Singapore and Malaysia- A Tale of Two Nations

May 13, 2013

by Mariam Mokhtar@http://www.malaysiakini.com

The greatest fear of the Singapore government is a Malaysia that is better governed and less corrupt. The extraordinary events in Malaysia over the past few years, plus the courageous stand of her citizens in the last few days, has been closely monitored from across the causeway.

If the infection spreads, the pent up feelings of Singaporeans may be unleashed. The two nations have a shared history.

Singapore may be a first world nation, but when it comes to an outpouring of feelings, the Singaporeans still look up to their cousins in Malaysia.

Dictatorship could be described as the new democracy in our neck of the woods; UMNO Baru’s Najib Abdul Razak together with his Singaporean counterpart, Lee Hsien Loong, have every reason to be rattled by the ‘Anwar Ibrahim phenomenon’.

Not since independence has Malaysia been rocked by a political force which has captured the rakyat’s sense of frustration at the nation’s existing archaic order.

The older generation are weary of the wanton waste of resources, the lack of discipline shown by its leaders and the disintegration of society. The young yearn for a new order where their contributions are acknowledged, where everyone is treated as equals and where they are rewarded for hard work, rather than their connections or lineage.

Anwar has articulated their needs and galvanised the rakyat into action. Two weeks ago, some Malaysians residing in Singapore were cautioned by the Singapore Police for reminding Malaysians to return home to vote. A few days ago, some were arrested in Merlion Park for protesting about the fraud perpetrated during GE13. The Singaporean government does not like its citizens to have a mind of their own.

Najib wants Malaysia to be “the best democracy in the world”, but the hallmarks of his version of democracy are cheating, intimidation and bribery. In Singapore, the authorities also intimidate and take legal action against anyone who dares besmirch the characters of its leaders.

In Malaysia, insecure Malays reject the DAP because of the implied threat that Malaysia will be swallowed up by Singapore. Their fears are enhanced by some Chinese Malaysians, who look up to an idealised version of Singapore. Singapore absorbed many of them into learning institutions, gave them scholarships and jobs. These Malaysians forget that the price paid for Singapore’s transformation into a first world nation has been high.

‘Soulless inhabitants’

What use are towers that reach up to the sky when deep down, its inhabitants lack a soul?  Children suffer from mental health issues because of academic pressures. Adults complain of a poor work-life balance. Many Singaporeans are unhappy and a number of them have migrated.

When Anwar held a talk at the London School of Economics a few years ago, the event was oversubscribed and several hundred participants were accommodated in an adjoining lecture theatre to listen to him via video link.

The audience were mainly young adults in their early twenties, but the most amazing thing, was that a sizeable proportion were Singaporeans.

Many people disagreed with me, when in an article, I mentioned the possibility that Singapore feared a strong, successful and less corrupt Malaysia, and that the People’s Action Party (PAP) would prefer UMNO Baru to govern Malaysia, rather than an Anwar-led administration.

Without a doubt, Singapore is clean, its public transport is efficient, the entertainment and the promotion of the arts is good, English is widely spoken, it is very safe, local and international cuisines are easily available, and the island state is an important international transport hub.

In many ways, Singapore is like Malaysia. Both have state-controlled media, its Armed forces are dominated by one race, and they are ruled by autocratic governments. The cost of living is high, housing and car ownership are expensive.

Both Malaysia’s UMNO Baru government and the Singapore PAP have alienated themselves from the population.

Although change is within the grasp of the ordinary Malaysian, change in the near future is only a dream for many Singaporeans. Wasn’t it Lee Kuan Yew (left) who once said, “…I spent a whole lifetime building this, and as long as I am in charge, nobody is going to knock it down.”

Like Dr Mahathir Mohamad, will Lee ever relinquish his hold on the island?

Last month’s Global Witness exposé highlighted the flip-side of the financial world of Singapore. It appears that dodgy South-East Asian governments and drug barons find Singapore a convenient place to launder money.

To add to Singapore’s woes, there are the worldwide syndicated football rigging and sex scandals which have rocked the world.  Only the naive would think that corruption does not exist in Singapore – they are simply better at concealing their underhanded practices. An acquaintance who handled the Malaysian side of business for a Singapore firm, alleged that he was given a sizeable allocation to sweeten any business deals in Malaysia.

The Singaporeans like to project a clean image, but it is the Malaysians who gets the bad  reputation.

The government of Singapore is concerned by the moral awakening in their people, but they fear most the economic repercussions if UMNO Baru were to be replaced. If Anwar’s administration gave Malaysians meritocracy, and excellent learning institutions were open to all, the majority of Malaysians would not need to go to Singapore to study.

No more brain drain?

There are tales of children being woken up at 4am to travel to Singapore to go to school because their parents could not enrol them in a local Malaysian school. Bright children are deprived of scholarships because they belong to the wrong race or religion. Families are broken up when some family members moved to Singapore for employment.

Singapore has every right to be scared if UMNO Baru were ousted. The brain drain would stop. If working conditions in Malaysia were improved, the daily migration of workers to Singapore would be stemmed and Singapore might suffer a shortage of workers. If corruption was reduced, Malaysia would attract more foreign investment.

The feeling of xenophobia is high in Singapore, and is mostly directed at the Chinese from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Singaporeans consider them to be loud, brash, arrogant and lacking in culture. They are wary of their government’s desire to attract more people from the PRC to increase the dwindling population, to take care of the elderly and to bolster the economy.

The recent wave of xenophobia in Malaysia was generated by UMNO Baru because it gave away identity cards (ICs) to foreigners – like the Filipinos and Indonesians – in exchange for votes to stay in power.

Leaders in UMNO Baru have lost valuable Malaysian land to the Singaporeans, such as the Pedra Banca island off Johor and the land swap deal involving Keretapi Tanah Melayu (KTM) land in Singapore.

To increase their land mass, Singaporeans have obtained sand from Malaysia, through legal and illegal means. The buying power of the Singapore currency means that they can buy property cheaply in Malaysia and in some places, have priced the locals out of the housing market.

In Ipoh, Singaporeans have built skyscrapers beside limestone hills and many locals fear that this has set a precedent and before long, the natural beauty of Ipoh will be marred forever. The Perak UMNO Baru seem oblivious to the concerns of the locals.

A clean and efficient government can improve our economy, but UMNO Baru will continue to hamper our progress. Without cronyism and corruption, Malaysia will emerge a stronger, richer nation, no longer the poor relation of Singapore.

Malaysia’s Attorney General on The “Sabah Claim”

April 5, 2013

by Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail (04-04-14)@http://www.nst.com.my

ESSENTIAL PART OF MALAYSIA: The Sulu sultanate’s claim to the state collapses upon closer inspection.

THE claim to Sabah is one that has over the years been intermittently pursued by a Sulu sultanate, one that is self-proclaimed and headed by a self-styled sultan.

This claim is in itself with no basis either in history or under the law and collapses upon detailed inspection.

This article is aimed at giving an overview of the key events in time that led to the legitimising of the creation of Malaysia, with Sabah as an essential component part, and discusses the status of Sabah in light of international legal principles on the right to self-determination.

As recorded through available historical agreements, documents and other publications, the greater part of the lands that today constitute the territory of Sabah once came under the control of the Sultan of Brunei and the Sultanate of Sulu.

However, over time, the North Borneo lands gradually and by separate grants came under the control of the British North Borneo Company, the British government before finally constituting part of the Federation of Malaysia.

 In 1877, the sultan of Brunei and the Pengiran Temenggong of Brunei entered into four grants to transfer parts of the Sultan of Brunei’s domains to Gustavus Baron de Overbeck, the Austria/Hungary consul-general in Hong Kong, and Alfred Dent Esquire, merchant and entrepreneur of the commercial house of Dent Brothers and Company of London.

During this time, Overbeck and Dent learnt that the territory in the northeast coast of Borneo, which formed a large portion of the territory ceded to them in the Brunei grants, was in fact in the possession of the sultan of Sulu.

Overbeck and Dent, thus, decided to secure a further grant from the Sultan of Sulu. They succeeded in doing so and on Jan 22, 1878, Overbeck and Dent acquired from Sultan Jamal Al Alam, in consideration of the sum of $5,000 Malayan annum, the grant and cession of parts of the island of Borneo.

On the same day, the Sultan of Sulu also commissioned Overbeck as Bendahara and Raja of Sandakan, granting him the powers and rights over the territories usually reserved for sovereign rulers.

A similar commission was also granted to Overbeck in 1877 by the Sultan of Brunei. In 1880, Overbeck sold his rights and interests under the 1877 and 1878 grants and commissions to Dent, who subsequently in 1881, obtained a royal charter from the British Government.

The charter in effect incorporated the British North Borneo Company and transferred the full benefit of the grants and commissions to the said company.

The British North Borneo would later become a British protectorate in 1888. At around the same time, by virtue of the Madrid Protocol of 1885, which was signed between Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany, the UK and Germany recognised Spain’s sovereignty over the Sulu archipelago, while Spain renounced its claim to North Borneo in favour of the UK.

After the collapse of the Spanish government in Manila, by the Treaty of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded all its sovereignty over “…the archipelago known as the Philippine islands” to the United States.

Subsequent thereto, by virtue of the treaty of November 7, 1900, between the US and Spain, the latter “relinquish[ed] to the United States all title and claim of title . . . to any and all islands belonging to the Philippine archipelago”, which had not been covered by the treaty of December 10, 1898.

On March 22, 1915, the Carpenter Agreement was entered into between the sultan of Sulu and the US whereby the sultan ratified and confirmed his recognition of the US’ sovereignty in Mindanao and Sulu.

