Islamic Diplomacy and the Search for Human Security

May 20, 2013

The Keynote Address at the Peace and Security Forum 2013 at the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur on May 16,2013.

by  HRH Dr. Raja Nazrin Shah

I WARMLY commend the organisers of this conference for shining a spotlight upon one of the most pressing challenges confronting the Muslim world.

The violent conflicts that afflict some Muslim countries are discussed in many conferences. They feature in the global media every day. In fact, they feature in the global media virtually every hour of every day, and in my view rightly so, for almost every day Muslim lives are lost, Muslims’ limbs are maimed and Muslim land and property destroyed.

But few international forums — and far less the global media — look at the problems the Muslim world is encountering in a way that is more profound and comprehensive, as that of a paucity of human security.

Fewer still approach the subject of human security in the Muslim world from the standpoint of the role that Islam and diplomacy can play in promoting it. The theme of this conference is, therefore, both novel and welcome.

Before I proceed, I should like to take a moment to place the problem of human security, as I see it, in perspective. It is interesting to note that the concept of human security first came into international vogue as a result of the work of a Muslim economist, Dr Mahbub ul Haq. He conceived both the concepts of human development as well as human security that have been so central to the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) approach to developmental issues since the 1990s.

Unlike the Human Development Index of the UNDP — which has now been widely accepted and adopted — an index of human security is still very early work-in-progress. Even an understanding of what human security means and what it encompasses is the subject of debate and discussion.

Until the dust settles on this subject, I should like to be guided essentially by the initial concept as outlined by the UNDP in 1994 and developed further in Version 2 of the Human Security Index.

I must stress, however, that the Human Security Index probably cannot yet be regarded as a sufficiently robust measure of the real state of human security among different countries. But it does give some general picture of the situation. Its importance at this stage lies more in its ability to depict the relative gravity of conditions in different countries based on the criteria employed.

In my view, briefly expressed, human security centres on the security of the human person and the community. This is unlike the conventional notions of national security which pivot around the security of the state.

Human security includes traditional national security concerns such as security from external aggression, security from external intervention, security from foreign occupation as well as security from internal strife; but it also embraces much more.

It includes the security of livelihood provided by steady jobs and meaningful employment; the security from disease that is provided by good and widely accessible health facilities; food security; protection from crime and domestic violence; freedom from political repression; the right to practice one’s religion freely; and the right to clean air, safe water and a sustainable and healthy environment.

Human development as postulated by the UNDP is thus closely correlated with human security. The former seeks to develop the human person; the latter to protect him or her from threats to that development.

Human security facilitates human development, while human development releases more resources to improve human security.

Human security tends to be better assured in peaceful countries that rank high in human development, but it can also lag behind.The United States, for instance, ranks No. 3 in the latest Human Development Index; yet its composite Human Security Index ranking is 147 out of 232 countries and dependencies.

The ranking reflects very poor scores in several areas, including very high incarceration rates and wide disparities in income and wealth.

Thus understood, human security, or human insecurity, knows no nationality. It knows no religion. And it knows no race or ethnicity.

Although the peoples of the developed nations of Europe and North America are less vulnerable, human insecurity also tends to recognise no geography.

Unemployment in the European Union, for instance, is expected to reach an average of 12.2 per cent this year. That is four times the unemployment rate of Malaysia. In Spain and Greece, every fourth person in the workforce is unlikely to have a job.

Human security, whether in the Muslim world or elsewhere, is something that is complex in the sense that it cannot be advanced by just the one tool of diplomacy.

Diplomacy, indeed, is perhaps not even the most important instrument. Much of the hard work must be done at home in each country, through sound and equitable political, economic and social policies.

The primary actor and driver may indeed be the state, but there are a host of other important domestic and external players that make an impact upon human security in every individual locale.

The mix of political, economic, social and security factors that affect human security differ markedly among countries and communities, Muslim as well as non-Muslim.

I will elaborate on some of these general points presently, but let me turn now to the quest for human security in the Muslim world.

As we know, Muslim communities are found virtually everywhere on the globe and amidst differing conditions of human security.

Like many non-Muslim majority countries, Muslim countries and Muslim-majority countries often fare worse in the Human Security Index than they do in the Human Development Index.

This reflects their relatively poorer performance in areas such as political freedoms, income distribution, access to information and personal security compared to indicators such as per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product).

Whereas at least ten Muslim-majority countries make it to the top 70 in the Human Development Index ranking, none are in the top 70 in the Human Security Index ranking. Seven countries managed to be ranked between 80 and 100. As in the case of the Human Development Index, many Muslim countries are ranked in the bottom third of the Human Security Index table.

The picture that emerges shows that the comprehensive well-being of the people in a number of Muslim-majority countries leaves much to be desired.

Many millions of Muslims do enjoy high levels of material security as minorities in affluent Western countries and as majorities in high income and peaceful Muslim countries like Malaysia, Brunei, Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

But when factors like extensive poverty, unemployment, income inequality, poor education opportunities, inequitable access to healthcare, violent conflict, political repression, abuse of rights, lack of information empowerment, and the position of women are factored in, about a billion Muslims in a majority of the Muslim countries, or two-thirds of the total global Muslim population, are at risk.

The tragic human security conditions in conflict-ridden and occupied Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and war-torn Syria, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan — the last four are occupied, but, only by themselves — are only too painfully evident to us all.

But there are also hundreds of millions of Muslims who live in vulnerable communities or areas in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, Yemen, Nigeria, Niger, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Benin, Chad and Senegal.

Put bluntly, the Muslim world is home to a disproportionate share of all the seven areas of human insecurity identified by the UNDP.

Vulnerabilities to aggression, foreign intervention and occupation, sectarian, tribal and ethnic strife, joblessness, poverty and severe income disparities, disease, crime, undemocratic regimes, political repression and violation of rights, discrimination against and abuse of women, and even natural and environmental disasters are all too common and even pervasive in large parts of the Muslim world.

In the Arab world, including the imploding crucible that is Syria today, as well as in Afghanistan, the destruction that Muslims have managed to inflict upon themselves has been colossal. This has been aggravated by some countries that have colluded with foreign powers and involved themselves in the affairs of fellow Arab and Muslim nations.

The Sunni-Shia fault line that runs through the Arab crescent and the Persian Gulf has been a major destabilising factor. It pits Muslim against Muslim not only within countries but between countries as well.

Together with historical tribal enmities, it underlies much of the unrest in the Arab world today. The confrontation between Arabs and Persians, for example, is an age-old enmity that has further embroiled West Asian nations in intra-Muslim struggle and conflict.

The Sunni-Shia sectarianism, tribal animosities and Arab-Persian power plays have undermined not just the national resilience of Muslim countries in West Asia and North Africa. They have also rendered the countries even more vulnerable to the machinations, military intervention and occupation by foreign powers and weakened their capacity to present a collective response to Israel.

Next to war and violence, nothing degrades human security and human dignity more than extreme poverty and widespread unemployment, for their effects are often hunger, malnutrition, starvation, illiteracy, disease and crime.

Such conditions also contribute to a highly combustible political environment.In this regard, poverty and unemployment levels are unacceptably high in much of the Muslim world. No less than 40 to 65 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line in nearly a third of all Muslim countries or those with a sizeable Muslim component, for which there is reliable information.

Democratic governance, protection of human rights and support for gender equality are also key attributes of human security and human development that are in short supply in many of those countries.

Taken together then, the human security landscape of the Muslim world is a grim and dismal one. However, this situation has nothing to do with Islam. It is, in fact, the very antithesis of all that Islam stands for.

Instead, the problems have more to do with factors such as sectarian, tribal and class rivalries; the consequences of colonisation including borders drawn without regard to the glue that natural demographic patterns would have yielded; the strategic location and resources of the Gulf region that make them perennial targets of predatory powers; the insecurity of small states that seek alliance with foreign powers; the dislocation that the imposition of the state of Israel created and the half century of violence that has followed in the absence of a political solution; the grip of unhealthy tribal traditions and customs that distort religious interpretation and inhibit human development; and the absolute lack of resources in some sub-Saharan countries.

As I observed earlier, the improvement of human security, as also in the case of human development, is a task mainly to be done at home. Indeed, diplomacy is one of the means which can be used for that purpose. It normally comes into prominence, however, only when a country is at war or is under military threat, or when there is foreign intervention in internal conflicts.

For those Muslim countries and their peoples that are in this unfortunate situation, like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Sudan (and thus South Sudan), diplomacy becomes a crucial instrument.

But good diplomacy — I am using “diplomacy” here interchangeably with foreign policy — can also be important for alleviating other aspects of the human security conditions that prevail in many Muslim communities.

Diplomacy has become indispensable in this globalised age when the politics, economics and security of nations and communities are becoming increasingly enmeshed.

Although domestic policies are primary, human security and human development are impossible to pursue without engagement with the outside world and without interaction with other important actors.

This is especially the case for the less developed nations with scarce or limited resources that make up a large proportion of the Muslim world.

If diplomacy — that is diplomacy as in foreign policy — is important in the pursuit of human security, what has Islam to offer to the endeavour? How can Islam affect diplomacy so as to provide better human security in the Muslim world and beyond?

When I surveyed the literature on Islam and diplomacy, the work that stood out was the Rusul al-Muluk, or Messengers of Kings. Written in the tenth century, or about 300 years after the demise of the beloved Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), it describes the diplomacy that was practised by the Arabs and Muslims from pre-Islamic days to its own time.

It also presents and makes use of examples of Arab diplomatic practice drawn from the Quran and other sources used by Muslim scholars.

The work examines extensively the use of emissaries, diplomatic exchanges, the types of treaties and agreements that the Prophet and other Muslim leaders entered into with Muslim and non-Muslim tribes and empires, the principles of diplomatic negotiations, the codes that guided war and peaceful settlement, the granting of asylum, and the treatment of prisoners, refugees and minorities.–Part I (May 18, 2013)

MUCH of the diplomacy that is described in the book Rusul al-Muluk, or Messengers of Kings, existed before Islam, and it also continued to be practised by non-Muslim nations after the revelation of Islam.

From translations of ancient writings such as Letters from Early Mesopotamia and the Amarna Letters, we learn that there was a thriving culture of diplomacy that had been practised as far back as the 3rd millennium BC, in the very region we now call West Asia and North Africa.

The diplomacy depicted in that literature, practised by the ancient kingdoms and empires of Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Assyria and Egypt, among others, included diplomatic codes of conduct, exchange of emissaries, arbitration and mediation, negotiation of treaties and treatment of political fugitives.

Diplomacy in somewhat less ancient times developed in similar modes in the great civilisations of China and India. For example, the “realist theory” of International Relations can be traced back to Sun Tzu in 6th century BC China and Kautilya in 3rd century BC India. The Persian, and the Roman and then the Byzantine Empires, of course, were famous for their diplomatic endeavours.

The revelation of Islam, however, brought a sea-change in the conduct of foreign policy and the practice of diplomacy as Muslim political sway expanded in West Asia and beyond.

Islam’s conception of humanity, the Ummah, its world view and its ethos and values were infused into foreign policy and diplomatic practice. The personal character of the Prophet (PBUH), guided by the principles and teachings of Islam, also left its imprint.

The Rusul al-Muluk, the Islamic work which I referred to earlier, is not an ordinary manual on diplomacy; rather, it is a work that boldly argues for a very modern theory of International Relations, by rejecting warlike policies in favour of low-key but firm diplomacy with the pragmatic outlook of constructive realpolitik — all done with the aim and intention of securing the common goal of human security among all mankind.

The ultimate purpose of Islam is the well-being and salvation of all humankind, irrespective of national, ethnic or even religious identity. Islam’s horizon is the Universe: it does not stop with the Muslim Ummah.

This is the bedrock upon which universal human well-being (including what is now called “human security”) is to be built, both domestically and abroad, across nations.

Development, peace, security, justice and human dignity are for all peoples regardless of race or gender or even faith. Human beings are created by God to fulfil the dual role of the person as a servant of God (al-’Abd) and as His representative (al-Khalifah) on Earth.

The goals of Islam that have a bearing upon the prevailing ideas of human security – as well as human development – are founded on two concepts. One is that of human well-being: Sa’adah, which can also mean success, happiness, prosperity or felicity.

The second is the Muslim concept of the good life in this world and in the next world: Hayatun Tayyibah. The balanced fulfilment of both the material and spiritual needs of all human beings will lead to human well-being and the good life that fulfils human security needs.

A fundamental core of human security is the freedom from want, and this is best assured by education and knowledge, which can help secure jobs and a better livelihood. In Islam the pursuit of knowledge, both spiritual and material, is nothing short of a religious obligation. Acquisition of knowledge is considered a form of worship and will bring a Muslim closer to God.

Islam also enjoins ethical action (‘Amal Salih), morality (Akhlak), justice and fairness (‘Adl), moderation (‘Iffah), integrity (Amanah), and provision for the poor and the disadvantaged.

The payment of zakat, or charity, by the rich for the poor is obligatory. Islam’s principle of Tawhid further demands that there be no exploitation among human beings. All these teachings point to a basic concern with what we call “human security”.

In the field of foreign policy, diplomacy and war, the Islamic tradition privileges negotiations and peaceful resolution of disputes over war. It further specifically forbids the taking of innocent life and damage to property.

It also enjoins humane treatment of prisoners and due protection for refugees. Our tradition counsels just peace, when the circumstances allow.

The Islamic faith, thereby, provides a unique religious, normative and legal reference for the formulation and implementation of foreign as well as domestic policies to protect and promote human security.

