‘New Malaysia’ makes Singapore look outdated


July 10, 2018

‘New Malaysia’ makes Singapore look outdated

by Dr.Bridget Welsh

https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/New-Malaysia-makes-Singapore-look-outdated

Mahathir’s triumph exposes shortcomings of city-state’s one-party rule

Over two months after Mahathir Mohamad’s election in Malaysia, the political reverberations for Singapore show no signs of fading.

The new Malaysian Prime Minister’s reviews of the key water-supply deal with Singapore and of the planned costly high-speed rail link from Kuala Lumpur to the city-state are only visible signs of a different — and more charged — Singapore-Malaysia relationship.

The key problem for Lee Hsien Loong’s People’s Action Party (PAP) is that developments north of the Johor-Singapore Causeway have exposed vulnerabilities at home. The PAP has become the longest-governing incumbent party in Southeast Asia, and it no longer has undemocratic immediate neighbors. Mahathir’s Pakatan victory mirrors the PAP’s worst fear: its own possible defeat.

Worse yet, some of the factors that contributed to the loss of Barisan Nasional (National Front) are also present in Singapore. The first is the challenge of leadership renewal. Over the past three years, the PAP has been locked in a battle over who should succeed Lee, 66, as prime minister, with the fourth generation (4G) leaders on display.

Among the leading contenders are Chan Chun Sing, the Minister for Trade and Industry and former army chief, Finance Minister Heng Swee Keat, former Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Ong Ye Kung, the Minister of Education and Second Defense Minister.

The problem is that these leaders are 4G without the connectivity. They are in a highly elitist party, largely unable to relate to ordinary Singaporeans. 4G leaders also suffer from the same issue that haunted the National Front, namely they are embedded in the system. Emerging from within the party and government, particularly the military, they are from the system and are seen to be for the system. The intertwining of the PAP and the bureaucratic state has created singular agendas and resulted in a distancing from the electorate and its needs.

For the first two decades of Singapore’s existence after independence in 1959, PAP secured all the seats in the legislative assembly. Since 1984, opposition politicians have won seats despite what the government’s critics describe as the sustained political harassment of opponents and the repression of public protests, combined with the alleged manipulation of electoral boundaries.

In the last election in 2015, PAP secured 83 out of 89 seats with 70% of the vote. Since that resounding victory, more conservative forces within the party have gained ground. Despite their popularity, reform-minded leaders such as Tharman Shanmugaratnam and Tan Chuan-Jin have been pushed aside in favor of conservative alternatives. At the same time, Singapore’s system has moved in a more authoritarian direction, with curbs on social media and attacks on civil society activists.

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Tharman Shanmugaratnam

Prime Minister Lee, the son of Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew, is making the same mistake Najib did after the 2013 polls. He is depriving the system of a necessary valve for dissent, and moving the country away from needed reforms. He has failed to recognize that greater openness and policy reforms were integral parts of the PAP’s 2015 victory. The dominant mode has been to attack the Worker’s Party, its leaders and other opposition figures. These moves do not show confidence in a more open and mature political system — or even in the PAP itself.

At the same time, rather than being an asset to his party, Lee is becoming more of a liability. This is the same trajectory that occurred for Najib. Questions have been raised about Lee’s leadership from the very public “Oxleygate” row with his siblings over their father’s home to the managing of Temasek, the republic’s sovereign wealth fund, by his wife Ho Ching.

Singapore’s handling of scandal over 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), the Malaysian state-run investment fund which saw millions of dollars siphoned out on Najib’s watch, will be in the more immediate bilateral spotlight; assessments will be made as to whether Singapore responded effectively to the alleged malfeasance and whether in fact Singapore’s purchase of 1MDB bonds strengthened the fund.

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Meanwhile, in Malaysia, Mahathir’s readiness to deal with 1MDB signals a willingness not only to clean up the system but to begin much-needed economic reform. Singaporeans will see obvious parallels with their own country’s economic policies.

