear to have created a backlash against the regime. Recent polling done by the Nation newspaper shows the PPRP winning just 62 of 350 constituency seats, with the anti-regime Pheu Thai party winning 136. A recent rally of the PPRP in Korat drew just a few hundred supporters, leaving thousands of empty seats.

Perhaps more interesting are the results of a recent King Prajadhipok Institute poll, which indicate that 96 per cent of eligible voters intend to vote. One would not expect that level of enthusiasm if voters were happy with the government and the status quo.

Political parties also seem to be reacting to anti-government sentiment. The Democrat party, which is likely to win the second most seats after Pheu Thai, recently announced that it would not support the return of Prayut as prime minister. The Democrat Party had previously been deliberately ambiguous regarding its stance. It also set conditions for potential pro- and anti-government coalition partners.

In an interview with Bloomberg, Bhum Jai Thai (BJT) party leader Anuthin Charnvirakul stated that the party will wait for the outcome of the election before finalising its stance, so that it can take into account the voice of the people. BJT has long been considered to be firmly on the government side. Answering this way, even as a campaign tactic, indicates concerns with being seen as too firmly on the side of the junta.

Despite these indications of very limited support for the government, it is expected that the junta will continue to manage the outcome. In the interviews I conducted in January and February, academics and candidates suggested that the junta will expend resources to convince both small parties and individual MPs to join the pro-government side after the election, ensuring support will go well beyond the elected members of the PPRP.

One leading member of a large party noted that the ECT has 60 days to certify the results of the election. They raised concerns that during that period anti-government parties might be dissolved to ensure the junta remains in power.

While Prayut is likely to return to power, it will not be with the clear mandate he seeks. The manipulation of the elections to ensure his return is more likely to result in a decline in legitimacy and support at home, although even a manipulated election may help relieve international pressure to return to democracy. Under such circumstances, concerns about future government stability are likely to remain.

James Ockey is Associate Professor at the School of Language, Social and Political Sciences, University of Canterbury

 

 

WOMEN WHO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER


March 26, 2019

WOMEN WHO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER

Press statement by Kua Kia Soong, SUARAM Adviser 26.3.19

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The obsequious protestations by mainly male politicians over Nurul Izzah’s frank opinion about the Prime Minister in her Straits Times interview brings to mind my article last year: “Thank goodness for daughters!” (9 Jan 2018). At that time it was a breath of fresh air to read Sangeet Karpal’s critical statement on Pakatan Harapan’s endorsement of BN 2.0 with Malaysia’s infamous autocrat as their “interim Prime Minister.

She also pointed out that the leaders in the opposition had remained silent in the face of Mahathir’s recent hollow “apology” over his use of the ISA during his first term as PM. Then there was Anwar Ibrahim’s other daughter, Nurul Nuha who on 14 September 2016 felt she had to uphold her family’s dignity by demanding that former PM, Dr Mahathir apologise for ‘trumped up’ charges against her father. The men currently critiquing Nurul so loudly doth protest too much…

Is it not Malaysian to criticise the PM?

Some of these male politicians have spouted the old feudal argument by saying that Nurul Izzah should show more courtesy toward the Prime Minister. Really? If Malaysians want to learn about the correct etiquette with regard to respecting Prime Ministers, they should learn from the recalcitrant Dr. M himself! Didn’t he teach us the art of the surat layang when he wrote his piece against the Tunku during the May 13 crisis? It certainly was not “sopan santun” the way he slammed the “Father of Independence” on his way to political power.

And if the office of Prime Minister has to be so respected, why did Dr Mahathir proceed to humiliate and denigrate Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi after he had ascended the post in 2003 and to do the same against Prime Minister Najib Razak after 2009? Wasn’t it the only way to get rid of the Great Kleptocrat as Dr. M has reminded us? Let’s not forget that Dr. Mahathir does not respect prime ministers and presidents in other countries either and that was why the former Australian PM Paul Keating bequeathed Dr. M with the epithet “recalcitrant”.

Calling a spade a spade

Was Nurul Izzah wrong to refer to Dr. M as a former dictator?

Some young male politicians in PH may have been born after Dr. M left office in 2003, but they only need to talk to their older colleagues like the former leader of the Opposition and the PM-in-waiting himself to know that Dr. M was called worse things after 1998. Nurul Izzah and her siblings know this only too well. Or if these male politicians in PH are keen to learn, they can start reading all that was written about Dr. M during his first term as Prime Minister by writers such as K. Das, Barry Wain, Kua K.S. and others.

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Whiffs of autocracy

Nurul Izzah has resigned from the PAC because Pakatan’s promised reform of having an Opposition MP chair the committee has been overruled by the PM. This is but the latest in a series of unilateral decisions by Dr. M since he took office in May 2018, including the plans to privatise Khazanah and to start another national car. The Cabinet will have to bear collective responsibility for the consequences in the event of its failure. We are witnessing the same “silence of the lambs” culture for which the DAP used to criticise the BN leaders under Mahathir 1.0 with the new ministers saying “We’ll leave it to the Prime Minister” and “I’ll discuss this with the prime minister to let him decide”, ad nauseum.

The PH manifesto prohibits the PM from also taking over the Finance portfolio but Dr Mahathir has in the 100 days taken over the choicest companies, namely Khazanah, PNB & Petronas under his PMO. It is the return to the old Mahathirist autocracy. The appointment of Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Economic Affairs Minister Azmin Ali to the board of Khazanah Nasional Berhad also goes against the PH manifesto promise of keeping politicians out of publicly-funded investments since it leads to poor accountability. Only by insisting on boards being comprised of professionals and on rigorous parliamentary checks and balances for bodies such as Khazanah can we ensure a high level of transparency and accountability.

Mahathir’s response to this criticism was the old feudal justification: “I started Khazanah so why can’t I be in it?” In other words, “Stuff your high ideals and democratic principles!”

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What spat with Singapore?

 

Some of these male politicians have further claimed that Nurul Izzah should not have made her views known to a Singaporean newspaper because of our supposed “spat” with Singapore over the water agreement. Do we have “spats” with either Singapore or China or are these issues just another diversion created by Dr. M to cover up his unfulfilled reforms and failed economic policies?

Let us be clear. The 1962 water agreement between Singapore and Malaysia is sacrosanct just like all the other international agreements made with China and other countries. Dr M himself should be held responsible for failing to amend the agreement when we had the right to do so in 1987. In fact, this is another issue that he should apologise to Malaysians for. Malaysia’s current financial difficulties are strictly of our own doing and we cannot rely on other countries for alternative sources of revenue growth. Creating a “spat” over the water agreement is another vain attempt at creating a storm in a teacup out of a tired issue when the new administration should be doing its best to nurture good bilateral relations with all our neighbours in the region.

 

The importance of speaking truth to power

Malaysians in the “New Malaysia” need to value and practice “speaking truth to power”. Instead of criticising Nurul Izzah based on feudal obeisance to authority, let her be an example especially to the opportunistic men who have lost their principles and integrity. It means that we have to take a stand if we truly want reformasi and to challenge injustice and authoritarianism.

All it takes is courage, courage to stand for one’s convictions and not the courage to throw conviction out the window for personal gain or political opportunism. “Speaking truth to power” means believing deeply in what you say – it may not be popular. It means taking a risk, it means standing for something without fearing condemnation.

After witnessing these interventions by Karpal Singh’s daughter, Sangeet Karpal and Anwar Ibrahim’s daughters, Nurul Nuha and now Nurul Izzah at the critical junctures, I say again: Thank goodness for daughters. They have shown the male politicians that they have the gall to speak truth to power…

 

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