So what roles can Islam play in the contemporary diplomacy of Muslim countries in their pursuit of human security? I can think of at least three.

FIRST the great achievement of the Prophet (PBUH) in bringing peace and reconciliation to the warring tribes and communities of Arabia can be invoked to inspire and reinforce efforts to reduce enmity among Muslim countries and communities and make their relations harmonious.

There is no more necessary and important effort than the active pursuit of reconciliation for healing the wounds caused by conflicts, bloodshed and violence.

This is especially pressing for the conflicts in West Asia and North Africa, where Sunni-Shia sectarianism and tribal conflicts are tearing nations apart and bringing them into conflict with one another.

What is happening in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan with the involvement of other Muslim countries as well as outside powers is producing the very antithesis of the peaceful aims and teachings of Islam. It strikes at the very core of the human security concerns of the affected multitudes, which include millions of displaced persons and refugees.

SECOND Islam is all about human dignity, human development and human security. Yet in so many countries of the Muslim world, it is these very things that are in shortest supply.

The values and teachings of Islam can be more effectively mobilised to spur greater efforts by Muslim countries, acting individually as well as collectively, through such institutions as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), to bring more and better development.

These efforts could embrace marginalised minority communities, such as the Rohingyas in Myanmar and the Muslims in southern Thailand and southern Philippines.

Among the programmes that should be highest in priority are those aimed at improving education and health facilities, reducing income inequities, bringing greater protection and emancipation for women, strengthening representative government, and enhancing standards of governance.

These, in fact, are some of the causes that are already being championed by organisations such as the Islamic Development Bank, but progress will continue to be slow unless there is greater commitment from many member countries.

THIRD the non-governmental infrastructure for human development and human security greatly needs to be developed in many Muslim countries. Organisations in civil society and the private sector have a vital role to play and an important contribution to make.

 In areas such as education, healthcare, welfare activities, protection of women and children, crime prevention and environmental conservation the participation of voluntary organisations is necessary and invaluable, especially when they are supported by the business sector and the state.

Muslim nations, again, individually as well as collectively, can do much to foster and strengthen the infrastructure within their own countries and sometimes even in others.

If we take our humanity seriously, and are motivated by the guidance conveyed in our sacred traditions, then we should expand our conception of security to embrace its human dimensions.

A foremost requirement for promoting human security is the recognition of diversity and differences in our global context, as well as within the boundaries of individual nations.

To this end we should cultivate awareness and understanding of the worldview of others, and learn to respect their various traditions.

This is why inter-cultural competence and training for understanding other religions and worldviews is important – both for non-Muslims to appreciate Islam, and for Muslims to appreciate cultures and peoples belonging to other traditions.

Indeed the search for human security is the gateway to the future of a reformed global order.The combined experiences of human societies in the modern era in the economic, political, social and cultural domains of life are pushing towards recovering the basis of security reflected in basic human needs and hopes.

Peace will only be achieved between nations, and among the diverse peoples within nations, when security is understood in these terms. (Part II-May 20, 2013)

http://www.nst.com.my

Kamil Jaafar–The Diplomat Extraordinaire of My Generation

May 19, 2013

COMMENT: Kamil Jaafar (he insists that I forget the “Tan Sri” bit when I address him) was my senior at MU and Wisma Putra (I joined the Foreign Service in 1963 when Tun Ghazalie Shafie was the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs) and housemate together with Tun Mohd Khalil Yaccob, the present Governor of Malacca (right) and a host of other foreign  service colleagues at No 272, Jalan Brickfields/Jalan Tun Sambanthan, Kuala Lumpur in the heart of Little India.

Despite his many achievements as Malaysia’s top career diplomat, the First Among Equals, Kamil remains the simple and kind man that I knew when we first met at Bukit Mertajam railway station when we took the train to MU at Kuala Lumpur. Of course, he was not really that nice on the train!

He and another Kedahan, (Tan Sri) Razali Ismail (left), who was President, United Nations General Assembly in 1996-1997, ragged me throughout the night.  But I suppose the ragging brought us together to this day.

I promised Kamil that I will review his book, Growing Up with the Nation after it is launched by our respected friend, the Governor of Malacca on May 22, 2013 at 4.30 pm at Hotel Impiana, Jalan Pinang, Kuala Lumpur. My wife Dr Kamsiah and I will be there and hope you will join us at the launch.–Din Merican.

The Tiger of Wisma Putra still has his bite

by Balan Moses@http://www.nst.com.my

RESPECTED AND REVERED: After 51 years of diplomatic service, the imposing former Secretary-General has stories to tell

THE giant who greets me at the door of his spacious condominium unit in the upmarket Jalan U Thant suburb of Kuala Lumpur is wearing a wide smile, inimical really,  on the diplomat extraordinaire never known more than three decades in harness to smile.

He might have smirked, but that was par for the course, fitting the carefully cultivated image of the uncaring senior civil servant, who tolerated subordinates (and superiors), only as long as their actions and professional philosophy were in consonance with his.

But if anyone is looking to read about a Tan Sri Ahmad Kamil Jaafar, who ran roughshod over everyone, was vengeful and worked only for his glory, nothing is further from the truth as “I never harmed anyone and I never kept anything in my heart”.

“If you did well, you were promoted and gained my trust and respect. If you did not see things the way I did (in the larger interest of the nation) and fumbled, you were on your own,” he says a little past midway into the interview for this column on his memoirs — Growing Up With the Nation — to be launched on Wednesday (May 22, 2013).

“Of course, I even scolded ambassadors (and a few others in various capacities) at airports and other places, with many afraid to even talk to me after that,” the 76-year-old says, admitting that his temper sometimes got the better of him.

But again, I get the feeling that even those episodes were crafted to fuel the image of the hard-boiled bureaucraft who did not suffer fools gladly, when he was actually just a man on a personal mission to serve his country to the best of his abilities using the manpower available.

The smile for me this morning is part of a countenance reserved for friends and people that Kamil likes, a compliment for a story I wrote nine years ago in my column “Diplomatic Dealings” about him that he fancied.

The breezy welcome from the former number one diplomat at Wisma Putra, more famous for his scowls and penetrating gaze than the expansive countenance he is wearing today, is courtesy of the fact that he will be baring all about his 51 years in diplomatic service (the last 17 years or so on national service as special envoy to the Prime minister) at Hotel Impiana in three days’ time.

The 189cm-tall Kamil, a little thicker around the waist, more jowl than cheek and slightly slower in movement than in 2004, is in his element, casting a commanding eye over all he surveys at home. It is not very much unlike the towering presence he had at Wisma Putra as secretary-general, frightening lesser beings into acquiescence with a look that told you where you stood in his esteem.

Kamil is almost curt on the phone in his baritone that has lost a little of the boom it held in years past, but is still respected enough to be listened to carefully by his wife, Lena Hultgren Kamil, son, Tariq, daughter, Yuhanis, a wide range of friends and acquaintances.

If there is an occasional observation of a seemingly lack of steel in his overt personality, I feel it is just another side to the multi-facetted life of the man touted as the most famous non-conventional diplomat that Malaysia has ever produced.

The cloak-and-dagger stuff of the spy (he refuses to be buttonholed in this genre) is still very much evident to me in the almost whispered requests to steer clear of issues “better less spoken about”.

This is vintage Kamil at its best, always putting the nation first as he had since he began serving the nation under founding Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1962 and continuing under five Prime Ministers, including Dato’ Seri Najib Razak (son of second Prime Minister Tun Razak Hussein, for whom he probably had the most personal affection for…”he was a very kind man”).

“This is my first and last book, Balan. Don’t expect to interview me on another book,” the tiger that roamed the corridors of Wisma Putra says in an almost threatening growl, sans a few of the proverbial “teeth” that gave him his bite in office.

Kamil beams as I ask him who will launch his book as the honour goes to old friend and bosom buddy of 56 years, Tun Mohd Khalil Yaacob, the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of Malacca, one of four classmates (also prefects) at Malay College Kuala Kangsar, who wrote new chapters in the schools annals with their mischief.

“We did a lot of havoc like going to the prefects’ room and sneaking a few cigarettes. At night, we used to leave the school and go for packets of char kuey teow in town and come back before dawn. We also used to take laundry money from students under our charge, use it for a taxi to town to live it up before giving what was left to the dobi and telling him he will get the rest the next month,” he says, chuckling at the incident that occurred in the 1950s.

His four partners-in-crime rose to high office in different areas of calling; Khalil became the head of a state; Tan Sri Razali Ismail became Malaysian special envoy to the United Nations; Sallehuddin Alang joined the French Foreign Legion; while the late Dalil Awin became a senior executive here.

All these episodes find print in his memoirs, written in a style that could be termed “diplomatese”, in the sense that the memories are strong in their profundity, but are often played out in a style that lacks the colour and character of a true-blue novelist. But then, Kamil has never claimed to be a writer, admitting in his low-key manner that “I speak better than I write”.

I am convinced that the veracity of his stories, told in a frank, guileless and breathtaking manner, will embrace and captivate the reader to a great extent.

The man who has worked with Kings, Prime Ministers and Statesmen has vignettes for some of them in his book, that traces his genesis from a gangling kampung boy in Kedah to a respected and towering figure in international diplomacy.

“Tunku Abdul Rahman was almost like a father to me. He used to tell his wife, Sharifah Rodziah, that I looked like my father because of our height. I remember one night in Bangkok, when I had to physically dig up the remains of his younger brother as he wanted them to be reburied in Kedah.

“It was a terrible night, with heavy rain and thunder, almost like out of a ghost movie, and there I was, a middle-ranking diplomat in a Muslim cemetery in a Buddhist country, up to my arms and knees in mud.”

Tun Abdul Razak was also almost like a father to Kamil, constantly wanting him to take up a diplomatic position in London, which the latter gently demurred as he wanted to be at home to do national service here. On Tun Hussein Onn, he says the old soldier was made of the stuff of legends, with his razor-sharp ethics that were premised on the fact that “one must not do to others what you do not want others to do to you”.

Kamil reminisces that Hussein (he always had a ruler and pen with him) took his own time with decisions, which sometimes did not work in consonance with the demands of a Foreign Ministry that worked around the clock. But his career truly took off under Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, with whom he had a special chemistry based on a shared belief that Malaysians were no lesser beings than others, “especially whites, who sometimes thought we were second-class people”.

On Dr Mahathir, he says they worked extremely well in “unconventional diplomacy”, which fitted the former Prime Minister’s bill as both had the force of will, commitment and character to help the downtrodden in places like Bosnia and Kosovo.

“I became an arms runner of sorts when I helped arrange for delivery of weaponry to the Bosnians, who were at the mercy of Serbs around them. Dr Mahathir and I shared a personal commitment to the Bosnians that went beyond the pale of our jobs.”

Kamil may be getting on in age, but the sharpness that sometimes riled others at senior levels in government is still there.

“Wisma Putra committed a faux pas a little while ago in the case of Bahrain, where there was a disconnect between the reality and the advice given to the leader of the land (Najib). This would never had happened back then.”

There is more new ground touched upon as Kamil meanders into Malaysian politics, which he has always studiously steered clear off, but here again, his comments are in relation to foreign policy.

“The ground under our feet is shifting after what Malaysians collectively did at the recent general election.Our foreign policy is shaped on a multiracial, multilingual and multireligious character at home and represents the sociopolitical make-up of the nation.”

Kamil wants the powers-that-be to address the problem fast,  “with special attention paid to communitarian and normative values as these are important and at the core of our social fabric”. The former diplomatic craftsman also remembers people like Farah Aidid, the Somali strongman, who  gave him a walking stick which “he said had kept him alive for years, but you know that he died the month after giving me the souvenir”.

Kamil tries to laugh the deep laugh that rang through his office and that of his friends  (he has great memories of his late friend, historian and author, Dr Chandran Jeshurun)  years ago,  but is unable to do so, no thanks to a 50 per cent lung capacity,  courtesy of scores of Camel cigarettes for a major part of his life.

“I never cry when giving speeches,  but I cried when delivering his eulogy,” says the characteristically unemotional  diplomat,  never known for asking for a quarter  and certainly giving none to no one of his childhood friends, fellow Malaysian visionary and noted historian.

Today, Kamil says the days of unconventional diplomacy are over and that he never bothered to pass on the tricks of the trade that he wrote the book on in his heydays between 1962 and 1989,  when he ruled the heap at Wisma Putra. The world at large, however, should never forget that the slightly bent (crouching) tiger still has much fire in his belly, a phenomenon  that Malaysians may witness (if he so decides to) at the launching of his book.

After all, he is still the Special Envoy to the Prime Minister and who knows what demands the nation may still make of the man who managed more delicate scenarios in foreign service than a hoard of diplomats across the board will ever handle in their lifetime.

‘GE-13 exposed elements of PKR being a US puppet’

May 16, 2013

Ruhanie Ahmad, trying to make a political comeback?

‘GE13 exposed elements of PKR being a US puppet’

by Aidila Razak@http://www.malaysiakini.com

The 13th general election has elements fitting the hypothesis that Pakatan Rakyat, or PKR in particular, is a foreign stooge working to change the regime for the benefit of the United States of America.

However, whether PKR is indeed on the US payroll to do its bidding can only be confirmed by the party itself.This is the argument put forth by blogger Ruhanie Ahmad (left) at a forum in Universiti Malaya today that discussed the way forward for the BN and Pakatan after GE13.

According to Ruhanie, who authors the socio-political blog Kuda Kepang, geo-political readings would make US interference not entirely surprising.