Singapore’s gross domestic product growth is expected to reach 3% this year, which is a significant drop from a decade ago. Importantly, much of this growth is being driven by public spending (as occurred in Malaysia under Najib), notably on infrastructure. New jobs are not being created in Singapore at the same high rate as in the past. Even more constraining, PAP continues to rely on immigration as a driver of growth, failing to move on from using a combination of low-cost labor and imported foreign talent to expand the economy. Population pressures remain real for ordinary Singaporeans, who continue to feel displaced. They are disappointed with the PAP’s tenacious grasp on old and unpopular models for growth.

The pendulum of discontent has swung against the PAP. The government opted to increase water prices by 30% in 2017, and this year indicated it will raise the goods and services tax (GST) from 7% to 9%. The electricity tariff has risen by 16.8% to date this year alone. The cost of living remains high; Singapore has topped the Economist Intelligence Unit’s list of most expensive cities to live in for five years running. High costs are compounded by persistent inequalities that are increasingly entrenched. The Gini coefficient is at 0.46, but income gaps are deeply felt. Many locals feel they are being impoverished on account of foreigners. The social reform measures introduced for the “pioneer generation” (people born before 1950), and increased handouts before the 2015 polls, are being seen as inadequate to address the current social needs of disadvantaged communities.

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Changes in Malaysia have reduced Singapore’s regional comparative advantage. It is not just about greater democracy and changes in governance next door but also the attention “New Malaysia” draws to how Singapore has remained locked in the past, moving away from embracing an alternative future.–Bridget Welsh

By comparison, Malaysia has removed the unpopular GST, and reform pressures for addressing contracting social mobility and inequality are substantial. Malaysia is now seen as a potential role model in areas of governance. For example, greater transparency and attention to inclusivity are evident in the multi-ethnicity of new government appointees. Singapore’s 2017 Malay-only presidency contest in contrast sent a signal of exclusion and an embrace of race-based politics. This is being compounded by the fact that Malaysia is being seen as bucking regional authoritarian trends, promising substantive political reforms and the removal of many of the draconian laws that Singapore has on its books.

Changes in Malaysia have reduced Singapore’s regional comparative advantage. It is not just about greater democracy and changes in governance next door but also the attention “New Malaysia” draws to how Singapore has remained locked in the past, moving away from embracing an alternative future.

Bridget Welsh is associate professor of political science at John Cabot University, Rome

 

Data Driven Preventive Diplomacy For ASEAN Member States


July 6, 2018

Data Driven Preventive Diplomacy For ASEAN Member States

by Hana Hanifah and Askabea Fadhilla, The Habibie Center

http://www.eastasiaforum.org

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ASEAN countries are no strangers to conflict and violence. As a region comprising diverse nation-states, Southeast Asia has experienced a number of inter- and intra-state conflicts. Political stability in the region has improved over the last decade, especially due to a decline in inter-state disputes. But intra-state disputes in the form of ethnic conflicts, violence against minorities and violent extremism — including terrorism — are gaining ground.

 

There are ongoing reports about Rohingya trying to escape from Myanmar and seeking refuge in Malaysia. Amid the Myanmar army’s denial of its alleged atrocities against the Rohingya, about 700,000 Rohingya have reportedly fled the country since August 2017.

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Meanwhile, according to the Global Peace Index, the Philippines is one of the least peaceful countries in the region due to its bloody war against drugs and crime that has resulted in increasing rates of homicide, incarceration and extrajudicial killings. Based on the same report, Indonesia had the greatest performance drop in the Asia Pacific in terms of peacefulness due to an increase in politically-motivated terrorism and growing tensions between hard-line fundamentalists and minority groups. Indonesia is also more and more vulnerable to the threat of an alliance between the so-called Islamic State, Darul Islam and some local violent extremist groups, as shown in the recent Surabaya bombing.