When North Borneo was finally liberated from the Japanese occupation, which spanned from January 1942 to September 1945, and after the time of British military administration ended on July 15, 1946, North Borneo, including Labuan, was made a crown colony administered by a governor assisted by an executive council and a legislative council.

With reference to the cabinet memorandum, policy in regard to Malaya and Borneo of 1945, it was clear that the British government itself was keen to assume and believed that it was assuming “sovereign and administrative rights” over North Borneo.

The North Borneo Cession Order in Council 1946, which came into operation on July 15, 1946, annexed the state of North Borneo to Britain and made it a part of His Majesty’s dominions called, together with the Settlement of Labuan and its dependencies, the colony of North Borneo.

Thereafter, from 1946 to 1963, pursuant to its obligations under the United Nations Charter, the UK (as the administering power of a non-self-governing territory) reported on North Borneo to the relevant committee established under Article 73(e) of the United Nations Charter.

Sabahans waving the Jalur Gemilang during Malaysia Day celebrations in Kota Kinabalu on September 16, 2012

_____________________

Gani Patail extinguishes the proclamations made on Sabah

By Shalina R

“We thought it is high-time the public is informed about our stance on the claims that have been made,” said Malaysia’s Attorney General Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail at the Political Transformation Conference held at the Magellan Resort in Kota Kinabalu on April 2nd.

“The research for this book started at least three or four years ago. The materials were collected and retrieved by colleagues who, some of them, travelled to different countries including the United States of America in order to do so,” said Gani.

“We have done an extensive amount of research which includes articles and documents that have become very important to us and through this book we are able to cite it to you without prejudice,” he said while also citing the United Nation Secretary General’s report as one of the reference materials used to garner more information.

Gani took the initiative to detail the status and historical background of Sabah through his book entitled ‘Putting to Rest the Claim to Sabah by the Self-proclaimed Sultanate of Sulu’. He also explains Malaysia’s position under international law and discusses the claims of the Sulu and Philippines on Sabah.

According to the Attorney General, the book details the exact happenings and the agreements that were set during the times of Gustav Baron Von Overbeck as well as British North Borneo Company Founder Alfred Dent. The book also outlines the events that led Sabah to join the Federation of Malaya which ultimately culminated in the formation Malaysia. Besides that, Gani also touches on the subject of Cobbold Commission in his book.

“I think a lot of people have been talking about and are confused about the details of the Cobbold Commission,” he said. “I thought maybe just this once, I would pen down what was reported exactly in order to provide clarity over the subject.”

The 149-page book is jointly published by Razak School of Government and the Malaysian Institute of Translation and Books. The RM30 book is expected to be available in the market by this week and it can also be purchased online at ecommerce.itbm.com.my.

“I must thank the people in my department and acknowledge the efforts that they have made,” said the Attorney General. “They put their heads together and did all the research.”

Gani’s book will be launched by Sabah’s Chief Minister Datuk Seri Musa Aman at the opening of the Political Transformation Conference which will be held at the Magellan Sutera Resort on April 3rd. – Insight Sabah

Posted on April 3, 2013

Malaysia at (yet another) crossroads

April 1, 2013

The DRUM Opinion

by Gerhard Hoffstaedter and Greg Lopez

While Malaysia has achieved admirable economic success under its dominant coalition government, this has come at the expense of human rights and the free press. Now, the opposition is offering greater transparency, write Gerhard Hoffstaedter and Greg Lopez.

The Malaysian government and its multiple state governments have become caretaker governments and elections will have to be called before June 28, 2013 if the country wants to maintain the semblance of an electoral democracy.

Everything is at stake at these elections. Malaysia has been ruled as a country by one coalition since independence in 1957 and its hold on political power has been tenacious. The economy and society remains formidable.

Opposition coalitions have tried at every election to make inroads in a system clearly stacked against them. In 2008, there was a real breakthrough, with the opposition capturing five out of the 13 states of the federation and breaking the ruling coalition’s psychologically important 2/3 majority it had become accustomed to.

It is not easy to categorise the two opposing coalitions and its members, as they are disparate, complex, and, with multiple agendas, often fractured. The ruling coalition is run by UMNO, the United Malays National Organisation, with other constituent parties largely serving the Chinese and Indian populations as well as some indigenous communities of Sabah and Sarawak.

This consociational model of politics provided each major ethnic group a share in the political domain under the leadership of the Malays and an increasingly Islamicised UMNO. In return, the basic social, cultural and economic rights of the non-Muslims were guaranteed. With a plethora of positive discrimination for the Malays to become upwardly mobile, a new Malay middle class was created, which secured a peace between and among what in Malaysia are referred to as racial groups.

This coalition and its grasp on power has maintained this status quo, which has served the elite very well and achieved real economic success, at least on a national level, with Malaysia almost eliminating absolute poverty, recording impressive socioeconomic outcomes, building state-of-the art infrastructure, and achieving upper middle income status in less than half a century after independence.

However, outward peace and economic success were built on enduring human rights violations, a lack of a free press, corruption, and the capitulation of the civil sphere to reactionary and extremist nationalist and religious zealots.

The Opposition promises to unmake some of these strictures and aims to provide a more transparent form of governance, which it demonstrated in two of Malaysia’s most populous, rich and industrialised states – Selangor and Penang – which it has governed since 2008.

But the Opposition coalition is a looser coalition, made up of a predominantly Chinese party with socialist ideologies, Malaysia’s only Islamist party, and the People’s Justice party, headed by former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. He remains a divisive figure in Malaysia. His democratic credentials (as well as his economic liberal ones) are well known in the West, but in Malaysia punters are more concerned with his sexuality. The ruling coalition will continue to pursue any opening it can to destabilise his appeal as elder statesman.

Prime Minister Najib, meanwhile, is ignoring corruption charges in a French court over kickbacks in the purchase of French submarines and, more disconcertingly, questions about his involvement in the murder of a Mongolian model in Malaysia, who had acted as a translator in the said French submarine deal.

The campaign thus far has been fought by chipping away at both leaders’ capacity to elder statesmen and their ability to lead a divided country. The ruling coalition has, upon advice from an American PR company, rolled out a more inclusive image of its administration and vision for Malaysia, epitomised under its “1Malaysia” concept that now features on shop fronts, medical centres and government offices.

It has not, however, reined in the divisive reactionary movements and NGOs that call for Sharia to be the supreme law in the country or that continue to call non-Malays ‘sojourners’ in ‘their’ land.

To overcome the divided body politic, it will require a leader of substance and integrity. For many, that continues to be Anwar Ibrahim, while others are less sure. But without any alternatives, the stage is set for a bruising and expensive campaign with the highest of stakes and the lowest of strategies – in terms of quality – to get there.

Australia has largely been able to accommodate and deal with even the intransigent Mahathir, so continuing with a Najib administration will suit it just fine. In fact, Najib signed off on the Malaysia solution, or refugee swap deal, has furthered economic ties, and has been a gracious host to Australian delegations, bar one.

Independent Senator Nick Xenophon learnt the hard way, being the wrong person at the right time for Najib Razak and UMNO to show their mettle domestically. UMNO moving into overdrive in the home stretch made it clear that there is a magic, invisible line foreigners should not cross when ‘meddling’ in Malaysia’s affairs.

Any commentary on the democratic process in Malaysia is not sought from the officials and Australian interventions, even in election observation, is not tolerated. These are the limits of good neighbours like Malaysia in its current political climate.

If the Opposition wins, it is unlikely that there would be any fundamental departure in the overall Australia-Malaysia relationship as it is on solid footing. If anything, it would further improve bilateral relations as the opposition coalition’s stated aspirations of social justice are quite similar to Australia’s core values.

There are two outstanding issues currently – the Malaysia solution and the Lynas rare earth plant. In relation to the Malaysia solution, Australia would have to renegotiate and reassess its border protection plans as at present the opposition coalition does not have a clear refugee policy other than stating its commitments to current international norms. They may sign a range of international conventions including ones that would protect the rights of the refugees, and require that Australia process them onshore.

However, in signing the various international conventions, the ‘Malaysia solution’ would also meet the requirements of the Australian High Court decision and leave open the possibility of renegotiating them. The Lynas issue is more complex as it involves an approved investment. The issue has created a groundswell of popular domestic dissent, but the opposition has been ambiguous on what it would do if it comes into power.

But for now, all we can do is wait for the election to be (finally) called.

Gerhard Hoffstaedter is a lecturer in anthropology in the School of Social Science at the University of Queensland, and the author of Modern Muslim Identities: Negotiating Religion and Ethnicity in Malaysia. View his full profile here. Greg Lopez is a visiting fellow at the department of political and social change, Australian National University. View his full profile here.

http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4603166.html

ASEAN won’t accept the idea of a “state within a state”

March 26, 2012

by Farish A. Noor @http://www.nst.com.my

INTRUSION: Unlawful for Kiram to have private army and wage war on another nation.

THE security breach in Sabah remains a lingering problem, thanks largely to the claims made by one person who has sparked off what is really a complex internal debate within Philippine society itself.

Jamalul Kiram III’s demand that he be recognised as the Sultan of Sulu with a claim on some parts of Sabah has raised an even deeper question that the Philippines has to address: can the Philippine republic accept the idea that within its republican framework there are citizens who claim to be more than citizens, and who claim that they have power and authority over parts of the republic which they argue are part of their own kingdom?

In short, can the Philippine republic accept the idea of a state within a state, or in this case a kingdom within a republic?The initial answer to this might seem to be a straightforward “no”.