He told a packed lecture hall at the main campus in Petaling Jaya that this was because the US has been sore with Malaysia for blocking its control of the Malacca Straits.

“If they can control (the Malacca Straits), they can transport energy from the Middle East to East Asia.Control of sources of energy and transportation routes will make the US the ultimate superpower,” said Ruhanie, who is a doctorate candidate in geo-politics and security studies.

Malaysia’s Prime Ministers from Dr Mahathir Mohamad to Najib Abdul Razak have been clear that no global superpower will have a stake in the maintenance of the straits.

This makes Malaysia the last elusive jigsaw piece in the US bid to control the Southeast Asia maritime channels, after successfully forging agreements with the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia.

“I see the 13th general election as the climax to an attempt by a superpower to put its proxy against the ruling government. That is my initial assumption. Is it true?” asked the former BN backbencher.

Ruhanie said question marks over foreign influence also extended to NGOs such as electoral reform group Bersih, which has admitted to receiving funding from US sources.

He said that this argument was also put forward by “authentic” sources like socio-political portal Global Research writer Tony Cartalucci, who said that Wall Street was disappointed that its “proxy” lost in the Malaysian election.

“For the BN, this election exposes two security problems – national security and societal security – and this must be corrected by the BN as a government’s role is to safeguard security.”

Hypothesis failed peer review?

However, Ruhanie’s views were challenged by members of the audience, made up largely of post-graduate students and doctorate candidates.

One doctorate candidate from Akademi Tentera Malaysia Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (ATMA-UTM) – who stood up during the question-and-answer session – even went as far as saying that if he were Ruhanie’s supervisor, he would not give the former MP a passing mark.

“As a doctorate candidate, what framework did you use to come to that conclusion?

“The Global Research writer Cartalucci had also written that the Lahad Datu intruders were part of the Free Syria army, which is absolutely absurd,” the UTM student said.

To this, Ruhanie replied that he did not make a conclusion, but merely raised a hypothesis for further study.

“My hypothesis is based on the new classical realm… that everything that happens in a country is a causal effect of something else that happens outside the country,” he said.

Another postgraduate student also asked how was it that supporters of BERSIH and Pakatan have to often fork out their own expenses to attend events if the two groups were so flushed with cash.

However, the former Parit Sulong MP did not respond to this.To another question, Ruhanie admitted that he had been very supportive of BERSIH in 2007, but “the objectives and perceptions were different then”.

“The first BERSIH is not the same as the second and third BERSIH (rallies),” he said, admitting that he was also very critical of the Abdullah Administration, but that he was okay with the Najib Administration.

Also on the panel were Merdeka Centre Director Ibrahim Suffian and Keevan Sivarajah (left), who coordinated the Institute of Democracy and Economic Affairs (Ideas) election observation mission.

In response to Ruhanie, both started their presentations by admitting that they are foreign funded.

Ibrahim said he received US$60,000 in foreign grants, while Keevan said the entire election observation mission was funded by foreign missions and most controversially, by the George Soros-funded Open Society Institute.

“We wrote to the Pakatan and BN governments, as well as the Prime Minister’s Department for funding, but no one wrote back,” Ibrahim said.

Although not taking Ruhanie head on, Ibrahim said one needed to truly question if funding of US$60,000 for Merdeka Centre and US$20,000 for BERSIH was as big a security threat as the thousands of foreigners flooding Sabah, as was revealed to the Royal Commission of Inquiry on illegal immigrants.

SHEER Arrogance: New Home Minister tells unhappy Malaysians to emigrate

May 16, 2013

Sheer Arrogance, Zahid Hamidi

Newly-appointed Home Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi said Malaysians who are unhappy with the country’s political system should leave the country, stressing that loyal citizens should respect the Rule of Law.

In his first opinion piece printed in Utusan Malaysia since receiving the portfolio yesterday, Ahmad Zahid wrote that the illegal gatherings held across the country by Pakatan Rakyat was a form of escapism and the denial of the fact that it failed to take control of Putrajaya.

The Minister added that the Opposition was over-confident with the support it received from voters.

Despite the fervour shown by their supporters, some PR leaders acknowledge that no concrete change will manifest from continued rallies. — File pic Malaysian Insider

“Even if it is true that the Opposition had claimed a greater majority, the measurement used by the opposition had been manipulated to follow the list system or the single transferable vote system,” he said in column entitled “Perhimpunan haram sebab tak terima hakikat gagal kuasai Putrajaya.” (Illegal gathering because refuses to accept failure in controlling Putrajaya)

“Malaysia inherited the political system from the United Kingdom and many Commonwealth countries also use the first past the post system where political parties contesting in the election will only have one representative in each constituency with the principle of a simple majority of votes,” he added.

Malaysia inherited the political system from the United Kingdom and many Commonwealth countries also use the first past the post system where political parties contesting in the election will only have one representative in each constituency with the principle of a simple majority of votes !

He said opposition leaders, especially those from PKR and DAP, have been irresponsible in confusing young Chinese voters and their followers who are “politically blind” to dress in black to protest against the result of the 13th general election which they believe is for them due to the popular vote.

“If these people wish to adopt the list system or the single transferable vote used by countires with the republic form of government, then they should migrate to these countries to practise their political beliefs. Malaysia is not a country to translate their political beliefs, even if they are really loyal to this country, they should accept the political system and the existing system to form a government as enshrined in the Federal Constitution,” he said.

He said PR must recognise and accept that the voters have rejected their rule in accordance to the first past the post system.

“Illegal gatherings organised as roadshows are just an escapism by the opposition to run away from the fact that they have failed to capture Putrajaya. The Opposition was actually over confident with the support of the voters and manipulated the various issues with false promises in its manifesto that they know will not be able to implement,” he said.

He also pointed out that PAS President Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang had already accepted the results  and disagreed with the illegal gatherings by PKR and DAP.

“People are getting fed up with the behaviour of a number of opposition leaders who are dragging in the young, especially those of Chinese descent, by fanning the flames of hatred and racism in a pluralistic society which has already fostered a sense of harmony. The Opposition is also questioning the authority of the Election Commission (EC) which had allegedly manipulated the votes. It is an outrageous accusation when the EC have observed most of their demands including the use of indelible ink that is only used by the third world countries,” he said.

Digest this and think about it: Who won GE-13?

May 14, 2013

It could have  gone Pakatan’ Rakyat’s way in the last General Elections. Can someone out in cyberspace explain this to me since I am wondering what the Election Commission did between 11.00 pm on May 5 and around 1 am on May 6 when the EC Chairman announced the results that the Barisan Nasional was the first to obtain 112 seats in Parliament. I watched him on NTV7 and his body language gave him away. Obviously he had done a good job for Barisan Nasional.–Din Merican

The Malaysian Bar Council pays tribute to Tan Sri P G Lim

May 9, 2013

by Christopher Leong, President, Malaysian Bar Council

The Malaysian Bar is deeply saddened by the passing of Tan Sri Lim Phaik Gan on 7 May 2013 in Perth, Australia.

Tan Sri P G Lim was born in London on 29 June 1915, and received her early education at Light Street Convent, Penang. Her tertiary and post-graduate education were at Cambridge University (1).

She was called to the English Bar in 1948 and the Malayan Bar in 1954.  She was a member of the Bar Council for several years and served as Bar Council Secretary from 1955 to 1956.

Tan Sri PG Lim comes from a family of illustrious lawyers. Her late father was Lim Cheng Ean, and her brothers are Lim Kean Chye, formerly a senior Member of the Malaysian Bar, and the late Lim Kean Siew.

As a lawyer, Tan Sri PG Lim was an indefatigable advocate for the underprivileged and of trade union rights.  She was counsel in the landmark Railwaymen’s Union of Malaya case (2)  that accorded government employee status to 14,000 railwaymen.  She was involved in the famous Privy Council case of Lee Meng,(3)  which led at the time to the introduction of trial by jury for all cases involving the death penalty.(4)

Tan Sri PG Lim was the first Malaysian woman lawyer to be appointed as an Ambassador.(5) The Washington Post (6) carried a report on her appointment that, inter alia, was as follows:

NEW MALAYSIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N.

Malaysia, a male-oriented Moslem nation, is sending a woman to the United Nations as ambassador.  She is Phaik Gan Lim, whose battles for human rights have brought wide acclaim and likely a tapped telephone.  It is her first diplomatic post.

Miss Lim’s fame is as an internationally known trial lawyer, a leading art patron, a concert pianist, a gifted cook, a party worker, and a party-goer.

Of her professional roles, she told a reporter, her most satisfying one is noted by the highest woman in Malaysia’s government, Welfare Minister Fatimah Haji Hashim: “fighter for social justice”.

“If I find that something is wrong,” she said, “I fight . . . . If there is a need I take the case sometimes when no one else will.” She brought reprieve for a Chinese girl, Lee Meng, sentenced to death for communist activities in a famed case that reached London’s Privy Council.  She later won commutations for 11 communist guerrillas, saving them from hanging.

Tan Sri PG Lim had an illustrious career both as a lawyer and a public figure.(7) Her achievements were epochal and her commitment to the causes she believed in was inspiring.

On her retirement from legal practice and the diplomatic service, she was appointed as Director of the Kuala Lumpur Centre for Arbitration(8), and she was instrumental in establishing it as one of the pioneering centres for commercial arbitration in this region.

We have lost a towering Malaysian who served our country and the public with distinction.Tan Sri PG Lim’s contributions will not be forgotten.

She received the Merdeka Award in 2009.  In this regard, Dato’ Henry S Barlow presciently noted in the conclusion of his preface to her recently published memoirs:(9)

And so, as she lays down her pen, she rejoices in the successes which Malaysia has enjoyed since Independence, in which she has played a significant role.  At the same time, she views with some apprehension the storm clouds on the horizon, both internationally and locally, and hopes that Malaysia’s current leaders will exercise the outstanding political skills and magnanimity which marked the country’s early Prime Ministers. She has known them all well.The present leaders face unprecedented challenges. She hopes they will be able to face these challenges successfully, and wishes them well.

The Malaysian Bar conveys its deepest sympathies and heartfelt condolences to Tan Sri PG Lim’s family and loved ones in this time of grief.

(1) Girton College, BA (Cantab) and MA (Cantab).

(2) Industrial Arbitration Award No 22 /1966.  She was junior counsel to Sir Dingle Foot QC.

(3)  The London Times, 18 February 1953

(4) A departure from the previous system that involved a trial by assessors in the Federated Malay States.

(5). Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations (1971-1972) and later Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Austria (1973-1977).

(6) 14 August 1971.

(7) She was also President of Women’s Aid Organisation (1986-2000) and a member of the Board of Trustees of ISIS (1986-2007)

(8) 1982-2000

(9) Kaleidoscope: The Memoirs of P.G. Lim (Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2012).

Disturbing Questions surrounding GE13 polling

May 7, 2013

by Bridget Welsh@http://www.malaysiakini.com

GE13 SPECIAL: The GE13 results are in and the BN has managed to hold only power, winning by a 22-seat majority. This result is the worst performance for BN in Malaysia’s history.

For the first time, the incumbent government has lost the popular vote nationally (in 2008, it was only on the peninsula). The BN coalition has still managed to hold onto power. This piece, in a series analysing the election results, looks at the concerns raised regarding the electoral process and the potential impact these issues may have had on the final results.

In analysing the fairness of any polls, one asks whether the irregularities in the process could have affected the final outcome. Were the problems enough to change which coalition would have formed government? These issues will be debated and assessed in the days and weeks ahead. Let me share some preliminary observations that suggest that in this election, some things appear not to be quite right.

Integrity of electoral roll

This was the longest wait for an election, and both sides were extremely active in registering new voters, especially in the urban areas where the party machinery was well honed.

Even factoring in the more robust voter registration efforts, changes in electoral procedures to register people where they live rather than where they are from, population demographics, and possible housing developments in different seats, the increased numbers in the electoral roll are significantly not in line with historical patterns of voter registration. This out-of-line pattern is in every state, except Negeri Sembilan.

The figure that stands out in voter increase occurred from 2004 to 2008 in Sabah. The questions about the electoral roll in Sabah have been long standing, and are the subject of the ongoing Royal Commission of Inquiry into Immigrants.

These increases from 2004 through 2008 are by any measure – huge – in places such as Liburan, where caretaker Chief Minister Musa Aman state seat is located, in Semporna, the seat of Shafie Apdal and in Ranau currently held by Ewok Ebin.

Yet, after 2008, while the numbers have dropped, there is still on average 21% new voters in Sabah seats, a high number not in line with demographic trends. Migration appears to continue be a factor shaping voter numbers in Sabah in this GE13, despite calls to tighten the flows.

We also find that new voters have flooded states like Selangor, Pahang, Terengganu and Johor in GE13. The average increase in voters nationally between 2004 and 2008 was 8.2%. In the run-up to GE13, the voters registered doubled to 19.4%. The national and statewide averages however obscure the differences among different seats within states. It is clear that some seats have been special recipients of new voters.

Much has been made of the 28% of new voters in Lembah Pantai. This seat is actually on the low side compared to others. Consider the whopping 61.5% increase in Tapah, recently re-won by BN, or Subang with 52% new voters, won by Pakatan with a larger majority this election but shaped heavily by Pakatan’s registration of new voters.

A total of 90 seats, or 41% of all parliamentary seats, have more than 25% new voters. Many of these were in races with tight contests in 2008, and continued to have tight contests in GE13. The new voters has advantaged the opposition in urban areas, but benefitted the BN in rural and semi-rural areas or in states where the machinery of the opposition is comparatively weak, such as Johor.