Even decades before the United Nations’ An Agenda for Peace report in 1992, ASEAN had committed to maintaining peace in the region without using the label of ‘preventive diplomacy’. From its inception, ASEAN was intended to be a regional conflict-prevention mechanism that internalised the practices of peaceful dialogue, consultation and consensus building among its members, amid the geopolitical uncertainty and diplomatic breakdowns that characterised the Cold War period.

The ASEAN Regional Forum defined preventive diplomacy for ASEAN in 2001 as member states’ diplomatic or political action to prevent disputes or conflicts that could pose a threat to regional stability, with the purpose of preventing such disputes from escalating to armed confrontation and minimising the impact of those conflicts and disputes on the region.

But in practice, preventive diplomacy in ASEAN is limited to the execution of forums and meetings that do not necessarily producing binding mechanisms to resolve potentially destabilising intra-state conflicts. ASEAN seems to be stuck in confidence-building measures and has not completely implemented preventive diplomacy as envisioned by the United Nations.

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Critics point to the development gap and significant political differences between ASEAN member states. The ‘ASEAN way’ that rests on the principles of consensus building and non-intervention is often cited as one of the factors that undermine a deeper commitment to implementing preventive diplomacy. ASEAN’s limited definition of preventive diplomacy is also criticised for constraining the practice of preventive diplomacy in the region to only include conflicts between and among states. This excludes non-state and intra-state conflicts or violence, which are seemingly growing in the post-Cold War era.

But the biggest challenge to preventive violence in ASEAN yet to be taken seriously is the lack of knowledge about conflicts and violence. To this day, it remains a challenge to pinpoint the general trend and exact number of violent events and conflicts within ASEAN. Some instances were allegedly perpetrated by the state, while others were committed by non-state entities and individuals. Although some reports intuitively indicate that violence in ASEAN is increasing, it is hard to identify the exact number of incidents because the data is scarce and rarely updated.

The limited reliable data that is available reveals that each country in Southeast Asia has its own patterns and characteristics of conflict and violence. In terms of intensity, there are also differences in the number of casualties and frequency of incidents. The types of violence also differ and include civil wars, insurgency, crimes, communal conflicts and violence against minority groups.

Relatively little data on violent incidents existed until recently, and the data is generally focused at the national level. Data on regional trends is patchy and scattered across various sources, which makes it difficult to generate a quick and accurate analysis to aid policy making processes. Not all countries have the capacity to record such data, which itself can be a controversial process in a number of ASEAN member states where conflicts are sometimes highly political.

Knowledge about the distinct features of violence in ASEAN is crucial to enable policymakers and stakeholders to identify shortcomings in the region’s approach to responding and preventing conflict. Such knowledge would also equip them to come up with effective policies and strategies to promote peace and stability in ASEAN.

A knowledge-based approach would enable stakeholders to resolve conflicts more effectively — not only by managing the impacts but also by preventing the escalation of future conflicts and violence. It would also encourage better practices of data collection and recording violence in and between ASEAN member states — which is essential to monitoring and evaluating preventive diplomacy and progress towards peace in the region.

Hana Hanifah and Askabea Fadhilla are Researchers at the ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center, Jakarta.

 

Regional leadership needed to save trade regime


July 5,2018

Regional leadership needed to save trade regime

by Mari Pangestu, University of Indonesia, and Christopher Findlay, University of Adelaide

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/24/regional-leadership-needed-to-save-trade-regime/

Image result for Mari Pangestu, University of Indonesia

The world in which Asia Pacific economies operate is changing. Two main forces are driving this change — one ‘top-down’, the other ‘bottom-up’.

The top-down force is the emergence of a world with a larger number of key economies. In recent decades, growth rates around the world have diverged. For much of Asia, this has meant dramatic improvements in incomes and a huge reduction in the number of people living in poverty. It has also meant a new order among countries — a multipolar world.

Image result for Christopher Findlay, University of Adelaide

 

Prof. Christopher Findlay, University of Adelaide

The bottom-up force is the change in the way production is organised, driven by progress in communications and information technology. Technological improvements have shifted the location of production, with production processes becoming increasingly fragmented across countries. The nature of work and the composition of skills within economies have changed.

