Lessons for Singapore: Malaysian Armed Forces vs Sulus Gunmen in Sabah


March 8, 2013

LESSONS FOR SINGAPORE: Malaysian Armed Forces versus Sulu Gunmen in  Lahad Datu, Sabah

By David Boey

SINGAPORE – A week ago, Malaysia’s Defence information officers were busy ramping up publicity for the Malaysian Army’s 80th Anniversary celebrations – a happy occasion that culminated in a massive show of force by Tentera Darat Malaysia (Malaysian Army) in Port Dickson.

After their 80th Anniversary their pace of work increased dramatically with real operations in the East Malaysian state of Sabah.

After their 80th Anniversary their pace of work increased dramatically with real operations in the East Malaysian state of Sabah.

After a weekend on duty, their pace of work increased dramatically with real operations in the East Malaysian state of Sabah. Ongoing operations by Malaysian security forces against Filipino gunmen in Lahad Datu, Sabah, mean that it will be sometime yet before information officers from Cawangan Perhubungan Awam (Public Relations Department) at Kementerian Pertahanan (Kementah, the Malaysian Ministry of Defence) can enjoy a restful weekend.

The exposure to real operations in Sabah will reward Kementah’s information officers with firsthand experience managing hearts and minds operations during an unfolding operation that has international dimensions.

Add in the timing of the operation, which was triggered during the run-up to the Malaysian General Elections, and the information officers entrusted to handle media operations will get a chance to learn invaluable lessons in calibrating domestic political considerations during an unfolding operation other than war.

While it is early days yet before defence observers can compile a credible blow by blow account of the assault, here are some preliminary thoughts on the situation:

1. Malaysia’s mainstream broadcast media, RTM, worked commendably fast in producing the clip with rousing martial music and TV footage aired at the end of Tuesday night’s news bulletin that canvassed support for Malaysia’s Fallen Heroes.

This is the type of psychological defence response that the Malaysians are good at, having picked up valuable lessons from the British during the Emergency years.

2. The casual attitude to personal protection equipment by Malaysian soldiers and General Operations Force Field Police has been noted by defence observers.

The casual attitude to personal protection equipment by Malaysian soldiers and General Operations Force field police has been noted by defence observers.

The casual attitude to personal protection equipment by Malaysian soldiers and General Operations Force field police has been noted by defence observers.

During the three-week long standoff against a force which claims to have 200 gunmen and even after blood was shed, Malaysians deployed for security duty do not seem to care much for their own personal protection.

* Body armour is rarely seen. When worn by some officers, the body armour appears to be of the soft body armour type which is not designed to withstand full metal jacket projectiles discharged from firearms or mortar rounds.

* Headgear in the form of ballistic helmets is almost never worn. And let’s not even go into protective eyewear like goggles.

This apparently cavalier attitude during live operations is baffling when measured against mountains of defence science literature which underline how lives can have been saved from ballistic protection.

If the officers are content to deploy for operations unaware of the life-saving potential of ballistic protection, then this indicates a failure of the curriculum in Malaysia’s military education system.

If the officers are aware but sent their men into action ill-equipped, then the After Action Review (AAR) should perhaps look at how to address the shortfall in such equipment.

Medical reports on the Malaysian security forces killed in action should indicate the cause of death, whether by penetrations from firearm projectiles (if so, the estimated calibre), shrapnel or non-penetrating trauma caused by blast damage.

A frank report would reveal the possible root causes of casualties during the Sabah operation and could suggest the type of protection needed to reduce casualties during the next operation.

3. Concomitant with the above observation is the poor quality of firearms used by the Police General Operations Force. Their M-16 5.56mm rifles are aimed using iron sights. There appears to be no option for optical sights (for example, a Picatinny rail) that can improve marksmanship or, more importantly, allow Malaysian police officers a rudimentary night-fighting capability.

4. Even after a deadly ambush, it is noteworthy that armoured vehicles appear to be in short supply in Sabah. Vehicle patrols by the Police there continue to be mounted in unarmoured Land Rovers and trucks. Again, this begs the question what happened to lessons learned during the Emergency?

Even after a deadly ambush, it is noteworthy that armoured vehicles appear to be in short supply in Sabah but not during exhibitions.

Even after a deadly ambush, it is noteworthy that armoured vehicles appear to be in short supply in Sabah but not during exhibitions.

5. The tit-for-tat cyber attacks, said to have been the work of computer hackers from Manila and Kuala Lumpur, are a sign of things to come during a Period of Tension (POT) or OOTW (which is what the Sabah operation has evolved into).

