Malaysia at (yet another) crossroads

April 1, 2013

The DRUM Opinion

by Gerhard Hoffstaedter and Greg Lopez

While Malaysia has achieved admirable economic success under its dominant coalition government, this has come at the expense of human rights and the free press. Now, the opposition is offering greater transparency, write Gerhard Hoffstaedter and Greg Lopez.

The Malaysian government and its multiple state governments have become caretaker governments and elections will have to be called before June 28, 2013 if the country wants to maintain the semblance of an electoral democracy.

Everything is at stake at these elections. Malaysia has been ruled as a country by one coalition since independence in 1957 and its hold on political power has been tenacious. The economy and society remains formidable.

Opposition coalitions have tried at every election to make inroads in a system clearly stacked against them. In 2008, there was a real breakthrough, with the opposition capturing five out of the 13 states of the federation and breaking the ruling coalition’s psychologically important 2/3 majority it had become accustomed to.

It is not easy to categorise the two opposing coalitions and its members, as they are disparate, complex, and, with multiple agendas, often fractured. The ruling coalition is run by UMNO, the United Malays National Organisation, with other constituent parties largely serving the Chinese and Indian populations as well as some indigenous communities of Sabah and Sarawak.

This consociational model of politics provided each major ethnic group a share in the political domain under the leadership of the Malays and an increasingly Islamicised UMNO. In return, the basic social, cultural and economic rights of the non-Muslims were guaranteed. With a plethora of positive discrimination for the Malays to become upwardly mobile, a new Malay middle class was created, which secured a peace between and among what in Malaysia are referred to as racial groups.

This coalition and its grasp on power has maintained this status quo, which has served the elite very well and achieved real economic success, at least on a national level, with Malaysia almost eliminating absolute poverty, recording impressive socioeconomic outcomes, building state-of-the art infrastructure, and achieving upper middle income status in less than half a century after independence.

However, outward peace and economic success were built on enduring human rights violations, a lack of a free press, corruption, and the capitulation of the civil sphere to reactionary and extremist nationalist and religious zealots.

The Opposition promises to unmake some of these strictures and aims to provide a more transparent form of governance, which it demonstrated in two of Malaysia’s most populous, rich and industrialised states – Selangor and Penang – which it has governed since 2008.

But the Opposition coalition is a looser coalition, made up of a predominantly Chinese party with socialist ideologies, Malaysia’s only Islamist party, and the People’s Justice party, headed by former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. He remains a divisive figure in Malaysia. His democratic credentials (as well as his economic liberal ones) are well known in the West, but in Malaysia punters are more concerned with his sexuality. The ruling coalition will continue to pursue any opening it can to destabilise his appeal as elder statesman.

Prime Minister Najib, meanwhile, is ignoring corruption charges in a French court over kickbacks in the purchase of French submarines and, more disconcertingly, questions about his involvement in the murder of a Mongolian model in Malaysia, who had acted as a translator in the said French submarine deal.

The campaign thus far has been fought by chipping away at both leaders’ capacity to elder statesmen and their ability to lead a divided country. The ruling coalition has, upon advice from an American PR company, rolled out a more inclusive image of its administration and vision for Malaysia, epitomised under its “1Malaysia” concept that now features on shop fronts, medical centres and government offices.

It has not, however, reined in the divisive reactionary movements and NGOs that call for Sharia to be the supreme law in the country or that continue to call non-Malays ‘sojourners’ in ‘their’ land.

To overcome the divided body politic, it will require a leader of substance and integrity. For many, that continues to be Anwar Ibrahim, while others are less sure. But without any alternatives, the stage is set for a bruising and expensive campaign with the highest of stakes and the lowest of strategies – in terms of quality – to get there.

Australia has largely been able to accommodate and deal with even the intransigent Mahathir, so continuing with a Najib administration will suit it just fine. In fact, Najib signed off on the Malaysia solution, or refugee swap deal, has furthered economic ties, and has been a gracious host to Australian delegations, bar one.

Independent Senator Nick Xenophon learnt the hard way, being the wrong person at the right time for Najib Razak and UMNO to show their mettle domestically. UMNO moving into overdrive in the home stretch made it clear that there is a magic, invisible line foreigners should not cross when ‘meddling’ in Malaysia’s affairs.

Any commentary on the democratic process in Malaysia is not sought from the officials and Australian interventions, even in election observation, is not tolerated. These are the limits of good neighbours like Malaysia in its current political climate.

If the Opposition wins, it is unlikely that there would be any fundamental departure in the overall Australia-Malaysia relationship as it is on solid footing. If anything, it would further improve bilateral relations as the opposition coalition’s stated aspirations of social justice are quite similar to Australia’s core values.

There are two outstanding issues currently – the Malaysia solution and the Lynas rare earth plant. In relation to the Malaysia solution, Australia would have to renegotiate and reassess its border protection plans as at present the opposition coalition does not have a clear refugee policy other than stating its commitments to current international norms. They may sign a range of international conventions including ones that would protect the rights of the refugees, and require that Australia process them onshore.

However, in signing the various international conventions, the ‘Malaysia solution’ would also meet the requirements of the Australian High Court decision and leave open the possibility of renegotiating them. The Lynas issue is more complex as it involves an approved investment. The issue has created a groundswell of popular domestic dissent, but the opposition has been ambiguous on what it would do if it comes into power.

But for now, all we can do is wait for the election to be (finally) called.

Gerhard Hoffstaedter is a lecturer in anthropology in the School of Social Science at the University of Queensland, and the author of Modern Muslim Identities: Negotiating Religion and Ethnicity in Malaysia. View his full profile here. Greg Lopez is a visiting fellow at the department of political and social change, Australian National University. View his full profile here.

http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4603166.html

ASEAN needs to remain on course for integration by 2015

April 1, 2013

by Farish A. Noor@http://www.nst.com.my

DEALING WITH FUTURE CHALLENGES: Southeast Asia needs to remain on course for integration by 2015

IN the space of a week, several worrying developments have taken place close to our Southeast Asian region which merit our attention.

It was reported that a flare-up occurred in the South China Sea when a Chinese vessel fired flares at a Vietnamese fishing boat. China has since stated that the clash was due to the fact that the Vietnamese vessel was fishing in Chinese territorial waters — though China’s claim on vast areas of the South China Sea is precisely the issue that has to be resolved in the first place.

Then came the news that North Korea has decided to cut off its military hotline to South Korea, coming at a time when North Korea has demonstrated an increasingly bellicose stance towards the South, and its allies.

North Korea’s threats of engaging in war with its neighbour, and the even more serious threat of taking its confrontation further afield, has stirred anxiety among other countries in East Asia that wish to de-escalate the potential for conflict in the region.

While all of this is happening, we in ASEAN need to remain on the course towards ASEAN integration by 2015. For, whether we like it or not, and whether we are ready for it or not, the pace and momentum have been set by developments that have accumulated over the past decade.

ASEAN today is more integrated than ever before, with ASEAN countries spreading their investments far and wide across the region, and building floating economies where their capital has been dispersed overseas as well: a smart strategy of not putting all of one’s eggs in one basket, and to link our economies closer with the awareness that what-ever happens to one Asean country in the future will impact on the rest of ASEAN as well.

It is with these factors in mind that we need to retain faith in ASEAN and ASEAN’s capacity to absorb changes and contingency whenever they arise.

The recent security crisis as a result of the incursion by some armed Filipinos into Malaysian territory cannot, and should not, be a reason to stall the process of ASEAN integration in the near future.

I raise these concerns now as I feel that we need to do more to boost the level of inter-ASEAN contacts and co-operation in the years to come as we will be dealing with some real challenges in the decade ahead.

For a start, ASEAN needs to come together to deal with the very real shift of power that we will see soon.

China’s forays into the South China Sea have to be understood in the context of its internal regional politics, and the need to feed the country’s massive population.

The relative decentralisation that has taken place in China over the past decade means that the southern provincial governments have been left to fend for themselves when dealing with the challenge of food production and food distribution.

The growth of China’s fishing fleet and their increased visibility further south of the Chinese coast is an indication of China’s growing need to feed itself, and the changing demographics of China’s southern cities and coastal regions.

Like it or not, ASEAN has to find a way to cater to its own food security needs while not antagonising a powerful neighbour like China.This can only happen if ASEAN can work in cooperation with one another, and not when some ASEAN countries are harbouring long-held primordial historical claims on other parts of neighbouring countries.

To put it bluntly: ASEAN cannot continue to bicker about historical claims of the past when the pressing needs of the moment are more urgent.Then there will be the challenge of dealing with the waning of American power, as well as the decline of Europe as an economic partner.

Here, too, ASEAN needs to come together to adjust to the new realities on the ground and to work together rather than against each other.

The decline of American power, coupled with the rise of China’s economic power, entails a shift in the polarities of regional power as well. But for ASEAN to adjust to these changes, and to benefit from them as a region, it has to behave like a regional pact in the first place.

In the recent past, some ASEAN countries have opted to deal with either the US or China unilaterally.The Philippines, for instance, cooperated with China when it came to the survey of the South China Sea, without inviting its other ASEAN neighbours (though Vietnam was later brought into the project as well).

Ideally, ASEAN states should recognise that what is good for the region is good for them as well, and the spirit of ASEAN cooperation needs to be upheld and further strengthened all the time.

As the countdown to ASEAN integration in 2015 continues, it is hoped that the ASEAN spirit and its culture of inter-state dialogue will be further enhanced.

ASEAN has come in for a bit of criticism over the past decade, and accused of institutional inertia and group-think among elites.

But this does not mean that more meaningful people-to-people contact cannot be enhanced as well, or that ASEAN cannot think out of the box to deal with complex issues such as diaspora communities, overlapping communities and our complex past.

What is needed, however, is faith in the ASEAN dialogue process; and also the awareness that apart from the European Union, ASEAN is the only other multi-state body that has prevented wars between states since 1967.

Anyone who doubts the importance of that can simply look at the deteriorating situation between the two Koreas and learn to appreciate the value of dialogue and cooperation.

King Ghaz and the Question of the “Sabah Claim”

March 30, 2013

by Dato Hamzah Abdul Majid*

Fast forward to a morning in July 1962, I was reporting for duty at the Ministry of External Affairs (now Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Wisma Putra). The Ministry was located at the (then) Selangor State Secretariat Building (now Bangunan Sultan Abdul Samad), directly opposite  the (Royal) Selangor Club.  It shared the  building with the Treasury and a few other government departments.

Meeting King Ghaz (The Boss) of Foreign Affairs and his Professionals

I reported to the Assistant Secretary (Administration) Encik Hanafiah Ahmad (later Chief of Tabung Haji and now Tan Sri). A slight gentleman with glasses, he was friendly and helpful. With all the formalities completed, Encik Hanafiah took me to YM Tengku Ngah Mohamed, the Deputy Secretary of Ministry.

The pipe smoking Tengku Ngah informed me that I would be assigned to the Ministry’s Political Division reporting to my immediate superior, Principal Assistant Secretary (Political Division) Raja Aznam Raja Ahmad (later Tan Sri), a well- educated Malay aristocrat with impeccable manners.

Raja Aznam briefed me on the role of the Ministry and its structure, Right at the top was the Prime Minister (Tengku Abdul Rahman) and concurrently  Minister of External Affairs. The top  Diplomatic Service Officer was the Permanent Secretary, Encik Muhammad Ghazali Shafie.

Raja Aznam took me to the Permanent Secretary’s Office where I was introduced to the redoubtable Matthew Josef, Personal Assistant to the Boss. Josef looked at me and said, “The Permanent Secretary is expecting you. Come in, he will see you now, Good Luck.“

With that he took me into the Boss’ spacious wood-panel office. Directly in front of me were a set of sofa and 2 deep armchairs. To my left was a large somewhat semi-circular desk. Behind the desk was the Man himself. I recognised him at once. The same ear of a man that I met five years earlier in the Radio Malaya studio–in command, confident, even arrogant.

He then asked me if I knew that we had a diplomatic issue with Indonesia and the Philippines  over our intention to invite North Borneo and Sarawak  to form Malaysia. I told him only from I read in the newspapers. Again that glare. He snapped, “then, write me a brief summary of how you understand the situation…Get to work.”

Zainal Abidin Sulong and Jack de Silva

Raja Aznam introduced me to Zainal Abidin Sulong (later Tan Sri) who had just returned from a posting in the United Nations, New York. Zainal was an excellent office mate–well informed, calm, hardworking and with a sense of humour. He was always busy drafting. From time to time, the Boss would barge into the room and growl instructions to him.

Zainal (left)  would slowly stand up. listen patiently and, when the Boss left, quietly resume his work. He was widely liked and respected. His knowledge of the personalities involved in North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia was encyclopedic, and the Boss depended heavily on him.  Next to the Boss, I would say Zainal was to play an exceedingly important role in the formation of Malaysia.

In the next room was Jack de Silva, a Catholic and strongly anti-Marxist. He  had served as First Secretary  in our High Commission in London. Articulate, gregarious, chain smoking, Jack was a hard driving officer with a mercurial temperament and a prolific drafter of documents and reports. I got my ‘sea legs’ in the ministry while sharing the small office with Zainal.

Tunku’s Singapore Statement on the Formation of Malaysia

On May 27, 1961, the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman had made a historic statement in Singapore proposing the formation of Malaysia. The (then) Federation of Malaya was intent on inviting British North Borneo (now Sabah) and Sarawak to join in and from a new nation, Malaysia.

Initially, the Philippine government did not react. But after the election of Diosdado Macapagal as president in December 1961 the “Sabah Claim” emerged as a factor. It had been on the “back burner” for a while, as it was an issue only between the Philippine and British governments.

The  “Sabah Claim”

Now with the formation of Malaysia becoming reality, the clamour in the Philippine media grew stronger. The momentum built up quickly, and emotions morphed into policy.

Indonesia, headed by President Sukarno regarded North Borneo and Sarawak as part of Indonesian Kalimantan and claimed to be the rightful heir when the British finally withdrew.

Thus Sukarno and Macapagal joined forces in opposition to the Tunku’s proposal. Macapagal (left) hoisted a Philippine “claim” on Sabah and Sukarno vowed to “ganyang” (crush) Malaysia.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines regarded the idea of Malaysia as a “Neo-colonialist plot”. They claimed that the British no longer had any moral authority to hold on to the two colonies and were using the concept of Malaysia to perpetuate their influence in the region.

The Boss  was the main figure in the gathering storm, helping Prime Minister and his illustrious Deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, and tasked to design and implement a strategy to bring about the formation of Malaysia.

A team of competent and dedicated officers in the ministry was assigned to assist the Boss. They did a Herculean task of keeping in touch with events and developments in North Borneo and Sarawak, in the United Nations,in our neigbouring countries, and among our allies.  It was a small but effective and ably led team.

Sometime in April, 1963, the Boss told me that there would be a meeting of top diplomatic officials of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines at the Padre Faura (the Philippine Foreign Ministry) in Manila. He would lead the Malaysian Delegation and I was to attend it as a member.

The Boss said, “You can stay with Bertie (now Dato Albert Tallala). You know Bertie, don’t you? I think you both the same University (in Dublin). Bertie (left) had graduated the year before I joined.