Given the new order of production and trade, the Trump administration’s mercantilist focus on reducing merchandise trade deficits will end up hurting the United States, as well as disrupting global production networks.

As trade flows change, pressure for domestic structural change can arise. In the United States, a decline in support for international trade and openness has been exacerbated by a lack of adjustment support for geographically concentrated bearers of the burden. Their reaction via domestic political processes has shocked the international system.

In the United States and elsewhere, good macroeconomic outcomes no longer win elections. Much economic policy is now driven by nationalistic and protectionist politics. This is particularly evident in US initiatives to protect its domestic production and seek adjustments from China.

These political conditions were preceded by waning support for openness at a multilateral level. As multilateral negotiations stalled, the response has been the emergence of ‘mega-regional’ platforms such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP 11) and the East Asian Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

These initiatives sit atop a ‘noodle bowl’ of messy bilateral agreements. Before the current US America First regime, these mega-regional and bilateral agreements still operated under the lid of the World Trade Organization. The rules-based trading system was still an anchor for economic integration, especially the dispute settlement mechanism.

Today, the principles of openness, non-discrimination, transparency and open regionalism — which have helped generate prosperity in the region, especially for developing economies in Asia — are being severely challenged. When the United States leaves the TPP, undertakes unilateral action and declares that the multilateral rules have not served US interests, the anchor of the trading system is challenged. At most international forums like the G20, policymakers’ time is being wasted on phrasing defensive communiques instead of cooperating on the substantive trade and investment issues of the day.

At the same time, new issues are emerging in relation to trade and investment, such as the taxation of international income flows, the treatment of data flows and the management of intellectual property. Responding to climate change and finding appropriate policies to deal with inequality are also among the challenges.

Progress will be difficult in the multipolar world without clear leadership from the major economies.

Waiting for a consensus to emerge among key economies about the importance of maintaining these anchor principles — while at the same time dealing with the new issues that have emerged — is not an option. There are no obvious forces now at work to resolve this lack of consensus within a reasonable timeframe. Lower-income people in rural ASEAN areas, for example, should not have to wait for the rest of the world to figure out how to shift their own economies and communities to new sources of growth.

In the absence of leadership from the advanced economies, a shared leadership model in the region should be the answer. The key then is the response of the increasingly influential ‘second-tier’ economies. No actors are more important than Indonesia and Southeast Asia, operating through ASEAN and the ASEAN-plus regional agreements that are already in place and being consolidated under RCEP.

Recent statements by leaders in Indonesia indicate recognition of the role it can play and wants to play. But Indonesia’s contribution will be so much greater and more effective if it acts in concert with others. Concerted action could take multiple forms. It might include unilateral reforms, or working on sustainability initiatives that are in both local and global interests.

Effective concerted action depends on a few factors. Foremost, it depends on shared principles. Part of this is agreeing on a purpose, such as the basic principles of non-discrimination, transparency and support for the rules-based trading system. Other principles can relate to specifics, such as the management of open data flows. These principles provide important reference points as countries take their own actions. There is value in sharing experience and aligning countries’ expectations about each other’s reform programs.

These are not new approaches. Readers with long memories will recall efforts like the APEC non-binding investment principles and Individual Action Plans. But this is the point — we already have relevant structures for mobilising this cooperation that can be rejuvenated.

APEC is the most relevant example. Putting weight on APEC does carry a risk. But APEC has a well-developed network of second-track structures that can be engaged more deeply. Given the complexities of the new issues facing the regional economic order, it is even more imperative that there be wide, multi-stakeholder participation and input.

Even more importantly, APEC remains a forum in our region where key economies in the multipolar world and the leading second-tier countries can interact effectively, and where the major protagonist, the United States, can still be engaged.

Mari Pangestu is former Indonesian trade minister and Professor at the University of Indonesia. Christopher Findlay is Professor and Executive Dean of the Faculty of the Professions at the University of Adelaide.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Trade Wars in Asia’.