Singapore must therefore prepare itself for such a virtual world onslaught as part of its business continuity plan. It should perhaps also study options to pay back with interests anyone who opens an account with Singapore using cyber attacks.

6. At a more basic level of security preparedness, it would be ill-advised for the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to display the level of tolerance shown by the Malaysians during this episode.

A three-week standoff against armed intruders said to have conducted active operations on home ground and shed blood is a trigger point Singapore’s government should never de-sensitise itself to.

Our circuit breaker must be designed to trip much faster so that a swift and decisive response can be unleashed.

Malaysia has been named among 54 countries which have helped the US’s Central Intelligence Agency by hosting secret torture cells and participating in illegal deportation of detainees to and from US custody without any legal process.

Malaysia has been named among 54 countries which have helped the US’s Central Intelligence Agency by hosting secret torture cells and participating in illegal deportation of detainees to and from US custody without any legal process.

The writer, a former defence correspondent for the Straits Times, maintains Senang Diri, a blog about Singapore defence matters (http://kementah.blogspot.sg/).

-AsiaOne

Action in Lahad Datu

22 thoughts on “Lessons for Singapore: Malaysian Armed Forces vs Sulus Gunmen in Sabah

  1. Where’s our army? =.= Three weeks standoff against intruders of only hundreds. Are we really that weak or we are too “tolerable”? Or… there might be some political hidden agendas going on.
    *I keep thinking that maybe the Sultan want to establish himself on the same level as Sultan Brunei in terms of wealth, Lahad Datu is a catch anyway. Being a Sultan where no one want him.*

  2. Writer forgot to mention that for rapid deployment military transports and not Air Asia of Firefly that ought to be used.

    But the writer is right. Given half a chance, Bolehlanders always rise to the occasion and can mount an impressive show of style (over substance).

    A low level functionary officiating at a function in a school, jabatan, clinic, or even a public toilet etc, will be given the whole kit and kaboodle. Never mind if the whole thing collapses one week after the do. Its never the rakyat’s interest, only that of the batik-suited ketua or pol whose visit is met with fanfare befitting a Roman emperor.

  3. Based on the reports and images as shown in our mainstream newspapers on the standoff between our troops and the armed Sulu group at Kampong Tanduo every day since the first day the intruders were sighted, many things seem to be wrong.

    Firstly, while there are some members of the troops who were seen to be donning bullet-proof vests, none were wearing helmets. Some were seen wearing long-sleeved tee-shirts and standard ‘soft’ headgear, bandanas and some were not even wearing any headgear at all especially the members of the VAT 69. Many were also seen not wearing bullet-proof vests. This is most surprising and wrong.

    VAT 69 Police Commandos are not cowboys on horses fighting against Red Indians armed with bows and arrows, spears, axes and machetes!

    Malaysian soldiers guarding the area were however seen wearing helmets and bullet-proof vests.

    Mind you unprotected bodies and unprotected heads aren’t bullet proof!

    Secondly, there don’t seem to be any trenches and bunkers with sandbags to protect troops who are keeping watch and who came into contact with the enemy resulting in eight already dead. Soldiers taking defence positions must be in dug-in, in bunkers or trenches. They should not be taking up positions where they can be seen and shot at.

    What I wrote above are basic modern war tactics and in the standoff at Lahad Datu even these basics are not followed.

    I was a soldier before and I do know something about basic modern war tactics.

    Knowing that some members of the militant group (the enemy) are armed with SLRs using 7.62 mm bullets and 81mm mortars, these can be deadly. Even a hit on the arm from as far as 600 metres, because of its sheer power, can kill. This is very much unlike the bullets used by our troops which are the 5.56 mm type where sometimes even a direct hit to the body may only injure and are not strong enough to kill. If I were the commander on the ground, I wouldn’t want to position my troops to be anywhere nearer than 200 meters of the enemy.

    Compared to soldiers of the Malaysian Armed Forces, the VAT 69 Police Commandos are either ill-disciplined or not properly trained.

  4. The move-in operation came rather too late. This could be partly due to wanting a peaceful settlement – a pathway dragged by frantic back and forth communications with Manila. Even then, when the decision was taken, it should have been the army and not the police who should have been deployed, all the way from the start.

    Police are required to perform their duties outside the jungles in the urban landscape. It is the soldiers who fight in the jungles because they are specifically trained in jungle warfare. This could explain why several police officers died in the early skirmishes.

    From the photoshots seen, it was evident that the police looked casual and without adequate protective gear.

