Is China Losing its Plot


July 31, 2012

Is China Losing its Plot

Kishore Mahbubani (07-26-12)

In 2016, China’s share of the global economy will be larger than America’s in purchasing-price-parity terms. This is an earth-shaking development; in 1980, when the United States accounted for 25% of world output, China’s share of the global economy was only 2.2%. And yet, after 30 years of geopolitical competence, the Chinese seem to be on the verge of losing it just when they need it most.

China’s leaders would be naïve and foolish to bank on their country’s peaceful and quiet rise to global preeminence. At some point, America will awaken from its geopolitical slumber; there are already signs that it has opened one eye.

But China has begun to make serious mistakes. After Japan acceded to Chinese pressure and released a captured Chinese trawler in September 2010, China went overboard and demanded an apology from Japan, rattling the Japanese establishment. Read On Project Syndicate: Kishore Mahbubani on China

7 thoughts on “Is China Losing its Plot

  1. PRC’s policies are usually a reflection of their internal troubles.
    Their second rung leaders are indeed Machiavellian and cut-throat, seeing what happened to that Bo fella in Sichuan. Whether this has translated into the brouhaha in the Paracels and Spratlys, is debatable. But i have a sneaky suspicion that the Hainan Governor and CCP chief (the latter being the controller) are making a power play. The chaps in Guangxi are more attuned to ASEAN.

    Their insistence on bilateral negotiations in an issue that is multinational, if not international, is truly mind boggling and archaic as their Mandate of Heaven ideation.

    One way to make a stand against their Taikorism would be for ASEAN members (probably with the exception of Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos) to withdraw from participation in the China-Asean Exposition (Caexpo ’12) in Nanning, this September. Might hurt us plenty, but that is better than a death of a thousand cuts.

  2. The Chinese government is all centered in Beijing. What this means is that there are a lot ‘hua yang’ (wayang in Hokkien or Malay) to lead the entire country and the world to believe in this. To the Chinese government, the centre must be seen to be powerful, and therefore have the mandate to rule and speak on behalf for the entire country.

    Midway between all these, things got divereted because of political infighting and clamouring for positions in the central government.

    Dealing a heavy hand (in any way) against Japan is seen as more relevant than say dealing with Southeast Asia. Therefore, there is expected move by the central government to prolong problems with Japan, so as to provide political ammunation for the up and coming cohort of leaders. [The same logic applies to the presidential candidates of the United States who have always revelled in the myth of the Vietnnam War, Iraq, and Afghanistan.]

    It gives the central government in Beijing for creditability. The central government in Beijing sees more gain when dealing with United States, Europe, and Japan concerning various issues. Dealing with Southeast Asian countries has been relegated to lower priority and hence, the problems with the islands right now. Dealing with Southeast Asian countries does not provide the central politicians with the high profile they need for creditability.

    The armed forces are largely a landn force. The commanders [who are politicians too] are NOT too interested in developing a separate and independent navy or airforce. That is why they are called PLA Navy, and PLA Airforce. The commanders always regarded power as equated to the number of soldiers they have. The more the better because that equates of political power.

    The Beijing government is hoping for the United States to engage on behalf of the ASEAN countries. However, many ASEAN countries are worried because they do not want the United States increasing their influence on countries like Philiipines and consquently set a precendent in solving territorial disputes. If the United States come in, the Chinese will engage the United States directly of which the engagement will bring the up and coming leaders more creditability to rule from the centre.

  3. the PRC has not changed much since the WWII. the changed or mellowed image potrayed internationally is only wayang. it would do everything to expand its territories and influence. PRC would not give back or back up from what it claims or has taken e.g Tibet or the disputed islands.
    ASEAN has to stick together and show their fangs to PRC and negotiate. PRC is big enough and has enough resources of its own.
    this issue can only be solved at international level just like the dispute over the rock islands between M’sia and Singapura. this time around with capable lawyers and officials from our side.
    our present crop of politicians might sell the islands in question to the PRC behind our backs; if we want to prevent that we have to keep monitoring the bank accounts of our leaders throughout the period of negotiation. (possibly I’m going paranoid la!)

    and don’t forget, there is nothing ‘republic’ about the PRC, just like there is nothing ‘democratic’ about Putins Russia. bum-chums they are and they may be saying you take Europe and I’ll take Asia one day ;).

  4. “… China has become politically pluralistic…” says Mahbubani in the Project Syndicate article. He ought to have gone on to say…”and that is why it is basically even more ungovernable as a single country”.

    Meaning? Its best chance to survive is devolution… the same applying to India. For China it will be a case of looking deep back into its history in order to move forward.

  5. History of China in contemporary China begins in 1949. Please do not forget, the Red Guards attempted to destroy ancient Chinese history, and also philosohopies – it was only fourty years ago.

    For example, people were forbidden to study Tang history, and more. Admission to universities were based on recommendations by political commissars until the high school examination appeared in 1975.

    If many of these Red Guards were twentyish then, they would be only 60 plus now -the peak age for politicians in China. Some may be working as professors in universities as well as top government administrators in Beijing. All would be at the peak of the power excutive pyramid which still lay heavy influence of the thinking of today’s China, and the implementation of its policies.

    The world will have to wait to coming change – at least another 10 years because current leaders like Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and their annointed replacements belong to the pre Cultural Revolution generation.

    Those who will replace them in 10-15 years’ time belong to the Cultural Revolution generation. Can China skip this generation and give the leadership to the post Cultural Revolution generation?

  6. It has been said that the Chinese leadership is afraid of losing control… and it is odds on that they will end up losing control… unless they successfully devolve power away from the centre and do it relatively quickly.

    A billion people just cannot be governed efficiently in a single entity. For China, therefore, the age-old axiom will have to be turned on its head… United we fall, Divided we may succeed.

    India has had to allow this to happen almost imperceptibly and piece-meal and they are better for it. Still a nightmare to govern, but relatively stable.

  7. Brilliant may be our analysts from econmically and politcally ‘small’ Southeast Asia but they may be always encrusted by siege mentality when they do their thinking, because they have always surrounded by playing small stakes games, especially when they analyse United States and China which are giants in their own right.

    United States and China get geared in high risk games that our Southeast Asian analysia would have very little idea about because they have not or are not able to encounter the sceanrios in their lives. Sadly, it means their prespectives best represent the Southeast Asian views or of small countries which cannot afford to lose much to wait for long-term returns [even if they know it is coming].

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