 

 

 

If an esteemed historian like PJ Thum can be fooled by fake news, what hope is there for us?


July 4, 2018

If historian PJ Thum can be misled by fakes…

TL;DR – But if you take some effort to google, actually, you can avoid embarrassing yourself.

Singaporean Historian PJ Thum became famous after he was grilled by Minister Shanmugam at the hearing of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods for six hours. Back then, he had made the audacious claim that the politicians of the PAP were the “clear source of fake news”. He based that claim on his work as a historian.

And PJ Thum appeared to be a historian with glowing credentials. He graduated from Harvard with a bachelors in East Asian Studies. He then went on to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and got a second degree in Modern History and Politics. He returned to Oxford on a Commonwealth Scholarship to get his Doctor of Philosophy. Since 2014, PJ has been a Research Associate at the Centre for Global History, University of Oxford; a Fellow of Green Templeton College, and coordinator of Project Southeast Asia, an initiative of the University of Oxford to expand its range of scholarly expertise on Southeast Asia. In 2015, PJ was elected as a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum.

Sounds impressive, right? A historian with such sterling credentials must be a really smart person. Someone who won’t be easily fooled by fake news. Someone who would think critically of the things he reads, cross-references multiple sources to ensure that he comes to the right conclusions. Right?

Well… not quite. At least not in this particular instance.

PJ Thum posted this on Facebook recently:

Just in case it gets taken down, it’s a post with this cartoon:

 

Two versions of the same event. What is the truth?

Accompanying the cartoon, PJ Thum had the following remarks:

“Another from the archives:

“At the end of (Lee’s speech to the joint session of the US Congress), there was a sustained standing ovation… Even before he started his speech, there was a standing ovation – such is the Prime Minister’s reputation.” – Straits Times, 10 October 1985.

“(Lee) was addressing a sparsely attended joint session and drew polite applause.” – International Herald Tribune, 10 October 1985.

Hmmm… now I’m wondering just how much of what Singaporeans believed to be LKY’s vaunted global reputation was actually manufactured by the government-controlled media, in the days when there were no alternative news sources?”

PJ Thum questioned whether the media, controlled by the Singapore government, had manufactured Mr, Lee Kuan Yew’s “vaunted global reputation”.

Is he once again insinuating that the Singapore government is a source of fake news?

Thankfully, there’s a video of the speech

Someone added this video in the comments to PJ Thum’s post, and the video proved PJ Thum wrong.

It’s a video of Mr Lee Kuan Yew speaking at a Joint Session of the US Congress taken off C-SPAN.

And at the 3:13 mark, and also 4:09 mark the video shows people applauding in a packed room.

At the 9:47 mark, the video shows Mr Lee Kuan Yew receiving a standing ovation when he wrapped up his speech.

Now we can’t possibly know from the video alone if the Congressmen really respected Mr Lee Kuan Yew, but the fact was that the Joint Session was well attended, and that Mr Lee Kuan Yew had received a standing ovation.

Those are facts.

Captured on video.

Facts which directly contradict what PJ Thum had insinuated. Facts which can be found if Thum had taken a little bit care and effort to verify and check.

Which unfortunately makes PJ Thum look rather bad

This could mean one of two things.

The first possibility is PJ Thum is a sloppy historian who doesn’t dig deeper and look for more sources of information so that he can come to a proper (and accurate) conclusion.

Or the second possibility is that he had deliberately put up the post and asked a question in such a way that would induce people to conclude that the Singapore government is a source of fake news.

Of course, we don’t know which is the truth. We don’t believe that PJ Thum is that malicious as to deliberately spread fake news. But we also don’t think PJ Thum is stupid. So… It’s hard to say. Having said that, if PJ Thum can be so wrong on this incident, what else could he or we have gotten wrong?

Whatever the case is, this incident has again demonstrated that we should all learn to google. And don’t automatically accept anything we read or what we’re told to be true.

ALWAYS check and look for more sources of information. Otherwise, we might end up looking like fools for believing that some piece of fake news is true.