On the morning of the meeting, the Boss, Ambassador Zaiton Ibrahim Ahmad, First Secretary Hashim Sam-Latiff were greeted by Pete Angora Aragon, Chief of Protocol at the Padre Faura and taken to the reception room where Philippine Undersecretary Salvador P. Lopez and the Indonesian First Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Suwito Kusumowidagdo were waiting. The three men greeted one another warmly. Lopez was the very epitome of Philippine charm and bonhomie and Dr Kusumo was all smiles. Each diplomat tried to project an air of earnest amity.

Right of Self Determination

This meeting was in every sense historic. It was the first time that the three adversary countries actually sat down at the official level to try to solve their problems diplomatically and avoid a military conflict. From the outset the Boss took the position that the two territories should not be viewed as pieces of real estate, devoid of human inhabitants, to be carved up and divided cynically by neighbouring countries.

There was need to ascertain the wishes of the people of the two territories, as was undertaken and reaffirmed by the Cobbold Commission in its Report dated August 1, 1962.

But both the Philippines and Indonesia did not accept the Cobbold Report as the last word on the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak.

Clearly, these officials could decide on the issue after several days of deliberations (April 9-17, 1963). It was finally agreed that the meeting would recommend to their respective governments that the Foreign Ministers of the three countries should meet early in May. They further agreed to recommend that the Foreign Ministers meeting should be followed by a meeting of the Heads of Government of the three countries.

Two more Tripartite meetings followed. One  was at the Foreign Ministers’ level on June 7-11, 1963, where our side was led by the Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak. The Philippine delegation was led by Vice President Emanuel Pelaez, Dr. Subandrio headed the Indonesian side. The Ministers reaffirmed in the Manila Accord (Clause 10) the principle of self-determination and “would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided support of people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative”.

As quid pro, Malaysia “undertook to consult the Government of the Borneo territories with a view to inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative to take the necessary  steps in order to ascertain the wishes of people of those territories.” (Clause 11).

Clause 12  reflected the long discussion on the issue of the Sabah claim and the subdued compromise that the Foreign Ministers “took note” of the Philippine claim to North Borneo and its rights to pursue it in accordance with international law and the peaceful settlement of  disputes. This was another fig leaf that we could live with, but it was  to lead to lingering tensions with the Philippines.

The successful June 7-11 Foreign Ministers meeting paved the way for the Summit Meeting of Malaya’s Tunku Abdul Rahman, Indonesia’s President Sukarno and Philippine President Macapagal which produced the Manila Declaration of August 5, 1963. The Heads of Government of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines “welcomed” the formation of Malaysia.

Eventually, with the fall of Sukarno and with the installation of the New Order government led by General Suharto, Malaysia reached an amicable solution with Indonesia. However, normalisation of relations with the Philippines took longer as the issue of the Sabah claim lingered on. In fact, bilateral relations underwent some strains over the issue.

Malaysia will not enter into any further dialogue on the Question of the Claim

A defining bilateral meeting was held in Bangkok, Thailand on July 15, 1968. The Philippine delegation was led by Ambassador Guerrero, an aggressive diplomat who played hardball. The Malaysian delegation included the brilliant lawyer R.Ramani (who was also our Permanent Representative to the United Nations), Zainal Abidin Sulong and Zain Azraai.

This meeting did not start, nor did it end for that matter, too auspiciously.The Philippine delegation began with tactical moves to cause delays and with sweeping dicta and claims. It declared that its claim on Sabah was valid based on history and on its own security arrangements and made clear that it would not entertain any further clarifications sought by Malaysia.

The Boss rose to the occasion and demolished the Philippine claim with devastating logic and I quote:

“…Our questions indicated that we wished to challenge your basic assumption that the Sultan of Sulu had in fact sovereignty over the territory. his rights and powers over which he purported to convey to Dent and Overbeck in 1878. We did receive any precise answer from you on this question; and you were unable to point to anything in support of the Sultan’s claim to sovereignty, except to say in the vaguest terms that the Sultan of Brunei had ceded the territory to him, and you mentioned several dates when such cessation was understood to have taken place…

“We drew your attention to various authorities which cited different dates when the Sultan of Sulu acquired some rights and powers over the territory. Was it therefore in 1650, or was it in 1704, or was it about 1836, or near 1842, or was it 1878? You yourself gave several possible dates. It did not seem to occur to you that each particular date destroyed every other date and the fact of cession was, thereby, at the highest, left in doubt. Nor were you able to indicate the circumstances of his acquisition, whether rebellion in the territories of Brunei, a war of succession or an act of capitulation…

“We drew your attention to the documents of that time…Whether your case should not go no further than mere assertion of Sulu sovereignty…You are unable to do so, and we did not any intelligible answer from you as this, except that you had not heard of the Anglo-Philippine Talks in London in 1963…

“… in fighting subversion and terrorism Malaysia has the best record in this region…Malaysia has a good record of cooperation with Thailand and Indonesia on these matters. It is common knowledge that Malaysia and Thailand have a working arrangement on the Malaysian/Thai border…likewise along the Malaysian/Indonesian border.”

He concluded his long address with…

“Let me say this once again, Excellency. Do not pursue your claim to Sabah in order to satisfy these economic and security needs. These can only be fulfilled through cooperation with us. But your persistent pursuit of the claim will destroy that cooperation and therefore will not achieve for you the very things which you desire most for your economy and security…

“Therefore, let us maintain the good relations between our two countries and discuss our common needs. But at the same time let it be clearly understood that my Government will not enter into any further dialogue on the question of the Claim, or with that claim as its basis”.

__________________

*The above by Dato Hamzah Abdul Majid is an abridged and edited excerpt of his tribute titled King Ghaz: Personal Recollection, which appears in the National Archives publication titled King Ghaz: A Man of Time (2010) edited by Dato Seri Utama Dr. Rais Yatim.

I have chosen parts that deal with the Philippine Claim on Sabah. It is intended to provide a historical account of what happened during the period leading to the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Dato Hamzah was a member of the Malaysian foreign policy team led by (Tun) Muhammad Ghazali Shafie that dealt with the struggle to form Malaysia.

Filipino politicians are now apparently using the Lahad Datu Incursion as a pretext to revive  this issue  of the Sultan of Sulu’s claim on Sabah which is now a sovereign state in Malaysia. As far as Dato Hamzah and I are concerned, this matter should be put to rest in the interest of good relations between the Philippines and our country. Sabah belongs in Malaysia and the Philippines must learn to respect the wishes of the people of Sabah to be part of Malaysia.–Din Merican

Also read this :http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/journals/apssr/pdf/200712/4Fernandez.pdf

Mahbubani on “What is governance?”

March 29, 2013

Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, responds to Francis Fukuyama’s “What is governance?”:

Francis Fukuyama has done the West an enormous favor with his essay on “What is governance?” He is subtly introducing a distinction between democracy and good governance, a distinction which is almost inconceivable in Western minds.

To put it bluntly, democracy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for good governance. And, yes, it is possible to have good governance without democracy. Anyone who doubts this should look at the record of China’s government over the past thirty years. It is not perfect but it has lifted more people out of poverty, educated more people, increased their lifespans and generated the world’s largest middle class. No other society in human history has improved human welfare as much as the Chinese government. It would be insane to deny that China has enjoyed “good governance.”

The reason why Western minds cannot state this obvious fact is that they believe that good governance without democracy is as inconceivable as a semi-pregnant woman. Yet, as Fukuyama delicately argues in his essay, it is “more of a theory than an empirically demonstrated fact” that “the current orthodoxy in the development community” is right in believing that “democracy and good governance are mutually supportive.”

For the record, to avoid misunderstanding, let me emphasize that democracy is a desirable goal. I do not want to live in a non-democracy. This is why China too will eventually become a democracy, especially after it has developed the world’s largest middle class. The destination is not in doubt but the route and timing are.

This is why it is essential to draw a clear distinction between democracy and good governance and try to understand what good governance is.

Fukuyama’s essay introduces many key elements we have to pay attention to. These include: procedural measures, input measures, output measures and measures of bureaucratic autonomy. But these measures are not enough. They focus more on the methods of good governance than the results. To state the obvious, there is no point having the best processes in place if the results are bad. At the end of the day, the people want to know if they are better off.

Fukuyama asserts that “the quality of government is the result of an interaction between capacity and autonomy.” And on the next page he shows that Singapore stands highest on the axes of capacity and autonomy. Curiously, he does this without any explanation or reference to Singapore in his article.

Having worked in the Singapore civil service for 33 years, I believe that Singapore has done well because it scores high on capacity and on the culture of service. The Singapore civil service has performed brilliantly but it has not done so because it is the most autonomous. It has done so because it has imbibed a culture which focuses the minds of civil servants on improving the livelihood of Singaporeans.

Sadly, the Singapore success story has never been properly studied because most Western minds—with their usual black and white mindset—cannot conceive of “good governance” as an independent and desirable good. The greatest contribution that Fukuyama’s essay can make is to open the Western mind to new possibilities. And when the Western mind opens up, it will discover a treasure trove of examples of good governance, a treasure trove which has become even more relevant to the West given the travails that both the American and European governments are having in delivering even basic levels of good governance to their populations.

Kishore Mahbubani is Dean and Professor in the Practice of Public Policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.  His most recent book is The Great Convergence: Asia, the West and the Logic of One World (PublicAffairs, 2013).

________________

What Is Governance?

by Francis Fukuyama

Article first published online: 3 MAR 2013

DOI: 10.1111/gove.12035

Abstract

This commentary points to the poor state of empirical measures of the quality of states, that is, executive branches and their bureaucracies. Much of the problem is conceptual, as there is very little agreement on what constitutes high-quality government.

The commentary suggests four approaches: (1) procedural measures, such as the Weberian criteria of bureaucratic modernity; (2) capacity measures, which include both resources and degree of professionalization; (3) output measures; and (4) measures of bureaucratic autonomy. It rejects output measures and suggests a two-dimensional framework of using capacity and autonomy as a measure of executive branch quality. This framework explains the conundrum of why low-income countries are advised to reduce bureaucratic autonomy while high-income ones seek to increase it.

This commentary is the beginning of an effort to better measure governance, which at this point will amount to nothing more than an elaboration of the issue’s complexity and the confused state of current discussions. Before we can measure good governance, however, we have to better conceptualize what it is.

The state, that is, the functioning of executive branches and their bureaucracies, has received relatively little attention in contemporary political science. Since the onset of the Third Wave of democratizations now more than a generation ago, the overwhelming emphasis in comparative politics has been on democracy, transitions to democracy, human rights, transitional justice, and the like.

Studies of nondemocratic countries focus on issues like authoritarian persistence, meaning that the focus still remains the question of democracy in the long run or democratic transition. In other words, everyone is interested in studying political institutions that limit or check power—democratic accountability and rule of law—but very few people pay attention to the institution that accumulates and uses power, the state.

The relative emphasis on checking institutions rather than power-deploying institutions is evident in the governance measures that have been developed in recent years. There are numerous measures of the quality of democracy like the Freedom House and Polity measures, as well as newer and very sophisticated ones like the Varieties of Democracy project led by Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, et al. We have fewer measures of Weberian bureaucracy—that is, the degree to which bureaucratic recruitment and promotion is merit based, functionally organized, based on technical qualifications, etc.

One of the only studies to attempt to do this was by Peter Evans and James Rauch back in 2000, but their sample was limited to 30 odd countries and produced no time-series data. The Varieties of Democracy project is also collecting data on bureaucratic quality based on expert surveys. Other bureaucratic quality measures include the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which “focuses on how effectively policymakers facilitate and steer development and transformation processes,” and the proprietary Political Risk Service’s Group International Country Risk Guide.

Four of the six World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators purport to measure aspects of state capacity (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political stability and absence of violence, and control of corruption), but these are aggregates of other existing measures and it is not clear how they map onto the Weberian categories. For example, does a good absence of violence score mean that there is effective policing? I suspect that there isn’t much by way of street crime or military coup attempts in North Korea. (These problems are also true of the Bank’s internal CPIA scores.)

Finally, Bo Rothstein’s Quality of Governance Institute in Gothenberg has developed a set of measures of quality of governance for 136 countries worldwide, as well as a more detailed survey of 172 regions within the European Union. It is based again on expert surveys focusing on the degree of a state’s impartiality, which Rothstein argues is a proxy for overall state quality.

The bias against thinking about state capacity is particularly strong among rational choice institutionalists. Most in this school begin with Mancur Olson’s assumption that states are predatory and that the chief aim of political development is the creation of institutions like rule of law and accountability that limit the state’s discretion. This school assumes that all states have the power to be predatory, and seldom raise the question of where state capacity comes from in the first place, or how it increases or decreases over time. Frankly, it would be very hard to develop a rational choice theory of state capacity, as capacity in any organization is so heavily influenced by norms, organizational culture, leadership, and other factors that do not easily fit into a model based on economic incentives.

In addition, there has been a large literature on public sector reform coming out of institutional economics, public administration, and from the communities of practice surrounding development agencies seeking to improve governance. The approaches favored by economists sought to conceptualize governance in a principal–agent framework, and have sought to control corruption and bad administration through manipulation of incentives.

Many of the new approaches under this framework sought to bring market-like incentives into the public sector through creation of exit options, competition, manipulation of wage scales, shortening of accountability routes, and better methods of monitoring and accountability. Many of the techniques of New Public Management was in some sense an outgrowth of these approaches, though their applicability to developing world contexts has been questioned (Grindle 2004; Heady 1991; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Schick 1998; World Bank 2004).

The existing measures of state quality or capacity have a number of limitations. There is an inherent weakness in expert surveys, especially when trying to create time-series data. As the concept of good governance is not well established, different experts may intend different things when responding to the same survey question. For example, there is an important difference between clientelism and outright corruption; in the former there is true reciprocity between patron and client, whereas in the latter there is no obligation on the part of the corrupt official to give anything back.

The economic impact of corruption varies tremendously depending on whether the corruption “tax” is 10% or 50%, and the quality and nature of the services that clients get in return. In China, for example, corruption seems to be pervasive, but the tax rate is lower and the service provision rate much higher than in, say, sub-Saharan Africa. None of the existing corruption surveys are, as far as I know, able to make distinctions of this sort.

Bo Rothstein makes a number of persuasive arguments that impartiality ought to be the core measure of the quality of government. However, it would seem entirely possible that a state could be highly impartial and still lack the capacity and/or autonomy to effectively deliver services. Rothstein argues that impartiality implies the existence of sufficient capacity. This may be true, but it is something that needs to be empirically verified rather than simply asserted.

In addition, there are a number of Rule of Law measures that relate to bureaucratic quality, such as those published by the ABA Rule of Law Initiative and the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. Some Chinese scholars have tried to measure the spread of rule-based decision making by measuring the number of administrative cases filed against government agencies, as well as the percentage of such cases that are won by the plaintiffs.

The rule of law is defined differently by different scholars and can mean, alternatively, law and order, property rights and contract enforcement, observance of substantive Western norms of human rights, and constitutional constraints on the power of the executive (Kleinfeld 2006). Some scholars have distinguished between rule by law, in which the executive uses law and bureaucracy as an instrument of power, and rule of law, in which the executive is itself constrained by the same laws that apply to everyone else. In many respects rule by law overlaps with state quality, as we want states to operate by general, transparent, impartial, and predictable rules. Rule of law in the narrow sense of constitutional constraints on the executive, on the other hand, is closely associated with democracy.

The Prussian/German Rechtsstaat in the 19th century, Meiji Japan, and contemporary China were all authoritarian states that could be said to have rule by law but not rule of law. This means that certain aspects of rule of law would be useful as measures of state quality. On the other hand, many rule of law measures measure what is measurable rather than the underlying quality of law, so we would need to be careful in selecting them.