As President Benigno Aquino himself noted during one of his press conferences, it is technically unconstitutional for any Philippine citizen to have a private army, to bear arms without licences and to declare war on another country. On legal grounds, Kiram’s stand seems shaky indeed.

But Kiram continues to probe into the soft underbelly of the post colonial state by invoking primordial attachments to the past, and this is where the modern post colonial state of the Philippines — like all other ASEAN states — has to address the question of its own complicated origins and genesis.

Let us remember that the states of ASEAN are a varied lot: when the countries of Southeast Asia became independent from the 1940s to 1960s, they emerged on the stage of world politics in different shapes and forms.

Today, when we look at the ASEAN region we see constitutional democracies, constitutional monarchies, republics, single-party states and so on. Each ASEAN country has had to find its own way of dealing with the legacy of the past.

But in this respect, Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand are more alike for none of these states has marginalised or eclipsed the older polities that pre-existed before independence.

The Federation of Malaysia, for one, maintains some degree of relative authority over the nine kingdoms where the Sultans of Malaysia remain as important figures in the context of their respective kingdoms.

Like Thailand, Malaysia is also a country with a constitutional head of state. But in Malaysia, as in Thailand, it is the government that prints the national currency, deals with other states and manages things like international relations and diplomacy.

The Philippines, on the other hand, is more akin to Indonesia and Myanmar which have opted to become republics, and where the former ruling elites have been integrated into the broader framework of universal citizenship.

Myanmar’s Royal family practically ceased to exist after the Third Anglo-Burmese war of 1885, and though traces remain in terms of some of their descendants, there has never been an attempt to revive the Burmese kingship in modern-day Myanmar. Indonesia, too, once had many royal courts in Java, Sumatra, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. But most of the Royal houses were brought under the auspices of the centralised state after the tumultuous years of Indonesia’s war of independence between 1945 and 1949. Today, they exist in name only, but with no real political power or authority.

As far as the structure of the state is concerned, the Philippines bears a much closer resemblance to Indonesia than it does to Malaysia, and this is where the problem lies — though it has to be emphasised that this is a Philippine problem, and not Malaysia’s.

Like Indonesia, the Philippines does not accept the idea that there can be a state within a state in the republic, which is why Kiram is no different in terms of his rights and obligations from any other citizen.

In Indonesia, too, there remain many sultans such as the rulers of Cirebon, Yogjakarta and Surakarta in Java. But they, too, have no special powers or rights, and they too come under the law of the republic.

Indonesia has been better able to deal with some of the claims of the former rulers of the country, for the central government has displayed more sensitivity in according them the respect that is their due: in the history books of Indonesia, Indonesian children learn about the role played by the sultans in the anti-colonial struggle for instance.

And today the kingdom of Yogjakarta has been able to reposition itself very well, packaging itself as a tourist destination and presenting itself as the custodian of Javanese art, culture and heritage.

 Some of the less fortunate kingdoms in Sumatra and Kalimantan, however, have fallen into a state of despair and ruin. The fate of the sultanate of Sulu seems to be similar to that of some of the now-defunct Royal houses of Indonesia.

 Bereft of funds and with no real political authority, it relies on cultural capital and its claims to history to project itself.But Kiram’s armed incursion into Malaysia was probably one of his “biggest miscalculations”, to quote the Philippine analyst Joseph Franco; and has now turned into a major own goal that has robbed him and his followers of whatever residual sympathy others may have had for his cause.

The Royal families of Indonesia have also tried to project themselves internationally, but through their promotion of the arts, by appealing to UNESCO, and by maintaining their relevance as a bastion of culture and history — and certainly not by waging war against the Indonesian republic, which would be politically self-defeating.

However this crisis pans out in the near future is anyone’s guess at the moment, though one thing is clear for now: ASEAN, for all its strengths and weaknesses, is a still a region where no country accepts the notion of states within states, and that is not likely to change tomorrow.

NO Deal on Sabah: Sabahans are Malaysians

March 23, 2013

by Raymond Tombung@http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com

The Sabah claim will continue to be raised by the Phlippines and Sulu as it is powerful and emotive international issue which many leaders in Manila will find convenient to bleed for political mileage. And the many “sultans” in Sulu will continue to cast their hungry eyes at Sabah, considered to be “the last gold coin” and aspire, albeit hopelessly, to try and achieve the impossible.

But Malaysians, especially Sabahans, should be able to give a cogent argument on the issue of this claim and in favour of Sabah.All Malaysians and Sabahans need is three or four historical facts, events or political realities to win the argument.

So let’s always keep clear knowledge of the following:

1. The controversy arising from the 1878 treaty between Jamalul Alam and British North Borneo Company.It can strongly be argued that it was a “cession” and not a “lease” as claimed by Filipinos.

Note that any argument on the matter was decisively clarified and settled when on April 22, 1903, Sultan Jamalul Kiram signed a document known as “Confirmation of Cession of certain Islands” in which he says the 1878 treaty was a CESSION.

The “confirmation” of the 1878 treaty says specifically that “We, the Sultan of Sulu, state with truth and clearness that we have ceded to the Government of British North Borneo of our own pleasure all the islands that are near the territory of North Borneo… This is done because the names of the islands were not mentioned in the 22nd January, 1878 [treaty]… that the islands were included in the cession…”

2. The purpose of the Madrid Protocol of 1885 was to recognise the sovereignty of Spain in the Sulu Archipelago and also for Spain to relinquish all claims it might have had over North Borneo.

Article III of the protocol states that “The Spanish Government renounces… all claims of sovereignty over the territories of the continent of Borneo, which belong, or which have belonged in the past to the Sultan of Sulu [Jolo]….”

3. The signing of the Carpenter Agreement on March 22, 1915 in which Sultan Jamalul Kiram II was stripped off all temporal (worldly) power and retained only the empty title of Sultan. His claimed ownership of North Borneo was of no concern to the American colonists.

4. The Macaskie Dictum (Judgment) of 1939. This judgment doesn’t settle the argument although Macaskie said the annual payment was cession money and not rental money and that the nine plaintiff heirs were entitled to.

These payments, however, in no way had anything to do with territorial property. This is because a later translation by the Filipinos of the original 1878 treaty (written in Malayan Jawi) said the agreement was a “pajak” which they say meant “lease”.

(Today “pajak” can mean “purchase”). But even this judgment was preceded by the addition “cession” of 1903 and the Madrid Protocol of 1885.

Power of Attorney questionable

5. The Sulu “sultans” cannot claim Sabah because there is no more a Sulu sultanate and there is no more any real sultan. The only legitimate royal group in Sulu are the descendants of the nine heirs who went to Macaskie in 1939.

6. Sulu (a region of the Philippines without any national sovereignty) cannot claim Sabah which is part of Malaysia – a sovereign nation.Only a country can claim another country or a part of another country. This,therefore,means Sulu has no locus standi to claim Sabah. The power of attorney that was given to Macapagal by the Sulu Sultan to give Diosdado Macapagal the “authority” to claim Sabah on Sulu’s behalf (now withdrawn) has very questionable validity.

Maybe this is one of the reasons why Manila had not really pursued the claim using the so-called power of attorney.

7. Manila had denied and re-recognised the sultanate a number of times, but this does not change the fact that there has been not been any sultanate to speak of since the Carpenter-Kiram Agreement of 1915.

8. By July 15, 1946, the British government had taken over North Borneo when the North Borneo Company could no longer manage it after the devastation of World War II.

The company had the right to hand over North Borneo to whoever it wanted because the country had been ceded to it in 1878 (and confirmed by the confirmation of cession in 1903 and the nullification of Sulu’s ownership of the country by the Madrid Protocol of 1885).

9. Many Brunei historians actually argue that Brunei never gave away any part of North Borneo to Sulu. And there is no document whatsoever to prove this cession.

10. After Sabah became part of Malaysia and Malaysia’s sovereignty was recognised by the United Nations and the world, that had effectively superceded and nullified any claim on Sabah.

ICJ confirmed Sabah’s status as part of Malaysia

Sulu cannot be so arrogant and shameless to think that it can simply and freely take back a piece of land it “owned” 135 years ago after it has been developed by someone else for half a century.

11. The International Court of Justice (which is an arm of the United Nation) had recognised and confirmed Sabah as part of Malaysia when it made a verdict in 2002 that Sipadan and Ligitan islands belonged to Malaysia (and not Indonesia). This confirmation of ownership cannot be reversed in favour of Sulu (judgments of the ICJ  are not subject to appeal).

12. Whatever the arguments are, all the past agreements and treaties – whether they were valid, arguable or controversial – are now effectively useless historical references because they have been superseded by bigger and more important events.

Therefore the argument by Harry Roque, a law professor at University of the Philippines, who says that a legal principle known as “uti posseditis juris” (“accords pre-eminence of legal title over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty”) is useless and ineffective. Also, this pre-eminence of legal title is a double-edged sword because it can also be applied to Malaysia.

13. Professor Dr Ramlah Adam recently said: “They cannot claim [Sabah] just based on history. For example, the Siam government handed Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu over to the British and [today] cannot claim the states.”

Prof Emeritus Khoo Kay Kim said that if the Philippines’ argument can be accepted, then “Singapore should be returned to Johor and Penang be returned to Kedah”.

And for that matter why does Brunei not claim Sabah as well because there is a Brunei argument that it never gave Sabah to Sulu? Or why doesn’t Indonesia claim Peninsular Malaysia and southern Thailand? After all, weren’t these regions under the Srivijaya Empire in the eighth century?

14. Sabahans do not want to be part of the Philippines, as confirmed by the findings of the Cobbold Commission.Even today Sabahans feel a lot of trepidation at the mere thought of being under the so-called Sulu sultanate.