 

The Fight for Democracy in Asia Is Alive and Well


July 3, 2018

The Fight for Democracy in Asia Is Alive and Well

Image result for chee soon juan

For decades, Asian values, under the guise of Confucianism, have been used by the region’s autocrats to ward off criticisms, mainly from the West, about their undemocratic ways. This argument’s most artful proponents are Singapore’s former Prime Minister, the late Lee Kuan Yew, and Malaysia’s Dr. Mahathir Mohamad during his first stint as the country’s leader.

With the region in the thrall of dictatorships – from Korea’s Park Chung-hee in the north to Indonesia’s Suharto in the south – there seemed to be a seductive ring to the uniqueness of the Asian political culture.

But there is nothing quite like a few revolutions, mainly peaceful ones, to debunk the no-democracy-please-we’re-Asians theory. Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Myanmar, Mongolia, and Thailand overcame repressive governments to establish democratic systems. The extent of reform may be limited, as in the instance of Myanmar, or has backslid, as in Thailand. But the trend toward democratic change has been unmistakable.

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The New Democrats in Malaysia headed by former Asian Values proponent, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad took over Putrajaya after resoundingly defeating UMNO-BN in GE-14

The most recent example is, of course, Malaysia where after 61 years of one-party rule, Malaysians staged an electoral revolt of their own and sacked the Barisan Nasional government.

So, have Asian peoples jettisoned Asian values and adopted Western ones? Of course not. Remember that for the better part of the last two centuries, much of Asia toiled under the subjugation of Western colonialism, where the concepts of freedom and universal suffrage were as alien as the languages imposed on the natives.

The truth is that, regardless of the part of the world they inhabit, man has always sought to lord over his fellow beings. But it is just as ineluctable that the masses will, at some point, rise up to show despots the boot and claim their freedoms.

To avoid sounding simplistic, however, let me point out that the factors contributing to the demise of autocratic regimes in Asia are varied. Distressed economic conditions in the Philippines and Indonesia contributed massively to the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos and Suharto. In Taiwan and South Korea, it was the burgeoning educated middle-class that grew intolerant of the oppressive military regimes.

Even so, these revolutions were not a result of spontaneous combustion. There were years of relentless campaigning and sacrifice by individuals who saw the need for change and, more importantly, found the courage to stand up and rattle the authoritarian cage. Regional organizations like the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, a body comprising political parties (both ruling and opposition) committed to advancing democracy in Asia, have been keeping freedom’s agenda on the front burner.

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The 1998 Reformasi paved the way for Malaysia’s New Democracy of 2018

Again, take the most recent case of Malaysia. Those who cried reformasi and fought corruption and abuse of power did not just surface during the historic elections this year. It was a struggle that spanned two decades, one which saw the opposition leaders and activists harassed, humiliated, and jailed. In the end, like in the other countries, the democrats prevailed.

The mother of all ironies is that it was Mahathir, the leader of the opposition coalition that toppled incumbent Najib Razak, who wrote in 1995 that Asia’s rejection of democracy came from the “Eastern way of thinking.”

Image result for CNN's Christiane Amanpour and Lee Hsien Loong

Singapore’s current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, unwilling or unable to read history, continues this charade. In a recent interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, he denied that his administration is repressive. Politics in Singapore, he insists, is the way that it is because Singaporeans voted for it. Of course, he did not mention that he had to change the rules for the presidential elections so that only his party’s nominee qualified as a candidate. There are elections and there are free and fair elections.

The not-so-hidden message for autocrats and democrats alike is that the mood in Asia has irrevocably altered. The idea that democracy is ill-suited to the Asian mind has been exposed for the propaganda that it is.

No wonder the fight for democracy is alive and well.

Chee Soon Juan is the secretary general of the Singapore Democratic Party and former chairperson of CALD.  