Definitions

As a starting point, I am going to define governance as a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not. I am more interested in what Michael Mann labels “infrastructural” rather than “despotic” power (Mann 1984). The reason I am excluding democratic accountability from the definition of governance is that we will later want to be able to theorize the relationship between governance and democracy.

The current orthodoxy in the development community is that democracy and good governance are mutually supportive. I would argue that this is more of a theory than an empirically demonstrated fact, and that we cannot empirically demonstrate the connection if we define one to include the other.

In this initial conceptualization, the quality of governance is different from the ends that governance is meant to fulfill. That is, governance is about the performance of agents in carrying out the wishes of principals, and not about the goals that principals set. The government is an organization that can do its functions better or worse; governance is thus about execution, or what has traditionally fallen within the domain of public administration, as opposed to politics or public policy.1 An authoritarian regime can be well governed, just as a democracy can be maladministered. (As we will see below, this distinction cannot always be maintained quite so neatly; principals can set self-undermining tasks for their agents.)

As Rothstein (2011) points out, it is not so easy to separate governance as implementation from the normative ends that government is meant to serve. It is not clear that a well-governed state is one that has ruthlessly efficient concentration camp guards as opposed to bribable ones. On the other hand, once one starts to introduce substantive ends as criteria for good government, it is hard to know where and when to stop. As Rothstein points out, the existing Worldwide Governance Indicators embed a number of normative policy preferences (e.g., less rather than more regulation) that color the final results. Would we want to argue that the U.S. military is a low-quality one because it does things we disapprove of, say, invading Iraq?

Rothstein argues that use of the criterion of impartiality solves this problem as it is both normative and embeds what most people understand by “good government.” However, for reasons I will elaborate below, I don’t think that impartiality by itself is a sufficient metric.2 I want to put the normative question to the side for the time being, however, particularly because I am interested in developing measures that will work for both authoritarian and democratic regimes.

Focusing on an extreme case like concentration camps should not distract us from the fact that there are many valence issues like provision of education, health, or public safety that are shared by virtually all governments, in which a more instrumental view of quality of governance will suffice.

If we accept this definition of the object we are trying to study, then there are at least four broad approaches to evaluating the quality of governance: procedural measures, input measures, output measures, and measures of bureaucratic autonomy.

Procedural Measures

The most classic effort to define governance in terms of procedures was Max Weber’s famous characterization of modern bureaucracy in Economy and Society (Weber 1978, 220–221). We continue to use the term “Weberian bureaucracy” as an ideal type to which we hope highly corrupt, neo-patrimonial states will eventually conform. It might be useful to review Weber’s conditions here:

1. Bureaucrats are personally free and subject to authority only within a defined area.
2. They are organized into a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a defined sphere of competence.
4. Offices are filled by free contractual relationship.
5. Candidates are selected on basis of technical qualifications.
6. Bureaucrats are remunerated by fixed salaries.
7. The office is treated as the sole occupation of the incumbent.
8. The office constitutes a career.
9. There is a separation between ownership and management.
10. Officials are subject to strict discipline and control.

Conditions 1–5 and 9 are probably at the core of what people think of when they talk about “modern bureaucracy”: They clearly delineate such an organization from the kinds of venal or patrimonial office that existed in Europe under the Old Regime, or that exist in contemporary neo-patrimonial developing countries today. However, characteristics 6, 7, 8, and 10 are more problematic. Condition 6, fixed salaries, is not compatible with the kinds of incentives often offered bureaucrats under New Public Management. Conditions 7 and 8 are not true of many mid-level officials in contemporary America, in both the public and private sectors.

One could say that the United States fails to live up to the Weberian ideal, but it does not seem likely that the quality of bureaucracy in the United States would improve if it were impossible for talented individuals from the private sector or the academy to serve in government for periods of time. And condition 10 is incompatible with civil service protection, which during the Progressive Era was seen as a hallmark of the modern bureaucracy that was replacing the patronage system.

More importantly, condition 10 suggests that bureaucrats are simply robotic agents whose only purpose is to do the bidding of principals. The idea of bureaucratic autonomy—the notion that bureaucrats themselves can shape goals and define tasks independently of the wishes of the principals—is not possible under the Weberian definition.

Nonetheless, certain procedural measures would remain at the core of any measure of quality of governance. One would want to know whether bureaucrats are recruited and promoted on the basis of merit or political patronage, what level of technical expertise they are required to possess, and the overall level of formality in bureaucratic procedure.

Capacity Measures

The problem with all procedural definitions of bureaucracy is that the procedures, however defined, may not actually correlate with the positive outcomes expected from governments. We assume that a Weberian bureaucracy will produce better services than one that is highly discretionary and patrimonial, yet there may be circumstances where the latter’s lack of rules result in faster and better tailored responses.

Enforcement power is not part of Weber’s definition; it is possible to have an impersonal, merit-based bureaucracy that nonetheless is extremely poor at getting things done. To say that a bureaucrat is selected on the basis of “merit” does not define merit, nor does it explain whether the official’s skills will be renewed in light of changing conditions or technology.

The most commonly used measure of capacity is extractive capacity, measured in terms of tax extraction. Tax extraction measures capacity in two ways: First, it takes capacity, however generated, in order to extract taxes; second, successful tax extraction provides resources that enable the government to operate in other domains. Tax extraction rates can be measured both by the percentage of taxes to gross domestic product, as well as by the nature of taxation—that is, whether it is based on income or wealth, or indirect taxation (as income and wealth taxes are much more difficult to extract than indirect taxes).

While tax extraction is a reasonable starting point for measuring capacity, it has several important limitations:

1. There is a difference between extractive potential and actual extraction rates. Actual tax rates are set not just by extractive potential, but by policy choices regarding the optimal rate and types of taxation.3 The United States proved it had the potential to extract significantly higher levels of taxes during the two World Wars, because it had an overriding national interest in doing so. The peacetime level reflects normative preferences for the optimal size of government, which may vary between countries of identical potential capacity.4
2. A given level of taxation does not necessarily translate into the efficient use of tax revenues. Revenues can be wasted on poor administration, unproductive transfers, or outright corruption. Bureaucratic outputs are the result not just of resource inputs, but of things like organizational culture. Judith Tendler has written about a poor and underresourced state in Northeast Brazil that nonetheless achieved very good governance outcomes (Tendler 1997).5
3. For many countries, government revenues are based on resource rents or international transfers rather than domestic taxation. In many countries such rents and transfers constitute the vast majority of government revenues. One could argue that if taxation is going to be used as a measure of state capacity, then resource rents ought to be excluded.

Tax extraction rates are hardly the only possible measures of state capacity. States perform a whole variety of functions, any one of which can be used as a proxy for state capacity as a whole. Taxation is a useful proxy for general capacity because it is a necessary function of all states, and one for which considerable data exist. In an ongoing doctoral research, Melissa Lee and Nan Zhang have suggested using the capacity to generate accurate census data as an alternative proxy for capacity, as population registration is a very basic state function.

Beyond taxation, another critical measure of capacity is the level of education and professionalization of government officials. Central banks in the early 21st century across the developing world are incomparably better run than they were in the lead-up to the debt crises of the 1980s in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, due in part to the significantly higher degree of professionalism in their staffing. A key aspect of state building in the United States during the Progressive Era was the replacement of incompetent political patronage appointees with university-trained agronomists, engineers, and economists.

A focus on the degree of professionalization of the bureaucracy partially solves the problem of how to measure levels of corruption, a measure that is not dependent on expert or perception surveys. All professional education (with the possible exception of business schools) embeds a strong normative element in which service to one’s profession and broader public goals is paramount. A doctor, for example, is supposed to act primarily in the interests of the patient rather than seeking first to maximize his or her individual benefit. Of course, all professionals are also selfish individuals who can act in a corrupt manner. But in modern organizations we trust highly educated professionals with a much higher degree of discretion because we assume or hope that they will be guided by internal norms in cases where their behavior cannot be monitored from the outside.

As state capacity varies substantially across functions, levels of government, and regions, one would ideally want capacity measures for all major government agencies. In Brazil, for example, it has been widely recognized that certain “islands of excellence” exist within the Brazilian state that would be missed by an aggregate measure. Thus, an article by Katherine Bersch, Sergio Praça, and Matthew Taylor develops capacity measures across more than 300 different Brazilian federal agencies (Bersch, Praça, and Taylor 2012).

Obviously, this kind of data does not exist for many countries, and even in Brazil the authors do not have similar statistics for capacity at the state, local, and municipal levels where a great deal of governance happens. For evaluating a country like China, it would be very important to generate this type of disaggregated data, as there is a widely held perception that the quality of governance varies enormously across the different levels and functions of government.

As a kind of compromise between an unachievable ideal of fully disaggregated capacity data and a limited aggregate measure, it might be possible to specify a subset of government functions on which data should be collected. This could be a set of functions theoretically performed by all governments (e.g., macroeconomic policy management, basic law and order, primary and secondary education, population registration), or it could incorporate data on how expansive the functions performed are (e.g., giving extra credit if a government is able to, say, regulate pharmaceuticals).

Output Measures

Good procedures and strong capacity are not ends in themselves. We want governments to do things like provide schooling and public health, public security, and national defense. This suggests an alternative measure of government quality, a measure of final output. One could look at literacy, primary and secondary education test scores, or various measures of health to get some idea as to how governments are performing.

Attractive as output measures sound, there are several big and, in my view, decisive drawbacks to their use. First and most important, outputs like health or education are not simply the consequences of public action; the public sector interacts with the environment around it and the society it is dealing with to produce results. For example, the Coleman Report on U.S. education in the 1960s showed that educational outcomes depended much more strongly on factors like friends and family of students than they did on public sector inputs to education (Coleman 1966).

Joel Migdal’s model of weak states and strong societies suggests that a government’s ability to penetrate or regulate a society depends on the ratio of two factors, state capacity and the self-organization of the underlying society. Two states could have equal regulatory capacity but unequal regulatory outcomes because the society in one is far better organized to resist state penetration than the other (Migdal 1988).

A second problem is that measuring output is itself problematic methodologically. Public sectors produce primarily services, which can be notoriously hard to measure. For example, standardized test scores, a common way of evaluating educational outcomes, have long been under attack as poor measures of education, and for creating incentives to “teach to the test.” Measures of rule of law, like time to trial, rate of case clearances, etc., say nothing about the quality of the justice being produced by a legal system.

Finally, outcome measures cannot be so easily divorced from procedural and normative measures. A police state may succeed in controlling street crime by massively arresting and torturing suspects, yet most believers in liberal democracy would accept a higher degree of crime in exchange for procedural protections of individual rights. Even if one is morally neutral about whether torture is justified as a police method, one would want to know whether it is employed routinely in evaluating a government.

My own sense is that the problem of the tainting of output measures by exogenous factors means that they should not be used as state quality measures in the first place. One could employ a variety of econometric techniques to control for these exogenous factors, but that entails another layer of complexity and problems. In fact, it might be better to leave output as a dependent variable to be explained by state quality, rather than being a measure of capacity in itself. If output is not a valid measure of state quality, it implies that we also cannot generate useful measures of government efficiency as a measure of state quality, as the latter represents a ratio of state inputs to outcomes.

Bureaucratic Autonomy

A final measure of the quality of government is the degree of bureaucratic autonomy possessed by the different components of the state. Samuel Huntington makes autonomy one of his four criteria of institutionalization; highly institutionalized political systems have bureaucracies with high autonomy. The opposite of autonomy in Huntington’s terminology is subordination (Huntington 2006).6

Autonomy, properly speaking, refers to the manner in which the political principal issues mandates to the bureaucrats who act as its agent. No bureaucracy has the authority to define its own mandates, regardless of whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian. But there are a wide variety of ways in which mandates can be issued. Ideally, the principal should set a broad mandate to the agent, for example, procurement of an advanced strike fighter. But the principal can also issue many other mandates as well regarding the way in which to carry out the broad mandate, such as purchasing a strike fighter using contractors that increase employment in Congressional districts X and Y, or through minority and women-owned businesses, or to achieve Z degree of performance desired by a rival service. In other cases the principal can issue mandates regarding the bureaucracy’s recruitment and promotion of personnel, requiring that they hire certain individuals, or else setting detailed rules for personnel management.

Political principals often issue frequently overlapping and sometimes downright contradictory mandates. Indeed, there can be multiple principals in many political systems, that is, political authorities with equal legitimacy able to issue potentially contradictory mandates. State-owned utilities, for example, often have mandates to simultaneously do cost recovery, universal service to the poor, and efficient pricing to business clients, each promoted by a different part of the political system.

These different mandates obviously cannot be simultaneously achieved, and generate bureaucratic dysfunctionality. Amtrak could become a profitable and efficient railway if it were not under Congressional mandates to serve various low-volume rural communities. In China there are often duplicate functional agencies, one reporting through a chain of command that goes through national ministries, the other reporting to municipal or provincial governments; it is not always clear how conflicts between them are to be resolved.

Autonomy therefore is inversely related to the number and nature of the mandates issued by the principal. The fewer and more general the mandates, the greater autonomy the bureaucracy possesses. A completely autonomous bureaucracy gets no mandates at all but sets its own goals independently of the political principal. Conversely, a nonautonomous or subordinated bureaucracy is micromanaged by the principal, which establishes detailed rules that the agent must follow.

An appropriate degree of bureaucratic autonomy does not mean that bureaucrats should be isolated from their societies or make decisions at odds with citizen demands. Indeed, if the general mandate is to provide high-quality services in health or education, the bureaucracy would need considerable feedback and criticism from the citizens that it is trying to serve. It also does not exclude extensive collaboration with private sector or civil society organizations in service delivery. Indeed, an appropriately autonomous bureaucracy should be able to make judgment calls as to when and where to engage in such collaborations.

It would seem that the relationship between autonomy and quality of government would look like an inverted U (see Figure 1). At one extreme, that of complete subordination, the bureaucracy has no room for discretion or independent judgment, and is completely bound by detailed rules set by the political principal. At the other end of the x-axis, that of complete autonomy, governance outcomes would also be very bad, because the bureaucracy has escaped all political control and sets not just internal procedures but its goals as well. This is basically the idea contained in Peter Evans’ concept of “embedded autonomy”: Bureaucrats need to be shielded from certain influences of social actors, but also subordinate to the society with regard to larger goals (Evans 1995).

Figure 1. Bureaucratic Autonomy and Quality of Government

There are myriad examples of excessive subordination leading to poor performance. One of the worst forms is when bureaucracies lose control over internal recruitment and promotion to the political authorities and are staffed entirely by political appointees. This is in effect what happens in clientelistic political systems. But even in the absence of clientelism, bureaucracies can be excessively slow moving and indecisive because they are excessively rule bound. However, the curve in Figure 1 slopes downward at the left end of the x-axis, which represents full autonomy.

Both Imperial Germany and Japan in the periods before World War I and World War II, respectively, suffered from this problem. Both countries had developed very high quality, autonomous bureaucracies, particularly their military services, which then took over from the political authorities the task of formulating foreign policy.

The inflection point of the curve in Figure 1 is shifted to the right, however, due to a general recognition that the dangers of excessive micromanagement are greater than those posed by excessive autonomy. A high degree of autonomy is what permits innovation, experimentation, and risk taking in a bureaucracy.