Such races also won by BN that had large number of voters include Cameron Highlands (20%), Pasir Gudang (39%) and Tebrau (45%) in Johor. While some of the increase in the latter two seats might be explained in part by development, bizarrely there are sharp increases in voting populations in the remote interior state of Pensiangan (33%) and remote coastal seat of Kota Marudu (32%) in Sabah. These abnormal high increases raise questions.

The placement of new voters is even more intriguing when studying the actual polling stations results. Many new voters are concentrated in more less populated areas within constituencies, often in rural and semi-rural seats.

 

This is where the questions over the large number of unexplained voters grouped in bunches in places like Bachok (21% new voters and won by PAS with less than 1% margin) and Bukit Gantang (29% of new voters and won by PAS with 2% margin) come in.

It appears that the localised remote placements of new voters may have had an impact. For example, the placement of 3,600 new voters in a remote Felda schemes occurred in Segamat, which was won by the BN with a 1,217 majority. The voting in this Felda scheme was over 90%, with one stream at 99%. In 2004, the voter turnout in this area was much lower.

This spike pattern of voter turnout in particular polling stations was found in Terengganu in 2004, when the BN wrested back the state, and questions were raised at that time as well.

Spike patterns out of line

This GE13 spike in voter turnout at the local level is being witnessed in specific places across the country. With the national level of turnout at 80%, the spike patterns that are well out of line with historic patterns of voting behaviour raise questions, even accounting for the overall rise in participation and voter turnout.

Another pattern in the placement of new voters beyond tight races involves prominent leaders getting large shares of new voters, such as Najib Razak’s own seat Pekan with 38% new voters, or Rompin represented by Jamaluddin Jarjis at 29% new voters. It remains unclear why these largely rural constituencies would have such large voter increases.

Generally out-migration areas such as Perak and Pahang receiving large numbers of new voters does not conform with population patterns. Why are places with people leaving to work outside get sharp increases in voters?

The lack of clear transparent explanations on why voters are registered in some areas in such high numbers this election, compared to past patterns in these areas, understandably raises questions.

Many seats that were lost by the opposition or were in tight races have large number of new voters, including, including Tanah Merah (24%) and Balik Pulau (25%), although in some cases the opposition picked up or retained seats with large voter increases in these seats, such as Kota Raja (47%) and Kuala Nerus (25%), among others.

This issue of voter registration and voter turnout levels needs further study, with more information on who are these new voters and their pattern of voting. The fact is that the polling station results will show the spikes at the local level and careful study will tell us statistically the impact of these new voters on electoral outcomes.

The Electoral Commission (EC) and electoral administration as a whole are facing a real trust deficit. A reliable electoral roll is essential for any fair elections. Repeatedly questions have been raised about the veracity of many new voters.

Election watchdog Merap and others have time and again drawn to the questions of electoral roll integrity. Before the polls, these matters were essentially ignored or dismissed. To date, the scope of phantom voters and questionable placement was not fully known. Now the results themselves will show the impact at the local level.

This is why the sharing of all results through the Borang 14 is essential in order to make a systematic and thorough assessment. Preliminary reviews of results are already raising red flags as they have shaped the outcomes at both the parliamentary and state levels.

Early and postal voting

Queries about the early and postal voting have also emerged. Here the question is about double voting, with individuals having the opportunity to vote twice. Postal voting numbers increased in this election. Historically, there have always been questions about the veracity of postal voting, with reports questioning that this voting is secret and others arguing over the accuracy of the results.

There have been improvements in recent years over postal voting involving polling agent access to this process in many locations. Yet, even with these improvements, questions about whether postal voting is fair and accurate remain.

In this election, further questions emerged over the numbers and placement of these postal voters in different constituencies. Many tight races, such as Sibu, had increases in postal voters. In some cases, the list of names of new postal voters were reportedly not provided openly.

Early voting, an estimated 240,000 people, is also a new addition for this election and being queried. Early voting includes many Malaysians within Malaysia, such as the wives of army officers and journalists who can vote before polls.

There was not a clear distribution of the list of early voters provided nationally, and in some cases even individual candidates were not able to access the names of who were the postal and early voters.

No clear explanation was given to why some constituencies received early voters and others did not. Importantly, this information was not properly shared so that it could be verified. Furthermore, there were unexplained instances when the numbers of early and postal voters increased. In Lembai Pantai, for example, the number stated was 200, but 600 showed up. How did this happen?

Given the reality that the indelible ink was in many cases not indelible, the possibility of double voting exists. On voting day there are numerous reports of individuals finding out that someone had voted fraudulently using their name, leading to concerns also about electoral disenfranchisement.

The indelible ink was in many cases not indelible.

There were also reports of non-Malaysians being transported to the polling stations by buses and even flown in, some of these believed to be phantom voters. The scale and impact of these on the results is not yet clear, but given the combination of a non-transparent early and postal voting process in various locations and non-indelible ink issues on election day, and sightings of non-Malaysians in contentious seats, troubling questions are being raised.

The close results make these issues and questions more salient. A total of 72 of seats (or 32%) were won by less than 10% margins of turnout. Twenty percent of seats, 44 seats, were won with less than a 5% margin. The closeness of these races could easily have come down to a few voters. These razor-thin margin seats were won by both sides, but given the questions raised about the process of voting in these close seats, they need to be carefully reviewed.

To date, the total number of seats affected by either non-transparent new voter increases and early voting allocations and unexplained incidents of disenfranchisement appears to be more than the actual margin of victory for the BN. These reports need to be properly vetted and verified, but fundamental questions remained.

A spoilt-vote victory

Finally, this brings up the questions on the election night itself. There are queries surrounding the recounts and spoilt votes. How many recounts which overturned the results at the last moment were there? In Perak, for example, three state seats – three is a famous number in Perak – Alor Pongsu, Manjoi and Pangkor results were overturned at the last minute. Questions were also raised at Kamunting as well.

The need for transparency at the final count is essential for a fair election. When the EC asks people to leave and there are new ballot boxes seen outside of a polling station, as was reported in Lembah Pantai, there are questions. It is not fully clear what exactly happened with the recounts in Perak and elsewhere – as there were numerous recounts nationally this election – but the climate of distrust that has permeated the assessment of the election process raises doubts.

In the days ahead, a better sense of the numbers and recounts will emerge. With reports of sudden changes in the voting results such as Bentong and Labis, questions are being raised. Many people cannot understand how a result that was statistically a large margin ahead could be overturned. These need to be clarified, particularly in Bentong where the margin was larger.

Part of the problem is that in some cases, the number of spoilt votes exceeded the actual majority in places where recounts took place. Here are some of the seats at the parliamentary level where this happened: Kuala Selangor, Cameron Highlands, Bachok, Bentong, Sungai Besar, Kota Merudu and Baram won by the BN and Sepang and Kuala Nerus won by the opposition. Another seat with high spoilt votes is Segamat, at 950.

What distinguishes these close recounts from the famous cases of Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh losing in 1999 with more spoilt votes than the majority, is the process of the administration of the indelible ink in this election – before marking the ballot paper – thus staining the papers and contributing to higher spoilt votes.

This pattern of higher spoilt votes than actual margins of victory was also replicated at the state level as well in many areas, where only a few seats mattered for who should win state power. The process of administering the ink appears to have had an impact on the results in some areas.

It is important to be careful when reviewing the election results and not rush to judgement about what happened and why. It is also important to see the election holistically. The focus here has not touched on the use of money in the campaign, which was rampant, labeled ‘bombing’ in Sabah, or the mainstream media reporting.

The aim has been to raise the preliminary questions revealed in the results and the impact actual numbers of voters associated with the election. As the evaluation of the election moves forward, the call to answer these questions will only increase and intensify. Further study and analysis is essential.

Nevertheless, from the non-indelible ink and spikes in voter turnout to being not allowed to vote, concerns with the electoral process itself are not sitting right with many in the public, and this is not just supporters on one side or another. Transparent and truthful answers are both needed and welcomed.

DR BRIDGET WELSH is Associate Professor of Political Science at Singapore Management University. She is travelling around Malaysia to provide her GE13 analyses exclusively to Malaysiakini. Bridget can be reached at bwelsh@smu.edu.sg.

NY Times Book Review: ‘The Dispensable Nation,’ by Vali Nasr

April 22, 2013

Books of The Times

Superpower, Leading From Behind

‘The Dispensable Nation,’ by Vali Nasr

by Michiko Kakutani (04-18-13)

The title of Vali Nasr’s provocative and uneven new book, “The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat,” plays on President Bill Clinton’s description of the United States as the world’s one “indispensable nation.” Mr. Nasr — who was a senior adviser to Richard C. Holbrooke, the Obama administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak) — suggests in this sharply critical volume that the foreign policy pursued under Mr. Obama has diminished America’s leadership role in the world.

To our allies, Mr. Nasr writes, “our constant tactical maneuvers don’t add up to a coherent strategy or a vision of global leadership. Gone is the exuberant American desire to lead in the world. In its place there is the image of a superpower tired of the world and in retreat, most visibly from the one area of the world where it has been most intensely engaged,” the Middle East.

Mr. Nasr does not grapple here with how the Bush administration’s aggressive, pre-emptive policies led the United States into a costly and unnecessary war in Iraq, and he also fails to provide a convincing and detailed assessment of just how the developments of the Arab Spring might have been more cogently handled by the Obama administration.

What Mr. Nasr’s book, at its best, does do is shed light on the heated infighting within the Obama administration, particularly between the White House and the State Department, adding new details and insights to dynamics previously chronicled in news reports and books like “Little America,” by Rajiv Chandrasekaran; “The Obamians,” by James Mann; and “Obama’s Wars,” by Bob Woodward.

Mr. Nasr (left) offers his own thoughts about one of the most watched relationships in modern politics, the pas de deux of former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and President Obama: he asserts that had it not been for Mrs. Clinton’s personal connection with the president and her tenacity, “the State Department would have had no influence on policy making whatsoever.”

He also fleshes out our understanding of the contentious relationship that developed between Mr. Holbrooke and the White House, which was the result of turf wars, philosophical differences, a clash of personalities (the brash, sometimes swashbuckling style of Mr. Holbrooke crashing up against the “no drama” style favored by President Obama and many of his aides) and differing ideas about how to bring the war in Afghanistan to a close.

It was a rivalry, Mr. Chandrasekaran argued in “Little America,” that “sabotaged America’s best chance for a peace deal to end the war” there. Mr. Holbrooke became ill during a meeting in Mrs. Clinton’s office on December 10, 2010, and despite surgery to repair a tear to his aorta, died a few days later.

In this book Mr. Nasr contends that “the White House campaign against the State Department, and especially Holbrooke, was at times a theater of the absurd. Holbrooke was not included in Obama’s video conferences” with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, “and was cut out of the presidential retinue when Obama went to Afghanistan.”

“The White House,” Mr. Nasr says, “resented losing AfPak to the State Department,” and “that was one big reason” it was “on a warpath with Holbrooke — he was in their way and kept the State Department in the mix on an important foreign policy area.” Mr. Holbrooke, he goes on, “would not cede ground to the White House, not when he thought those who wanted to wrest control of Afghanistan were out of their depth and not up to the job.”

Mr. Nasr describes Mr. Holbrooke (who oversaw the 1995 Dayton peace accords that ended the war in Bosnia) as “a brilliant strategic thinker in the same league as such giants of American diplomacy as Averell Harriman and Henry Kissinger.” And he uses his own in-depth knowledge of the geopolitics of the Middle East to make an impassioned case for many of Mr. Holbrooke’s diplomatic initiatives and ideas, which often failed to find traction within the White House.

In these pages Mr. Nasr — who is now dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington — writes about Mr. Holbrooke’s pressing for reconciliation talks with the Taliban early on, when, in Mr. Nasr’s words, “our leverage was at its strongest — when we had the maximum number of troops on the ground in Afghanistan,” and before troop withdrawal plans were announced.

Mr. Nasr also writes thoughtfully about Mr. Holbrooke’s understanding of the regional dynamics of the Middle East and South Asia. He discusses Mr. Holbrooke (right)’s belief that lasting political solutions could be forged not by military means alone but through a combination of leverage and diplomacy involving all the stakeholders in the region (including countries like Iran and India), and his conviction that such diplomacy included engagement on issues of long-term social and economic interest to individual countries.

The problem with this book is that its genuinely interesting analyses are often undermined by Mr. Nasr’s certainty about matters that are subject to an incalculable number of variables; his vitriolic anger at the Obama White House; and his penchant for making overly broad, sometimes willfully alarmist generalizations.

Mr. Nasr asserts that the president was “very concerned with shielding his right flank so as not to open himself to right-wing criticism,” then goes on to declare that “it is not going too far to say that American foreign policy had become completely subservient to tactical domestic political considerations.”

He writes that the administration’s current policy toward Iran (its assumptions and strategy are now “hardly distinguishable,” he says, “from those of the Bush White House”) will “eventually turn Iran into a failed state” that will “pose a new set of security challenges to the region and the United States.” And he argues that the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” policy and what he sees as its neglect and mismanagement of the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan and the unspooling fallout of the Arab Spring are simply pushing that vital region “further into China’s bosom.”

One nightmarish possibility envisioned by Mr. Nasr goes like this: in a couple of decades, “China and Russia will have gobbled up Central Asia, cornered Europe’s energy markets, and planted themselves smack in the middle of the Middle East. They will have emerged as global giants challenging America’s place in the world and perhaps the primacy of the U.S. dollar as the currency of international exchange. And once that happens, it will be all but impossible to reverse. We would then face global threats, threats on a scale we encountered during the cold war, threats that dwarf whatever danger Iran can ever pose.”