No referendum

15. There is an argument that Malaysia had agreed in the Manila Accord (signed July 31, 1963) that the formation of Malaysia was subject to the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

But whatever was agreed in the Manila Accord has been superseded by later events, for example, the formation of Malaysia which included Sabah, two months after the Manila Accord.

In the Bangkok Talks of June-July 1968, Malaysia had unilaterally rejected the Manila Accord.With the benefit of hindsight, wasn’t the Manila Accord an exercise in futility, especially by the Philippines in trying to hang on to something which couldn’t be implemented and solved till the end of time?

If the terms of the Manila Accord were adhered to, there would have been no Malaysia.Of prime importance was the wishes of Sabahans – two-thirds of whom wanted to join Malaysia as the findings of the Cobbold Commission indicated the year before.

And noteworthy is Article 10 of the accord which says: “The Ministers reaffirmed their countries’ adherence to the principle of self-determination for the people’s of non-governing territories. In this context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representatives.”

There was not much time to carry out such a referendum, but wasn’t this condition (to allow Sabah to be part of Malaysia) already fulfilled by the Cobbold Commission the year before?

A virtual paradise

16. Even Sabahan Tausugs do not want to be part of the Philippines.Ed Lingao, a renowned Filipino author and journalist had on February 21, 2013, reported in Minda News that he had undertaken a random survey of the Tausugs in Sabah and found out that even they do not want Sabah to become part of the Philippines.

He wrote: “Many of the Tausugs we encountered detested the idea of the Philippine government reclaiming Sabah. Refugees from war and poverty, many of these Tausugs see little benefit in a Sabah under the Philippine flag; in fact, for them, it is a worrying proposition, not unlike jumping from the clichéd frying pan into an even bigger fire.

“One Tausug we encountered outside a mall in Kota Kinabalu bristled at the idea of the Philippines staking a claim on Sabah saying ‘sisirain lang nila ang Sabah. Okay na nga ang Sabah ngayon, guguluhin lang nila,’ (They will just destroy Sabah. Sabah is doing fine right now, they will just mess it up).

“It is hard to blame them for the cynicism. After all, they took great risks and fled their own troubled country in droves for a better life, only to have that same country reach out and stake a claim on what, to them, is already a virtual paradise where one can finally live and work in peace. That, to them, may be the ultimate irony, the ultimate tragedy.”

As such, what we see today is a group of desperate people trying to live in the glory of the distant past, stepping forward with their thick skins with no regard for the truth.Lingao described the nature of the situation on February 19 in an article, “Sabah as the last gold coin”.

In it he notes: “Sabah became their clutch when their own Sulu was sinking, so to speak, from the heavy weight of bloodshed that spiralled into poverty.

“Sabah became the vision of the last gold coin that could win back the possibility of rising again, getting back the worth of a name: the venerable House of Kiram.”

How very sad and tragic indeed. And now more blood is being spilled in the name of a great overstated lie!

Sabah Insurgency: A Setback for Malaysia’s Role as Regional Conflict Mediator

March 17, 2013

Sabah Insurgency: A Setback for Malaysia’s Role as Regional Conflict Mediator

by Dr. Johan Saravanamuttu* (March 15, 2013)

The month-long crisis in Sabah, which has seen an incursion of rebel fighters from the Philippine island of Sulu into Malaysia’s northern-most state on the island of Borneo, is a stark reminder that Southeast Asia remains engulfed in unresolved territorial disputes and conflicts.

Malaysia has been deeply involved in several of these conflicts as both a stakeholder and a mediator. The Sabah crisis now presents Malaysia with a thorny domestic security challenge that also has implications for its regional role.

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia has so far subscribed actively to the ASEAN principle of “pacific settlement of conflicts” espoused in the organization’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, of which Malaysia was a founding signatory. Malaysia played a major role, as both host and mediator, in the negotiations that recently brought the conflict in the southern Philippines to a peaceful resolution.

On October 15, 2012, after 15 years of negotiations and 27 rounds of talks in Kuala Lumpur, the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed a comprehensive peace accord establishing a political settlement to the Islamic insurgency in the Muslim-majority region of Mindanao.

Malaysia also recently agreed to help try to broker an end to the conflict involving Muslim insurgents in four provinces in the deep south of Thailand. In a state visit to Malaysia on Feb. 28, 2013, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra agreed to begin talks in Kuala Lumpur with the “Barisan Revolusi Nasional” (“National Revolutionary Front”), the main Muslim group involved in southern Thailand’s conflict.

In the past decade, Malaysia has also peacefully resolved external territorial disputes with both Indonesia and Singapore. Indonesia took a dispute over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan off the Sabah coast to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which in 2002 deemed the islands to be Malaysian. Singapore and Malaysia settled the dispute over Pedra Branca, called Pulau Batu Puteh in Malaysia, in 2008, again through the ICJ, with Singapore retaining the island.

Malaysia still has claims in the Celebes and South China Seas involving other Southeast Asian states and China. In all these instances, Malaysia has maintained a stance of peaceful conflict resolution and, where expedient and possible, has brought matters to international arbitration.

As an internal conflict with an external dimension, the current crisis in Sabah constitutes a hybrid case of the region’s conflicts and territorial disputes. When Sabah was included into the new Federation of Malaysia in 1963, Manila maintained that Sabah belonged to the Philippines instead. However, after a U.N. observer team ascertained that the majority of Sabah’s people supported joining Malaysia, the Philippines stopped pressing its claim, though no Philippine government ever formally rescinded it. Over the years, the dispute was shelved due to good relations between the two states.

But in the current crisis, a century-old sovereignty claim over Sabah has been revived by Jamalul Kiram III, the self-proclaimed sultan of Sulu, an autonomous Philippine island province in Mindanao that historically included the area of north Borneo now known as Sabah. Kiram says that his ancestors merely leased and did not cede the territory to the British in 1878.

On February 12, more than 200 fighters of the self-styled “Royal Sulu Sultanate” landed in Malaysia, near the southeast Sabah coast, and holed themselves up in a nearby village, ignoring calls by Philippine President Benigno Aquino to return home.

In Malaysia’s initial Police response, 12 armed men were killed along with two Malaysian Policemen. Malaysia then conducted air strikes on the village and sent in some seven army battalions, killing 32. Other incidents occurring nearby left five Malaysian policemen dead. At the time of writing, the Malaysian authorities have rounded up almost 100 intruders and the death toll has reached 63, including two Malaysian soldiers, making the crisis the most serious military action involving Malaysian forces since the communist insurgency of 1948-1960.

More ominously, Malaysia, a promoter of regional conflict resolution for Muslims, is for the first time engaged in a shooting war with Muslim insurgents within its own territorial boundaries.

With the initial standoff having given way to a series of one-sided skirmishes, the Sabah situation risks becoming an internal Malaysian insurgency, with the Tausugs — the main ethnic group from Sulu in the Philippines, where they are known as Suluks — as the principle protagonists. The crisis is further embedded in the fluid character of local politics in Sabah, where large numbers of the population are Muslim.

In recent hearings held by a Malaysian Commission of Inquiry on illegal immigration in Sabah, it was revealed that Kuala Lumpur had awarded Malaysian citizenship to hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the southern Philippines for the sake of gaining an electoral advantage for the ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).

For years, UMNO has considered Sabah to be a “fixed deposit,” safely delivering 24 seats to the ruling coalition in the 222-seat national parliament. The large Filipino Muslim population in Sabah that helped deliver these seats in the past could now turn against its former protector and patron, with implications for the UMNO’s supremacy in national politics in the general election that must be held by late-June.

Given Malaysia’s prized role as regional peacemaker, it is a bitter irony that the pendulum of internal conflict has swung from Mindanao to Sabah, with the gloomy prospect of the Malaysian government facing a long-term low-intensity war with the Suluks and their supporters. That would not only represent a disruptive distraction in the run-up to the general elections, but also a huge blow to Malaysia’s role as a promoter of regional conflict resolution.

Dr.Johan Saravanamuttu is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/

Suluk Invaders only flog a dead horse (kuda mati)

March 17, 2013

by Bunn Nagara @www.thestar.com.my

EVEN though foreign insurgents make a historical claim to Sabah, the facts of history refute it.

AS Malaysian troops and police continue mopping-up operations to flush out straying remnants of the Lahad Datu standoff, partisans on both sides trade emotive claims and insults.

Analysts, meanwhile, weigh the terms in historical documents like “rent”, “lease” and “cession money” to determine Sabah’s actual status. But not only are these documents read differently in translation (English and Sulu), the terms are also interpreted differently.

It makes more sense to focus on the events and circumstances of history. The known facts reveal at least 16 reasons why the Filipino Sulu claim to Sabah is unwarranted and unworthy of consideration.

First, today’s Philippines as a modern nation state and a republic by definition abrogates a former sultanate whose territory it occupies and whose sovereignty it denies.

The Republic of the Philippines has no claim to Sabah of its own. The on-off claim, originating from Sulu sovereignty made by certain quarters, is only a private matter of some revisionist individuals.

The second reason is that the Sulu Sultanate no longer exists, since there was no provision even for a constitutional monarch. Any claim requires a claimant and the property/territory in question, whether anyone else has effective control and ownership over it. If the claimant or the territory does not exist, the claim cannot stand.

The insurgents and their leader Jamalul Kiram III (right) are only pressing a notional claim, since they cannot represent a defunct entity.

Third, there is no agreed rightful heir to the last Sultan of Sulu, even if an heir were to press the claim. Jamalul’s claim to be that heir is disputed by nearly a dozen other hereditary “royal” personages.