In Daniel Carpenter’s The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, both the Post Office and the U.S. Forest Service are portrayed as high-quality autonomous bureaucracies during the Progressive Era precisely because they innovated and devised agendas not strictly spelled out by Congress (Carpenter 2001). This same insight is embedded in the evolution of the U.S. Army’s basic field manual for combined arms operations, FM 100-5.

In rethinking combined arms doctrine in light of the Vietnam War, the drafters of the manual shifted emphasis from centralized command and control to more flexible Mission Orders under which the commander only set broad goals, and devolved implementation to the lowest possible echelon of the command structure. The latter were in other words agents who were permitted a high degree of autonomy, which included toleration of failure if they sought to innovate or experiment.7 More broadly, one could argue that modern private sector organizations have evolved over time away from rigid “Taylorite” hierarchies reflecting strict Weberian criteria to more flexible, flatter organizations that delegate far more authority to lower levels of the organization.

If an appropriate degree of bureaucratic autonomy is an important characteristic of high-quality government, then neither the Weberian nor the principal–agent models can stand intact as frameworks for understanding how bureaucracies ought to work. The Weberian model, as noted earlier, assumes that bureaucrats are essentially rule-bound implementers of decisions made by political authorities; they may have technical capacity but they do not have the authority to set agendas independently.

The principal–agent framework is inadequate as well because it, too, assumes that agents are simply tools of the principals, whereas in a good bureaucracy authority often flows in the reverse direction, from the agent to the principal (the latter point, basic in an older tradition of public administration, is made by Herbert Simon; Simon 1957).

How do we measure bureaucratic autonomy? I believe that this is one of the most central and difficult issues in constructing a good measure of government quality. The most common approach is to use expert surveys in which experts are asked to evaluate the autonomy of a given bureaucracy. Expert surveys are particularly problematic in this area because the very concept of autonomy has been poorly specified, and it is not clear exactly what it is that experts are being asked to judge. Do they have adequate criteria for judging what proper and improper mandates are, or to look for multiple or conflicting mandates as a measure of subordination?

It would be nice therefore to have a more objective measure of autonomy. As autonomy is the opposite of subordination, one could use the degree of clientelism or political interference in bureaucratic operations as a measure. One could look, for example, at the relative number of classified versus political positions in a bureaucracy. However, this gets at only one type of subordination related to personnel. Political principals can hamstring bureaucracies by issuing multiple contradictory mandates that have nothing to do with staffing, or by setting excessively detailed rules for bureaucratic behavior.

Capacity and Autonomy

It would seem to be the case that the quality of government is the result of an interaction between capacity and autonomy. That is, more or less autonomy can be a good or bad thing depending on how much underlying capacity a bureaucracy has. If an agency were full of incompetent, self-dealing political appointees, one would want to limit their discretion and subject them to clear rules. The assertion embedded in Figure 1 that the optimal amount of autonomy is shifted to the right is true only in high-capacity countries. In very low capacity countries, the opposite would be the case: One would want to circumscribe the behavior of government officials with more rather than fewer rules because one could not trust them to exercise good judgment or refrain from corrupt behavior.

This is why Robert Klitgaard coined the formula Corruption = Discretion − Accountability (Klitgaard 1988). This is also why development agencies have been advising poor countries to limit bureaucratic discretion in recent years. On the other hand, if the same agency were full of professionals with graduate degrees from internationally recognized schools, one would not just feel safer granting them considerable autonomy, but would actually want to reduce rule boundedness in hopes of encouraging innovative behavior.

Figure 2 illustrates how the optimal autonomy curves would differ for four hypothetical countries of differing levels of capacity. For each, the curve slopes downward at the extremes, because every bureaucracy can have too much or too little autonomy. But the lower-capacity countries have their inflection points shifted to the left, while they are shifted right for higher-capacity countries.

Figure 2. Optimal Levels of Autonomy for Differing Levels of Capacity

One can control the behavior of an agent either through explicit formal rules and incentives or through informal norms and habits. Of the two, the latter involves substantially lower transaction costs. Many professionals are basically self-regulated, due to the fact that (1) it is hard for people outside their profession to judge the quality of their work and (2) part of their education, as noted previously, consists of socialization to certain professional norms that seek to preclude certain types of self-seeking behavior. The higher the capacity of a bureaucracy, then, the more autonomy one would want to grant them. In judging the quality of government, therefore, we would want to know about both the capacity and the autonomy of the bureaucrats.

One would want, in other words, to be able to empirically locate the agency on the matrix shown in Figure 3. The line sloping downward and to the left represents the line drawn through the inflection points of Figure 2, representing optimal levels of autonomy for a given level of capacity. Bureaucracies that were to the left of the line would be hobbled by excessive rules; those to the right of it with excessive discretion.

For the past decade, international donors have been advising developing countries to decrease the amount of discretion in the behavior of their bureaucracies. From Figure 3 it would appear that this is only contingently good advice; in a high-capacity state, one would like to have more rather than less discretion.

Figure 3. Autonomy and Capacity

The framework in Figure 3 suggests that there are two quite separate approaches to public sector reform. One always wants to move up the y-axis to higher capacity, particularly with regard to the professionalism of the public service. This, however, is not something that can be done easily, and it is not something that can in any case be accomplished in a short period of time. If a country cannot significantly upgrade capacity in the short run, one would want to shift the degree of autonomy toward the sloping line. This would mean moving toward the left in a low-capacity country, and toward the right in a high-capacity country.

Figure 4 contains some hypothesized positions, aggregated across the whole government, for different countries, and suggests that while Nigeria and China need to move left, the United States needs to move right. However, China needs to end up at a point with significantly more autonomy than Nigeria because of its much higher capacity.

Figure 4. Reform Paths

Trying to locate India on this matrix demonstrates some of the complexities of this analysis. India is famous both for high levels of corruption and clientelism, and for simultaneously having excessive rules and bureaucratic red tape. India clearly needs much greater state capacity across the board. But does it need more or less autonomy? The answer to the latter question is probably both, dependent on specific context.

Given the recent scandal, the agency handling spectrum auctions needs to be subjected to much stricter rules; on the other hand, the Hyderabad Municipal Water Authority needs to be relieved of its multiple and conflicting political mandates if it is to function properly. This then suggests why devising single aggregated measures for quality of governance can be inadequate and misleading.

Conclusion

It is clear that in evaluating the quality of governance in large, complex countries like China or the United States, the existing quantitative measures are woefully inadequate. If we are to establish desiderata for better ones, we would have to answer the following questions:

• If we are to use procedural measures of government quality, which on Weber’s list do we want to keep?
• For how many countries could we collect disaggregated capacity data?
• If we cannot collect a full set of capacity measures, what are the best proxies for aggregate capacity? Beyond tax extraction levels, can we come up with measures of bureaucratic professionalization?
• How do we distinguish between actual and potential capacity, with regard to a commonly used measure like tax extraction?
• How, exactly, are we going to define bureaucratic autonomy, and what measures are available as proxies for it?
• How important is it to have quantitative measures at all, as opposed to qualitative descriptions of process, or else case studies of particular areas of governance?

This commentary does not pretend to answer these questions, but only to serve as a basis for discussion. As we cannot measure what we cannot adequately conceptualize, we have to start with the concept first. I have laid out two separate dimensions of governance, capacity and autonomy, and suggested some of the components that make them up. Capacity, in particular, consists of both resources and the degree of professionalization of bureaucratic staff. I have further posited that quality of governance is ultimately a function of the interaction of capacity and autonomy, and that either one independently will be inadequate as a measure of government quality. Finally, I have also suggested that states need to be disaggregated into their component parts, by function, region, and level of government, and that we need both capacity and autonomy measures for all of these components. Obviously, this volume of data does not exist for most countries, and may not exist for any country. How much could be generated? It might be useful to start with a large, relatively data-rich country like the United States, and see how far we could get.

Acknowledgments

This commentary has been extensively revised based on presentations and discussions generated by the Governance Project at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. I would like to also thank the reviewers at the Center for Global Development for their comments.

Notes

1. 1

   This distinction was made in Woodrow Wilson’s famous article (Wilson 1887). It is also made in Max Weber’s equally famous essay, “Politics as a Vocation” (Weber 1946).

2. 2

   One would have to say that a concentration camp guard who executed everyone he was ordered to kill was more impartial than one who played favorites or spared certain individuals in return for bribes or sexual favors. This points to the difference between impartiality of policies compared to the impartiality of the way in which policies are executed.

3. 3

   Mancur Olson and others in the rational choice tradition argue that states are predatory and that all states will seek to tax at a maximal rate, subject only to limitations on capacity, and the time discount rates of the sovereign. There is, however, considerable historical evidence that this is not true, and that states have deliberately taxed well below their theoretical capacities for a variety of reasons (Fukuyama 2011, 303–305; Olson 1993).

4. 4

   Marcus Kurtz in his forthcoming book on the state in Latin America makes use of this distinction (Kurtz 2013).

5. 5

   On the general importance of organizational culture, see DiIulio (1994) and Wilson (1989).

6. 6

   One could use the term “accountability” as the antonym for autonomy; however, accountability has certain normative implications that subordination does not.

7. 7

   This field manual was based on the operational doctrine that had been developed by the German army from the end of World War I through the beginning of World War II; Mission Orders are an American version of Aufstragstaktik (Fukuyama and Shulsky 1997).

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• Tendler, Judith. 1997. Good Government in the Tropics. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Weber, Max. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.
• Wilson, Woodrow. 1887. “The Study of Administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2 (2): 197–222.
• World Bank. 2004. World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Appendix: Appendix: The Inadequacy of Existing Measures of China’s Quality of Government

If we accept the fact that quality of government is a mixture capacity and autonomy, and that governments are themselves complex collections of organizations, then it becomes clear that existing measures of governance are highly inadequate. The Worldwide Governance Indicators produced by the World Bank Institute (Kaufmann and Kraay 2009), as well as finer-grained measures like Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, treat single sovereign nations as the unit of analysis. Yet it is obvious that the quality of governance varies enormously within countries, both by specific government function and by region. Moreover, one cannot look at governance problems at one level only; many occur because of interactions between levels of governments. A poor national government can reduce the performance of a good local one, and vice versa.

The problem of single country indicators is evident when we consider something like Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The 2011 index lists China as the 75th most corrupt country in the world. It does a bit better than Brazil and Tunisia (both #73), it tied with Romania, and it is just slightly better than Gambia and El Salvador. Yet this number is virtually meaningless because it does not take account of the diversity of outcomes within China. It is widely believed in China, for example, that local governments there are much more corrupt than higher-level ones. We do not in fact know whether this is true or not. Corruption varies not just by level of government, but by region and by function; the railroad ministry is very different from, say, the Central Bank.

There is also something very strange about the Worldwide Governance Indicators rankings of China (see Table A1).

Table A1. China’s 2010 Performance, Worldwide Governance Indicators (Scores Range from −2.5 [Weak] to 2.5 [Strong])

Category	Score	Percentile
Voice and accountability	−1.6	5
Political stability/no violence	−0.77	24
Government effectiveness	0.12	60
Regulatory quality	−0.23	45
Rule of law	−0.35	44
Control of corruption	−0.60	33

China’s low rankings for Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law are not surprising, given that no one argues either of these are China’s strong suit. The other four measures relate to what we are defining as governance. While both the score and ranking for government effectiveness are higher than for any other measure, China still places only in the 60th percentile. But what possible meaning can such a figure have?

Clearly many local Chinese government authorities have huge problems; on the other hand, others perform far better. In my purely subjective estimation, the effectiveness of China’s national government with regard to macroeconomic management of a hugely complex modernization process over the past three decades has been nothing short of miraculous, given the fact that China was not just managing an existing set of institutions, but also transforming them in a more market-friendly direction. Its performance since the Asian financial crisis has arguably been better than that of the United States, which nonetheless ranks in the 90th percentile.

In terms of the three categories above, what do existing measures of governance measure? In the case of the WBI Worldwide Governance Measures (WWGM), it is hard to say, because they are an aggregate of many other measures. Many of them are perception surveys or expert estimates, which often reflect output measures, but may also include evaluations of procedures and capacity. It is not clear whether any of the WWGM components explicitly seek to measure bureaucratic autonomy.

Presumably categories like Political Stability/Control of Violence are exclusively output measures (where China’s low 24th percentile ranking seems a bit bizarre). The Rule of Law measure has big problems, beginning with the lack of definition of what is being measured. If rule of law is defined as constraints on the executive, China should rank even lower than it does as there are no real legal constraints on the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party.

If on the other hand this category means something more like rule by law (which would make it a component of governance), the ranking should be considerably higher. Most Rule of Law measures tend to be related to procedures or capacity rather than output, because the output of a legal system is so hard to measure. But we actually have no idea what the Chinese numbers actually mean or purport to measure.

Biography

• Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to democratization and international political economy. His book, The End of History and the Last Man, was published by Free Press in 1992. His most recent book, The Origins of Political Order, was published by Farrar, Straus, and Giroux in 2011. Other books include America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, and Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap between Latin America and the United States.

  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/gove.12035/full

Who is the Enemy?: Certainly not us Malaysians

March 28, 2013

by Dr. Kua Kia Soong@http://www.malaysiakini.com

COMMENT: As the Global Day of Action on Military Spending, GDAMS 3.0 (April 15, 2013) approaches, it is time for Malaysians to ask: Who are Malaysia’s enemies and what appropriate weaponry do we need?

One would think this is the first question the Ministry of Defence should ask in the multi-billion decisions to procure armaments now that the arms merchants are here again for LIMA 2013. Yet our National Defence Policy has never even been properly debated in Parliament.

Just a few months ago, the Ministry of Defence would not have said that Malaysia’s enemies were among the Suluks who have been coming back and forth between Southern Philippines and Sabah all these years.

After all, hadn’t we helped to train MNLF fighters there against Marcos in the seventies? Wasn’t this the reason why the Home Minister Hishamuddin Hussein(right) said that the invaders at Lahad Datu were “neither militants nor terrorists” during the two or three weeks that they were already there?

And haven’t we got a “Rapid Deployment Force” (10 Paratrooper Brigade) ready to be dispatched to any flashpoint? One wonders what flashpoint scenarios they are trained for?  Are they ready to be deployed only when there are secessionists fighting to take East Malaysia out of the federation? They certainly hadn’t been prepared for the Sulu Sultan’s army to “turn”.

Don’t be surprised if the “defence analysts” in the Ministry have now shredded all their previous analyses about Malaysia’s perceived “enemies”. With the new-found enemies of the Malaysian state, the arms lobby has at last found a raison detre for their fabulous arms procurements.

Heck, didn’t we finally get the chance to use our F18 fighter bombers and Hawk 208 fighter jets against this so-called “rag-tag army”? Wouldn’t armoured cars and tanks and mortars have sufficed in that four square kilometer area of land against that motley crew? In the end, were Malaysians given a clear picture of the efficacy of those fighter jet sorties?

Whatever the reasons for sending in the fighter bombers and jets, the international arms merchants have now come to town to peddle their wares. The French have started advertising their ‘Rafale’ fighter jets in our mainstream newspapers, alongside bargains by ‘Giant’ and ‘Tesco’ for the attention of Malaysians.

BAE are also desperately trying to flog their ‘Typhoon’ jet fighters in a RM10 billion deal they hope to clinch with a “Buy 1 – Get 1 free” gambit. They lost out recently to the French when the Indian government opted to buy 126 Rafale fighter jets instead, and are still fuming.

But do we need any fighter jets at all, considering their cost is spiraling way out of control and they so quickly become obsolete? They will be even more obsolete when future air wars are fought using drones (Unarmed Aerial Vehicles)!