Mr. Nasr makes some persuasive arguments for more concerted diplomatic and economic engagement on the part of the United States around the globe, though his observations about America’s essential role on the world stage owe a lot to those set out by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his astute 2012 book, “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.”

When it comes to specifics, Mr. Nasr’s recommendations can sound vague or unrealistic. For instance, he writes that “solving the problems of the Middle East and the threat they pose to the world requires a fundamental change in the region’s economic profile,” and the “international community would have to make a sizable investment — a Marshall Plan in scale — to bring about change of that magnitude.”

He acknowledges that this is problematic, given the economic difficulties America faces today, but in another chapter complains that our settling “for doing so much less” — in Egypt — “than we did after 1989 in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America speaks volumes about our disengagement from the region. If the potential for democracy held by the Arab Spring was not enough to compel our engagement, it is not clear what would be.”

In the end, Mr. Nasr’s eagerness to see virtually every action taken by the Obama administration on foreign policy through as dark a glass as possible distracts attention from his many valid criticisms, and from his thought-provoking assessments of how developments across the Middle East and South Asia today — in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Syria — are intertwined historically, economically and politically in a fantastically complicated puzzle that has no easy or straightforward solutions.

A version of this review appeared in print on April 19, 2013, on page C27 of the New York edition with the headline: Superpower, Leading From Behind.

From ASA to ASEAN

April 19, 2013

By Datuk Dr. Ananda Kumaraseri | akumaraseri@yahoo.com

http://www.nst.com.my

REGIONAL TIES: ASA paved the way for a more palpable multilateral cooperation outfit

IT would be recalled that the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was a foreign policy goal that Tunku Abdul Rahman had envisioned, from the outset of newly independent Malaya, as the country’s major thrust of diplomacy.

His primary motive for ASA’s formation is to be viewed against the backdrop of the Cold War rivalry that triggered a growing concern over the future security and peace of member states.

Defined blandly, ASA represented a regional and inter-governmental organisation aimed at promoting cohesiveness among Southeast Asian states which external powers had for centuries fiercely contested over for rich natural resources and to gain strategic and geo-political advantage in the region.

However, in terms of substance, ASA’s collaborative activities since its formation in 1961 were generally confined to promoting technical and cultural cooperation among its members.

The modest performance on the part of ASA — the first-ever indigenous undertaking among independent Southeast Asian states in regional cooperation — was understandable, especially given the political and cultural diversity of the member states and the turbulent state of the regional environment. This perception of ASA was self-evident in my personal involvement with the Malaysian secretariat of ASA, as a young desk officer in 1966, under Walter Ayaduray, the principal assistant secretary who was at the helm during its pioneering years.

Here, I cannot help but digress a bit to acknowledge that as my immediate superior, Ayaduray was more of a mentor than a boss.

I am ever grateful that I had the good fortune of commencing my diplomatic career under his highly competent and caring tutelage. His sudden death in 1979 robbed Wisma Putra of a brilliant officer possessed of a genius mind that had so much to offer towards Malaysia’s diplomatic prowess.

As Ayaduray used to pacify us in our moments of professional frustration over the lethargic pace of regional cooperation: “ASA is a nascent inter-governmental organisation. We must be realistic and move forward in small incremental steps and not expect earth-shattering developments to manifest in a poof with the stroke of a wizard’s wand.”

Furthermore, the hopeful expectations of regional cooperation were battered by serious impasses virtually from the very outset of ASA’s creation.

Indonesia’s Konfrontasi against Malaysia, the Philippines’ Sabah claim and Singapore’s separation from Malaysia had the effect of weighing down heavily on any remarkable progress in regional cooperation.

These were indeed unsettling times for the whole of Southeast Asia that impelled ASA to remain dormant and exist more in terms of name than in substance. In fact, ASA ceased to be operational for a period as a result of the strain in Malaysia-Philippines relations arising from the Sabah claim.

In the midst of the strained relations, president Diosdado Macapagal floated the concept of a larger Malay Confederation or Union of Malay peoples in the region that was encapsulated in his initiative to form a new regional grouping, Maphilindo.

A summit conference of the heads of government of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia was convened in Manila from July 30 to August 5, 1963 to endorse the creation of the Pan-Malay grouping.

Maphilindo, however, suffered a still birth because of severe suffocation of mutual suspicion, distrust and enmity that beset the rather loosely defined ambiguous grouping. Moreover, the Maphilindo concept was ethnic-based in a narrow sense and was retrograde in a modern global village context.

Looking back, it can be said that notwithstanding its modest track record, ASA paved the way for a more palpable multilateral cooperation outfit. This came about on Aug 8, 1967 as a result of the mutually agreed subsumation of ASA to form a larger grouping, namely, the Association of Southeast Asian States, acronymed Asean, comprising five member states. They were the three founder members of ASA, plus the new players, Indonesia and Singapore.

The timing as well as the circumstances surrounding the birth of Asean were certainly more propitious than when its precursor ASA was formed. The new ASEAN grouping evolved closely on the heels of the downfall of president Sukarno and the annihilation of Parti Kommunist Indonesia.

The regime of new Indonesian leaders, under President Suharto, was distinctively receptive to regional cooperation.

Indeed, an underlying motivation among ASEAN’s founding fathers was a desire to reconcile differences that had cropped up in the recent past and to seek genuine cooperation.

Against the backdrop of the escalating wars in the Indo-China peninsula bearing ominous security implications, the move to establish a new and larger regional grouping appeared pertinent and urgent as well.

In addition, leaders of the member states embraced a common believe that an environment of peace in the region would enable individual states to harness national resources to focus on building strong economic, social and political national fabrics.

They were further convinced that this would in turn help to forestall internal communist subversion as well as preempt external powers harbouring narrow self-interest from continuing to dictate the stability, security and peace in the region.

akumaraseri@yahoo.com

Tunku Abdul Rahman with (right) talking to Philippine ambassador Romeo Busuego (left) and Thai ambassador Prasong Bunchoem in 1967. Tunku had envisioned ASA as Malaysia’s major thrust of diplomacy.

Najib’s zombie apocalypse

April 15, 2013

by Mariam Mokhtar@http://www.malaysiakini.com

In keeping with the unhealthy obsession with cerita hantu (ghost stories) and the supernatural, which is displayed by the rakyat – especially the Malays – caretaker Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak should be applauded for converting some Malaysians into zombies.

The living dead are characterised by their lack of self-awareness and the inability to think for themselves. Najib’s zombies may not crave human flesh, but they do feast on cash handouts and freebies. In the zombie culture, human brains are considered a delicacy.

Perhaps UMNO has seized on the rakyat’s minds as a means to spread their evil. They have mentally enslaved us and used this exploitation to satisfy their greed for material goods, and hunger for power.

Six decades ago, Malayans had to decide – either continue to be ruled by the British, or accept change and take charge of running the country. The operative word was change.

We had to manage the nation’s finances, defend the country and administer self-rule. It was no mean feat. Malayan brains, intellect, and toil made Malaya (later Malaysia), a success story. Change to self-rule required the combined effort of Malayans, and not just one particular section of the community.

Change took place in 1957. It can happen again in 2013. Today, the word ‘change’ is anathema to our leaders. Our great-grandparents were more open-minded and embraced change more readily, but Najib and former PM Dr Mahathir Mohamad are trying to deceive us when they say that change is not necessary.

Najib may have promised to deal with corruption after GE-13, but why should we believe him? For years, we witnessed his failure to address problems in society.

If he was worried about graft, why did he employ leaders who were corrupt? Najib appointed Mohd Isa Abdul Samad as chairperson of FELDA despite objections from the public and criticism from Mahathir, who is no stranger to money politics.

Going to the Polls

In three weeks time, we go to the polls. What will happen then?  If we elect BN, aren’t we condoning a government which is corrupt, and which breaks the laws whenever it chooses? The corruption network involves people from the junior office boy to the PM. Those at the bottom make petty sums whilst those at the top amass huge rewards. There has been little enforcement despite plenty of evidence, but the complaints of the public have been completely ignored.

Restoring confidence in the Government?

If the Opposition were to win GE13, what steps should they take to restore confidence in the government? Anwar has reiterated that he will not go on a witch-hunt; but he cannot ignore the rakyat’s desire for justice. Many lives have been crushed, families destroyed, livelihoods devastated and communities ravaged, because of corrupt BN leaders.

Many people have painful experiences to relate. The business deal of one acquaintance was scuppered by allegedly dodgy people in the Defence Ministry. After years of maintaining a good working relationship with his American and Taiwanese partners, millions of ringgits were lost when the ministry supposedly reneged on a deal.

Despite spending vast sums on engaging lawyers and waiting at the court’s pleasure, this man learnt – after a brief appearance in court – that his case had been dismissed. He lost everything.  In Malaysia, justice goes to the highest bidder. There are presumably several cases of miscarriages of justice like this in the country as well.

So, should a new government purge all officials and businesspeople connected with the previous BN regime? To what extent should this process be continued? Should the top brass and business cronies only be punished? Should the crony business be made to cease operations?

It is easier to deal with those at the top, whose personal gain and lust for power broke several laws. Their unexplained wealth can be traced, by the paper trail, to offshore bank accounts and overseas properties.

Will the more educated among us adopt a different approach to the cleansing ritual? Mahathir’s brand of politics left deep trenches in the minds of many Malaysians.

How will the different sections of the community react to the purge post-GE13? How should we treat the junior civil servant, who in the old regime, took advantage of a crooked system?

Perhaps, the more obscure cases will be found in the private sector, where businesses helped prop up the UMNO government in deals that enriched both corrupt politicians and business people. How should the new regime resolve these cases? It would be naive to think that any government contract came without strings attached.

How should civil servants or businesspeople who denounced the corrupt practices of the old regime be dealt with in the new order? Should their positions be enhanced? What if their actions were entirely self-serving when they jumped ship?

How would you deal with the civil servants who refused to become involved in corrupt acts of the previous government? Do you promote them despite their lack of expertise and seniority? How would the new government deal with false accusations? How would they deal with politicians who are Trojan horses of frogs?

Not enough time, resources

After GE13, we cannot go after everyone whom we perceive to be corrupt because we do not have the time and resources to manage this laborious process. Anger and resentment will simply build and this will feed into the rakyat’s racial and religious prejudices, as well as accentuate other insecurities.

To add to the problem, our judiciary and police force have been corrupted by Mahathir. We will have to find a system to maintain law and order in the transition from the old guard until a just and effective police force and judicial system is formed.

We certainly must recover the large sums, several of which are said to be in excess of RM40 billions which have been allegedly stolen by several BN ministers and tycoons acting in collusion with them.

Najib’s incessant refrains of “I help you, you help me” to the rakyat has created a zombie apocalypse in Malaysia. Therefore, radical change is necessary to reclaim our souls and save the nation.

Muhasabah Lahad Datu

April 6, 2013

oleh Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang@http://www.themalaysianinsider.com

5hb April, 2013–Peristiwa berdarah di Lahad Datu menjadi ujian kebijaksanaan kerajaan dan kesetiaan seluruh rakyat terhadap negara.

Walau pun berbeza kaum, agama dan fahaman politik, namun tugas mempertahankan negara apabila diceroboh dan keselamatannya diganggu gugat adalah kewajipan bersama mengikut agama, adat dan akal yang waras.

Maka Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) dan seluruh ahlinya mendoakan Allah melimpahkan rahmat kepada anggota keselamatan yang terkorban dan dimasukkan ke dalam kalangan para syuhada, sekurang-kurangnya syahid akhirat dan disembuhkan mereka yang tercedera, serta dikembalikan keamanan dan keselamatan negara.

Walau bagaimana pun muhasabah wajib dilakukan terhadap kerajaan yang diamanahkan menjaga keselamatan negara. Dalam hal ini pihak tentera dan polis tidak boleh dipersalahkan, kerana banyak asas dari sudut politik yang kukuh menunjukan bahawa peristiwa seperti itu tidak sepatutnya berlaku.

Pasukan keselamatan juga tidak sepatutnya menjadi mangsa korban musuh yang tercipta dengan sebab kecuaian politik mereka yang memimpin negara sejak mencapai kemerdekaan lebih 50 tahun yang lalu.

Persoalan asas yang kita ingin tanya ialah: “Mengapa asas keharmonian yang sedia ada di daerah itu tidak dijaga dan dibina dengan baik?”

Hakikatnmya ialah, kedudukan serantau, kejiranan, serumpun, sekelurga dan se agama cuma dipisahkan oleh sempadan geografi dua negara. Malaysia mempunyai hubungan kejiranan dengan Filipina, dan sama-sama menjadi anggota ASEAN sejak penubuhannya pada 8 Ogos 1967 lagi.

Orang-orang Suluk, atau grup etnik Tausug pula mempunyai hubungan keluarga, agama dan budaya yang sama dengan sebahagian besar penduduk keturunan Sulu di Sabah yang sukar dipisahkan. Hubungan rapat ini menjadikan aktiviti keluar-masuk antara rakyat kedua-dua negara berada pada kedudukan yang paling sukar untuk dikawal secara keras oleh pasukan keselamatan yang bertugas.

Tragedi ini berlaku kerana pihak politik yang berkuasa tidak menyelesaikan akar-usul masalah ini secara bijaksanaan sehingga berlakulah kemalangan yang sangat menyayat hati itu. Di samping kemarahan membara terhadap penceroboh yang tidak beretika, namun sifat kemanusiaan tetap berada dalam setiap orang yang berperasaan.