Another reason for rejecting his claim to Sabah comes with denial of his claim to the throne: 10 other “heirs” had renounced all claim to Sabah in 2007. Nine did so in a signed statement, and Rodinood Julaspi Kiram II in a separate declaration.

It does not matter whether Jamalul was among the nine. If he was, he had unlawfully reneged on the signed agreement, and if he wasn’t, he is outnumbered and is challenged 10 ways.

Fifth, when Spain took over the Sulu Sultanate as part of the Philippines, it left North Borneo (Sabah) in British hands. Spain disrupted the Sultanate by removing 18-year-old Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1886, replacing him with a rival, only to “reappoint” him six years later.

Britain made North Borneo a protectorate in 1888. Under Spain, the Philippines and most of the Sulu Sultanate with it were going in one direction, while North Borneo and the British went in another.

Eventually, the sultanate was divested of political and administrative powers until it exercised authority only over religious matters. No effective, functioning sultanate existed any more.

Sixth, the death of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1936 saw no successor, since he died childless. His younger brother and anointed successor, Mawalil Wasit, died the same year before he was crowned.

Thus ended the Royal House of Sulu’s lineage. After Spain passed the Philippines, including the territory of the former sultanate (excluding North Borneo) to the United States, the US officially abolished what remained of the sultanate in 1936.

Eighth, the British North Borneo Company also ceased payment to the sultanate that year, indicating that the business sector had considered the 1878 agreement voided. (Payment later resumed only after relatives of the deceased sultan brought the matter to court.)

Ninth, President Manuel L. Quezon (left) of the (then) Commonwealth of the Philippines declared in 1936 that Jamalul Kiram II was the last Sultan of Sulu. To emphasise the point, Quezon said the Philippine government would no longer recognise a Sulu Sultanate.

Britain had been exercising increasing proprietary moves over North Borneo, earning two rebukes from the US (1906, 1920). Britain ignored those reminders and annexed North Borneo in 1946, turning it into a crown colony.

Whatever the moral issues there, it again spelled the end of any vestige of Sulu royalty. For London, it was a justifiable move since it had taken over all the legal obligations of North Borneo.

Tenth, there was no question later (in the 1960s) about Sabah having to obtain independence from Britain. This underlined the fact that Britain was the sole governing authority up to that point.

Then as Sabah’s independence and the Cobbold Commission’s findings led to the scheduled formation of Malaysia on August 31, 1963, agitation flared from the Philippines. The date was postponed to September 16, such that Sabah was an independent entity for 16 days, ending any remaining claim from an extinct sultanate or the Philippines as belonging to it.

Twelfth, the very act of freely becoming part of the Malaysian federation negated all further claims on the territory by foreign partisans. The new state of Malaysia in its present form is recognised in all international organisations, including the United Nations and ASEAN, of which the Philippines is also a member.

Although former President Marcos tried to retake Sabah in the 1960s, the claim was later abandoned. At the Second Asean Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1977, Marcos declared that the Philippines was taking concrete steps to end the claim.

Later, as Marcos’ rule clearly became a dictatorship, he made Punjungan Kiram “interim sultan” for Sulu. But this candidate ran off to Sabah, preferring to be a Malaysian instead.

Marcos then “appointed” Punjungan’s son Jamalul Kiram III successor to a non-existent sultan. This instigator of Lahad Datu is not only a dubious candidate since he is not the son of a sultan, but his claim to authority comes from a discredited and ousted dictator of a republic.

Not least, when President Corazon Aquino’s post-Marcos government planned a new Philippine Constitution in 1987, Malaysia lobbied for wording to end the disturbing claim to Sabah for good.

This would replace “historical right or legal title” with “over which the government exercises sovereign jurisdiction” (i.e. the status quo), which was accepted after the third reading in Congress.

So for Philippine citizens to invade Sabah to lay claim to it clearly violates their country’s Constitution. President Benigno Aquino III’s prosecution of these criminals is fully in accordance with the law.

It is also said that no rightful Filipino claim to Sabah exists because as a country, it had not consistently engaged in the activities of a de facto power there. Not only that, there has also been no consistent Filipino claim to Sabah.

Musa’s candor is bipartisanship’s grist

March 15, 2013

By Terence Netto@http://www.malaysiakini.com

COMMENT: Finally, (Tun) Musa Hitam had something to say about the party of change (read: Pakatan Rakyat) and, by implication, the party of the status quo which, needless to say, is BN.

It’s not his style to have declined to say something, given the gravity of the issues before the electorate and of the decision that voters must make at GE-13.

To have avoided making a comment would have been contrary to his instincts as a politician, albeit a retired one, and his stature as an elder statesman in Malaysian councils.

Someone in his situation could not be expected to have let current matters pass without comment of the objective sort. UMNO man though he is, a reflexive partisanship is just not his style.

When matters facing the nation are fraught, Musa can be expected to lift anchor and float intriguingly in the space between a concern for the where the country is headed and the understandable partisanship of a party man.

One remembers the remarks he made when there was a rush by Malays to join PAS in the aftermath of Anwar Ibrahim’s sacking from government and UMNO in late 1998. The expulsion and public humiliation of the former Deputy Prime Minister became an international cause celebre and generated a tidal movement towards signing up for PAS.

After observing the phenomenon for some time – a year on from September 1998, PAS had doubled its membership from 400,000 – Musa confessed to being amazed at the magnetism of the Islamic party, whereupon one of the party’s columnists, Subky Latif, offered to “sediakan borang” (fetch Musa a membership form).

Of course Musa, admiring though he was at the rush to sign up with PAS, wasn’t going to join the cavalcade. But his readiness to observe and remark candidly on the phenomenon was reflective of a trait all democrats ought to have: common sensical acknowledgment of easily attributable happenings.

Absent this quality, the competitive process in a democracy will be reduced to a raucous shouting match and is bound to become a turnoff to voters.

The trait of candid acknowledgment of easily ascribable phenomena is sine qua non of all parties to the democratic process in which competing coalitions vie for the privilege of ruling the country.

Musa’s last hurrah

In his most recent instance of unabashed recognition of compelling realities, Musa was reported to have said that Pakatan Rakyat won’t want to bankrupt the Treasury simply because they would want to be returned to power at GE-14 should they win GE-13.

So even if certain planks in the Pakatan manifesto appear impossible to fulfill, Musa was saying that a desire to be returned to power would slow, if not halt, a gallop to the fiscal precipice.

Pakatan cannot hope for a more candid acknowledgment from one from the other side of the country’s political divide about their seriousness as contenders for national governance not just now but for decades to come.

Pakatan have in Musa a credible candidate for the role of speaker of the Dewan Rakyat should it gain Putrajaya at GE13.

This is not to suggest that Musa was angling to be appointed to the role by his recent remarks on Pakatan’s viability.

Some time ago, Subki Latif suggested Musa for the role on the basis of his credibility as a personage on the national political scene.

Pakatan would embellish its claims to bipartisanship by appointing Musa to the role should they win power at the next polls.

And Musa would relish a last hurrah in national affairs as fair-minded interlocutor between two competing coalitions which are likely to run each other close at the general election.

Parliament would be an elevated arena for debate on issues. Rare would be the repeat of demeaning instances of the past when unparliamentary language and actions debased the arena.

Musa would have just the right combination of elegant speech and enlivening humour to steer proceedings along elevating channels. He will be 79 next month; there’s no reason these days to think that a person would be past it in his ninth decade in this world.

A prospective role in Malaysia’s 13th Parliament’s elevation would bring his career to a coda that recalls the poet Robert Frost’s lines on old age:

No memory of having starred
Atones for later disregard
Nor keeps the end from being hard
Better to go down with boughten friendship at your side
Than with none at all. Provide, Provide.

Lessons for Singapore: Malaysian Armed Forces vs Sulus Gunmen in Sabah

March 8, 2013

LESSONS FOR SINGAPORE: Malaysian Armed Forces versus Sulu Gunmen in  Lahad Datu, Sabah

By David Boey

SINGAPORE – A week ago, Malaysia’s Defence information officers were busy ramping up publicity for the Malaysian Army’s 80th Anniversary celebrations – a happy occasion that culminated in a massive show of force by Tentera Darat Malaysia (Malaysian Army) in Port Dickson.

After their 80th Anniversary their pace of work increased dramatically with real operations in the East Malaysian state of Sabah.

After a weekend on duty, their pace of work increased dramatically with real operations in the East Malaysian state of Sabah. Ongoing operations by Malaysian security forces against Filipino gunmen in Lahad Datu, Sabah, mean that it will be sometime yet before information officers from Cawangan Perhubungan Awam (Public Relations Department) at Kementerian Pertahanan (Kementah, the Malaysian Ministry of Defence) can enjoy a restful weekend.

The exposure to real operations in Sabah will reward Kementah’s information officers with firsthand experience managing hearts and minds operations during an unfolding operation that has international dimensions.

Add in the timing of the operation, which was triggered during the run-up to the Malaysian General Elections, and the information officers entrusted to handle media operations will get a chance to learn invaluable lessons in calibrating domestic political considerations during an unfolding operation other than war.

While it is early days yet before defence observers can compile a credible blow by blow account of the assault, here are some preliminary thoughts on the situation:

1. Malaysia’s mainstream broadcast media, RTM, worked commendably fast in producing the clip with rousing martial music and TV footage aired at the end of Tuesday night’s news bulletin that canvassed support for Malaysia’s Fallen Heroes.

This is the type of psychological defence response that the Malaysians are good at, having picked up valuable lessons from the British during the Emergency years.