Malaysians should be aware that the latest (US) F35 fighter jets cost at least half a billion ringgit a piece? Can we keep up with the race? What race? Who are we racing against? Who are our enemies?

Appropriate vessels for RMN

When the bombardment finally began at Lahad Datu, it was mentioned that the navy had formed a cordon to prevent the intruders from getting away. It became clear that there has never been a cordon to prevent any intruders from getting INTO Sabah all these years.

Looking at the geography of the area, it is evident that our two submarines (costing more than RM7 billion) sitting pretty in Sepanggar Bay and our six New Generation Patrol Vessels (costing RM9 billion) were not the most suitable vessels in such circumstances.

This mismatch raises the question of the need for our navy to prioritise the deployment of appropriate alternative vessels.  As part of the RM5 billion arms deal signed between Dr Mahathir and Margaret Thatcher in 1989, we procured two corvettes built by the Yarrow shipbuilders costing RM2.2 billion. (NST, Novembe 11, 1991).

At the time, the Royal Malaysian Navy said they required sixteen offshore patrol vessels but due to financial constraints, the RMN could only afford four or five of these locally-built OPVs. Mindef had budgeted RM85 million per OPV. (NST, November 25,1991).

Now, in the light of the latest incident at Lahad Datu, Malaysians will be in a better position to see the appropriate vessels that would be more suitable to secure the Sabah coastline.

Before the Lahad Datu incident, the main “enemies” testing the capacity of our armed forces were the pirates in the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca.

There were no bigger “enemies” than those seafaring marauders. Are state-of-the-art fighter jets and submarines the appropriate defence equipment against pirates? These would likewise be inappropriate if “international terrorists” and suicide bombers choose to target Malaysia.

So, exactly how are decisions made in the Ministry of Defence to purchase the submarines, the corvettes, the frigates (costing billions) instead of more effective patrol boats to guard our coastlines?

ASEAN needs to take ZOPFAN more seriously

There is no end if we choose to embark on an arms race with our neighbouring countries. We simply cannot afford such an arms race and it is time ASEAN countries seriously talk about disarmament and joint defence agreements instead of an arms race within ASEAN.

Our economic priorities need to be diverted away from military production toward production for human needs, and public expenditure diverted to more and better social services throughout ASEAN.

Any disputes over territories should be settled through international arbitration as was done over Pulau Batu Putih with Singapore. The dispute of the Spratly Islands should be resolved the same way.

M’sian people not the enemy

The Lahad Datu incident should act as a wake-up call for the Malaysian government that seems preoccupied with treating its own people as the enemy. When we bear in mind that throughout the tenure of the Internal Security Act since 1960, more than 10,000 people had been incarcerated for being “threats to national security”.

But hardly any have been charged for any crimes involving violence against the state. Then again, there have been at least two cases of Malaysians who have been killed in neighbouring countries for alleged terrorist activities. Yet, none of them were ever arrested under the ISA!

This goes to show that our intelligence service has been focusing on the wrong suspects. As a former ISA detainee who was incarcerated for being a “threat to national security”, I can vouch for the wanton wastage of security personnel on Malaysians who are simply not “enemies of the state”.

When I think of the number of state operatives who had been spying on me, arresting me, guarding me, interrogating me, accompanying me on family and hospital visits, I immediately wonder how they could be better deployed to prevent crimes being committed and watching out for the real enemies of the state.  And when we multiply the cost 10,000 times since 1960, we will realize the enormous waste of human resources that could be better put to use!

It was recently reported in the New York Times (March 13, 2013) that Malaysia is among 25 countries using off-the-shelf spyware to keep tabs on citizens by secretly grabbing images off computer screens, recording video chats, turning on cameras and microphones, and logging keystrokes:

“Rather than catching kidnappers and drug dealers, it looks more likely that it is being used for politically motivated surveillance,” security researcher Morgan Marquis-Boire was quoted by NYT as saying.  This is what I mean when I say our intelligence service is not focused on the job but wasting valuable resources spying on and apprehending the good guys!

Indeed, if the Malaysian state had only focused on the job of catching the real criminals, Malaysia would be a much safer place instead of being the “nation of guarded communities” it has become today.

Militarism serves ruling class

Apart from the huge commissions that can be creamed from multibillion ringgit arms contracts, the ruling class requires militarism to contain the oppressed and disgruntled sections of the population.

A strong military is necessary to prop up the ruling class. At the same time, the military-industrial complex promotes the development of a specially favoured group of companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of munitions and military equipment for personal gain and profit. These armaments companies have a direct interest in the maximum expansion of military production.

Arms production is a green issue

Military spending and arms production are very much green issues. The military- industrial complex not only produces toxic products, they produce weapons that kill indiscriminately. LIMA and other defence fairs are certainly not congruent with Malaysian leaders’ stated commitment to peace and spiritual values.

The green movement has a responsibility to work toward an end to the culture of war. This involves re-ordering our financial priorities away from wasteful and destructive arms production and procurement to the social well-being of the people.

Ultimately, working towards a culture of peace is a vision that is only attainable in a society that respects human dignity, social justice, democracy and human rights.

Chinese Navy makes waves in South China Sea

March 28, 2013

by Calum MacLeod and Oren Dorell, USA TODAY 6:49p.m. EDT March 27, 2013

BEIJING – The appearance of a Chinese navy flotilla at an island chain 1,120 miles from its home shores is a clear sign that the new Communist regime is moving to enforce its claims to the entire South China Sea, experts said Wednesday.

James Shoal is 50 miles from the coast of Malaysia, one of several countries that have appealed to the United States for help in countering China’s aggressive attempt to seize 1 million square miles of fishing and energy resources.

The Chinese military drills in the southernmost part of the sea show that the Obama administration’s “Asia Pivot,” which the White House said will refocus U.S. defense assets from the Middle East to East Asia, has produced few results for countries such as the Philippines and Japan, says Michael Auslin, an East Asia specialist at the American Enterprise Institute.

“We’re losing credibility with our allies and friends by not getting involved,” he says. “China has interpreted U.S. inaction as a green light to go forward.”

The flotilla includes China’s most advanced amphibious landing ship. Sailors on the ship’s helicopter deck declared their loyalty to the ruling Communist Party and vowed to “struggle arduously to realize the dream of a powerful nation,” said Xinhua, the Chinese state news agency.

In 2010, China planted a monument on the shoal declaring it the Chinese territory of “Zengmu Reef.” The act was part of China’s claims to all islands, fishing grounds and energy resources in a sea shared also by Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan. The South China Sea is also a major transit route for global shipping; half of all cargo in the world passes through the sea.

Malaysia says China’s claims are bogus and merely an attempt to seize resources such as possible oil and gas deposits that are well within the internationally recognized coastal territory of Malaysia.

Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Northeast Asia director for the International Crisis Group, a non-profit working in conflict prevention, said the naval exercise is consistent with China’s “shift from a land-focused power to a maritime power.”

The strategy has been pushed over the past two years, during which China has grown more assertive over its maritime claims, she said.

Gary Li, a senior analyst with IHS Fairplay in London, described the flotilla mission “a surprisingly strong message” from the new Chinese leadership recently installed under President Xi Jinping.

“It is not just a few ships here and there, but a crack amphibious landing ship carrying marines and hovercraft and backed by some of the best escort ships in the fleet,” he told the South China Morning Post, adding that jet fighters had also been used to cover the task force.

“We’ve never seen anything like this that far south in terms of quantity or quality.”

Auslin said the United States should respond in its longstanding role of ensuring the sea is not controlled by any single nation. He said the White House should increase the frequency of U.S. warship formations in the area to show China “we’re going to be present.” It would also boost the confidence of allies that the U.S. is standing up to challenges from their mighty neighbor, he said.

The White House has said it wants all sides to settle their disputes peacefully through international legal structures. But in light of Chinese behavior that many in the region view as aggressive, that sends a message that the United States will not confront China, Auslin says.

China’s behavior could undermine 100 years of U.S. policy that “might makes right” cannot prevail in sea lanes open to all, Auslin said.

“Do we want to see that environment change to where relations between countries are determined by the strongest? That’s the 19^th century world,” he said.

MacLeod reported from Beijing; Dorell from McLean, Va.

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/27/china-military-south-china-sea/2023947/

A New Concert of Nations

March 26, 2013

In 1990, a billion people earned enough income to consider making discretionary purchases. By 2010, the figure had more than doubled.

by Tom Nagorski (03-19-13)@http://online.wsj.com

The Indian scholar Brahma Challaney recently gave a talk at the Asia Society in New York about the coming global water-supply crisis. It was a dispiriting forecast: drought and pollution, even wars over water. That same morning brought dreary news from other fronts: a fresh threat from North Korea, another atrocity in Syria, a frightening smog alert from Beijing.

Anyone feeling the weight of the world’s woes will be grateful for Kishore Mahbubani’s “The Great Convergence,” a sweeping survey that proves to be, in large measure, a counterweight to global gloom and doom. Mr. Mahbubani, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, is under no illusions about the troubles we face, but he takes the longer view, reaching back a few decades to see an upward trend and to marvel at how far we have come.

Under Mr. Mahbubani’s lens, we see a plunge in the rates of extreme poverty and early-childhood deaths; a rise in literacy; a drop in the number of armed conflicts. “Major interstate wars,” says Mr. Mahbubani, “have become a sunset industry.” The good-news numbers are remarkable. In 1990, one billion human beings earned enough income to consider making discretionary purchases beyond mere necessity; by 2010, the figure had more than doubled. Mr. Mahbubani has lived this change. He was raised, he says, in “a typical third world city . . . [with] no flush toilets, some malnutrition, ethnic riots and, most importantly of all, no sense of hope for the future.” The city was Singapore, today an economic juggernaut with a per-capita income that outranks America’s.

Such statistics are presented as evidence of a “great convergence,” a phrase that Mr. Mahbubani first spotted in a Financial Times column by Martin Wolf, in which the columnist was describing a convergence of global interests, values and economic fortunes. Of course, nothing says “convergence” like the rush to connectivity, and while we know this story well, Mr. Mahbubani’s treatment still startles: Eleven million cellphone subscriptions, world-wide, in 1990; 5½ billion today. In 1985 the world’s fastest computer, the Cray 2, the size of a washing machine, was prohibitively expensive and required coolants to avoid overheating. Today the Cray 2′s match is the iPad 2, and it runs on 10 watts of power.

The Great Convergence

By Kishore Mahbubani
(PublicAffairs, 315 pages, $26.99)

Mr. Mahbubani is a big-picture writer and thinker, a Thomas Friedman with a strong Asian perspective, and like Mr. Friedman he is inclined toward the aphorism or analogy. When he eventually leaves his world-is-improving narrative to fret about future geopolitics, he does so with a maritime metaphor: “People no longer live in more than one hundred separate boats. Instead they all live in 193 separate cabins on the same boat. But this boat has a problem. It has 193 captains and crews, each claiming exclusive responsibility for one cabin. However, it has no captain or crew to take care of the boat as a whole.”

This passage sounds Mr. Mahbubani’s second theme: If we are gaining ground and converging in inspiring ways, we still lack an effective architecture for global governance. The need is critical, Mr. Mahbubani believes, because that metaphorical boat may soon run into an iceberg. The new arrivals in the Asian middle class, for example, will expect the trappings of success: a car, a refrigerator and so on, and our planet won’t be able to support them. For Mr. Mahbubani, the answer is some kind of global stewardship, one especially concerned with the environment, the economy and security. In short, we need a global referee.

But how to get there? Mr. Mahbubani skewers existing structures—the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the G-20—as either ineffectual or beholden to the great powers. The largest carbon emitters, to take a favorite example, have rejected global protocols (the U.S.) or signed them and pursued a “development first” strategy (China and India). It’s hard to argue with Mr. Mahbubani on that point but also hard to see how a new global architecture is possible when the great powers aren’t interested.

One great power, of course, is particularly uninterested, and in these pages Mr. Mahbubani casts the U.S. as an arrogant actor, a hegemon with no patience for multilateralism. Here his argument weakens from overreach. America’s frustration with the U.N. is not, as he argues, merely a matter of self-interest; it is also rooted in real concerns about mismanagement and certain U.N. policies.

As for Mr. Mahbubani’s charge that the U.N. acts only “when the residents of Park Avenue” (his phrase for the five permanent members of the Security Council) are affected, that just isn’t so. We have seen U.N. interventions in Somalia, Kosovo and Libya, none of which was exactly a “Park Avenue” interest.

But Mr. Mahbubani has a good idea for reforming the Security Council itself (a kind of staggered, tiers-of-influence plan), and he has good questions for Americans. Are we ready to accept being “No. 2″ on the global stage, at least by certain metrics? In fewer than five years China’s share of global income (only 2% two decades ago) will surpass that of the U.S., and yet the political discourse in America suggests an unwillingness to face that outcome, let alone plan for it. “The West will not lose power,” Mr. Mahbubani writes. “It will have to share power.”

In the end, he remains hopeful because he really believes it’s the long view that matters. If Southeast Asia—a war-torn, poverty-riven corner of the globe only a half-century ago—is today a region of peace and prosperity, then, Mr. Mahbubani believes, much else is possible. “In this rapidly changing world of ours,” he writes, “. . . miracles can happen.”

Mr. Nagorski is Executive Vice President of the Asia Society and the author of “Miracles on the Water: The Heroic Survivors of a World War II U-Boat Attack.”

A version of this article appeared March 20, 2013, on page A13 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: A New Concert Of Nations.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324590904578288022370871376.html

ASEAN won’t accept the idea of a “state within a state”

March 26, 2012

by Farish A. Noor @http://www.nst.com.my

INTRUSION: Unlawful for Kiram to have private army and wage war on another nation.

THE security breach in Sabah remains a lingering problem, thanks largely to the claims made by one person who has sparked off what is really a complex internal debate within Philippine society itself.

Jamalul Kiram III’s demand that he be recognised as the Sultan of Sulu with a claim on some parts of Sabah has raised an even deeper question that the Philippines has to address: can the Philippine republic accept the idea that within its republican framework there are citizens who claim to be more than citizens, and who claim that they have power and authority over parts of the republic which they argue are part of their own kingdom?

In short, can the Philippine republic accept the idea of a state within a state, or in this case a kingdom within a republic?The initial answer to this might seem to be a straightforward “no”.

As President Benigno Aquino himself noted during one of his press conferences, it is technically unconstitutional for any Philippine citizen to have a private army, to bear arms without licences and to declare war on another country. On legal grounds, Kiram’s stand seems shaky indeed.

But Kiram continues to probe into the soft underbelly of the post colonial state by invoking primordial attachments to the past, and this is where the modern post colonial state of the Philippines — like all other ASEAN states — has to address the question of its own complicated origins and genesis.

Let us remember that the states of ASEAN are a varied lot: when the countries of Southeast Asia became independent from the 1940s to 1960s, they emerged on the stage of world politics in different shapes and forms.

Today, when we look at the ASEAN region we see constitutional democracies, constitutional monarchies, republics, single-party states and so on. Each ASEAN country has had to find its own way of dealing with the legacy of the past.

But in this respect, Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand are more alike for none of these states has marginalised or eclipsed the older polities that pre-existed before independence.

The Federation of Malaysia, for one, maintains some degree of relative authority over the nine kingdoms where the Sultans of Malaysia remain as important figures in the context of their respective kingdoms.