Muhasabah wajib dilakukan dengan meneliti dan memahami kerana beberapa perkara.

Pertama, pemisahan secara sempadan negara yang berbeza dimulakan oleh penjajah asing terhadap rantau ini, mereka sengaja meninggalkan bom jangka selepas mereka meninggalkan tanah jajahan dengan niat jahat, setelah mereka melaksanakan agenda pecah dan perintah di zaman penjajahan dahulu. Bukan sahaja pembahagian rantau ini di antara penjajah Inggeris, Belanda dan Sepanyol dan selepasnya Amerika juga mengambil tempat di Filipina secara khusus.

Kedua, perjanjian juga di buat oleh penjajah ini secara menipu sultan-sultan dan raja-raja yang dilemah dan dihilangkan kedaulatannya.

Ketiga, setelah masing-masing mencapai kemerdekaan dengan negara yang berbeza dan mempunyai kedaulatannya, mengapa segala syarat perjanjian yang sudah lapuk di zaman penjajah yang sudah pulang ke negeri masing-masing, dengan pihak yang sudah diletakkan dalam lipatan sejarah masih lagi wujud? Mengapakah pihak kerajaan dalam negara kita ini masih menghidupkan lagi perjanjian seperti ini?

Keempat, negara Malaysia dan Filipina pula yang terlibat secara lansung dalam perjanjian damai yang memberi kuasa otonomi kepada bangsa Moro di Mindanao. Mengapa terlepas pandang terhadap wiliyah dan kepuluan yang lain bersamanya, sehingga penyelesaiannya tidak lengkap dan masalahnya tidak selesai?

Perkembangan pendidikan, ekonomi dan sosial terbiar dan terus terbiar, kerana kerajaan UMNO lebih menumpukan kepentingan politik mengejar kerusi mendapat takhta dan harta semata-mata, tanpa perhatian terhadap pendidikan, ekonomi dan social di kawasan berkenaan. Rakyat miskin terus di rumah dalam air sejak turun temurun, hanya segelintir di daratan dengan kemudahan yang terhad tanpa penyelesaian.

Semua kecuaian tanpa cakna ini boleh menempah kesan negatif dalam kehidupan dan boleh mencetuskan ketegangan berbagai kaum. Semua perkara ini perlu dimuhasabah dengan adil dan ikhlas walaupun tercalar diri sendiri.

Tindakan ketenteraan mempertahankan kedaulatan negara, langkah menjaga keselamatan rakyat wajib dilaksanakan dengan berhemat, dalam masa yang sama jalinan hubungan tersebut di atas wajib diperbetulkan.

Jangan ikut contoh buruk yang pernah dilakukan oleh penjajah semasa darurat dahulu, penyelsaiannya secara mengepung dan memaksa semata-mata tanpa pendekatan yang lain. Perlu difahami bahawa perasaan manusia tidak boleh dikepung dan dikongkong sepanjang masa, walau pun jasadnya dikepung dan dikongkong secara paksaan .

Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 wajar menjadi iktibar apabila ianya ditangani sendiri oleh pemimpin di masa itu. Ditubuhkan Jawatankuasa Muhibbah melibatkan kerajaan dan seluruh pemimpin masyarakat, agama dan kaum yang berpengaruh tanpa mengira perbezaan agama, kaum dan politik. Seterusnya ditangani secara politik, ekonomi, pendidikan dan lain-lain.

Konfrantasi dengan Indonesia juga dapat ditamatkan dengan pendekatan ini, walau pun ada yang terkoban dan cedera, akhirnya berakhir dengan damai tanpa dendam.

Janganlah pihak kerajaan UMNO-BN terus menerus berdegil tidak mengaku kesilapan atau mahu menangguk di air keruh, kerana kedua-duanya akan menenggelamkan kita semua, atau laksana Pakistan yang melahirkan Bangladesh.

* Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang adalah Presiden PAS.

Regionalism in Diplomacy

April 5, 2013

by Datuk Dr Ananda Kumaraseri@http://www.nst.com.my

COOPERATION:Forging regional economic cooperation in Southeast Asia was by no means smooth sailing

IN a sense it can be said that regionalism and regional economic cooperation have been key features of Malaysia’s foreign policy even before its formation.

Being the visionary he was, ever since Malaya’s independence, Tunku Abdul Rahman had consistently favoured the fostering of close cooperative relations with the country’s immediate neighbours as a prerequisite of foreign policy.

What was truly significant in the Tunku’s foreign policy perception of regionalism was his earnest departure from the conventional route of promoting good neighbourly relations through bilateral endeavours.

No doubt, the legendary Burmese leader, General Aung San (left) had articulated his vision of regional economic cooperation among the countries in Southeast Asia a decade earlier. However, this foreign policy goal died along with his tragic assassination in 1947.

The Tunku’s foreign policy initiative in forging a regional economic cooperation grouping among the non-communist states of Southeast Asia was by no means smooth sailing.

Its beginnings in fact were greeted with false starts before it steered full steam ahead in the turbulent sea of Southeast Asian geopolitics and its unpredictable conflict-ridden regional environment.

In reminiscing over these turbulent years, it is indeed noteworthy that the proposal for establishing a regional economic cooperation grouping in Southeast Asia was among the very first foreign policy pronouncements of newly independent Malaya.

Inspired by the vision of a closely knit and unified Southeast Asia, the Tunku, on an official visit to Sri Lanka (Ceylon then), in February 1958, formally proposed his dream of a Southeast Asian regional grouping.

Today, of course, it is fashionable to talk about regionalism and regional cooperation. But this was certainly not the temperament when the Tunku articulated his proposal to his Sri Lankan host.

Interestingly, many have wondered why the Tunku had chosen distant Colombo instead of a more proximate capital as the venue to launch his innovative regional grouping proposal.

Moreover, he did so just several months after the country had gained independence. A cogent reason was that the very coinage of the modern-day term Southeast Asia originated out of Sri Lanka.

It would be recalled that it was in Sri Lanka, to be more precise, the hill city of Kandy, that the British had set up their Southeast Asia Military Operations Headquarters of their engagements in the Pacific War.

Thus, the term Southeast Asia historically as well as geo-politically was Sri Lanka-based. By definition, therefore, a regional grouping of Southeast Asia was to include Sri Lanka.

There was also another important consideration for the Tunku to choose Colombo to moot his regional cooperation proposal which has not been given due attention.

In part, this is because not many are privy to it, namely, the confidence reposed in the Tunku from the close personal friendship he had forged with Sri Lankan leaders since his student days in England.

His intimate circle of influential Sri Lankan friends included the then Prime Minister, Dudley Senanayake, Solomon Bandaranaike who succeeded him and several other leaders such as his buddies, the ever-popular, Savaranamutu brothers.

The latter interestingly were siblings of his close friend and confidant, Manicasothy Savaranamuttu, of the Straits Echo.

As it turned out, however, the high hopes the Tunku had placed on securing the support of Sri Lanka for his regional initiative were dashed. Contrary to assurances given by his highly influential Sri Lankan friends, the proposal failed to survive the vibrant Sri Lankan domestic politics that was seized with an anti-imperialist fervour.

The Sri Lanka government perforce had to concede to domestic criticism that the country’s participation in such a regional grouping would compromise its non-aligned credentials, which it felt beholden to uphold.

Furthermore, the virulent leftist-slanted Sri Lankan media that viewed the proposal with scepticism, even suspect as being a Western imperialist tool, dismissed it as inimical to the country’s interest.

On hindsight, it would appear that Sri Lanka lost a golden opportunity to play a definitive role in the regional diplomacy that was to unfold later with the emergence of ASEANan as a robust regional organisation.

By the time Sri Lanka tried to redeem itself and seek membership of Asean in the mid-1980s, it found to its dismay, the doors to ASEAN membership shut.

Despite the disappointing Sri Lankan response meted out to the Tunku’s proposal, he persisted in actualising his visionary regional grouping for Southeast Asia.

Numerous high-level consultations transpired and exchange of visits with leaders of neighbouring countries were actively pursued to give meaning and substance to his regional grouping proposition.

The Tunku’s daunting initiative finally took real tangible form in 1961 with the formal agreement among the Philippines, Thailand and Malaya to form the Association of Southeast Asia, with the acronym ASA.

The “Sabah Claim”: Disrespect for UN Charter On Right of Self-Determination

April 5, 2013

by Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail@http://www.nst.com.my

U.N. APPROVAL: The Cobbold Commission ascertained views of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak on the proposal to join Malaysia

THE catalyst for the United Kingdom’s agreement to grant independence to its colonies, including Malaya and later Sabah (and Sarawak), lies in the establishment of the United Nations.

With its establishment in 1945, the international community showed growing concern with regard to the position of territories of all kinds which had not attained independence and the condition of their inhabitants.

Self-determination, usually leading to independence, accordingly became the standard proclaimed by the international community.

The UN Charter in Chapter XI contains the “Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories” in which member states of the UN administering territories “whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost … the wellbeing of the inhabitants of these territories”.

That obligation includes in particular the duty enshrined in Article 73(b) of the UN Charter “to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement”.

The principle of self-determination has gradually transformed from a mere acknowledged principle in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter into a legal right recognised in international legal instruments under the auspices of the UN.

In 1970, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, the principles of which are declared to “constitute basic principles of international law, elaborated the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.

An important element in the principle of self-determination recognised in UN instruments is that self-determination must respect the freely expressed wishes of the people in question.

Article 73 of the UN Charter lays down that the interests of the inhabitants are “para-mount”; and the International Court of Justice has emphasised the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned.

These wishes are normally to be established by the usual political processes of the territory (for example, elections), but in some circumstances it may be necessary to make special arrangements, for example by holding a referendum or arranging for a UN mission to verify the expression of the peoples’ views.

In fact, further visiting missions may be ordered by the UN to satisfy itself of the will of the people. Based on the UN practice in ascertaining the valid exercise of self-determination, it appears that requiring a referendum or a UN mission is considered only when necessary. Otherwise the UN will not intervene in the self-determination process.

The integration of Sabah (and Sarawak) into Malaysia was unconditionally accepted by the UN as a valid exercise of self-determination by its peoples, firstly through the findings of the UN Malaysia Mission and subsequently by the removal of North Borneo (and Sarawak) from the list of non-self-governing territories maintained by the UN.

Members of the Cobbold Commission

In April 1962, the Cobbold Commission was formed to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak on the agreement of the governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya to include North Borneo and Sarawak (together with other territories) in the proposed Federation of Malaysia and to make recommendations in the light of their assessment of these views.

The Cobbold Commission spent a total of about four weeks in North Borneo and managed to complete all its sessions with the people before concluding its enquiry on April 18, 1962.

The commission unanimously agreed, in the light of their assessment of the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak, that a Federation of Malaysia was in the best interests of North Borneo and Sarawak.

On June 21, 1962, the Report of the Cobbold Commission and its findings were completed and submitted to the Prime Ministers of Britain and Malaya.

The report was considered in detail in a series of meetings between British and Malayan ministers in London in July 1962.The final report was published on Aug 1, 1962. The Cobbold Commission determined from the enquiry that two-thirds of the peoples of North Borneo were agreeable to the proposal for Sabah to join Malaysia while less than 20 per cent of the people disagreed with the proposal.

The Manila Accord of July 31, 1963, between the Federation of Malaya, the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines, entrusted the United Nations Secretary-General with the task of ascertaining the wishes of the people of North Borneo.

He reported that the majority of the peoples of North Borneo had given serious and thoughtful consideration to their future and to the implications for them of participation in a Federation of Malaysia.

He believed that the majority of the peoples of Sabah (North Borneo) and of Sarawak “have concluded that they wish to bring their dependent status to an end and to realise their independence through freely chosen association with other peoples in their region”.

He further added that the “fundamental agreement of the three participating governments in the Manila meetings, and the statements by the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Philippines that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided that the support of the people of the territories by me and that, in my opinion, complete compliance with the principle of self-determination within the requirements of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) Principal IX of the Annex was ensured; my conclusion based on the findings of the mission is that on both these counts there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia”.

In fact, in the 2001 Application by the Philippines for Permission to Intervene in the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), the International Court of Justice per Ad Hoc Judge Franck discussed the impact of the principle of self-determination on historic titles and emphasised that it is basic to the international rule of law that historic titles cannot, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, prevail in law over the rights of non-self-governing people to claim independence and establish their sovereignty through the exercise of bona fide self-determination.

The independence of North Borneo was brought about as the result of the expressed wish of the majority of the people of the territory in a 1963 election.

It is established fact that the state of Sabah has been, is and remains a legitimate and integral part of Malaysia since September 16, 1963, Sabah having joined the Federation of Malaysia as a newly independent state following its decolonisation by the United Kingdom, based on the wishes of the people of Sabah.

The independence of Sabah before it joined Malaysia having been gained and established through the legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination, as expounded under the UN Charter and international law, its status as part of Malaysia today is firmly established under international law and beyond dispute.

Therefore, any purported claim put forward by the self-styled sultan of Sulu on behalf of the self-proclaimed Sultanate of Sulu today to the territory of Sabah or any part of it has no legitimacy or merit.

Sabahans are now enjoying a higher standard of living and maintaining their traditions.

ASEAN’s chairmanship in 2013 and 2014

April 3, 2013

by Rodolfo C. Severino, ISEAS (04-02-13)

For the first time in the organisation’s history, ASEAN Foreign Ministers failed to issue the normal joint communiqué at the end of their annual meeting last July.