2. The casual attitude to personal protection equipment by Malaysian soldiers and General Operations Force Field Police has been noted by defence observers.

The casual attitude to personal protection equipment by Malaysian soldiers and General Operations Force field police has been noted by defence observers.

During the three-week long standoff against a force which claims to have 200 gunmen and even after blood was shed, Malaysians deployed for security duty do not seem to care much for their own personal protection.

* Body armour is rarely seen. When worn by some officers, the body armour appears to be of the soft body armour type which is not designed to withstand full metal jacket projectiles discharged from firearms or mortar rounds.

* Headgear in the form of ballistic helmets is almost never worn. And let’s not even go into protective eyewear like goggles.

This apparently cavalier attitude during live operations is baffling when measured against mountains of defence science literature which underline how lives can have been saved from ballistic protection.

If the officers are content to deploy for operations unaware of the life-saving potential of ballistic protection, then this indicates a failure of the curriculum in Malaysia’s military education system.

If the officers are aware but sent their men into action ill-equipped, then the After Action Review (AAR) should perhaps look at how to address the shortfall in such equipment.

Medical reports on the Malaysian security forces killed in action should indicate the cause of death, whether by penetrations from firearm projectiles (if so, the estimated calibre), shrapnel or non-penetrating trauma caused by blast damage.

A frank report would reveal the possible root causes of casualties during the Sabah operation and could suggest the type of protection needed to reduce casualties during the next operation.

3. Concomitant with the above observation is the poor quality of firearms used by the Police General Operations Force. Their M-16 5.56mm rifles are aimed using iron sights. There appears to be no option for optical sights (for example, a Picatinny rail) that can improve marksmanship or, more importantly, allow Malaysian police officers a rudimentary night-fighting capability.

4. Even after a deadly ambush, it is noteworthy that armoured vehicles appear to be in short supply in Sabah. Vehicle patrols by the Police there continue to be mounted in unarmoured Land Rovers and trucks. Again, this begs the question what happened to lessons learned during the Emergency?

Even after a deadly ambush, it is noteworthy that armoured vehicles appear to be in short supply in Sabah but not during exhibitions.

5. The tit-for-tat cyber attacks, said to have been the work of computer hackers from Manila and Kuala Lumpur, are a sign of things to come during a Period of Tension (POT) or OOTW (which is what the Sabah operation has evolved into).

Singapore must therefore prepare itself for such a virtual world onslaught as part of its business continuity plan. It should perhaps also study options to pay back with interests anyone who opens an account with Singapore using cyber attacks.

6. At a more basic level of security preparedness, it would be ill-advised for the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to display the level of tolerance shown by the Malaysians during this episode.

A three-week standoff against armed intruders said to have conducted active operations on home ground and shed blood is a trigger point Singapore’s government should never de-sensitise itself to.

Our circuit breaker must be designed to trip much faster so that a swift and decisive response can be unleashed.

Malaysia has been named among 54 countries which have helped the US’s Central Intelligence Agency by hosting secret torture cells and participating in illegal deportation of detainees to and from US custody without any legal process.

The writer, a former defence correspondent for the Straits Times, maintains Senang Diri, a blog about Singapore defence matters (http://kementah.blogspot.sg/).

-AsiaOne

Lahad Datu: Intrusion Confusion

March 8, 2013

The Philippines and Malaysia

Intrusion Confusion

A farcical invasion of Borneo gets serious, and nasty

March 9, 2013 | MANILA |From the print edition

FIGHTER aircraft gave covering fire as Malaysian troops mounted what their government hoped would be the final assault on a coastal village in the Malaysian state of Sabah, on the island of Borneo, on March 5th. Their mission was to end a three-week-old incursion by scores of Filipinos, some armed, who call themselves the Royal Army of the Sultanate of Sulu. But the intruders slipped away.

The intruders had occupied the village to stake a claim to Sabah by the man they recognise as the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram III, whose forebears once held sway over parts of Borneo and of what is now the Philippines, but who himself is a Filipino citizen living in Manila. After the assault, the Sultan called for a ceasefire, but told his followers to stay put.

If the Malaysian government thought the assault would end the incursion, it was mistaken. Its mistake is one of a series which threatens to turn what originally had the air of a quaint historical pageant played out with live ammunition into a real guerrilla war.

The Philippine government made the first mistake three years ago, by mislaying a letter from the sultanate asking it to take into account the claim to Sabah in peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a rebel group that had been fighting for independence for Muslim areas in the south of the mainly Christian Philippines. Previous governments had pressed the sultan’s claim. More recent governments have let it lie dormant, not least because Malaysia is the broker of peace between the government and the MILF. A preliminary peace agreement signed last year makes no mention of the claim. The Sultan was slighted.The Sultan made the next mistake, by thinking that by seizing the Sabah village of Tanduo, he could make the Malaysian government take him seriously and negotiate. The Sultan’s claim is legally plausible: Malaysia pays the royal house of Sulu a token rent for Sabah. But the idea that Malaysia would turn one of its constituent states over to a foreigner is just fanciful.

The Philippines government has also ordered the sultan to withdraw his followers.On March 1st shooting broke out in Tanduo. It is not clear who fired first, but 12 intruders and two Malaysian Policemen were killed.A day later, in fighting elsewhere in Sabah between the security forces and armed men described by the Malaysian authorities as Filipinos, six Policemen and six gunmen were killed.

This snapped the patience of the Malaysian government, and the assault on Tanduo began. The security forces said they had killed 13 intruders, and suffered no casualties themselves. As The Economist went to press, the sultan’s followers were still at large. An official of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), another Philippine Muslim rebel group, which made peace in 1996 but was never disarmed, said many of its fighters, acting independently, were on the way to Sabah as reinforcements. A Malaysian Police officer described the Filipino gunmen as adept at guerrilla tactics. The Malaysian government may now look at the 800,000 Filipinos living and working in Sabah and wonder whose side they are on.

It will also wonder how the stand-off will affect a keenly contested general election due by the end of June. Some think Sabah is where the poll will be won or lost. The government has dropped dark hints of the involvement of a Malaysian opposition leader in the invasion. But, if the mess worsens, it might lose votes itself.

http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21573148-farcical-invasion-borneo-gets-serious-and-nasty-intrusion-confusion

Al Jazeera Reports: Sultanate of Sulu–Pawn or Legacy?

March 7, 2013

http://www.aljazeera.com/ 03-06-13

Malaysia has responded with troops and fighter jets to an ancient and deadly claim to a remote corner of Borneo. It marked a dramatic conclusion to a bizarre three-week siege that appeared to catch the governments of the Philippines and Malaysia off guard.

“Part of the reason [for the lack of information] is that they [the Filipinos] do not want any information to leak out. As you know the Filipinos are relaying reports of what is happening on the ground to television stations in Manila, so I think they are trying to keep a tactical advantage by keeping quiet.“ - James Chin, Monash University

A group of Filipino rebels pitched up in a seaside village on the island of Borneo, and asserted their ancestral ownership rights to the territory.

The self-proclaimed Royal Army of Sulu are from the remote Philippine island province of Sulu. They made the short journey by boat to Borneo Island in February, landing in Lahad Datu in Sabah state.

The Philippines had urged Malaysia to show maximum restraint in dealing with the armed group but the killing of a number of policemen saw Malaysia respond with significant force.

This territorial dispute can be traced back to the 15th century. Back then, the region was divided into two main Sultanates. In 1658, the Sultan of Brunei gave an area of Borneo Island to the Sultan of Sulu. And a deal in 1878 further complicated matters.

“I think it’s got very little to do with the actual territorial dispute. The crucial context for all of this is the attempt to settle the long-running civil war in the southern Philippines, in Mindanao … it seems the clan associated with the Sultanate of Sulu has been excluded from these [framework agreement] discussions … and so it appears to have tried leverage this ancient claim – which it has been silent on for the last 40 years or so – to try and compel some kind of concession from Manila or embarrass the government…“ - Lee Jones, a senior lecturer at Queen Mary and Westfield University

A British trading company agreed to pay Sulu a nominal lease for the area, known as Sabah. Borneo later became part of Malaysia but Sulu became part of the Philippines.

Years on, Malaysia still pays Sulu some $1,500 a year. And modern-day followers of the self-proclaimed Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram III, have revived their ancestral right to the region.

This issue has come at a critical time for Malaysia and the Philippines. The two nations have much in common, but the Sabah territorial dispute has been a thorn in relations for decades.

The neighbours are founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and share a long history of diplomatic ties. Malaysia has been brokering peace talks between the Philippine government and the largest Muslim rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front since 2001.

And both have elections coming up, with a lot riding on how this whole issue was resolved. So, what is behind the brazen invasion by Sulu’s rag tag rebels? And how will the conflict affect regional relations?

Inside Story, with presenter Jane Dutton, is joined by guests: James Chin, a Professor of Political Science at Monash University and a commentator on Malaysian affairs; Harry Roque, a Law Professor from the University of the Philippines; and Lee Jones, a Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Queen Mary and Westfield University, and author of the book ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia.

“They [the Malaysians] have resorted to airstrikes which means that there is now a breach of human rights law because the use of airstrikes, in my mind, is not proportional and is not absolutely necessary and because they used aircrafts they have also invoked the applicability of international humanitarian law which now gives obligation for Malaysian authorities to ensure the principle of distinction – meaning they should only target combatants and not innocent civillians.”–Harry Roque, University of the Philippines.