Like Thailand, Malaysia is also a country with a constitutional head of state. But in Malaysia, as in Thailand, it is the government that prints the national currency, deals with other states and manages things like international relations and diplomacy.

The Philippines, on the other hand, is more akin to Indonesia and Myanmar which have opted to become republics, and where the former ruling elites have been integrated into the broader framework of universal citizenship.

Myanmar’s Royal family practically ceased to exist after the Third Anglo-Burmese war of 1885, and though traces remain in terms of some of their descendants, there has never been an attempt to revive the Burmese kingship in modern-day Myanmar. Indonesia, too, once had many royal courts in Java, Sumatra, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. But most of the Royal houses were brought under the auspices of the centralised state after the tumultuous years of Indonesia’s war of independence between 1945 and 1949. Today, they exist in name only, but with no real political power or authority.

As far as the structure of the state is concerned, the Philippines bears a much closer resemblance to Indonesia than it does to Malaysia, and this is where the problem lies — though it has to be emphasised that this is a Philippine problem, and not Malaysia’s.

Like Indonesia, the Philippines does not accept the idea that there can be a state within a state in the republic, which is why Kiram is no different in terms of his rights and obligations from any other citizen.

In Indonesia, too, there remain many sultans such as the rulers of Cirebon, Yogjakarta and Surakarta in Java. But they, too, have no special powers or rights, and they too come under the law of the republic.

Indonesia has been better able to deal with some of the claims of the former rulers of the country, for the central government has displayed more sensitivity in according them the respect that is their due: in the history books of Indonesia, Indonesian children learn about the role played by the sultans in the anti-colonial struggle for instance.

And today the kingdom of Yogjakarta has been able to reposition itself very well, packaging itself as a tourist destination and presenting itself as the custodian of Javanese art, culture and heritage.

 Some of the less fortunate kingdoms in Sumatra and Kalimantan, however, have fallen into a state of despair and ruin. The fate of the sultanate of Sulu seems to be similar to that of some of the now-defunct Royal houses of Indonesia.

 Bereft of funds and with no real political authority, it relies on cultural capital and its claims to history to project itself.But Kiram’s armed incursion into Malaysia was probably one of his “biggest miscalculations”, to quote the Philippine analyst Joseph Franco; and has now turned into a major own goal that has robbed him and his followers of whatever residual sympathy others may have had for his cause.

The Royal families of Indonesia have also tried to project themselves internationally, but through their promotion of the arts, by appealing to UNESCO, and by maintaining their relevance as a bastion of culture and history — and certainly not by waging war against the Indonesian republic, which would be politically self-defeating.

However this crisis pans out in the near future is anyone’s guess at the moment, though one thing is clear for now: ASEAN, for all its strengths and weaknesses, is a still a region where no country accepts the notion of states within states, and that is not likely to change tomorrow.

NO Deal on Sabah: Sabahans are Malaysians

March 23, 2013

by Raymond Tombung@http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com

The Sabah claim will continue to be raised by the Phlippines and Sulu as it is powerful and emotive international issue which many leaders in Manila will find convenient to bleed for political mileage. And the many “sultans” in Sulu will continue to cast their hungry eyes at Sabah, considered to be “the last gold coin” and aspire, albeit hopelessly, to try and achieve the impossible.

But Malaysians, especially Sabahans, should be able to give a cogent argument on the issue of this claim and in favour of Sabah.All Malaysians and Sabahans need is three or four historical facts, events or political realities to win the argument.

So let’s always keep clear knowledge of the following:

1. The controversy arising from the 1878 treaty between Jamalul Alam and British North Borneo Company.It can strongly be argued that it was a “cession” and not a “lease” as claimed by Filipinos.

Note that any argument on the matter was decisively clarified and settled when on April 22, 1903, Sultan Jamalul Kiram signed a document known as “Confirmation of Cession of certain Islands” in which he says the 1878 treaty was a CESSION.

The “confirmation” of the 1878 treaty says specifically that “We, the Sultan of Sulu, state with truth and clearness that we have ceded to the Government of British North Borneo of our own pleasure all the islands that are near the territory of North Borneo… This is done because the names of the islands were not mentioned in the 22nd January, 1878 [treaty]… that the islands were included in the cession…”

2. The purpose of the Madrid Protocol of 1885 was to recognise the sovereignty of Spain in the Sulu Archipelago and also for Spain to relinquish all claims it might have had over North Borneo.

Article III of the protocol states that “The Spanish Government renounces… all claims of sovereignty over the territories of the continent of Borneo, which belong, or which have belonged in the past to the Sultan of Sulu [Jolo]….”

3. The signing of the Carpenter Agreement on March 22, 1915 in which Sultan Jamalul Kiram II was stripped off all temporal (worldly) power and retained only the empty title of Sultan. His claimed ownership of North Borneo was of no concern to the American colonists.

4. The Macaskie Dictum (Judgment) of 1939. This judgment doesn’t settle the argument although Macaskie said the annual payment was cession money and not rental money and that the nine plaintiff heirs were entitled to.

These payments, however, in no way had anything to do with territorial property. This is because a later translation by the Filipinos of the original 1878 treaty (written in Malayan Jawi) said the agreement was a “pajak” which they say meant “lease”.

(Today “pajak” can mean “purchase”). But even this judgment was preceded by the addition “cession” of 1903 and the Madrid Protocol of 1885.

Power of Attorney questionable

5. The Sulu “sultans” cannot claim Sabah because there is no more a Sulu sultanate and there is no more any real sultan. The only legitimate royal group in Sulu are the descendants of the nine heirs who went to Macaskie in 1939.

6. Sulu (a region of the Philippines without any national sovereignty) cannot claim Sabah which is part of Malaysia – a sovereign nation.Only a country can claim another country or a part of another country. This,therefore,means Sulu has no locus standi to claim Sabah. The power of attorney that was given to Macapagal by the Sulu Sultan to give Diosdado Macapagal the “authority” to claim Sabah on Sulu’s behalf (now withdrawn) has very questionable validity.

Maybe this is one of the reasons why Manila had not really pursued the claim using the so-called power of attorney.

7. Manila had denied and re-recognised the sultanate a number of times, but this does not change the fact that there has been not been any sultanate to speak of since the Carpenter-Kiram Agreement of 1915.

8. By July 15, 1946, the British government had taken over North Borneo when the North Borneo Company could no longer manage it after the devastation of World War II.

The company had the right to hand over North Borneo to whoever it wanted because the country had been ceded to it in 1878 (and confirmed by the confirmation of cession in 1903 and the nullification of Sulu’s ownership of the country by the Madrid Protocol of 1885).

9. Many Brunei historians actually argue that Brunei never gave away any part of North Borneo to Sulu. And there is no document whatsoever to prove this cession.

10. After Sabah became part of Malaysia and Malaysia’s sovereignty was recognised by the United Nations and the world, that had effectively superceded and nullified any claim on Sabah.

ICJ confirmed Sabah’s status as part of Malaysia

Sulu cannot be so arrogant and shameless to think that it can simply and freely take back a piece of land it “owned” 135 years ago after it has been developed by someone else for half a century.

11. The International Court of Justice (which is an arm of the United Nation) had recognised and confirmed Sabah as part of Malaysia when it made a verdict in 2002 that Sipadan and Ligitan islands belonged to Malaysia (and not Indonesia). This confirmation of ownership cannot be reversed in favour of Sulu (judgments of the ICJ  are not subject to appeal).

12. Whatever the arguments are, all the past agreements and treaties – whether they were valid, arguable or controversial – are now effectively useless historical references because they have been superseded by bigger and more important events.

Therefore the argument by Harry Roque, a law professor at University of the Philippines, who says that a legal principle known as “uti posseditis juris” (“accords pre-eminence of legal title over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty”) is useless and ineffective. Also, this pre-eminence of legal title is a double-edged sword because it can also be applied to Malaysia.

13. Professor Dr Ramlah Adam recently said: “They cannot claim [Sabah] just based on history. For example, the Siam government handed Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu over to the British and [today] cannot claim the states.”

Prof Emeritus Khoo Kay Kim said that if the Philippines’ argument can be accepted, then “Singapore should be returned to Johor and Penang be returned to Kedah”.

And for that matter why does Brunei not claim Sabah as well because there is a Brunei argument that it never gave Sabah to Sulu? Or why doesn’t Indonesia claim Peninsular Malaysia and southern Thailand? After all, weren’t these regions under the Srivijaya Empire in the eighth century?

14. Sabahans do not want to be part of the Philippines, as confirmed by the findings of the Cobbold Commission.Even today Sabahans feel a lot of trepidation at the mere thought of being under the so-called Sulu sultanate.

No referendum

15. There is an argument that Malaysia had agreed in the Manila Accord (signed July 31, 1963) that the formation of Malaysia was subject to the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

But whatever was agreed in the Manila Accord has been superseded by later events, for example, the formation of Malaysia which included Sabah, two months after the Manila Accord.

In the Bangkok Talks of June-July 1968, Malaysia had unilaterally rejected the Manila Accord.With the benefit of hindsight, wasn’t the Manila Accord an exercise in futility, especially by the Philippines in trying to hang on to something which couldn’t be implemented and solved till the end of time?

If the terms of the Manila Accord were adhered to, there would have been no Malaysia.Of prime importance was the wishes of Sabahans – two-thirds of whom wanted to join Malaysia as the findings of the Cobbold Commission indicated the year before.

And noteworthy is Article 10 of the accord which says: “The Ministers reaffirmed their countries’ adherence to the principle of self-determination for the people’s of non-governing territories. In this context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representatives.”

There was not much time to carry out such a referendum, but wasn’t this condition (to allow Sabah to be part of Malaysia) already fulfilled by the Cobbold Commission the year before?

A virtual paradise

16. Even Sabahan Tausugs do not want to be part of the Philippines.Ed Lingao, a renowned Filipino author and journalist had on February 21, 2013, reported in Minda News that he had undertaken a random survey of the Tausugs in Sabah and found out that even they do not want Sabah to become part of the Philippines.

He wrote: “Many of the Tausugs we encountered detested the idea of the Philippine government reclaiming Sabah. Refugees from war and poverty, many of these Tausugs see little benefit in a Sabah under the Philippine flag; in fact, for them, it is a worrying proposition, not unlike jumping from the clichéd frying pan into an even bigger fire.

“One Tausug we encountered outside a mall in Kota Kinabalu bristled at the idea of the Philippines staking a claim on Sabah saying ‘sisirain lang nila ang Sabah. Okay na nga ang Sabah ngayon, guguluhin lang nila,’ (They will just destroy Sabah. Sabah is doing fine right now, they will just mess it up).

“It is hard to blame them for the cynicism. After all, they took great risks and fled their own troubled country in droves for a better life, only to have that same country reach out and stake a claim on what, to them, is already a virtual paradise where one can finally live and work in peace. That, to them, may be the ultimate irony, the ultimate tragedy.”

As such, what we see today is a group of desperate people trying to live in the glory of the distant past, stepping forward with their thick skins with no regard for the truth.Lingao described the nature of the situation on February 19 in an article, “Sabah as the last gold coin”.

In it he notes: “Sabah became their clutch when their own Sulu was sinking, so to speak, from the heavy weight of bloodshed that spiralled into poverty.

“Sabah became the vision of the last gold coin that could win back the possibility of rising again, getting back the worth of a name: the venerable House of Kiram.”

How very sad and tragic indeed. And now more blood is being spilled in the name of a great overstated lie!

Policy shift helped win more friends globally for Malaysia

March 22, 2013

By Dato Dr Ananda Kumaraseri@http://www.nst.com.my

HOW does one explain Malaysia’s distinct shift from one of being avowedly pro-Western and staunchly anti-Communist, that smacked of non-neutrality in the East-West Cold War conflict, to one of being Non-Aligned and equidistant? The significant shift is also somewhat intriguing in the way it emerged.

This landmark development in Malaysia’s diplomacy and international relations was an outcome of the rather uncanny impact Indonesian Konfrontasi had on the thinking and attitude of its leaders, in particular that of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.

The psyche of Malaysia leaders especially in respect to their overriding goal of safeguarding national sovereignty and in ensuring political self-preservation was shaken to its very core when Indonesia, the enamoured brotherly neighbour, launched its Konfrontasi to destroy Malaysia.

A parallel to this profound trauma is to be found in the horrifying experience Indian leaders underwent when their “Hindi Chini Bai Bai” foreign policy mantra was utterly shattered by China’s military attack in 1962.

When Konfrontasi was first unleashed, the government found itself compelled to rely almost wholly on the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement to ensure the country’s security and territorial integrity.

The heightened security concerns resulting from Indonesian military actions also initially prodded a reinforcement of the country’s pro-Western world view and a hardening of its anti-Communist stance on international issues.

This seemed thoroughly justified given the firm belief that Konfrontasi was a grand communist design hatched by Parti Kommunist Indonesia that was acting in concert with a larger Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi Axis, to ensure a fierce and sweeping geo-political communist domination in the region.

But as the traumatic challenge of Konfrontasi progressed, Malaysia found it necessary to go beyond addressing its immediate defence and military concerns to counter the stiff diplomatic hurdles in the international arena to secure its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The government found itself hard put to match Indonesia’s diplomatic clout among the international community of nations that the latter had built over the years.

Numerous Malaysian delegations to international conferences found themselves disadvantaged to press the country’s case because of its entrenched pro-Western anti-Communist profile.

To the utter disappointment and frustration of the government, Malaysian representatives were shunned and even shut out in important international forums at practically every turn. A pertinent case in point was Malaysia’s failure to secure admission into the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Cairo in 1964.

The bitter experiences underlined the reality to re-orientate the country’s profile if it was to succeed in winning friends globally. An earnest effort was called for to shed Malaysia’s pro-Western anti-Communist image in favour of an equidistant foreign policy in order to shore up its credentials as a non-aligned state.

The Tunku himself acknowledged the need for the shift on grounds of the realities of the contemporary international situation. So by 1966, the new direction of the country’s foreign policy and conduct of its diplomacy and international relations was well on course to win as many friends, particullarly among Afro-Asian and Latin American states.

Initial efforts to give substance to the foreign policy shift that focused on establishing Malaysia’s credential as a non-aligned state was soon widened to include the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states.

This policy shift witnessed a spate of historic exchange of visits and negotiations at senior-officials levels with the communist states.

The first Malaysian delegation to visit Moscow that eventually paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union at ambassadorial level included a senior Foreign Ministry officer in the person of Mr. Yeo Beng Poh.

The follow-up visits by the Soviet Delegation led to wide ranging discussions with senior officers from the Prime Minister’s Economic Planning Unit, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that included Mohammad Ghazali Shafie, Raja Mohar Raja Badiozaman, Tong Yaw Hong, Robless, and G.K. Rama Iyer. The focus of the negotiations was on exploring new avenues to enhance trade and economic collaboration.

But it was all too clear that these initiatives were an integral part of the Tunku’s policy shift aimed at giving real substance and meaning to Malaysia’s credentials as a member of the Organisation of Non-Aligned Nations by shedding its entrenched anti-communist pro-Western foreign policy profile.

Moreover, the government felt it prudent to expand its trade and economic interests globally by exploring new avenues of collaboration with the Soviet Union and Eastern European states.

Among other policy changes, these developments meant the relaxation and subsequent removal of the ban on Malaysians visiting the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states.