The Justice Facade: Trials of Transition in Cambodia


July 3, 2018

Book Review:

The Justice Facade: Trials of Transition in Cambodia

Alexander Laban Hinton (Oxford University Press, 2018)

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Since 2006, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have prosecuted international crimes committed between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979. In those years of Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge regime caused perhaps a quarter of Cambodia’s population to die through starvation, forced labour, torture and killings. An innovative “hybrid” tribunal with both Cambodian and international staff and procedures, the ECCC represents the key transformational mechanism to secure justice for these atrocities, leading Cambodia from its violent past toward a prosperous, rule-of-law-abiding democratic future.

Or so the story goes.

“The Justice Facade extends well beyond a simplistic condemnation of the ECCC as a neo-colonial artifice, by identifying the multiple unexpected and creative initiatives that transitional justice processes may stimulate (“combust”)”…Emma Palmer

Alexander Laban Hinton holds up a mirror to this aspiration for “justice” and invites the reader to jump through, and find not one, but innumerable reflections of what transitional justice means—for different people, and in different times and spaces. He counters the idea that international crimes tribunals deliver a “better future” through prosecuting crimes, leading from a time and place of violence and authoritarianism toward reconciliation and stability, delivered by a liberal democratic state. Instead, he calls this idea of transitional justice “imaginary”, a “facade” that leaves out crucial matters—including the impact of power, geopolitics, and individual experiences.

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Drawing on critical transitional justice scholarship and anthropological expertise derived from extensive research in Cambodia over many years, Hinton reveals what legal justice masks: a complex, turbulent, “dark world” of multiple possibilities. Here, there is not just one point to transitional justice, but the potential for numerous, shifting perceptions and translations. Rather than a single “justice cascade” from point A to point B, there are—to use the analogy developed throughout the book—dynamic ‘”ecosystems” filled with eddies, whirlpools, turbulence, counter-current, still spots, and vortices’ (p24).

“The Justice Facade is also compelling reading, with Hinton’s attention toward lived experience offering a richly emotive and personalised account of the dynamic impact of the Democratic Kampuchea period.”

If all of this complexity seems, well, complex, the structure of the book helps to navigate these waters. (Even if the idea is not to get to one particular place, but to appreciate the ever-changing nature and effects of transitional justice initiatives.) A preface describes the plot of a booklet used by a Cambodian NGO to explain the ECCC to Cambodians. Using a comic strip format, the booklet describes how “Uncle Yan”, who seems traumatised by his experiences during Democratic Kampuchea, comes to learn about the ECCC and participate in its proceedings, thereby finding peace. This, he imagines, involves a prosperous Cambodia—as depicted by electricity and smoking factory stacks in the distance. This story is returned to throughout the book to illustrate the typical A-to-B depiction of the aims and outcomes of transitional justice, as well as how that message has been translated in the Cambodian context.

The book’s introduction then helpfully explains the numerous complicated terms adopted throughout the book. These include the temporal and spatial aspects of the “imaginary”, the “point” and “justice facade”, and ideas such as “universalism”, “globalism” and “localization”. There is also a proposal for what might still be productive about this “assemblage” of ideas concerning transitional justice: the potential that new possibilities might emerge when actors engage with transitional justice concepts and institutions. Hinton’s suggestion that encounters between different perspectives can create unexpected consequences is inspired by Anna Tsing’s concept of friction, but Hinton terms it “combustion”. This sounds like a more enthusiastic term, but is supposed to indicate that contacts with transitional justice can also “smolder, fizzle, or fail to ignite” (p28). In the introduction Hinton also explains his “discursively-informed” phenomenological approach, which (loosely) involves being aware of how discourse and power mediate lived experiences and contexts. Subsequent chapters then elaborate upon aspects of the transitional justice imaginary by analysing past NGO activities and documents, individual experiences before, during and following Democratic Kampuchea, and outreach processes associated with the ECCC’s operations.