The Sabah Claim: A Thorn in Malaysia-Philippines Relations (PART 2)

March 7, 2013

http://www.nst.com,my

INITIATIVE: Philippine leaders have, since Marcos, taken the effort to resolve the sovereignty issue, writes Dr Paridah Abd Samad

THEN Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made a dramatic move towards normalisation of bilateral relations in 1976, just prior to an ASEAN summit meeting, when he stated that the Philippines no longer intended to press its claim to sovereignty over Sabah, though he did not officially drop it. The pronouncement, however, was never followed by any concrete action.

The dispute dragged on into the Corazon Aquino administration, which tried to resolve the problem through revising legal and constitutional provisions to drop the claim. The Philippine Constitution of 1987 no longer includes the phrase “by historical and legal rights” as part of the definition of the national territory. Also, Senate Bill No. 206, redefining the archipelagic boundaries of the Philippines, called for amendments to Republic Acts 5546, and it particularly excluded Sabah from Philippine territory.

However, Sultan Jamalul Kiram III’s denouncement of Aquino’s government for endorsing the bill without consulting him and bungling by the newly installed administration kept the bill from getting through the Senate, denying Aquino a diplomatic victory of the ASEAN summit in December, 1987.

The Philippines cannot just drop its claim to Sabah to patch up differences with Malaysia, as it must first consider the repercussions of such a decision on the politically unstable Sulu Archipelago. Sabah and Moro are interrelated in prolonging settlement of the dispute and in deepening the security concerns of the Philippine government.

The transmigration of mostly Filipino Muslim refugees to Sabah has put the Philippines in a favourable position because this has significantly contributed to reducing the Muslim population ratio and its resistance strength.

In 1970, Tunku Abdul Rahman played an important role in promoting international support for the Moro cause. As Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (now Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), he endorsed the Moro case submitted to him in 1972 and asked King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and (Libyan) president (Muammar) Gaddafi to help in persuading other OIC member states to support it.

But Malaysia’s optimism and hope for a new and brighter chapter in Malaysia-Philippines relations remain unfulfilled. While the Aquino administration made the effort and took the initiative to drop the sovereignty claim on Sabah, it was unable to push through its initiative because of stumbling blocks. Senate Bill 206, which excludes Sabah from Philippine territory, remains unenacted.

Since no law has yet been passed on the dropping of Sabah claim, the Philippine government still has the option to actively pursue the claim through internationally accepted norms. By pursuing the claim, the Philippine government could promote the Philippines’ historic rights and legal title over Sabah, as well as the proprietary rights of the heirs of sultan of Sulu.

However, the 1930 treaty between the United States and Great Britain drew a precise boundary to separate their island possessions off the northeast coast of Sabah. The allocation of islands defined in these treaties was enshrined in Article 1 of the Philippine Constitution of 1935.

The Philippine claim has no known international support while Malaysia is morally supported by Great Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations in rejecting this claim. Even the US has assumed a position of neutrality. The other Asean countries, though discreetly distancing themselves form the issue since it involves two of their fellow members, also seem to silently acknowledge Malaysia’s right to the disputed territory.

For the Philippines to drop its claim to Sabah without concessions would mean outright recognition of Malaysia’s sovereignty over Sabah. Taking this position might also jeopardise the proprietary rights of the Sultan of Sulu. In general, choosing this option appears to be damaging the national integrity.

Malaysia gave a solemn commitment to satisfactorily resolve the proprietary claim with recognised Sulu heirs once the sovereignty claim is legally and finally dropped. It sees no linkage whatsoever between the two claims. Malaysia has always insisted that sovereignty and proprietary rights over Sabah are two separate questions.

The writer is a former lecturer of UiTM Shah Alam and International Islamic University Malaysia, Gombak

The Sabah Claim Issue: A Thorn in Malaysia-Philippines Relations

March 6, 2013

http://www.nst.com.my

LONG-STANDING: The Philippines’ claim on Sabah has remained unresolved for nearly 50 years, writes Dr Paridah Abd Samad–Part 1

The level of irritation in the relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines is considered unnatural for two immediate neighbours who belong to a common regional grouping. The Philippine’s claim on Sabah, one of Malaysia’s 13 states, is an issue that has remained unresolved for nearly 50 years.

Once a part of the Sultanate of Sulu, Sabah’s land area exceeds 29,000 square miles, smaller than neighbouring Mindanao by about 8,000 square miles. Its centuries-old ties with the Philippines are indicated by the fact that inhabitants of both came from the same racial stock and have similar customs and traditions.

The Sultan of Brunei originally ruled this part of Borneo, but in 1704, the Sultan of Sulu helped suppress an uprising there and, as a reward, North Borneo was ceded to Sulu. Subsequently, Europeans came to Southeast Asia for the valuable minerals, spices, and other rich sources of revenue, and in 1878, two of these enterprising merchants leased North Borneo from the sultan. Soon the British North Borneo Company was formed and awarded a royal charter.

In the course of laying the groundwork for Philippine independence, the treaty signed in 1930 by the US government and the British Crown, circumscribed the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Republic. It did not include Sabah within the boundaries of Spanish, American, or Philippine jurisdiction.

Six days after the Philippines was granted independence (July 10, 1946), the British North Borneo Company turned over all its rights and obligations to the British government, which in turn asserted full sovereign rights over Sabah through the North Borneo Cession Order.

There was no advancement of Philippine claims to Sabah from 1946 to 1962. Within that period, successive Philippine administrations conducted low-keyed investigations on the merits of such a claim, and a study of these and other documents convinced Diosdado Macapagal (above), then chief of the Legal Division of the Philippines’ Foreign Affairs Department, that a claim on North Borneo could be filed.

The first official Philippine act on the matter — House Resolution No. 42 adopted on April 28, 1950 — stated explicitly that North Borneo belonged to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu and authorised the president to conduct negotiations for the restoration of sovereign jurisdiction.

But it was June 1962 before the Philippine government notified the United Kingdom of its claim on Sabah, and the following December the two agreed to hold talks on the issue. The promulgation of the claim brought the Philippines into diplomatic conflict with the British, who regarded it as a nuisance in relation to their own plan to change the status of North Borneo from a colony into a state of an expanded federation of Malaysia. The British government rejected the Philippine position in view of the overriding need to form the Federation of Malaysia, ostensibly to contain communism in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, since Sabah has a total land area of 74,398 square kilometres and is only 16km from Sulu, it was a Philippine security concern. Such concerns, may have moved President Macapagal on April 20, 1963 to write to President John F. Kennedy stressing the importance of North Borneo as vital to the security of the Philippines.

At the first ministerial conference on the claim, held in London in 1963, a joint communiqué was issued by the Foreign Ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines stating that the inclusion of North Borneo in the Federation of Malaysia “would not prejudice either the Philippine claim or any right thereunder”. This joint statement was ratified by the leaders of the three countries when they met later that year in Manila, and Macapagal’s participation in it, jeopardised the Philippine claim to Sabah.

In any case, the Federation of Malaysia came into being on September 16, 1963, and due to the physical possession of Sabah by Malaysia, the Philippine government refused to accord diplomatic recognition, contrary to its solemn commitment in the Manila Agreement. When Soekarno started his “confrontation” against Malaysia, Manila reduced its representation in Kuala Lumpur to consular level.

The claim was relegated to the sidelines when it became entangled within the wider context of the Republic of Indonesia’s “confrontation” with Malaysia and the Sukarno regime’s threat to resort to military means to crush the fledgling nation. Upon termination of the confrontation, the dispute over Sabah was carried to Bangkok, where bilateral negotiations aimed at its resolution were abruptly aborted. In the United Nation’s General Assembly, the disputants exchanged contentious charges and countercharges.

Various unsuccessful efforts were made to reconcile Philippines and Malaysia until the two finally agreed to restore full diplomatic relations in June 1966. Ironically, President Ferdinand Marcos (below) recognised the formation of Malaysia, after he took over political power in the Philippines.

With the inception of the five-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), there was a tacit agreement between Malaysia and the Philippines that the issue be shelved in the interest of regional solidarity, and they agreed that it should be finally resolved through ASEAN.

In March 1967, the Philippine government was invited to send observers to witness the first direct elections in Sabah, but Manila refused on the ground that this might prejudice its position on the claim. The refusal did not, however, impede the participation of the Philippines and Malaysia in the formation of ASEAN in August 1967, and the following January, President Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos, paid a state visit to Kuala Lumpur.

But deterioration in bilateral ties, again involving Sabah, led to a rupture in relations in 1969. The Philippines’s institutionalisation of the claim through enactment of Republic Act 5546, incorporating Sabah as part of the territory of the Philippines, triggered Malaysian suspension of diplomatic ties. However, in the spirit of regional cooperation, relations were restored on Dec 16, 1969, during ASEAN’s third ministerial conference.

Dr Paridah Abd Samad is a former lecturer at UiTM Shah Alam and IIUM Gombak

Malaysia’s Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty is NON-NEGOTIABLE

March 3, 2013

by Bunn Nagara @http://www.thestar.com,my

After Sabah’s standoff is resolved, the intruders will need to reconcile with modern realities.

IT is too easy to dismiss the Lahad Datu standoff as typical of Sabah’s labyrinthine intrigue. That would trivialise the rich history and cultural diversity of the state, besides mistaking a largely Philippine problem as being Sabah’s.

True, anywhere else in Malaysia with a significant Tausug population deriving from the former Sulu Sultanate’s diaspora, like the Klang Valley, would be unlikely to experience the drama of the past couple of weeks.

But none of the events in Kampung Tanduo, near Lahad Datu in eastern Sabah, was predictable or inevitable. The former Sultanate occupied only a small portion of Philippine territory and an even smaller portion of Sabah’s.