Bogor to Bali: Building an Asia-Pacific Community

March 20, 2013

Insight: Bogor to Bali: Building an Asia-Pacific Community

by Jusuf Wanandi & Tan Khee Giap | Insight |The Jakarta Post (02-22-13)

Almost 20 years ago, leaders of the Asia-Pacific region met in Bogor to “chart the future course of our economic cooperation, which will enhance the prospects of an accelerated, balanced and equitable economic growth not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but throughout the world”. In just a few months, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders will again meet in Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy. How far has the region come in achieving those goals and what more needs to be done?

The headline achievements are impressive. To note just one, incomes in the region have more than doubled since 1994 from an average of US$10,000 to more than $23,000.

The journey to where we are today has not been easy. The region has been buffeted by economic crises, first in 1997-1998 and then in 2008-2009. This crisis is not yet over, a number of APEC members recently enacted stimulus measures to kick start growth, such as QE3 in the US and Japan’s new attempt to reflate its economy. There is a possibility of a new stimulus in China in response to a deteriorating external environment.

These measures, while focused on domestic growth, have some unintended consequences. We are seeing rising capital flows into Asia that pose challenges, including the need to minimize the risks of asset bubbles and excessive credit expansion. There is already talk of “currency wars” and competitive devaluations. While the rhetoric makes for exciting reading, the world is far too complex for simplistic reasoning.

At the outset of the crisis, many had feared a descent into beggar-thy-neighbor polices, but thus far, through the actions of the G20 and APEC, we have avoided this. At this critical juncture, when nationalist sentiments are rising, we need more cooperation and understanding. APEC is the embodiment of bridging differences and must continue to play its role in bringing a diverse community together.

While APEC has done well in terms of freeing up trade and investment, the world that it occupies has changed. In 1994, bilateral trade deals were the exception, today they are the rule.

Even this is changing. The ASEAN Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Framework will consolidate the ASEAN+1 agreements into a single area and the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement hopes to build on the Pacific 4 agreement. Outside our region, the US and the EU are talking about a trans-Atlantic trade agreement, which would create the single biggest market in the world.

These massive trade groups, while potentially building blocs to multilateralism, can make outsiders feel excluded. This is a dangerous path to go down and this region, through APEC, with its spirit of inclusiveness and openness, should ensure that no economy is left out.

However, strong headline growth has masked a dirty secret — income disparities have been growing both among and within regional economies. APEC leaders have long talked of the need for growth to be equitable — both in Bogor and in recent years such as in 2009 in Singapore — with a call to “foster inclusive growth” and in Yokohama where it was a key dimension of the APEC Growth Strategy.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set the objective of universal primary education by 2015. In this region, we should move ahead and aim to provide all our citizens with the skills to participate in this competitive global economy. While some economies have done particularly well in increasing tertiary education participation, for example in South Korea where the ratio has increased from 35 percent to almost universal enrollment since 1994, others lag behind.

However, enrollment rates are not a panacea. One need only look at high unemployment rates among recent graduates in parts of Europe to see this. Emphasis must be on flexibility and resilience. There is a need for educational institutions and businesses to work together to help to develop skills of our peoples to fulfill their potential. This requires a change in culture in both business and education providers.

Even if our people possess the skills to compete, they cannot do so if they are not connected to the market. We need our people and our businesses — large and small — to be able to connect to where opportunities exist. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that East Asia alone needs to invest some $8 trillion in infrastructure.

Much of this would be in transportation but a critical part of the creative economy is access to information. Access to the Internet varies tremendously in the region, from 2 to 84 in every 100 in Papua New Guinea and South Korea, respectively.

Another aspect of the integration process is how do our businesses reap the opportunities that lie ahead? It has been conventional wisdom that multinational corporations account for 70 percent of global trade, while at the same time small and medium enterprises (SMEs) account for 90 percent of all businesses.

The idea that products are made in one particular country has given way to the idea of being “made in the world”. The emergence of global value chains opens up opportunities for SMEs to participate, but SMEs face a distinct set of problems going global as trade rules and compliance costs disproportionately impact smaller businesses, and their access to finance and information about overseas markets is limited.

A focus on these three areas: education, infrastructure and barriers to SME participation, could help make a major difference to addressing APEC’s goals of equitable and inclusive growth in the years ahead. Calls for addressing inequality should not be misconstrued as calls for the redistribution of wealth — that has already been tried and failed. Making growth equitable and inclusive are essential to the region’s goal of community building — that is one in which we share a sense of common destiny and purpose.

These issues will be addressed during a conference organized by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), the Singapore National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (SINCPEC) and the Indonesian National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (INCPEC) on February. 22-23.

Jusuf Wanandi is the co-chair of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and vice-chair of the Board of Trustees of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.

Tan Khee Giap is the chair of the SINCPEC and co-director of the Asian Competitiveness Institute (Singapore) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS.

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/02/22/insight-bogor-bali-building-asia-pacific-community.html

Sulu: Stop Payment of Cession Money by New Court Order

March 18, 2013

by Athi Shankar (03-16-13) @http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com

The DAP has urged the Attorney General Abdul Gani Patail to obtain a High Court order in Kota Kinabalu to discontinue Malaysia’s cessation payment to heirs of Sultan Sulu over Sabah.

Chairman Karpal Singh called on Gani, who hails from Sabah, to spring to action immediately and file the necessary application as public interests demanded him to do so.

Senior parliamentarian Karpal noted that the cessation payment was on the authority of a 1938 order by then High Court of North Borneo.The order allowed a petition of nine Sulu heirs to receive and share among themselves RM5,000, or now RM5,300, as annual payment.

The 1938 order actually has reinforced the payment that commenced very much earlier when the British took over Sabah.Kadir Mohamad, Agent for Malaysia in the ICJ case between Malaysia and Indonesia, said that Kuala Lumpur needed to continue honouring the 1938 judgment on the ground that any violation of that order can be challenged in court by interested parties.

Karpal conceded that a court order must be complied with unless it was set aside judicially.“Contravention of a court order amounts to contempt of court and is punishable by committal to prison,” said Karpal, a veteran lawyer.

But, he said with the passage of time and with Sabah having joined Sarawak and Peninsular to form Malaysia, and recognition by Manila of Malaysia as a sovereign state by having ambassadorial level representation in the country, the Philippines cannot lay any claim to Sabah.

He said Malaysia was internationally recognised with Sabah as a sovereign state in the Federation of Malaysia since the North Borneo territory opted to join Malaysia on August 31, 1963.

“It’s ridiculous to continue paying the Sulu heirs when Malaysia and Sabah are independent and sovereign states,” Karpal told newsmen during a routine visit to his Bukit Gelugor parliamentary constituency here today.

‘Respect sacrifices of our forces’

He said the cessation payment was different from the “annual royalty” being paid by Penang to Kedah, as both these provinces were part of a sovereign Malaysia.

He said the fact that the payment has been continuously made for 131 years does not mean, having regard to passage of time and change of circumstances, that the case cannot be reopened with a view to the payment to be discontinued.

He stressed that the continued annual cessation payment pursuant to the 1938 order required review to discontinue the payment and this can be done by the High Court in Kota Kinabalu.

He referred to a 2011 Federal Court decision on Harcharan Singh Piara Singh vs Public Prosecutor where unanimously ruled that a a court of first instance, including High Court, must be equipped with residual jurisdiction to rehear and reopen its own earlier decision in a fit and proper case.

He said  that the cessation payment constitutes a fit and proper case for the High Court in Kota Kinabalu to review the 1938 decision and order it to be discontinued.

“The country’s sovereign should not be allowed to be compromised in any way. The sovereignty should and must stand pristine,” stressed the DAP supremo.

On the sedition charge against PKR vice-president Tian Chua for allegedly making statements linking the Federal government to the Lahad Datu shooting, Karpal acknowledged that the Batu MP had denied making such remarks.

But, he stressed that the DAP stand was clear that no one should make a statement insulting the armed forces, especially when they were defending the nation’s independence and sovereignty against alien forces.

He said the DAP stand was that all Malaysians should stand united against intrusions by foreign forces.“The DAP is united against any intrusions. The sacrifices of the armed forces must be respected, appreciated and honoured by all Malaysians. It’s wrong to insult the role of armed forces,” said Karpal

Sabah Insurgency: A Setback for Malaysia’s Role as Regional Conflict Mediator

March 17, 2013

Sabah Insurgency: A Setback for Malaysia’s Role as Regional Conflict Mediator

by Dr. Johan Saravanamuttu* (March 15, 2013)

The month-long crisis in Sabah, which has seen an incursion of rebel fighters from the Philippine island of Sulu into Malaysia’s northern-most state on the island of Borneo, is a stark reminder that Southeast Asia remains engulfed in unresolved territorial disputes and conflicts.

Malaysia has been deeply involved in several of these conflicts as both a stakeholder and a mediator. The Sabah crisis now presents Malaysia with a thorny domestic security challenge that also has implications for its regional role.

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia has so far subscribed actively to the ASEAN principle of “pacific settlement of conflicts” espoused in the organization’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, of which Malaysia was a founding signatory. Malaysia played a major role, as both host and mediator, in the negotiations that recently brought the conflict in the southern Philippines to a peaceful resolution.

On October 15, 2012, after 15 years of negotiations and 27 rounds of talks in Kuala Lumpur, the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed a comprehensive peace accord establishing a political settlement to the Islamic insurgency in the Muslim-majority region of Mindanao.

Malaysia also recently agreed to help try to broker an end to the conflict involving Muslim insurgents in four provinces in the deep south of Thailand. In a state visit to Malaysia on Feb. 28, 2013, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra agreed to begin talks in Kuala Lumpur with the “Barisan Revolusi Nasional” (“National Revolutionary Front”), the main Muslim group involved in southern Thailand’s conflict.

In the past decade, Malaysia has also peacefully resolved external territorial disputes with both Indonesia and Singapore. Indonesia took a dispute over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan off the Sabah coast to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which in 2002 deemed the islands to be Malaysian. Singapore and Malaysia settled the dispute over Pedra Branca, called Pulau Batu Puteh in Malaysia, in 2008, again through the ICJ, with Singapore retaining the island.

Malaysia still has claims in the Celebes and South China Seas involving other Southeast Asian states and China. In all these instances, Malaysia has maintained a stance of peaceful conflict resolution and, where expedient and possible, has brought matters to international arbitration.

As an internal conflict with an external dimension, the current crisis in Sabah constitutes a hybrid case of the region’s conflicts and territorial disputes. When Sabah was included into the new Federation of Malaysia in 1963, Manila maintained that Sabah belonged to the Philippines instead. However, after a U.N. observer team ascertained that the majority of Sabah’s people supported joining Malaysia, the Philippines stopped pressing its claim, though no Philippine government ever formally rescinded it. Over the years, the dispute was shelved due to good relations between the two states.

But in the current crisis, a century-old sovereignty claim over Sabah has been revived by Jamalul Kiram III, the self-proclaimed sultan of Sulu, an autonomous Philippine island province in Mindanao that historically included the area of north Borneo now known as Sabah. Kiram says that his ancestors merely leased and did not cede the territory to the British in 1878.

On February 12, more than 200 fighters of the self-styled “Royal Sulu Sultanate” landed in Malaysia, near the southeast Sabah coast, and holed themselves up in a nearby village, ignoring calls by Philippine President Benigno Aquino to return home.

In Malaysia’s initial Police response, 12 armed men were killed along with two Malaysian Policemen. Malaysia then conducted air strikes on the village and sent in some seven army battalions, killing 32. Other incidents occurring nearby left five Malaysian policemen dead. At the time of writing, the Malaysian authorities have rounded up almost 100 intruders and the death toll has reached 63, including two Malaysian soldiers, making the crisis the most serious military action involving Malaysian forces since the communist insurgency of 1948-1960.

More ominously, Malaysia, a promoter of regional conflict resolution for Muslims, is for the first time engaged in a shooting war with Muslim insurgents within its own territorial boundaries.

With the initial standoff having given way to a series of one-sided skirmishes, the Sabah situation risks becoming an internal Malaysian insurgency, with the Tausugs — the main ethnic group from Sulu in the Philippines, where they are known as Suluks — as the principle protagonists. The crisis is further embedded in the fluid character of local politics in Sabah, where large numbers of the population are Muslim.

In recent hearings held by a Malaysian Commission of Inquiry on illegal immigration in Sabah, it was revealed that Kuala Lumpur had awarded Malaysian citizenship to hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the southern Philippines for the sake of gaining an electoral advantage for the ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).

For years, UMNO has considered Sabah to be a “fixed deposit,” safely delivering 24 seats to the ruling coalition in the 222-seat national parliament. The large Filipino Muslim population in Sabah that helped deliver these seats in the past could now turn against its former protector and patron, with implications for the UMNO’s supremacy in national politics in the general election that must be held by late-June.

Given Malaysia’s prized role as regional peacemaker, it is a bitter irony that the pendulum of internal conflict has swung from Mindanao to Sabah, with the gloomy prospect of the Malaysian government facing a long-term low-intensity war with the Suluks and their supporters. That would not only represent a disruptive distraction in the run-up to the general elections, but also a huge blow to Malaysia’s role as a promoter of regional conflict resolution.

Dr.Johan Saravanamuttu is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/

Suluk Invaders only flog a dead horse (kuda mati)

March 17, 2013

by Bunn Nagara @www.thestar.com.my

EVEN though foreign insurgents make a historical claim to Sabah, the facts of history refute it.

AS Malaysian troops and police continue mopping-up operations to flush out straying remnants of the Lahad Datu standoff, partisans on both sides trade emotive claims and insults.

Analysts, meanwhile, weigh the terms in historical documents like “rent”, “lease” and “cession money” to determine Sabah’s actual status. But not only are these documents read differently in translation (English and Sulu), the terms are also interpreted differently.

It makes more sense to focus on the events and circumstances of history. The known facts reveal at least 16 reasons why the Filipino Sulu claim to Sabah is unwarranted and unworthy of consideration.

First, today’s Philippines as a modern nation state and a republic by definition abrogates a former sultanate whose territory it occupies and whose sovereignty it denies.

The Republic of the Philippines has no claim to Sabah of its own. The on-off claim, originating from Sulu sovereignty made by certain quarters, is only a private matter of some revisionist individuals.

The second reason is that the Sulu Sultanate no longer exists, since there was no provision even for a constitutional monarch. Any claim requires a claimant and the property/territory in question, whether anyone else has effective control and ownership over it. If the claimant or the territory does not exist, the claim cannot stand.

The insurgents and their leader Jamalul Kiram III (right) are only pressing a notional claim, since they cannot represent a defunct entity.

Third, there is no agreed rightful heir to the last Sultan of Sulu, even if an heir were to press the claim. Jamalul’s claim to be that heir is disputed by nearly a dozen other hereditary “royal” personages.

Another reason for rejecting his claim to Sabah comes with denial of his claim to the throne: 10 other “heirs” had renounced all claim to Sabah in 2007. Nine did so in a signed statement, and Rodinood Julaspi Kiram II in a separate declaration.

It does not matter whether Jamalul was among the nine. If he was, he had unlawfully reneged on the signed agreement, and if he wasn’t, he is outnumbered and is challenged 10 ways.

Fifth, when Spain took over the Sulu Sultanate as part of the Philippines, it left North Borneo (Sabah) in British hands. Spain disrupted the Sultanate by removing 18-year-old Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1886, replacing him with a rival, only to “reappoint” him six years later.

Britain made North Borneo a protectorate in 1888. Under Spain, the Philippines and most of the Sulu Sultanate with it were going in one direction, while North Borneo and the British went in another.