Many people fear the same historic debacle could repeat itself this year and the next. They cite the small size of Brunei Darussalam, this year’s ASEAN chair, and the relative inexperience and geographic location of Myanmar, which will take its turn as ASEAN chair in 2014, as reasons for their concern. They argue that Brunei’s economy depends almost entirely on oil and gas exports. Myanmar is deeply divided ethnically and is one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia. These weaknesses are supposed to render the two countries vulnerable to political pressure from interested great powers, as, it is claimed, Cambodia was from China last year.

The disputes over sovereignty and jurisdiction in the South China Sea, on which the joint communiqué supposedly foundered, seem only to have escalated. China’s military ability to pursue its claims is reported to have increased, and Beijing’s assertiveness in the pursuit of those claims is said to have intensified.

On these counts, many people view the 2013 and 2014 chairmanships and the future of ASEAN itself with deep pessimism. Yet there is still cause for a touch more optimism.

First, we can safely assume that, as a matter of regional pride and practicality, the ASEAN foreign ministers will not allow an ASEAN ministerial meeting to take place again without adopting a joint communiqué.

Secondly, both Brunei and Myanmar enjoy the services of experienced diplomats. Brunei joined ASEAN in January 1984 and has chaired several ASEAN ministerial meetings, ASEAN summits and other ASEAN-organised gatherings. Spearheaded by the redoubtable second Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Lim Jock Seng, the long-time Foreign Minister, Prince Mohamed Bolkiah, and the Sultan himself, Brunei Darussalam’s leaders and diplomats — and their past performance — should reassure us that Brunei’s chairmanship of ASEAN, which started in January 2013, will proceed without missing a beat.

Myanmar, which joined ASEAN in 1997, or almost 16 years ago, has its share of competent diplomats. Although 2014 will be the first year the country chairs ASEAN as a whole and hosts ASEAN’s most high profile meetings, it has chaired and hosted many ministerial and other high-level meetings in the past.

The issues surrounding the conflicting claims in the South China Sea, which are said to have caused the foreign ministers’ failure to adopt a joint communiqué in Phnom Penh in July 2012, are old ones. Disagreements within ASEAN over the formulation of the paragraphs on the South China Sea have not, in the past, prevented ASEAN from adopting a common position.

Indeed, on July 20, 2012, a few days after their Phnom Penh meeting, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a statement on the South China Sea embodying the basic ASEAN position on the disputes, namely the ‘full implementation’ of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, the ‘early conclusion’ of a Code of Conduct for the area, ‘full respect’ for international law, the exercise of self-restraint and the non-use of force.

This statement of principles was paraphrased in the paragraphs on the South China Sea in the Chairman’s statement of the ASEAN Summit in November 2012 in Phnom Penh.

Finally, the strongest source of confidence in the leadership of ASEAN in 2013 and 2014 is that it is in the national interest of the major world powers, as well as ASEAN’s member states, that ASEAN remains united on the principles governing the conduct of international relations in Southeast Asia. These principles are consistent both with the values proclaimed by the United States and with the safeguards insisted upon by China.

Rodolfo C. Severino is the Head of the ASEAN Studies Centre, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He is a former ASEAN Secretary-General. The views expressed here are solely his own.

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/02/aseans-chairmanship-in-2013-and-2014/

ASEAN needs to remain on course for integration by 2015

April 1, 2013

by Farish A. Noor@http://www.nst.com.my

DEALING WITH FUTURE CHALLENGES: Southeast Asia needs to remain on course for integration by 2015

IN the space of a week, several worrying developments have taken place close to our Southeast Asian region which merit our attention.

It was reported that a flare-up occurred in the South China Sea when a Chinese vessel fired flares at a Vietnamese fishing boat. China has since stated that the clash was due to the fact that the Vietnamese vessel was fishing in Chinese territorial waters — though China’s claim on vast areas of the South China Sea is precisely the issue that has to be resolved in the first place.

Then came the news that North Korea has decided to cut off its military hotline to South Korea, coming at a time when North Korea has demonstrated an increasingly bellicose stance towards the South, and its allies.

North Korea’s threats of engaging in war with its neighbour, and the even more serious threat of taking its confrontation further afield, has stirred anxiety among other countries in East Asia that wish to de-escalate the potential for conflict in the region.

While all of this is happening, we in ASEAN need to remain on the course towards ASEAN integration by 2015. For, whether we like it or not, and whether we are ready for it or not, the pace and momentum have been set by developments that have accumulated over the past decade.

ASEAN today is more integrated than ever before, with ASEAN countries spreading their investments far and wide across the region, and building floating economies where their capital has been dispersed overseas as well: a smart strategy of not putting all of one’s eggs in one basket, and to link our economies closer with the awareness that what-ever happens to one Asean country in the future will impact on the rest of ASEAN as well.

It is with these factors in mind that we need to retain faith in ASEAN and ASEAN’s capacity to absorb changes and contingency whenever they arise.

The recent security crisis as a result of the incursion by some armed Filipinos into Malaysian territory cannot, and should not, be a reason to stall the process of ASEAN integration in the near future.

I raise these concerns now as I feel that we need to do more to boost the level of inter-ASEAN contacts and co-operation in the years to come as we will be dealing with some real challenges in the decade ahead.

For a start, ASEAN needs to come together to deal with the very real shift of power that we will see soon.

China’s forays into the South China Sea have to be understood in the context of its internal regional politics, and the need to feed the country’s massive population.

The relative decentralisation that has taken place in China over the past decade means that the southern provincial governments have been left to fend for themselves when dealing with the challenge of food production and food distribution.

The growth of China’s fishing fleet and their increased visibility further south of the Chinese coast is an indication of China’s growing need to feed itself, and the changing demographics of China’s southern cities and coastal regions.

Like it or not, ASEAN has to find a way to cater to its own food security needs while not antagonising a powerful neighbour like China.This can only happen if ASEAN can work in cooperation with one another, and not when some ASEAN countries are harbouring long-held primordial historical claims on other parts of neighbouring countries.

To put it bluntly: ASEAN cannot continue to bicker about historical claims of the past when the pressing needs of the moment are more urgent.Then there will be the challenge of dealing with the waning of American power, as well as the decline of Europe as an economic partner.

Here, too, ASEAN needs to come together to adjust to the new realities on the ground and to work together rather than against each other.

The decline of American power, coupled with the rise of China’s economic power, entails a shift in the polarities of regional power as well. But for ASEAN to adjust to these changes, and to benefit from them as a region, it has to behave like a regional pact in the first place.

In the recent past, some ASEAN countries have opted to deal with either the US or China unilaterally.The Philippines, for instance, cooperated with China when it came to the survey of the South China Sea, without inviting its other ASEAN neighbours (though Vietnam was later brought into the project as well).

Ideally, ASEAN states should recognise that what is good for the region is good for them as well, and the spirit of ASEAN cooperation needs to be upheld and further strengthened all the time.

As the countdown to ASEAN integration in 2015 continues, it is hoped that the ASEAN spirit and its culture of inter-state dialogue will be further enhanced.

ASEAN has come in for a bit of criticism over the past decade, and accused of institutional inertia and group-think among elites.

But this does not mean that more meaningful people-to-people contact cannot be enhanced as well, or that ASEAN cannot think out of the box to deal with complex issues such as diaspora communities, overlapping communities and our complex past.

What is needed, however, is faith in the ASEAN dialogue process; and also the awareness that apart from the European Union, ASEAN is the only other multi-state body that has prevented wars between states since 1967.

Anyone who doubts the importance of that can simply look at the deteriorating situation between the two Koreas and learn to appreciate the value of dialogue and cooperation.

King Ghaz and the Question of the “Sabah Claim”

March 30, 2013

by Dato Hamzah Abdul Majid*

Fast forward to a morning in July 1962, I was reporting for duty at the Ministry of External Affairs (now Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Wisma Putra). The Ministry was located at the (then) Selangor State Secretariat Building (now Bangunan Sultan Abdul Samad), directly opposite  the (Royal) Selangor Club.  It shared the  building with the Treasury and a few other government departments.

Meeting King Ghaz (The Boss) of Foreign Affairs and his Professionals

I reported to the Assistant Secretary (Administration) Encik Hanafiah Ahmad (later Chief of Tabung Haji and now Tan Sri). A slight gentleman with glasses, he was friendly and helpful. With all the formalities completed, Encik Hanafiah took me to YM Tengku Ngah Mohamed, the Deputy Secretary of Ministry.

The pipe smoking Tengku Ngah informed me that I would be assigned to the Ministry’s Political Division reporting to my immediate superior, Principal Assistant Secretary (Political Division) Raja Aznam Raja Ahmad (later Tan Sri), a well- educated Malay aristocrat with impeccable manners.

Raja Aznam briefed me on the role of the Ministry and its structure, Right at the top was the Prime Minister (Tengku Abdul Rahman) and concurrently  Minister of External Affairs. The top  Diplomatic Service Officer was the Permanent Secretary, Encik Muhammad Ghazali Shafie.

Raja Aznam took me to the Permanent Secretary’s Office where I was introduced to the redoubtable Matthew Josef, Personal Assistant to the Boss. Josef looked at me and said, “The Permanent Secretary is expecting you. Come in, he will see you now, Good Luck.“

With that he took me into the Boss’ spacious wood-panel office. Directly in front of me were a set of sofa and 2 deep armchairs. To my left was a large somewhat semi-circular desk. Behind the desk was the Man himself. I recognised him at once. The same ear of a man that I met five years earlier in the Radio Malaya studio–in command, confident, even arrogant.

He then asked me if I knew that we had a diplomatic issue with Indonesia and the Philippines  over our intention to invite North Borneo and Sarawak  to form Malaysia. I told him only from I read in the newspapers. Again that glare. He snapped, “then, write me a brief summary of how you understand the situation…Get to work.”

Zainal Abidin Sulong and Jack de Silva

Raja Aznam introduced me to Zainal Abidin Sulong (later Tan Sri) who had just returned from a posting in the United Nations, New York. Zainal was an excellent office mate–well informed, calm, hardworking and with a sense of humour. He was always busy drafting. From time to time, the Boss would barge into the room and growl instructions to him.

Zainal (left)  would slowly stand up. listen patiently and, when the Boss left, quietly resume his work. He was widely liked and respected. His knowledge of the personalities involved in North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia was encyclopedic, and the Boss depended heavily on him.  Next to the Boss, I would say Zainal was to play an exceedingly important role in the formation of Malaysia.

In the next room was Jack de Silva, a Catholic and strongly anti-Marxist. He  had served as First Secretary  in our High Commission in London. Articulate, gregarious, chain smoking, Jack was a hard driving officer with a mercurial temperament and a prolific drafter of documents and reports. I got my ‘sea legs’ in the ministry while sharing the small office with Zainal.

Tunku’s Singapore Statement on the Formation of Malaysia

On May 27, 1961, the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had made a historic statement in Singapore proposing the formation of Malaysia. The (then) Federation of Malaya was intent on inviting British North Borneo (now Sabah) and Sarawak to join in and from a new nation, Malaysia.

Initially, the Philippine government did not react. But after the election of Diosdado Macapagal as president in December 1961 the “Sabah Claim” emerged as a factor. It had been on the “back burner” for a while, as it was an issue only between the Philippine and British governments.

The  “Sabah Claim”

Now with the formation of Malaysia becoming reality, the clamour in the Philippine media grew stronger. The momentum built up quickly, and emotions morphed into policy.

Indonesia, headed by President Sukarno regarded North Borneo and Sarawak as part of Indonesian Kalimantan and claimed to be the rightful heir when the British finally withdrew.

Thus Sukarno and Macapagal joined forces in opposition to the Tunku’s proposal. Macapagal (left) hoisted a Philippine “claim” on Sabah and Sukarno vowed to “ganyang” (crush) Malaysia.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines regarded the idea of Malaysia as a “Neo-colonialist plot”. They claimed that the British no longer had any moral authority to hold on to the two colonies and were using the concept of Malaysia to perpetuate their influence in the region.

The Boss  was the main figure in the gathering storm, helping Prime Minister and his illustrious Deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, and tasked to design and implement a strategy to bring about the formation of Malaysia.

A team of competent and dedicated officers in the ministry was assigned to assist the Boss. They did a Herculean task of keeping in touch with events and developments in North Borneo and Sarawak, in the United Nations,in our neigbouring countries, and among our allies.  It was a small but effective and ably led team.

Sometime in April, 1963, the Boss told me that there would be a meeting of top diplomatic officials of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines at the Padre Faura (the Philippine Foreign Ministry) in Manila. He would lead the Malaysian Delegation and I was to attend it as a member.

The Boss said, “You can stay with Bertie (now Dato Albert Tallala). You know Bertie, don’t you? I think you both the same University (in Dublin). Bertie (left) had graduated the year before I joined.

On the morning of the meeting, the Boss, Ambassador Zaiton Ibrahim Ahmad, First Secretary Hashim Sam-Latiff were greeted by Pete Angora Aragon, Chief of Protocol at the Padre Faura and taken to the reception room where Philippine Undersecretary Salvador P. Lopez and the Indonesian First Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Suwito Kusumowidagdo were waiting. The three men greeted one another warmly. Lopez was the very epitome of Philippine charm and bonhomie and Dr Kusumo was all smiles. Each diplomat tried to project an air of earnest amity.