For instance, Chapter 1 considers the effects of the ECCC’s narrow jurisdiction over a small window of time (the several years of Democratic Kampuchea). This both diminishes events prior to and subsequent to the regime—and international responsibility for those events—but also produces a narrative in which a backward, authoritarian, violent past will be transformed in a progressive manner toward a liberal future. That narrative is not only factually highly questionable in Cambodia, but also leaves out important parts of many other stories, which the book then reveals.

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The remaining chapters detail the individual experiences of ECCC and NGO outreach workers and “civil parties” (victims who participate in the ECCC trials). These not only make fascinating reading, but demonstrate that many aspects of life before and after Democratic Kampuchea do not fit standard understandings of transitional justice. These include the significance of religion (particularly Buddhist teachings and traditional spiritual beliefs and practices), family and social relationships, living and studying outside Cambodia, and the various ways that language can be translated. Rather than simply providing material to secure prosecutions and a “transition”, these aspects can be central to individual understandings of justice, even if they appear removed from the judicial process. Hinton demonstrates how hints of these undercurrents emerged during the ECCC trials. Often these may have gone unnoticed—perhaps evident only in an awkwardly translated Cambodian phrase or Buddhist notion—while at other times the ruptures were more obvious, as when civil parties publicly lambasted the ECCC in the media.

They all, Hinton argues, demonstrate several features of the transitional justice facade. First, the idea that transitional justice proceeds in one linear direction over time. Second, that there are clear spatial boundaries between “global” and “local”, whereas there are “multiple points of contact that ‘combust’ in different and often unpredictable ways” (p27). Third, the technical (legal) disciplines associated with transitional justice, which represent particular forms of power and knowledge. Fourth, the normative truth claims and assumptions the “facade” presents, which may diverge from alternative understandings. Fifth, its performative, subjective and aesthetic aspects, which assert a particular script, roles, and a “look” for the delivery of transitional justice, whereas there may be other possibilities. Finally, the idea that there are different “dispositions” toward justice linked to certain categories of people and ideas. The title of each chapter indicates which of these critiques it is meant to address, although they all contribute toward Hinton’s general argument against a progressive linear understanding of transitional justice.

In adopting this structure, which draws out individual stories, Hinton not only advocates for a new approach to examining experiences of transitional justice beyond judicial processes—he implements it. To be sure, there has already been significant critique of the “justice cascade” and the transitional justice “imaginary” Hinton describes, including by some of the “local turn” and critical scholars he references such as Kamari Clarke. Some have identified some of the temporal and spatial dimensions Hinton refers to (and the book could have elaborated upon the theoretical relationship between these two aspects). The ECCC has itself attracted significant criticism. As Hinton notes, this is usually directed toward allegations of corruption, political interference, use of time and resources, or fair trial concerns, than for the more fundamental type of concerns raised by Hinton, although examples exist.

Where Hinton’s work really stands apart, though, is in its phenomenological approach that “reorients attention to what is masked by the justice facade” (p23). The result is a book filled with the fascinating stories one might hear in conversations with Cambodians, or with court and NGO staff in Cambodia, or derive from some exhibitions—but does not frequently find in transitional justice (especially international criminal law) scholarship. The book also offers another space to respectfully share diverse individual experiences that may have been minimised by the trial process.

This alone makes the book worth reading. However, Hinton’s ability to not only critique the standard narrative of transitional justice, but to offer and implement an alternative approach is also impressive—and useful. The Justice Facade extends well beyond a simplistic condemnation of the ECCC as a neo-colonial artifice, by identifying the multiple unexpected and creative initiatives that transitional justice processes may stimulate (“combust”).

This method and argument contributes to transitional justice—and particularly international criminal justice—scholarship and has implications for human rights, peacebuilding, and development studies in Cambodia. The Justice Facade is also compelling reading, with Hinton’s attention toward lived experience offering a richly emotive and personalised account of the dynamic impact of the Democratic Kampuchea period.

Dr Emma Palmer is a Lecturer at Griffith Law School. Her thesis, International Criminal Law in Southeast Asia: Beyond the International Criminal Court, was completed at UNSW, Australia, in 2017. You can follow her on Twitter at @Em7P.