    The higher-ups in the police should be made accountable for this.

    Kudos to the army!

  5. You notice they transport our tank using trailer owned by the Chinaman in Lahad Datu. They transport our troops using AirAsia plane.

    They don’t have night goggle,after sunset,instead of our troop continue with the search,they want back to the base and watching football EPL.

  6. For an ex defence correspondent, i think this piece is a disappointment . Singapore’s political leadership and its defence establishment is more professional and nothing like the sandiwara that has and is taking place here will happen in Singapore – unless of course they opt to employ our pariah prime minister of 22 years .

    Hence, there is nothing for singapore to learn from this stupid episode .

  7. Before anyone go making noise about how ill equipped security forces are. Firstly, Malaysia’s defence budget is not huge. As it is, barely succeeding in keeping things working 100%. Second, its not like the opposition is doing any better. You think they would increase defense spending? My bet is they have to “de-fund” the entire military just to pay for free education. Third, there’s nothing wrong with using AirAsia or civilian trailers. Even the United States use civilian charter flights to move troops into theaters. Its cost effective and it works. You buy a dedicated transport, it sits around doing nothing 90% of the time. Why waste money on such assets. Fourth, is that to have a body armour capable of blocking say 5.56 or 7.62 AK47 round would need something like metal plates or really bulky and heavy vests. You really don’t wear those in jungle or wooded areas. Its hot and difficult to move around. You probably loose too much water just wearing those vests. But I agree at least flak vests (i.e. sharpnels and 9mm rounds) and Kevlar helmets. Fifth, I would like to think our police is not equipped with heavy duty protection precisely because they are not trained to fight such opposition. I mean we’re talking about 50-100 gunmen with very recent guerrilla warfare experience. The police were out-gunned from day 1. They operated at a disadvantage. Which leads to the sixth point. Precisely because the police were not trained to deal with such opposition, they don’t practice certain procedures the military would. Sandbags and such. Anyway the sandbags and bunker points weren’t that important since they were operating very close to FOBs anyway. But still at least some. Seventh, while everyone might be thinking this is some form of video game, where it seems you can hit a guy easily from 200m. Its not. I doubt the Sulu gunmen were even rocking red dot sights let alone any sort of magnification other than iron sights. The question is, why weren’t our guys in the first line equipped with scopes? Without scope the effective engagement range drops significantly. Eighth, contrary to the FPS gaming fans, night vision goggle are extremely expensive and difficult to obtain. You’ll have more luck buying a rocket launcher than getting a NVG. Which comes back to the first point. Do we even have the budget to buy large quantitative of NVG? Even if we can should the police have priority or the army? My bet is the army.

    That said, the real and obvious gap is. 1) Communications. Its obvious radios were in short supply. Especially the types that work well in wooded areas. 2) Intelligence gathering. How is it that 2 weeks into the event and we still don’t have a good idea of what we’re dealing with. Is it 30 armed men? 50? or 100? We know the group is between 100-300 but we also know not everyone is armed. So how many is? And how did they manage to slip out of a cordon that was supposedly tighter than a hang mans noose? 3) Why did we allow the Sultan to communicate with the outside? Yes, he used a satellite phone, but there are equipment that blocks even sat com signals. Why wasn’t it the first thing done? Communications blackout. As a result, they easily got info on what we’re doing, our approach, and they were able to paint us as idiots and pushovers. That galvanised the Filipinos and cause more problems in trying to affect a better outcome. 4) Leadership. One day its we have them all contained. Next is some might have slipped away. Next is some might have died. Next is we think some might have died. Next is we have everything under control but they might have escaped to other villages…. 10 km away…. When certain, reconfirm. When uncertain, get confirmation.

    Just some observations. That said despite being out-gunned, the police did well considering the level of equipment they have and the poor leadership they had to endure. Sad that the officers were mutilated. No quarter should be given. We can’t trial them for treason (hangman beckons) since they’re not Malaysians.. Oh wait.. Maybe we can… : )

  8. Where got money to buy modern protective gears for our soldiers. Want protective gears, go borrow the periuk and kuali from makcik.

    Oh yes, to the BN leaders, the lives of our brave soldiers are cheap. Billions of RM supposedly for defence went to the likes of Perimekar and Razak Baginda!!!

  9. Your are dead right those responsible for the IC debacle must be tried for treason by the public. Trust not the judiciary! What the AG, apparently a sabahans and maybe Sulu himself. What a farce?