Eventually, the sultanate was divested of political and administrative powers until it exercised authority only over religious matters. No effective, functioning sultanate existed any more.

Sixth, the death of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1936 saw no successor, since he died childless. His younger brother and anointed successor, Mawalil Wasit, died the same year before he was crowned.

Thus ended the Royal House of Sulu’s lineage. After Spain passed the Philippines, including the territory of the former sultanate (excluding North Borneo) to the United States, the US officially abolished what remained of the sultanate in 1936.

Eighth, the British North Borneo Company also ceased payment to the sultanate that year, indicating that the business sector had considered the 1878 agreement voided. (Payment later resumed only after relatives of the deceased sultan brought the matter to court.)

Ninth, President Manuel L. Quezon (left) of the (then) Commonwealth of the Philippines declared in 1936 that Jamalul Kiram II was the last Sultan of Sulu. To emphasise the point, Quezon said the Philippine government would no longer recognise a Sulu Sultanate.

Britain had been exercising increasing proprietary moves over North Borneo, earning two rebukes from the US (1906, 1920). Britain ignored those reminders and annexed North Borneo in 1946, turning it into a crown colony.

Whatever the moral issues there, it again spelled the end of any vestige of Sulu royalty. For London, it was a justifiable move since it had taken over all the legal obligations of North Borneo.

Tenth, there was no question later (in the 1960s) about Sabah having to obtain independence from Britain. This underlined the fact that Britain was the sole governing authority up to that point.

Then as Sabah’s independence and the Cobbold Commission’s findings led to the scheduled formation of Malaysia on August 31, 1963, agitation flared from the Philippines. The date was postponed to September 16, such that Sabah was an independent entity for 16 days, ending any remaining claim from an extinct sultanate or the Philippines as belonging to it.

Twelfth, the very act of freely becoming part of the Malaysian federation negated all further claims on the territory by foreign partisans. The new state of Malaysia in its present form is recognised in all international organisations, including the United Nations and ASEAN, of which the Philippines is also a member.

Although former President Marcos tried to retake Sabah in the 1960s, the claim was later abandoned. At the Second Asean Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1977, Marcos declared that the Philippines was taking concrete steps to end the claim.

Later, as Marcos’ rule clearly became a dictatorship, he made Punjungan Kiram “interim sultan” for Sulu. But this candidate ran off to Sabah, preferring to be a Malaysian instead.

Marcos then “appointed” Punjungan’s son Jamalul Kiram III successor to a non-existent sultan. This instigator of Lahad Datu is not only a dubious candidate since he is not the son of a sultan, but his claim to authority comes from a discredited and ousted dictator of a republic.

Not least, when President Corazon Aquino’s post-Marcos government planned a new Philippine Constitution in 1987, Malaysia lobbied for wording to end the disturbing claim to Sabah for good.

This would replace “historical right or legal title” with “over which the government exercises sovereign jurisdiction” (i.e. the status quo), which was accepted after the third reading in Congress.

So for Philippine citizens to invade Sabah to lay claim to it clearly violates their country’s Constitution. President Benigno Aquino III’s prosecution of these criminals is fully in accordance with the law.

It is also said that no rightful Filipino claim to Sabah exists because as a country, it had not consistently engaged in the activities of a de facto power there. Not only that, there has also been no consistent Filipino claim to Sabah.

Lee Kuan Yew, Grand Master of Asia

March 16, 2013

by Graham Allison, Robert D. Blackwill -March 1, 2013

On his desk in the Oval Office, President John F. Kennedy kept a small plaque that reminded him of the vicissitudes of life, even for the leader of the most powerful nation on earth. It read: “Oh God, my boat is so small and thy ocean so large.” In the turbulent sea in which statesmen, corporate leaders, investors, and the rest of us are trying to get our bearings in international affairs today, where can one find wise coordinates?

In thinking about the rise of China, the stumbling of the United States, the potential of India, or the claim that the twenty-first century will belong to Asia, whom should we look to for insight about this uncertain future? Among the seven billion inhabitants of planet Earth today, only one has created a modern Asian city-state whose nearly six million inhabitants now enjoy higher levels of income than Americans. Only one individual has been called “mentor” by Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader who initiated China’s march to the market, and its new leader Xi Jinping. Only one individual has been called upon for counsel about these developments by every U.S. president from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama. That individual is Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of Singapore.

Over the past 18 months, we have been privileged to engage Lee Kuan Yew in a series of interviews and conversations about these issues. Having listened, reviewed what he has written and said in other settings, and then returned to follow up, we have been able to drill down in ways that capture many of his most penetrating strategic insights.

As they have embraced the magic of Adam Smith’s marketplace, Asian economies have grown at unprecedented rates. In a nation of 1.3 billion, China has raised more than 600 million people out of conditions of abject poverty and created a rapidly expanding middle class already larger than the entire population of the United States. On its current trajectory, for the first time in history, millions of individuals will experience a one-hundred-fold increase in their standard of living in a single lifetime. In Europe, that took one thousand years.

After three decades of double-digit growth, an economy that was smaller than Spain’s in 1980 now ranks second in the world and will become number one in the next decade. Do China’s leaders intend to displace the United States as the predominant power in Asia in the foreseeable future? Lee Kuan Yew answers: “Of course. Why not? Their reawakened sense of destiny is an overpowering force.”

Will a China that has risen to become the world’s largest economy follow the path chosen by Japan and Germany, accepting its place within the postwar order created by the United States? Lee says decidedly not. “It is China’s intention to become the greatest power in the world—and to be accepted as China, not as an honorary member of the west.”

Nevertheless, Western ideals of individuals’ basic rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness have become part of the mental geography of China’s “golden billion,” who are becoming increasingly part of the world outside China.

Lee thinks this bodes well for the future of the Asia-Pacific: “peace and security in the region will turn on whether China emerges as a xenophobic, chauvinistic force, bitter and hostile to the West, or educated and involved in the ways of the world, more cosmopolitan, more internationalized and outward looking.”

Will India rival or even surpass China’s rise? The U.S. government recently asked its $50 billion intelligence community this question. Their recently released report, Global Trends 2030, forecasts that “the most rapid growth of the middle class will occur in Asia, with India somewhat ahead of China in the long term.” Lee Kuan Yew disagrees strongly.

As he puts it, provocatively: “When Nehru was in charge, I thought India showed promise of becoming a thriving society and a great power,” but it has not “because of its stifling bureaucracy” and its “rigid caste system.” Being deliberately provocative, Lee says: “India is not a real country. Instead it is thirty-two separate nations that happen to be arrayed along the British rail line.”

In the competition between East and West, he expects Asia to overshadow the Euro-Atlantic powers. The principal reasons why have more to do with culture than with numbers. In his view, “Westerners have abandoned an ethical basis for society, believing that all problems are solvable by a good government. In the East, we start with self-reliance.”

No one will agree with all of Lee’s views. No one, however, can fail to be challenged by his direct, pithy answers, or to be enlightened by his insights. For navigating in the buzzing, booming confusion of international affairs today, the strategic grand master is a source of wise coordinates.

Graham Allison is director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Robert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. They are coauthors of Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World, published Feb. 1 by MIT Press).

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/lee-kuan-yew-grand-master-asia-8169

Musa’s candor is bipartisanship’s grist

March 15, 2013

By Terence Netto@http://www.malaysiakini.com

COMMENT: Finally, (Tun) Musa Hitam had something to say about the party of change (read: Pakatan Rakyat) and, by implication, the party of the status quo which, needless to say, is BN.

It’s not his style to have declined to say something, given the gravity of the issues before the electorate and of the decision that voters must make at GE-13.

To have avoided making a comment would have been contrary to his instincts as a politician, albeit a retired one, and his stature as an elder statesman in Malaysian councils.

Someone in his situation could not be expected to have let current matters pass without comment of the objective sort. UMNO man though he is, a reflexive partisanship is just not his style.

When matters facing the nation are fraught, Musa can be expected to lift anchor and float intriguingly in the space between a concern for the where the country is headed and the understandable partisanship of a party man.

One remembers the remarks he made when there was a rush by Malays to join PAS in the aftermath of Anwar Ibrahim’s sacking from government and UMNO in late 1998. The expulsion and public humiliation of the former Deputy Prime Minister became an international cause celebre and generated a tidal movement towards signing up for PAS.

After observing the phenomenon for some time – a year on from September 1998, PAS had doubled its membership from 400,000 – Musa confessed to being amazed at the magnetism of the Islamic party, whereupon one of the party’s columnists, Subky Latif, offered to “sediakan borang” (fetch Musa a membership form).

Of course Musa, admiring though he was at the rush to sign up with PAS, wasn’t going to join the cavalcade. But his readiness to observe and remark candidly on the phenomenon was reflective of a trait all democrats ought to have: common sensical acknowledgment of easily attributable happenings.

Absent this quality, the competitive process in a democracy will be reduced to a raucous shouting match and is bound to become a turnoff to voters.

The trait of candid acknowledgment of easily ascribable phenomena is sine qua non of all parties to the democratic process in which competing coalitions vie for the privilege of ruling the country.

Musa’s last hurrah

In his most recent instance of unabashed recognition of compelling realities, Musa was reported to have said that Pakatan Rakyat won’t want to bankrupt the Treasury simply because they would want to be returned to power at GE-14 should they win GE-13.

So even if certain planks in the Pakatan manifesto appear impossible to fulfill, Musa was saying that a desire to be returned to power would slow, if not halt, a gallop to the fiscal precipice.

Pakatan cannot hope for a more candid acknowledgment from one from the other side of the country’s political divide about their seriousness as contenders for national governance not just now but for decades to come.

Pakatan have in Musa a credible candidate for the role of speaker of the Dewan Rakyat should it gain Putrajaya at GE13.

This is not to suggest that Musa was angling to be appointed to the role by his recent remarks on Pakatan’s viability.

Some time ago, Subki Latif suggested Musa for the role on the basis of his credibility as a personage on the national political scene.

Pakatan would embellish its claims to bipartisanship by appointing Musa to the role should they win power at the next polls.

And Musa would relish a last hurrah in national affairs as fair-minded interlocutor between two competing coalitions which are likely to run each other close at the general election.

Parliament would be an elevated arena for debate on issues. Rare would be the repeat of demeaning instances of the past when unparliamentary language and actions debased the arena.

Musa would have just the right combination of elegant speech and enlivening humour to steer proceedings along elevating channels. He will be 79 next month; there’s no reason these days to think that a person would be past it in his ninth decade in this world.

A prospective role in Malaysia’s 13th Parliament’s elevation would bring his career to a coda that recalls the poet Robert Frost’s lines on old age:

No memory of having starred
Atones for later disregard
Nor keeps the end from being hard
Better to go down with boughten friendship at your side
Than with none at all. Provide, Provide.

Khmer Rouge’s Ieng Sary Dead

March 15, 2013

by Seth  Mydans@www,nytimes.com

Ieng Sary, the former Foreign Minister of the Khmer Rouge who was one of three elderly leaders on trial on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, died on Thursday in a hospital in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, where he had been taken from his holding cell. He was 87.

His lawyers said he was hospitalized with gastrointestinal problems on March 4. Mr. Ieng Sary (pronounced yeng sah-REE) had been treated for heart problems and other ailments for years. His death was announced by the special tribunal trying him, with United Nations backing.

Mr. Ieng Sary, a brother-in-law of Pol Pot, the top leader of the Khmer Rouge, was part of an inner circle of Paris-educated communists who led the movement, which caused the deaths of 1.7 million people from starvation, overwork and execution during its rule from 1975 to 1979.

Only one person, Kaing Guek Eav, a prison commander known as Duch (pronounced doik), has been convicted in connection with those deaths. He was convicted in 2010 and sentenced to life in prison in February 2012. The remaining defendants are Nuon Chea, the movement’s chief ideologue, and Khieu Samphan, the nominal head of state of the Khmer Rouge. Both are in their 80s.

As Foreign Minister, Mr. Ieng Sary helped persuade hundreds of Cambodian diplomats and intellectuals to return home from overseas to help the new revolutionary government. The returnees were sent to “re-education camps,” and most were executed.

Mr. Ieng Sary “repeatedly and publicly encouraged, and also facilitated, arrests and executions within his Foreign Ministry and throughout Cambodia,” wrote Stephen Heder, a Cambodia scholar who assisted the tribunal and is a co-author of “Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge.”

Before his arrest in 2007, Mr. Ieng Sary said: “I have done nothing wrong. I am a gentle person. I believe in good deeds. I even performed good deeds to save several people’s lives.” At a news conference, he blamed Pol Pot for the mass killings and also pointed a finger at Mr. Nuon Chea, who he said was implicated in torture and execution.

The tribunal, formally the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, expressed regret over Mr. Ieng Sary’s death. The defendants have all been in and out of the hospital since their arrests, and the tribunal has tried to assure that they survive to hear their sentences.

“The death of Ieng Sary is another blow to the Extraordinary Chambers and is an example of ‘justice delayed is justice denied,’ ” said Long Panhavuth, who has been following the trial closely as program coordinator of the Cambodia Justice Initiative, an independent monitoring program. “It is unfortunate that the trial chamber could not complete the judgment while the accused and the victims are still alive.”

Mr. Ieng Sary’s wife, Ieng Thirith, whose sister was married to Pol Pot, was also a defendant until she was excused because she has dementia.Pol Pot himself died in 1998 in a jungle stronghold of the Khmer Rouge and never faced a courtroom.

Mr. Ieng Sary was deputy prime minister for foreign affairs and a permanent member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea’s Standing Committee during the Khmer Rouge’s rule over Cambodia, which it then called Democratic Kampuchea.

During the trial, Mr. Ieng Sary’s lawyers argued that he was protected by a pardon, granted in 1996 by King Norodom Sihanouk, absolving him of a conviction in absentia for genocide in a show trial in 1979, shortly after the Khmer Rouge were driven from power by a Vietnamese invasion. The court, however, ruled that the amnesty did not apply in this case.

After the Khmer Rouge were ousted, Mr. Ieng Sary continued a civil war against the new government until he surrendered with thousands of troops in 1996 in return for the king’s pardon. Until his arrest he had lived openly in a villa in Phnom Penh, traveling often to Thailand for medical treatment.

Mr. Ieng Sary was born on Oct. 24, 1925, in Tra Ninh Province in southern Vietnam, to an ethnic Cambodian father and an ethnic Chinese mother. His birth name was Kim Trang, and he later used the revolutionary name Van.

He was one of a group of future Khmer Rouge leaders, including Pol Pot, who received scholarships to study in France, where he became a member of the French Communist Party in 1951.

After returning to Phnom Penh in 1957, he taught history in high school and became an underground member of the Communist Party of Cambodia. He fled to the jungle in 1963 when people suspected of being communists were being arrested.

In 1970, as the Khmer Rouge gained momentum and as war raged in neighboring Vietnam, he went to Hanoi to establish a radio station for his revolutionary movement. He then flew to Beijing, where he was given a permanent base in 1971, according to testimony in the trial.

He returned permanently to Cambodia in April 1975, a moment known as Year Zero, when the Khmer Rouge marched into Phnom Penh and began transforming the country.

A version of this article appeared in print on March 15, 2013, on page A23 of the New York edition with the headline: Ieng Sary, Former Official Of Khmer Rouge, Dies at 87.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/world/asia/ieng-sary-khmer-rouge-leader-tied-to-genocide-dies-at-87.html?_r=0