Right of Self Determination

This meeting was in every sense historic. It was the first time that the three adversary countries actually sat down at the official level to try to solve their problems diplomatically and avoid a military conflict. From the outset the Boss took the position that the two territories should not be viewed as pieces of real estate, devoid of human inhabitants, to be carved up and divided cynically by neighbouring countries.

There was need to ascertain the wishes of the people of the two territories, as was undertaken and reaffirmed by the Cobbold Commission in its Report dated August 1, 1962.

But both the Philippines and Indonesia did not accept the Cobbold Report as the last word on the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak.

Clearly, these officials could decide on the issue after several days of deliberations (April 9-17, 1963). It was finally agreed that the meeting would recommend to their respective governments that the Foreign Ministers of the three countries should meet early in May. They further agreed to recommend that the Foreign Ministers meeting should be followed by a meeting of the Heads of Government of the three countries.

Two more Tripartite meetings followed. One  was at the Foreign Ministers’ level on June 7-11, 1963, where our side was led by the Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak. The Philippine delegation was led by Vice President Emanuel Pelaez, Dr. Subandrio headed the Indonesian side. The Ministers reaffirmed in the Manila Accord (Clause 10) the principle of self-determination and “would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided support of people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative”.

As quid pro, Malaysia “undertook to consult the Government of the Borneo territories with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary  steps in order to ascertain the wishes of people of those territories.” (Clause 11).

Clause 12  reflected the long discussion on the issue of the Sabah claim and the subdued compromise that the Foreign Ministers “took note” of the Philippine claim to North Borneo and its rights to pursue it in accordance with international law and the peaceful settlement of  disputes. This was another fig leaf that we could live with, but it was  to lead to lingering tensions with the Philippines.

The successful June 7-11 Foreign Ministers meeting paved the way for the Summit Meeting of Malaya’s Tunku Abdul Rahman, Indonesia’s President Sukarno and Philippine President Macapagal which produced the Manila Declaration of August 5, 1963. The Heads of Government of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines “welcomed” the formation of Malaysia.

Eventually, with the fall of Sukarno and with the installation of the New Order government led by General Suharto, Malaysia reached an amicable solution with Indonesia. However, normalisation of relations with the Philippines took longer as the issue of the Sabah claim lingered on. In fact, bilateral relations underwent some strains over the issue.

Malaysia will not enter into any further dialogue on the Question of the Claim

A defining bilateral meeting was held in Bangkok, Thailand on July 15, 1968. The Philippine delegation was led by Ambassador Guerrero, an aggressive diplomat who played hardball. The Malaysian delegation included the brilliant lawyer R.Ramani (who was also our Permanent Representative to the United Nations), Zainal Abidin Sulong and Zain Azraai.

This meeting did not start, nor did it end for that matter, too auspiciously.The Philippine delegation began with tactical moves to cause delays and with sweeping dicta and claims. It declared that its claim on Sabah was valid based on history and on its own security arrangements and made clear that it would not entertain any further clarifications sought by Malaysia.

The Boss rose to the occasion and demolished the Philippine claim with devastating logic and I quote:

“…Our questions indicated that we wished to challenge your basic assumption that the Sultan of Sulu had in fact sovereignty over the territory. his rights and powers over which he purported to convey to Dent and Overbeck in 1878. We did receive any precise answer from you on this question; and you were unable to point to anything in support of the Sultan’s claim to sovereignty, except to say in the vaguest terms that the Sultan of Brunei had ceded the territory to him, and you mentioned several dates when such cessation was understood to have taken place…

“We drew your attention to various authorities which cited different dates when the Sultan of Sulu acquired some rights and powers over the territory. Was it therefore in 1650, or was it in 1704, or was it about 1836, or near 1842, or was it 1878? You yourself gave several possible dates. It did not seem to occur to you that each particular date destroyed every other date and the fact of cession was, thereby, at the highest, left in doubt. Nor were you able to indicate the circumstances of his acquisition, whether rebellion in the territories of Brunei, a war of succession or an act of capitulation…

“We drew your attention to the documents of that time…Whether your case should not go no further than mere assertion of Sulu sovereignty…You are unable to do so, and we did not any intelligible answer from you as this, except that you had not heard of the Anglo-Philippine Talks in London in 1963…

“… in fighting subversion and terrorism Malaysia has the best record in this region…Malaysia has a good record of cooperation with Thailand and Indonesia on these matters. It is common knowledge that Malaysia and Thailand have a working arrangement on the Malaysian/Thai border…likewise along the Malaysian/Indonesian border.”

He concluded his long address with…

“Let me say this once again, Excellency. Do not pursue your claim to Sabah in order to satisfy these economic and security needs. These can only be fulfilled through cooperation with us. But your persistent pursuit of the claim will destroy that cooperation and therefore will not achieve for you the very things which you desire most for your economy and security…

“Therefore, let us maintain the good relations between our two countries and discuss our common needs. But at the same time let it be clearly understood that my Government will not enter into any further dialogue on the question of the Claim, or with that claim as its basis”.

__________________

*The above by Dato Hamzah Abdul Majid is an abridged and edited excerpt of his tribute titled King Ghaz: Personal Recollection, which appears in the National Archives publication titled King Ghaz: A Man of Time (2010) edited by Dato Seri Utama Dr. Rais Yatim.

I have chosen parts that deal with the Philippine Claim on Sabah. It is intended to provide a historical account of what happened during the period leading to the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Dato Hamzah was a member of the Malaysian foreign policy team led by (Tun) Muhammad Ghazali Shafie that dealt with the struggle to form Malaysia.

Filipino politicians are now apparently using the Lahad Datu Incursion as a pretext to revive  this issue  of the Sultan of Sulu’s claim on Sabah which is now a sovereign state in Malaysia. As far as Dato Hamzah and I are concerned, this matter should be put to rest in the interest of good relations between the Philippines and our country. Sabah belongs in Malaysia and the Philippines must learn to respect the wishes of the people of Sabah to be part of Malaysia.–Din Merican

Also read this :http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/journals/apssr/pdf/200712/4Fernandez.pdf

Who is the Enemy?: Certainly not us Malaysians

March 28, 2013

by Dr. Kua Kia Soong@http://www.malaysiakini.com

COMMENT: As the Global Day of Action on Military Spending, GDAMS 3.0 (April 15, 2013) approaches, it is time for Malaysians to ask: Who are Malaysia’s enemies and what appropriate weaponry do we need?

One would think this is the first question the Ministry of Defence should ask in the multi-billion decisions to procure armaments now that the arms merchants are here again for LIMA 2013. Yet our National Defence Policy has never even been properly debated in Parliament.

Just a few months ago, the Ministry of Defence would not have said that Malaysia’s enemies were among the Suluks who have been coming back and forth between Southern Philippines and Sabah all these years.

After all, hadn’t we helped to train MNLF fighters there against Marcos in the seventies? Wasn’t this the reason why the Home Minister Hishamuddin Hussein(right) said that the invaders at Lahad Datu were “neither militants nor terrorists” during the two or three weeks that they were already there?

And haven’t we got a “Rapid Deployment Force” (10 Paratrooper Brigade) ready to be dispatched to any flashpoint? One wonders what flashpoint scenarios they are trained for?  Are they ready to be deployed only when there are secessionists fighting to take East Malaysia out of the federation? They certainly hadn’t been prepared for the Sulu Sultan’s army to “turn”.

Don’t be surprised if the “defence analysts” in the Ministry have now shredded all their previous analyses about Malaysia’s perceived “enemies”. With the new-found enemies of the Malaysian state, the arms lobby has at last found a raison detre for their fabulous arms procurements.

Heck, didn’t we finally get the chance to use our F18 fighter bombers and Hawk 208 fighter jets against this so-called “rag-tag army”? Wouldn’t armoured cars and tanks and mortars have sufficed in that four square kilometer area of land against that motley crew? In the end, were Malaysians given a clear picture of the efficacy of those fighter jet sorties?

Whatever the reasons for sending in the fighter bombers and jets, the international arms merchants have now come to town to peddle their wares. The French have started advertising their ‘Rafale’ fighter jets in our mainstream newspapers, alongside bargains by ‘Giant’ and ‘Tesco’ for the attention of Malaysians.

BAE are also desperately trying to flog their ‘Typhoon’ jet fighters in a RM10 billion deal they hope to clinch with a “Buy 1 – Get 1 free” gambit. They lost out recently to the French when the Indian government opted to buy 126 Rafale fighter jets instead, and are still fuming.

But do we need any fighter jets at all, considering their cost is spiraling way out of control and they so quickly become obsolete? They will be even more obsolete when future air wars are fought using drones (Unarmed Aerial Vehicles)!

Malaysians should be aware that the latest (US) F35 fighter jets cost at least half a billion ringgit a piece? Can we keep up with the race? What race? Who are we racing against? Who are our enemies?

Appropriate vessels for RMN

When the bombardment finally began at Lahad Datu, it was mentioned that the navy had formed a cordon to prevent the intruders from getting away. It became clear that there has never been a cordon to prevent any intruders from getting INTO Sabah all these years.

Looking at the geography of the area, it is evident that our two submarines (costing more than RM7 billion) sitting pretty in Sepanggar Bay and our six New Generation Patrol Vessels (costing RM9 billion) were not the most suitable vessels in such circumstances.

This mismatch raises the question of the need for our navy to prioritise the deployment of appropriate alternative vessels.  As part of the RM5 billion arms deal signed between Dr Mahathir and Margaret Thatcher in 1989, we procured two corvettes built by the Yarrow shipbuilders costing RM2.2 billion. (NST, Novembe 11, 1991).

At the time, the Royal Malaysian Navy said they required sixteen offshore patrol vessels but due to financial constraints, the RMN could only afford four or five of these locally-built OPVs. Mindef had budgeted RM85 million per OPV. (NST, November 25,1991).

Now, in the light of the latest incident at Lahad Datu, Malaysians will be in a better position to see the appropriate vessels that would be more suitable to secure the Sabah coastline.

Before the Lahad Datu incident, the main “enemies” testing the capacity of our armed forces were the pirates in the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca.

There were no bigger “enemies” than those seafaring marauders. Are state-of-the-art fighter jets and submarines the appropriate defence equipment against pirates? These would likewise be inappropriate if “international terrorists” and suicide bombers choose to target Malaysia.

So, exactly how are decisions made in the Ministry of Defence to purchase the submarines, the corvettes, the frigates (costing billions) instead of more effective patrol boats to guard our coastlines?

ASEAN needs to take ZOPFAN more seriously

There is no end if we choose to embark on an arms race with our neighbouring countries. We simply cannot afford such an arms race and it is time ASEAN countries seriously talk about disarmament and joint defence agreements instead of an arms race within ASEAN.

Our economic priorities need to be diverted away from military production toward production for human needs, and public expenditure diverted to more and better social services throughout ASEAN.

Any disputes over territories should be settled through international arbitration as was done over Pulau Batu Putih with Singapore. The dispute of the Spratly Islands should be resolved the same way.

M’sian people not the enemy

The Lahad Datu incident should act as a wake-up call for the Malaysian government that seems preoccupied with treating its own people as the enemy. When we bear in mind that throughout the tenure of the Internal Security Act since 1960, more than 10,000 people had been incarcerated for being “threats to national security”.

But hardly any have been charged for any crimes involving violence against the state. Then again, there have been at least two cases of Malaysians who have been killed in neighbouring countries for alleged terrorist activities. Yet, none of them were ever arrested under the ISA!

This goes to show that our intelligence service has been focusing on the wrong suspects. As a former ISA detainee who was incarcerated for being a “threat to national security”, I can vouch for the wanton wastage of security personnel on Malaysians who are simply not “enemies of the state”.

When I think of the number of state operatives who had been spying on me, arresting me, guarding me, interrogating me, accompanying me on family and hospital visits, I immediately wonder how they could be better deployed to prevent crimes being committed and watching out for the real enemies of the state.  And when we multiply the cost 10,000 times since 1960, we will realize the enormous waste of human resources that could be better put to use!

It was recently reported in the New York Times (March 13, 2013) that Malaysia is among 25 countries using off-the-shelf spyware to keep tabs on citizens by secretly grabbing images off computer screens, recording video chats, turning on cameras and microphones, and logging keystrokes:

“Rather than catching kidnappers and drug dealers, it looks more likely that it is being used for politically motivated surveillance,” security researcher Morgan Marquis-Boire was quoted by NYT as saying.  This is what I mean when I say our intelligence service is not focused on the job but wasting valuable resources spying on and apprehending the good guys!

Indeed, if the Malaysian state had only focused on the job of catching the real criminals, Malaysia would be a much safer place instead of being the “nation of guarded communities” it has become today.

Militarism serves ruling class

Apart from the huge commissions that can be creamed from multibillion ringgit arms contracts, the ruling class requires militarism to contain the oppressed and disgruntled sections of the population.

A strong military is necessary to prop up the ruling class. At the same time, the military-industrial complex promotes the development of a specially favoured group of companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of munitions and military equipment for personal gain and profit. These armaments companies have a direct interest in the maximum expansion of military production.

Arms production is a green issue

Military spending and arms production are very much green issues. The military- industrial complex not only produces toxic products, they produce weapons that kill indiscriminately. LIMA and other defence fairs are certainly not congruent with Malaysian leaders’ stated commitment to peace and spiritual values.

The green movement has a responsibility to work toward an end to the culture of war. This involves re-ordering our financial priorities away from wasteful and destructive arms production and procurement to the social well-being of the people.

Ultimately, working towards a culture of peace is a vision that is only attainable in a society that respects human dignity, social justice, democracy and human rights.