    Sent from my iPad

  10. Our Vat 69 are not well equipped, except for the M-16, the boys are wearing RM9.90 non-polarised non-standard issue cheap subglasses, bandanas instead of helmets and I don’t see a single walkie-talkie with them or their group….. aiyohyoh… this is like sending the lambs to the slaughter house!

  11. If you want to find out info on what the Malaysian police / army are up to, you just need to “follow” @HishammuddinH2O on Twitter between 2am – 5am coz that blabbermouth seems to reveal lots of stuff he is doing…. LOL!

  12. Well, these VAT 69 fellas thought they were Rambos and, therefore, were invincible. Only when they were shot and killed did they realise that the intruders’ bullets could not distinguish friends from foes.

    Talking about “mati katak”, many of my soldiers, including some good friends, were killed and maimed by the commies during my time. They “mati katak” but no one complained or made police reports against those who made such remarks.

    There was this infamous incident in the late 1980s when the then Corps Commander, Lt-Gen David Daud, kicked the boots of a dead soldier and said, “kurang latihan”. It was somewhat similar to Gen Patton’s slapping of a shell-shocked soldier during the North African campaign of WW2.

    David Daud was never hauled up for his despicable action. Those days our lives were worth only 25 cents, the cost of a bullet.

  13. All these happenings with our police and army at Lahad Datu brings to my mind the stupidest song I ever learned during my orientation month in Universiti Malaya in the late 70s… we were hauled up from our beds at 4am to line up along the fence of 3rd Residential College just to serenade those ladies:

    Third RC is full of apiah, tannannay tannannay,
    See them tumble down the stairs
    See them fumble here and there
    Third RC is full of apiah, tannannay tannannay…

    But then this humble college prduced three Ketua Wanita UMNO cum Ministers and the present CEO of Hong Leong Bank…. apiah alrite…

  14. The sheer arrogance by the Poster and the subsequent comments astounds me. All it takes is a few pictures and somehow everyone is an expert in Malaysian military matters. I like it how Singapore is bloated with absolute confidence in its abilities. Makes it a lot easier.

  15. the one that makes me the person malaysia is greatness in the world of Comedy …
    makes me always was a smile and of course your war will not happen
    because of the troops sent is a collection of comedians


    why they can be so ..? ..
    which obviously they are a bunch of being forced to be soldiers
    and not as being a soldier on the willingness or desire of his own troops

  16. For those Internet Military Professional,you should know the reality before acussing any sides (I’m not a Pro-government) As an ex Malaysia Rangers during communist era it really gives me a big shame towards Kementerian Pertahanan.But we shouldn’t compare Singapore and Malaysia in the first place.Malaysia doesn’t put alot of its GDP towards military unlike Singapore.Malaysia is larger than Singapore so the disadvantage of it is the quick deployment.Singapore boleh lah rapid deployment inside the small island.Malaysia? We had to use our own airline.What’s the point sending alot of troops and high tech equipment when you can’t even push back the opposition? Another factor why Malaysia send alot of its troop is to show the strength because recent controversy and big mouth citizens from its neighbour (Hah tak lah kuat sgt korang) Beside Malaysia don’t usually make conflict,unlike its provicative neighbours.In the end we pushed the opposition back and regain our sovereignty on Sabah.It’s the man behind the weapon is the main role,not the gear.

  17. The one without protective gear is most likely a police personals. In fact, our police force a re so ill equipped, they can’t even armed every policeman in the area, even with handgun, let alone a rifle or SMG. I heard they have to borrow from several Wataniah barracks just to fill their needs. On the other hand, Malaysian front line infantry was given body armor as a standard equipment. MINDEF have been buying body armor in large numbers since 2006, ever since they decided to adopt a new Standard Infantry Battalion. The front line troops was given a full set body armor with plate insert. The second line support troops, the one most likely seen by the civilians, were given light weight protective vest, which I suspect where this misconception came from.

    There was an intention to equip M4 with optics sometimes ago. The contract for rifle optics was opened. but the markup price was so insanely expensive, the army decided to withheld the acquisition.

    There’s nothing wrong with using Airasia or MAS or using “chinaman” trailer to haul tanks. Those who question this method are even worse that simple amateur. They simply failed to understand the basic of military logistics. Case in point, 80-90% of the logistical need of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was fulfilled by a non-military company. Civilian trucks and trailers haul US military vehicles and supplies from the port in Pakistan to the US bases in landlocked Afghanistan. Why the US, a superpower with highest military budget in the world, didn’t use their HEMTT for logistics even when they have thousands of those lying around?

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