And yet, the peculiar combination of north-eastern Borneo’s demography, geography, history and political heritage provides a probable backdrop to just such a standoff. How did it all begin this time?

On February 9, nearly 100 Philippine nationals, several of them armed, arrived by boat to join a smaller group that had arrived earlier. They took over the village, claiming the area belonged to the Sultanate that they said they represented.

They also demanded recognition as the Royal Sulu Sultanate Army, as well as a meeting with an unnamed Malaysian leader. Malaysian authorities rejected both demands.

They further said they had come in support of Sabah’s Tausug population, alleging reports that following a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Sabah’s illegal immigrant communities, Tausugs would be deported.

Many locals would be surprised by the claim. Sabahan-Malaysian Tausugs, who prefer to be called Suluks, have long settled comfortably among Sabah’s three dozen or so ethnic groups.

Filipino Tausugs who arrived later as migrant workers, clinging more closely to their “Tausug” roots, may face a different reality. But ethnic persecution hardly if ever surfaces in Sabah because of, not despite, its rich cultural diversity.

The annual lease payment of RM5,300 agreed in 1903, increased from RM5,000 agreed in 1878, was also said to be insufficient. Others said the territory should be returned to the late Sultan’s descendants anyway.

Although British and Sulu versions of the 1878 agreement differed slightly, the Sulu version was clear enough: “… hereby lease of our own free will and satisfaction … all the territories and lands … forever and until the end of time, all rights and powers which we possess over all territories and lands tributary to us …”

Both the Philippines and Malaysia would rather do without such disturbances that serve only as irritants to bilateral relations. As modern nation states, both countries have evolved well past an extinct sultanate.

But there are also differences.For Malaysia, the sovereignty and territorial claims of the former Sultan’s descendants are simply unacceptable. No such claims are negotiable.

The claimants argue that the sultanate’s territory had been leased only to Britain, with no agreement on incorporation into Malaysia. But their case is inconsistent.

Sabah, the former North Borneo, became a British protectorate from the late 19th century until it became a crown colony. It gained a brief period of independence before becoming part of the Malaysian Federation in 1963.

By then, the Cobbold Commission (above) had determined that a majority of people in Sabah and Sarawak favoured the formation of Malaysia. For a century the former Sultan’s descendants did not retake territory, but instead agreed to continue accepting the lease payment under the previous arrangements.

The Philippine government, which subsumed the sultanate’s authority in the four provinces of Mindanao, also took over the role of pressing the claim to Sabah. Despite being a republic that had abandoned all royal authority, Manila continued with the claim before, during and after Malaysia’s formation.

Although the Philippine claim has since become dormant if not extinct, Manila found it difficult to renounce it. It has become an object of nationalists eager to strike populist postures in domestic Philippine politics.

The issue has a different spin among the Moro or Philippine Muslim community in Mindanao, of which Tausugs are a part. Despite Malaysia’s key role in peace talks between the two main Moro separatist groups and the Philippine government, both groups are not necessarily in Malaysia’s corner.

The MILF (Moro Islamist Liberation Front) disagreed with the takeover of Kampung Tanduo, saying negotiations should have been the way. This wrongly presumed that the issue was negotiable for Malaysia.

The MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) is an even more enthusiastic supporter of the armed intruders. But it should be more mindful of the implications involved.

Since the former sultanate covered the Philippine provinces of Basilan, Palawan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao), and only an eastern part of Sabah, followers of the former Sultan should first settle differences of territorial authority with the MNLF and the MILF before venturing into Sabah. They should also settle differences with Manila over such issues as hegemony, usurpation and compensation.

Both the Philippines and Malaysia, as sovereign states that had subsumed and developed beyond the Sulu Sultanate, have successfully concluded various agreements bilaterally and multilaterally. Those agreements confirm mutual acceptance of their respective statehood in their present configuration.

Besides, the former Sultan and his descendants had consented to the terms of the agreement in return for the lease payment. So long as payment is still made, they are obliged to continue abiding by the agreement.

That would make any unilateral attempt to retake territory by force of arms illegal and unjustified. Whether Malaysia will seek to prosecute after a resolution of the standoff is another matter.

Army General: Intruders ‘well-trained’

http://www.malaysiakini.com

by Nigel Aw | 1:08PM March 3, 2013

Army General Zulkifli Zainal Abidin opinied that armed intruders in Sabah have shown combat experience and adeptness in insurgency tactics.

“From our intelligence and observation, they have combat experience and their insurgency guerilla tactics are quite good, I would say,” he said.He said that the group has positioned snipers in one area with a large public space. He did not name the area.

“They know we are not able to go in without casualties because of the open area,” he told a press conference in Felda Sahabat Residence, Lahad Datu.

Today was the first ever joint press conference by the Police and Army, more than three weeks after the first standoff in Kampung Tandou, some 15km away from here.

The press conference was held following another landing by intruders in Kunak and an ambush on a police team in Sempoerna. It is still unconfirmed if the two incidents are related to armed intruders loyal to the Sulu Sultanate.

Lahad Datu Incursion: Police have decided to act based on the Law

February 26, 2013

by Bernama (02-25-13) @http://www.malaysiakini.com

Police have decided to act based on the law to resolve the intrusion of armed Filipinos in Kampung Tanduo, some 130km from Lahad Datu town.

Sabah Police Commissioner Hamza Taib said today Police would use relevant laws to prosecute the foreigners under siege by security forces, to ensure that nobody could escape and enter the area.

“We will decide after considering various factors, including the surrounding area, before acting. When the time comes, there will be no more negotiations. We can charge them in court. It is up to us.

“We don’t care where they come from, including the Sultanate of Sulu. They are foreigners who intruded our country and violated our laws and sovereignty.

“Action can be taken under the Penal Code or related laws,” Hamza told reporters at Lahad Datu Marine Police Complex in Lahad Datu.

He said the Police would use a suitable approach and would never compromise on the intrusion issue to guarantee the country’s sovereignty.

“Yes, we heard gunshots but I dare say they were not from security forces. They may be aimed at animals or warning shots (from intruders),” he said, commenting on a report published in the alternative media.

Hamza urged the people not to worry as security is still under control adding the intruders may face shortage of water, food and fuel.

Asked about the alleged Philippine vessel sent to bring the intruders home, he said the vessel was not in Malaysian territorial waters. Police have identified the group of armed Filipinos who landed in Kampung Tanduo on February 9 as descendants of “Raja Sulu” from Southern Philippines.

- Bernama

Lahad Datu Incursion: Filipinos have invaded Sabah

February 25, 2013

by Din Merican

The invasion of Sabah last week by more than 200 armed Pinoys brings back memory of the ill-fated Jabidah force. In 1968, a group of Muslim irregulars were trained at the Corregidor Island to invade Sabah. When some of the trainees discovered the sinister plot, they tried to escape. A number were gunned down. That ended temporarily Manila’s attempt to reclaim Sabah by force.

Could this incident be a renewed attempt to reclaim Sabah by force? The difference this time around is the armed foreigners have reached our shores under all kinds of pretext. Instead of arresting and charging them, for breaching our national security, we gave them VIP treatment.

Our reaction defies logic and common sense.

There is a double standard in the treatment. Our leaders seem to turn a blind eye to armed foreigners. Under the Malaysian law, it is mandatory death penalty for any Malaysian committing offences in security areas for possession of firearms and explosives (Section 57(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960).

Invading another state is a treasonable offence. In many countries, the offence usually carries death penalty. Imagine what Manila would do if one hundred Malaysians armed with rifles and rocket launchers were caught in the Philippine town of Cotabato in Mindanao? Manila would probably hang them.

A diplomatic protest note would follow and a state of war declared.  Manila would probably request for the Security Council at the United Nations to be convened to discuss a grave matter of invasion.

Because our Government has not been transparent on this sensitive national security issue, it raises all kinds of insinuation. Some say the Government is complicit in this case as the border is not that porous; we have layers and layers of defence in depth.

Everybody was in the area: the Maritime Enforcement Agency (Coast Guard), the Marine Police and the Royal Malaysian Navy vessels. On land, the Army and Police had been there since Sabah joined Malaysia. In the air, the kumpits carrying the armed invaders were easy targets for the RMAF. Not to forget, the area of Lahat Datu is within radar range.

It is time for our Government to come clean on this invasion by the armed men from the Philippines. Perhaps, there should be a White Paper for consideration of our Parliament. Playing coy is not acceptable. Our Government must explain this invasion to the rakyat and reassure them that serious steps are being taken to prevent future incidents of this nature which challenge our sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is the least we must expect of any responsible government.

It is indeed disgraceful that our Prime Minister has chosen to remain silent on the matter, leaving  his Minister of Home Affairs to deal with it.

What went wrong

What went wrong? Why were they not stopped at sea? Is it a failure in intelligence or it was done on purpose to remind the Sabahans that something untoward could happen if they choose to vote the Opposition.

Whatever it is, it would seem that the project has backfired. At the time of writing, despite promises to the contrary, the armed bandits remain.

Invasion is a form of external threat. Under our law, the crisis should be handled by the military and the Ministry of Foreign affairs. But getting the media attention are the members of the Field Force and the Minister of Home Affairs.

Has our Minister of Defence gone hiding? Where is the Minister of Foreign Affairs? Has he surrendered his fate and taken the easiest way out?

ASEAN turns a blind eye

The ASEAN Secretary General is too very quiet. No ASEAN country has made any statement. There is little evidence of any form of diplomatic shuttle by Brunei, the ASEAN Chair. Are they saying that invasion is okay so long as it does not happen to them?Is everybody pretending that all is well in ASEAN?